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ii 
Abstract 
This dissertation argues that there is an electronic surveillance gap in the employment 
context in Canada, a gap that is best understood as an absence of appropriate legal provisions 
to regulate employers’ electronic surveillance of employees both inside and outside the 
workplace. This dissertation aims to identify and articulate principles and values that can be 
used to close the electronic surveillance gap in Canada and suggests that, through the 
synthesis of social theories of surveillance and privacy, together with analyses of privacy 
provisions and workplace privacy cases, a new and better workplace privacy regime can be 
designed. This dissertation uses both a comparative legal doctrinal methodology concerning 
the legal analyses of privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases, and an interdisciplinary 
legal methodology regarding social theories of surveillance and privacy, to examine the 
jurisdictions of Canada, the United States, and the European Union. The ideas generated in 
the analyses are used to formulate proposed provisions for a new workplace privacy regime. 
This dissertation indicates how these provisions can be integrated into Canada’s legal system, 
and provides examples of legislative provisions that could form part of a new workplace 
privacy regime. These proposed provisions modify and add to existing data protection 
legislation in Canada, such as the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA). The result is a better balance of the privacy rights of employees with the 
legitimate business interests of employers through an effective closing of the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment. This dissertation contributes to a better appreciation of the 
role of electronic surveillance in employment, to a better understanding of the nature of 
electronic surveillance gap, and makes concrete suggestions about how the electronic 
surveillance gap can be closed by means of novel legislative provisions.   
Keywords 
Surveillance technologies; electronic surveillance; workplace monitoring; workplace privacy; 
employment; data protection; social theory; surveillance theory; privacy theory 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This dissertation argues that there is a need for new laws regulating the electronic 
surveillance of employees by employers. These new laws can be drawn from a combination 
of surveillance and privacy theories, and from legal analyses of privacy legislation and 
workplace privacy cases. This dissertation creates a new workplace privacy regime that more 
effectively balances the interests of the affected parties. This dissertation offers a deeper 
understanding of the role of electronic surveillance in the employment context and shows 
how new laws can more justly regulate the electronic surveillance of employees by 
employers.   
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This Introduction describes the problem statement, the focus and justification for the 
dissertation, and the dissertation’s objective. It then sets out the research question, 
hypotheses, methodology, and theoretical framework used in this dissertation.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
The motivation for this dissertation is my belief that Canada is falling behind when it 
comes to informational privacy protection. This is plain to see when reviewing the 
recently announced
1
 joint resolution created by Information and Privacy Ombudspersons 
and Commissioners from across Canada, who are urging their governments to modernize 
privacy and access to information laws.
2
 More specifically, the report states: 
Privacy and access to information are quasi-constitutional rights that are 
fundamental to individual self-determination, democracy and good 
government. New technologies have numerous potential benefits for society 
but they have impacted fundamental democratic principles and human 
rights, including privacy, access to information, freedom of expression and 
electoral processes. 
Increasingly, the public is concerned about the use and exploitation of 
personal information by both governments and private businesses and, in 
particular, the opaqueness of information handling practices. Security 
breaches are happening more often and have impacted millions of citizens. 
While it is important to acknowledge that there have been legislative 
advances made in some Canadian jurisdictions, there is still ongoing work 
required to enhance and establish consistent modernization. Most Canadian 
access and privacy laws have not been fundamentally changed since their 
passage, some more than 35 years ago. They have sadly fallen behind the 
                                                 
1
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Canada’s Access to Information and Privacy Guardians 
Urge Governments to Modernize Legislation to Better Protect Canadians” (6 November 2019), online: 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-
do/provincial-and-territorial-collaboration/joint-resolutions-with-provinces-and-territories/res_191001/>. 
2
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Resolution of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial 
Information and Privacy Commissioners” (1−2 October 2019), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2019/nr-c_191106/>. 
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laws of many other countries in the level of privacy protection provided to 
citizens.
3
 
The report calls for improvements in the areas of privacy, access to information, and 
enforcement, as well as renewed commitments to collaboration and engagement to make 
innovative privacy and access to information changes.
4
  
Indeed, United Kingdom Information Commissioner and former Information and Privacy 
Commissioner for British Columbia Elizabeth Denham
5
 has recently commented in a 
podcast by Michael Geist: 
Unfortunately, Canadian law has not kept pace with the kind of reforms that 
we are seeing around the world…The law needs to keep up with the 
technology. And it’s really important that regulators can take action to 
protect people, especially online.
6
  
Denham points out that Canada does not provide comprehensive personal data 
protection across Canada and that further complications are created because Canada is a 
federated system.
7
 Denham also highlights the importance of trust when dealing with 
privacy policy and regulation:  
People have to know that somebody has their back and there is strong 
protection, because you need trust. People won’t go along unless they feel 
there is trust in the system.
8
 
Many jurisdictions have made important advances in privacy protection by creating 
stronger data protection laws and also constitutional or human rights laws. For instance, 
effective May 25, 2018, the European Union enacted the General Data Protection 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Elizabeth Denham is currently (as of April, 2020) the UK Information Commissioner at the Information 
Commissioner's Office in Cheshire. She is the former Information and Privacy Commissioner for British 
Columbia, and also the former Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada. See Information 
Commissioner’s Office, “Elizabeth Denham CBE, Information Commissioner” (2020), online: Information 
Commissioner’s Office <https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/who-we-are/information-commissioner/>. 
6
 Michael Geist, “The LawBytes Podcast, Episode 2: “It’s Time to Modernize the Laws”” (11 March 2019) 
at 9m:00s−9m:45s, online (podcast): Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2019/03/the-lawbytes-
podcast-episode-2-its-time-to-modernize-the-laws/>. 
7
 Ibid at 22m:55s−23m:20s. 
8
 Ibid at 23m:28s−23m:41s. 
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Regulation (GDPR)
9
 to accompany its broad right to privacy in Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (EU 
Convention).
10
 And effective January 1, 2020, the most privacy-protective State in the 
United States, California, created the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
(California Consumer Privacy Act)
11
 to accompany its constitutional provision declaring 
a broad right to privacy in section 1 of Article 1 of the California Constitution.
12
 
California even has section 980 in its California Labor Code,
13
 which prevents employers 
from forcing employees to provide usernames and passwords to their social media 
accounts.  
Canada’s private sector data protection legislation, the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),
14
 on the other hand, has been criticized for 
being outdated, for not keeping up with recent technological advances, for not providing 
adequate order-making powers to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, and for not being 
as sophisticated as the GDPR.
15
 As a result, Canada may be unable to continue its 
                                                 
9
 EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L119/1 
[GDPR]. 
10
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ETS 5 (1950), art 8 [EU Convention]. 
11
 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 3 CIV 1.81.5 (2018) [California Consumer Privacy Act]. 
12
 Cal Const art I, § 1 [California Constitution]. 
13
 Cal Lab Code § 980 (2012) [California Labor Code]. 
14
 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]. 
15
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Privacy Commissioner Denounces Slow Progress on 
Fixing Outdated Privacy Laws” (27 September 2018), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2018/nr-c_180927/>; 
International Association of Privacy Professionals, “Michael Geist Calls for More Robust Privacy Law at 
the IAPP Canadian Privacy Symposium, 2018” (13 July 2018), online (video): YouTube 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-iIuoNqFO8>; Michael Geist, “PIPEDA at 20: Time for PIPEDA 
2.0” (13 July 2018), online (blog): Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/07/pipeda-at-20-time-
for-pipeda-2-0/>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Appearance Before the Standing 
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI) on the Study of the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)” (16 February 2017), online: Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-to-
parliament/2017/parl_20170216/>; Timothy Banks, “Should PIPEDA be amended to meet GDPR 
requirements?” (4 April 2017), online: iapp.org <https://iapp.org/news/a/should-pipeda-be-amended-to-
meet-gdpr-requirements/>; EC, Decision 2002/2/EC Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 pursuant 
to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of 
personal data provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(notified under document number C(2001) 4539), [2002] OJ, L002/0013; Bob Zimmer, “Towards Privacy 
4 
 
harmonious trade relationship with the European Union.
16
 In addition, it remains unclear 
whether there is a constitutional or human right to privacy in Canada.
17
 Privacy has 
historically been interpreted to be a quasi-constitutional right in public sector privacy 
cases concerning data protection laws,
18
 and while it has recently been acknowledged by 
the Supreme Court of Canada as an important quasi-constitutional right that fosters and 
promotes a free and democratic society,
19
 Canada has not yet created a right to privacy 
that applies throughout the country. Only one Canadian province, Québec, has clearly 
established a broad right to privacy in its Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 
(Québec Charter).
20
  
Not only is Canada behind the times when it comes to general data protections, it is also 
underinclusive when it comes to data protections in areas such as employment law.
21
 This 
can be seen by noting that PIPEDA applies in the employment context only in connection 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
by Design: Review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Report of the 
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (February 2018) at 62–70, online (pdf): 
House of Commons 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP9690701/ethirp12/ethirp12-e.pdf 
>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Remarks by Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
Regarding the Facebook/Cambridge-Analytica investigation” (25 April 2019), online: Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/speeches/2019/s_d_20190425/> [Privacy 
Commissioner, “Remarks”]. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982(UK),1982, c 11; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 1985, c H-6. 
18
 The public sector privacy legislation, Privacy Act, RSC, 1985, c P-21, has been considered to be quasi-
constitutional as seen in Lavigne v Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages, 2002 SCC 53 at para 24; 
Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at paras 65-66, 132 FTR 55 (SCC); HJ Heinz Co 
of Canada Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 SCC 13 at para 28. See also Michael E Power, The Law 
of Privacy (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2013) at 13; Marta Otto, The Right to Privacy in 
Employment: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) at 133−134. 
19
 UFCW, Local 401 v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2013 SCC 62 at para 19; Douez v 
Facebook Inc, 2017 SCC 33 at paras 58–59.  
20
 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12, s 5 [Québec Charter]. 
21
 PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s 4(1). Pursuant to section 4(1), PIPEDA applies to every organization in 
respect of personal information that (a) the organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of 
commercial activities; or (b) is about an employee of, or an applicant for employment with, the 
organization and that the organization collects, uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a 
federal work, undertaking or business. 
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with the operation of federal works, undertakings or businesses.
22
 While there are some 
employment-related provisions in the substantially similar private sector data protection 
legislation of Alberta,
23
 British Columbia,
24
 and Québec,
25
 this partial coverage 
inevitably leads to the creation of patchwork protections.
26
  
In fact, Canadian employees enjoy different data protections depending on the province 
in which they are located, their unionization status, and what sector—public or private—
they are part of.
27
 The result of this piecemeal set of protections is a confusing, 
inconsistent, and unfair privacy regime in the Canadian employment context. 
Canada’s private sector data protections are also silent on the increasingly important issue 
of electronic surveillance. This failure amounts to a significant blind spot and creates a 
troubling problem, which I will call the “electronic surveillance gap”. In the employment 
context, which is the focus of this dissertation, the electronic surveillance gap can be 
understood as an absence of legal provisions to regulate employers’ electronic 
surveillance of employees inside and outside the workplace. One consequence of the 
electronic surveillance gap in this context is that serious issues relating to electronic 
surveillance of employees, such as balancing the legitimate business interests of 
employers with the justifiable privacy interests of employees, remaining unaddressed. 
This lack of direction is highlighted when one asks how this balancing of interests will 
take place, particularly when employers are attempting to respect the privacy of their 
employees while simultaneously protecting the personal information of their own clients. 
Accordingly, we see serious data breaches such as the recent Desjardins data breach, 
                                                 
22
 PIPEDA, supra note 14 at ss 2(1), 4(1). Some examples of federal works, undertakings or businesses to 
which PIPEDA applies include railways, banks, airlines, and radio broadcasting stations.  
23
 Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [AB PIPA]. 
24
 Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [BC PIPA]. 
25
 An Act respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1 [QC 
Act]. 
26
 One patch-repairing strategy is to add statutory or common law invasion of privacy torts. For instance, 
one example of a statutory tort of violation of privacy can be found in Saskatchewan’s statute, The Privacy 
Act, RSS 1978, c P-24. One example of a common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion can be found in 
Ontario’s landmark case, Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32. 
27
 Otto, supra note 18 at 171. 
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which constituted the most massive data breach in Canadian history.
28
 A rogue employee 
committed the breach; he allegedly created a scheme to win the trust of his colleagues 
and used their access along with his own to assemble a data trove.
29
 Security experts note 
that this type of a data breach is not uncommon; about 33 percent of reported breaches 
are caused by an insider who is typically an authorized individual with valid credentials 
within the organization.
30
  
Moreover, it appears that essential principles and values stemming from workplace 
privacy disputes involving the electronic surveillance of employees are nowhere to be 
found in PIPEDA. 
The electronic surveillance gap is most striking when it involves parties who experience 
power imbalances. This is especially true when looking at the employment relationship 
where there is unequal bargaining power between employers and employees.
31
 Simply 
put, employers have the potential to abuse their monitoring power and take advantage of 
weaker, more vulnerable employees, under the guise of exercising management rights in 
the workplace.
32
 Indeed, the employment relationship has been considered by Elizabeth 
Denham, who was then acting as Information and Privacy Commissioner for British 
                                                 
28
 Jonathan Montpetit, “Personal Data of 2.7 Million People Leaked from Desjardins” (20 June 2019), 
online: CBC News Montreal <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/desjardins-data-breach-
1.5183297>. 
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Buckley Smith, “Laying Blame on Employee in Desjardins Data Breach is Ignoring the Big Picture, 
Security Experts Say” (21 June 2019), online: ITWorldCanada 
<https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/laying-blame-on-employee-in-desjardins-data-breach-is-ignoring-
the-big-picture-security-experts-says/419299>. 
31
 Machtinger v HOJ Industries Ltd, [1992] 1 SCR 986 at para 31, 1992 CarswellOnt 892 (SCC) 
[Machtinger]; Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 701 at paras 92−93, 1997 CarswellMan 
455 (SCC) [Wallace]. See also David J Doorey, The LAW of Work: Common Law and the Regulation of 
Work (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2016) at 5−6, 67−75, 111−120 [David Doorey, 
“Common Law and Regulation”]; David J Doorey, The LAW of Work: Industrial Relations and Collective 
Bargaining (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2017) at 67, 94−97, 239−241 [David 
Doorey, “Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining”].  
32
 Peter Kivisto, Social Theory: Roots & Branches, 5
th
 ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 3–38; 
Carsten Bagge Laustsen et al, Social Theory: A Textbook (London: Routledge, 2017) at 14−34, online: 
Routledge <https://www-taylorfrancis-com>, DOI: <10.4324/9781315657998>; Nick Dyer-Witheford, 
Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2015) at 4−15, 
19−38. 
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Columbia, to be the ideal privacy laboratory.
33
 This is because there is a blurring of 
workplace and personal digital devices as well as a blurring of work and personal time;
34
 
because the parties must work together to coexist for significant periods of time despite 
the presence of significant opposing interests;
35
 because the parties are privy to several 
details regarding each other’s personal lives;
36
 and because employer surveillance 
activities can negatively affect the employment relationship by aggravating the lack of 
trust between the parties and create chilling effects on employee morale.
37
  
What the foregoing discussion highlights is an increased need to build trust between 
employers and employees, something that can be done by creating stronger data 
protections for employees.
38
 Unfortunately, Canadian privacy protections remain weak in 
this regard. Although the employment relationship requires protective data protection 
provisions that can minimize the abuse of power and effectively restore trust in the 
relationship,
39
 such provisions have not yet been created. 
Despite the clear power imbalances that employers and employees experience, there is no 
acknowledgement in PIPEDA that employees are often not in a position to validly 
provide, withhold, or revoke their consent in response to employers’ decisions to conduct 
                                                 
33
 Elizabeth Denham, “The Employment Relationship as the Privacy Laboratory” (22 November 2013), 
online: Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia 
<https://www.oipc.bc.ca/speeches/1584> at 2. 
34
 Ibid at 5–9; Government of Canada, “Disconnecting From Work-Related E-Communications Outside of 
Work Hours: Issue Paper” (4 April 2019), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-
standards/reports/disconnecting-e-communications.html>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
“Is a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Program the Right Choice for Your Organization?” (22 July 2015), 
online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-
topics/technology-and-privacy/mobile-devices-and-apps/gd_byod_201508/>; Lysa Appleton, “Flex Work 
and Telecommuting” (2018), online: Career Professionals of Canada <https://careerprocanada.ca/flex-
work-telecommuting/>; Nathan Battams, “Out of the office: workshifting and remote work in Canada” 
(August 2013) at 1, online (pdf): The Vanier Institute: Fascinating Families <http://vanierinstitute.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/FFAM_2013-08-00_Workshifting-and-remote-work-Canada.pdf>. 
35
 Denham, supra note 33 at 2. 
36
 Ibid at 2–3. 
37
 Ibid at 3, 9−10; Jennifer Stoddart, “Annual Reports to Parliament 2004 on the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act” (October 2005), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/reports-to-
parliament/200405/2004_pipeda/>. 
38
 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 74. 
39
 Ibid at 50–52, 61, 67–69, 71. 
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electronic surveillance of employees. Likewise, there is no acknowledgment that 
employers may only engage in reasonable acts of surveillance based on the legitimate 
business interests of employers and the privacy interests of employees. Employees have 
no real voice with respect to the extent to which employers conduct electronic 
surveillance. These features are simply not included in the legislation.
40
  
In fact, PIPEDA allows employers to unilaterally collect, use and disclose personal 
information without the consent of employees if the collection, use or disclosure is 
necessary to establish, manage or terminate an employment relationship between the 
employers and employees, and employers inform employees that the personal 
information will be or may be collected, used or disclosed for those purposes.
41
 There is 
no definition accompanying the phrase, “necessary to establish, manage or terminate an 
employment relationship”.
42
 And being informed of a privacy violation that will or may 
soon take place cannot possibly constitute fair and proper notification to employees. 
To date, the federal government’s responses to these sorts of concerns have been 
problematic. For example, the government’s recent attempt to introduce a so-called 
Digital Charter
43
 does not adequately protect the privacy interests of Canadians. To be 
sure, there is an acknowledgment of the need to simultaneously allow for innovation and 
protect users from data misuse, but simply listing 10 principles
44
 does not adequately or 
effectively address the electronic surveillance gap in employment.
45
 By not acting, 
                                                 
40
 PIPEDA, supra note 14 at ss 6.1, 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), Schedule 1, cl 4.3. 
41
 Ibid at s 7.3. 
42
 Ibid at ss 2(1), 7.1(1). 
43
 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Digital Charter: Trust in a Digital World” (21 May 2019), online: 
Government of Canada <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00108.html>; Government of Canada, 
“Canada’s Digital Charter: Trust in a Digital World” (21 May 2019), online (video): Government of 
Canada <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00108.html>.   
44
 The ten principles include: Universal Access; Safety and Security; Control and Consent; Transparency, 
Portability and Interoperability; Open and Modern Digital Government; A Level Playing Field; Data and 
Digital for Good; Strong Democracy; Free from Hate and Violent Extremism; and Strong Enforcement and 
Real Accountability. See Government of Canada, “Canada’s Digital Charter in Action: A Plan by 
Canadians, for Canadians” (21 May 2019), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00109.html>. 
45
 I assert that the same is true for the recent Mandate Letter to the Minister of Innovation, Science and 
Industry. See Office of the Prime Minister, “Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry Mandate Letter” 
(December, 2019), online: Prime Minster of Canada <https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/minister-
innovation-science-and-industry-mandate-letter>. 
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Canada risks missing an opportunity to be a world leader when it comes to addressing the 
electronic surveillance gap and enabling employees to preserve a sense of dignity and 
self-respect. 
1.2 Focus  
The focus of this dissertation is limited to workplace privacy involving electronic 
surveillance technologies that affect the employment relationship. 
This dissertation will focus in particular on two main instances of electronic surveillance 
that arise in the workplace. For simplicity, I will call these “surveillance scenarios”.
46
   
The first surveillance scenario involves what I will call “proactive surveillance 
operations”. In such situations, employers become suspicious of employees, believing 
that they are being dishonest about something (such as an injury or illness), and decide to 
instigate surveillance to confirm their suspicions. Such cases can involve taking steps to 
access information about employees by hiring outside private investigators who use 
specialized equipment such as cameras, audio equipment, or particular software that can 
analyze online use with web browsing surveillance technology (for instance, using 
snapshot or keystroke activity monitoring). Employers may take measures to install overt 
or covert cameras in the workplace, contact a data profiler to view aggregated data from 
social media activity, or purchase other equipment to track their company vehicles or 
property to catch an employee’s actions, including Global Position System (GPS), Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), web cameras, video cameras, closed-circuit television 
(CCTV), or telematics equipment. 
The second surveillance scenario involves what I will call the “discovery of employee 
misuse of technology”. This misuse of technology can harm the employer (such as some 
action taken online that can harm the employer’s reputation) and can take place on-duty 
or off-duty using work or personal digital devices. These scenarios can involve 
employers accessing information regarding an employee’s misuse of company 
                                                 
46
 See Chapter 2 regarding the examination of surveillance theories. 
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technology in several ways, including reviewing details provided by corporate computer 
cache logs, hard drives or Universal Serial Bus (USB) storage keys, emails that are 
copied to the server, phone records, and GPS activity logs. It can also involve employers 
accessing information regarding an employee’s misuse of technology by examining the 
employee’s digital devices that can be fluidly on the move inside or outside the 
workplace, or online activity that is generated during or outside working hours. 
1.2.1 Justification 
There are three principal reasons why this dissertation is limited to the employment 
context. The first reason is because the employment relationship is the most suitable 
setting for studying and understanding electronic surveillance technologies as they affect 
relationships of power imbalances. As discussed above, there is a significant potential for 
employers to abuse their electronic surveillance power and take advantage of vulnerable 
employees.  
The second reason why this dissertation is limited to the employment context is because 
there is a rich body of case law stemming from workplace privacy cases that can provide 
significant insights about how to best create an effective privacy regime pertaining to 
electronic surveillance technologies.  
The third reason why this dissertation is limited to the employment context is because of 
the centrality of paid work to the lives of individuals. One thing that the law is uniquely 
placed to do is protect essential values, including the dignity and self-respect of 
employees, in the employment sphere. This was eloquently put by Dickson C.J. in the 
Alberta Reference:
47
 
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the 
individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a 
contributory role in society. A person's employment is an essential 
component of his or her sense of identity, self‑worth and emotional 
well‑being. Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are highly 
                                                 
47
 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 1987 CarswellAlta705 
(SCC) [Alberta Reference]. 
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significant in shaping the whole compendium of psychological, emotional 
and physical elements of a person's dignity and self-respect.
48
   
To be sure, employment operates against the backdrop of a larger sphere of interactions 
between individuals, corporate entities, and governments that is also affected by privacy 
laws.
49
 There is a general problem with the electronic surveillance gap, and employment 
is the ideal realm for studying the problem. The electronic surveillance gap arises in 
interesting and important ways in the unique employment sphere. Accordingly, the 
narrow focus of this dissertation is employment because it allows for a useful way of 
understanding the electronic surveillance gap. The present examination is properly 
situated within the examination of the privacy protections in the employment 
relationship. 
Current approaches to privacy do not appear to provide protections that are adequate to 
close the electronic surveillance gap. For example, the dominant approach—which 
simply relies on existing data protection provisions—is insufficient to adequately address 
the sorts of specific and unique issues that arise from using electronic surveillance 
technologies. This results in a lack of clarity regarding the extent of privacy protection 
with respect to increasingly intrusive electronic surveillance technologies, and raises 
questions as to how to sufficiently close the electronic surveillance gap in employment.  
This dissertation suggests that, through the synthesis of social theories involving 
surveillance and privacy, together with analyses of legislative privacy and electronic 
surveillance protections (“privacy provisions”), court decisions, and labour arbitrations 
                                                 
48
 Ibid at para 95. 
49
 One example of an electronic surveillance issue in the larger sphere that has affected Canadians is the 
notorious Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal of 2018 that involved the collection of personally 
identifiable information of approximately 50 million user profiles of Facebook users without consent to use 
for political and advertising purposes. See Roger McNamee, Zucked (New York: Penguin Press, 2019) at 
178–240; Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy 
Restrictions on Facebook” (24 July 2019), online: Federal Trade Commission <https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions>; Catherine 
Tunney, “Privacy Watchdog Taking Facebook to Court, Says Company Breached Privacy Laws” (25 April 
2019), online: CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/privacy-watchdog-cambridge-analytica-
facebook-1.5110304>; Privacy Commissioner, “Remarks”, supra note 15; Amnesty International, 
“Surveillance Giants: How the Business Model of Google and Facebook Threatens Human Rights” (21 
November 2019) at 27−38, online (pdf): Amnesty International 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL3014042019ENGLISH.PDF>. 
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(“workplace privacy cases”), a new and improved regime that closes the electronic 
surveillance gap (“workplace privacy regime”) can be designed. This dissertation makes 
a significant contribution to how we view electronic surveillance in employment, how we 
understand the electronic surveillance gap, and how we can close the electronic 
surveillance gap by means of novel legislative provisions. The proposed legislative 
provisions better protect the dignity and self-respect of employees, while still allowing 
employers to responsibly use their electronic surveillance power to achieve their business 
goals. The proposed legislative provisions have the potential to enhance trust in the 
employment relationship, minimize chilling effects on employee morale, and ensure that 
employment can provide a sense of meaning, dignity, and self-respect to employees, free 
from concerns about inappropriate intrusions into their private lives.  
1.3 Objective 
The objective of this dissertation is to determine how the principles and values that 
emerge from selected privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases can be used to 
close the electronic surveillance gap using a design that fits into Canada’s legal system. 
1.4 Research question 
How can the principles and values that emerge from selected privacy provisions and 
workplace privacy cases be used to close the electronic surveillance gap using novel 
legislative provisions? 
1.5 Hypotheses 
This dissertation will suggest that there are currently insufficient data protection 
provisions in Canada’s legal regime for closing the electronic surveillance gap. 
This dissertation will also argue that principles and values can be extracted from selected 
privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases, and can be used to design a new 
workplace privacy regime containing proposed legislative provisions that closes the 
electronic surveillance gap in a way that fits into Canada’s current legal system. These 
proposed provisions modify and add to Canada’s data protection provisions.   
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1.6 Methodology 
This dissertation uses two main methodologies. The primary methodology is a 
comparative legal doctrinal methodology. Additionally, an interdisciplinary methodology 
is used in this dissertation to examine social theory. Therefore, this methodology section 
will include a discussion of: (1) Legal Analysis: Comparative Legal Doctrinal (regarding 
Chapters 4 and 5); and (2) Social Theory: Interdisciplinary (concerning Chapters 2 and 
3). 
1.6.1 Legal Analysis: Comparative Legal Doctrinal  
The primary methodology in this dissertation is a legal doctrinal methodology, and it is 
used for Chapters 4 and 5, where legal analyses of privacy provisions and workplace 
privacy cases will be undertaken. This methodology is based on the idea that legal 
research is an iterative process of problem-solving that requires legal reasoning and 
analysis.
50
 In fact, the manner in which one uses legal authorities to build legal arguments 
requires mastery of all the fundamental components of legal reasoning including critical 
interpretation and strategic application—when done correctly, legal research can lead to 
creative, imaginative, and flexible problem solving.
51
   
The doctrinal methodology that is used in this dissertation emphasizes both primary legal 
material (cases and legislation) and secondary material.
52
 The doctrinal method is a two-
part process involving locating sources of law and subsequently interpreting and 
analyzing them.
53
 In terms of purpose and motivation for undertaking the work, this 
dissertation uses a normative purpose; in particular, the research goes beyond simply 
describing what the law is, and argues for legal change.
54
  
                                                 
50
 Sarah Valentine, “Legal Research as a Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat for Students and Law Schools” 
(2010) 39 Baltimore L Rev 173 at 210. 
51
 Ibid at 211, 219. 
52
 Chris Dent, “A Law Student-Oriented Taxonomy for Research in Law” (2017) 48 VUWLR 371 at 377. 
53
 Terry Hutchinson, “Doctrinal Research” in Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton, eds, Research Methods in 
Law, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2018) 8 at 18. 
54
 Dent, supra note 52 at 386–387; Shane Kilcommins, “Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): 
Assumptions, Commitments and Shortcomings” in Laura Cahillane & Jennifer Schweppe, eds, Legal 
Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Dublin: Clarus Press Ltd, 2016) 7 at 9−11. 
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With respect to the scope of this dissertation, selected workplace privacy laws in private 
sector workplaces in Canada, the United States, and European Union jurisdictions are 
examined. The private sector is examined because it is beneficial to maintain a 
reasonably sized project, delve deeper into the one sector, and analyze what is—at least 
in my opinion—the more interesting sector compared to the public sector.
55
 I say this 
because analysis of the private sector elicits more intriguing questions regarding the 
responsibilities of private companies. As a result, certain specialized sectors and contexts 
such as government, health, and criminal law are not examined in this dissertation. Both 
unionized and nonunionized workplaces are examined when considering the two 
surveillance scenarios involving court decisions and labour arbitrations (torts, findings of 
the Privacy Commissioners, and decisions of the National Labour Relations Board are 
not examined in this dissertation). 
To that end, in this dissertation a comparative approach to the legal doctrinal method is 
used, which involves comparing “the law of different jurisdictions, legal families or legal 
traditions, with a special eye on the similarities and differences”.
56
 The rationale for using 
a comparative doctrinal approach is to discover any possible benefits and also warnings 
of possible difficulties when comparing jurisdictions, and in so doing, deepening the 
understanding of the Canadian system while trying to improve it.
57
 One strategy is to 
compare similarities and differences between laws of the different jurisdictions, and 
determine whether the laws achieve the same function, while also being sensitive to the 
cultural context of the jurisdictions examined.
58
 Not only does function assist in 
                                                 
55
 For the purposes of this discussion, the public sector involves government of Canada departments and 
agencies, provincial ministries and agencies, and municipal departments. For example, see Government of 
Canada, “Departments and agencies” (31 July 2017) online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/government/dept.html> and Government of Ontario, “Provincial ministries and 
agencies” (2017) online: Government of Ontario <https://www.ontario.ca/data/provincial-ministries-and-
agencies>. 
56
 Jaap Hage, “Comparative Law as Method and the Method of Comparative Law” in Maurice Adams & 
Dirk Heirbaut, eds, The Method and Culture of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 37 at 
37−38. 
57
 Dent, supra note 52 at 384–385. 
58
 Geoffrey Samuel, “Comparative Law and its Methodology” in Watkins & Burton, supra note 53, 121 at 
124–134; Mark Van Hoecke, “Methodology of Comparative Legal Research”, Law & Method (December 
2015) 1 at 3−6, 11, 28, 30, online: Law and Method <http://www.lawandmethod> DOI: 
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identifying cross-jurisdictional legal materials for mutual comparison, but it also provides 
interesting angles from which to analyze the materials.
59
 
To be sure, there have been criticisms of the doctrinal legal methodology.
60
 According to 
these criticisms, the doctrinal research method is less compelling than the research 
methods used by those in the sciences and social sciences.
61
 The criticisms suggest that 
law is a social endeavor, and the strict application of rules can mask phenomenon 
operating in society.
62
 Consequently, there has been a growth in the use of non-doctrinal 
and interdisciplinary research work by legal academics.
63
 As can be seen in the 
discussion below regarding interdisciplinary methods, I agree that interdisciplinary 
research approaches can bolster doctrinal legal methodology and lead to innovative 
research outcomes. 
For this dissertation, I propose to focus on privacy provisions and a variety of workplace 
privacy cases that are a source for principles and values relevant to designing a proposed 
new workplace privacy regime. My claim is that these principles and values can be 
codified and transformed into proposed legislative provisions that can fit into the 
Canadian legal system. 
The selected provisions provide excellent examples of privacy provisions and workplace 
privacy cases that highlight issues regarding the electronic surveillance gap. The privacy 
provisions involve different areas of law that are relevant to privacy (what I will call the 
“features of privacy provisions”): (1) constitutional and human rights provisions; (2) data 
protection provisions; and (3) employment provisions. Correspondingly, workplace 
privacy cases have several aspects that provide insights into a workplace privacy situation 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
<10.5553/REM/.000010>; Mathias M Siems, “The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants” in 
Adams & Heirbaut, supra note 56, 133 at 136−138.  
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 Hutchinson, supra note 53 at 9, 21–25. 
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 Ibid. 
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(what I will call the “features of workplace privacy cases”): (1) employee success in the 
wrongful termination/privacy claim versus failure in the claim; (2) court versus labour 
arbitrator; (3) surveillance scenario (proactive surveillance operations versus discovery of 
employee misuse of technology); (4) electronic surveillance technology type; and (5) on-
duty versus off-duty conduct. 
This dissertation is limited to the examination of selected privacy provisions and 
workplace privacy cases, with an aim of presenting a balanced representation and a 
strategic combination of the features of privacy provisions and features of workplace 
privacy cases. This will ensure that the analysis will generate relevant insights into how 
to close the electronic surveillance gap for the creation of a proposed workplace privacy 
regime. 
Put another way, the goal is not to provide an exhaustive description of the entire legal 
landscape in Canada, the United States, and European Union when it comes to privacy. 
Rather, the goal is to engage in a nuanced discussion of the chosen privacy provisions 
and workplace privacy cases to glean information relevant to the construction of a new 
workplace privacy regime. 
First, the privacy provisions from Canada will be selected from the: Québec Charter;
64
 
PIPEDA
65
 (including the PIPEDA Breach Regulations
66
); BC PIPA;
67
 and QC Act.
68
 
There will also be a discussion of Canada’s Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter).
69
 The 
privacy provisions from the United States will be chosen from the: California 
Constitution;
70
 California Consumer Privacy Act;
71
 California Labor Code,
 72
 and 
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 Supra note 20. 
65
 Supra note 14. 
66
 Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations (SOR/2018-64) [PIPEDA Breach Regulations]. 
67
 Supra note 24. 
68
 Supra note 25. 
69
 Bill S-21, An Act to Guarantee the Human Right to Privacy, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (first reading 13 
March 2001, dropped from the Senate Order Paper in 2002) [Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter)]. 
70
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71
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72
 Supra note 13. 
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California Civil Code (Customer Records).
73
 There will also be an examination of 
provisions in these American bills: Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act);
74
and Bill SB 6280 
(Washington Facial Recognition).
75
 The privacy provisions from the European Union 
will come from the: EU Convention;
76
 and the GDPR.
77
 Chapter 4 elaborates on the 
reasons why these privacy provisions have been selected for the analysis. 
In order to maintain the focus and narrow scope of the dissertation, it will be necessary to 
compare a small number of provisions regarding similar common topics. A mix of 
selected privacy provisions of the various jurisdictions will be discussed under each of 
three themes: (1) foundational principles touching on privacy and electronic 
surveillance;
78
 (2) consent and balancing rights with legitimate interests;
79
 and (3) order-
making powers, penalties, and fines.
80
  
Second, the two workplace privacy cases chosen from Canada are: Steel
 81
 and Maxam 
Bulk Services.
82
 The two workplace privacy cases selected from the United States are: 
                                                 
73
 Cal Civ Code, 3 CIV 1.81 (2000) [California Civil Code (Customer Records)]. 
74
 US, SB 5642, New York Privacy Act, 2019−2020, Reg Sess, NY, 2019 [Bill S5642 (New York Privacy 
Act)]. Bill S5642 was introduced into the Senate, read twice on May 9, 2019 and January 8, 2020, and 
referred to the Committee on Consumer Protection on those dates. See New York State Senate, “Senate Bill 
S5642” (2020) online: New York State Senate <https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s5642>. 
75
 US, SB 6280, Concerning the Use of Facial Recognition Services, 2019−2020, Reg Sess, Wash, 2020 
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of RCW, Title 43, Chapter 257) [SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)]. See also Washington State 
Legislature, “Bill Information: SB 6280” (12 April 2020), online: Washington State Legislature 
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Graphic Packaging
83
 and Baker Hughes.
84
 And the two workplace privacy cases chosen 
from the European Union are: Bărbulescu
85
 and López Ribalda.
86
 Chapter 5 elaborates on 
the reasons why these workplace privacy cases have been selected for the analysis. 
1.6.2 Social Theory: Interdisciplinary 
Currently, it is common for many areas of legal research and scholarship to employ 
information and methodologies from other academic fields.
87
 Legal scholarship has 
experienced an increased integration and cross-fertilization with other disciplines, and 
there has been a shift away from merely doctrinal legal scholarship towards more 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship, largely in response to criticisms of the doctrinal legal 
methodology.
88
  
An interdisciplinary methodology is used in Chapters 2 and 3 to examine social theories 
of surveillance and privacy. This discussion is included in the dissertation because social 
theory plays an important role when studying law and society; it can produce a more 
holistic understanding of what problems the law can solve, and can contribute to the 
crafting of a more effective legal regime for citizens in that society.
89
 Put another way, 
theories of surveillance and privacy can provide a foundation on which I can draw when 
analyzing privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases, extracting from those 
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provisions and cases various principles and values, and proposing a new workplace 
privacy regime.  
The term “socio-legal” refers to an approach to the study of law that views law as in part 
a social phenomenon.
90
 Socio-legal studies can be invaluable because they allow for 
diverse methods and perspectives to be adopted by legal scholars.
91
 Socio-legal studies 
embraces various disciplines because there is a recognition that law is not an autonomous 
force to which society is subjected, but rather it shapes and is shaped by broader social 
issues.
92
 In fact, some believe that the fact that the typical law syllabus rarely includes 
any significant study of the theories or research methods that are regarded as fundamental 
by other disciplines is problematic for the future development of the legal discipline.
93
 I 
agree that there is a range of theoretical work upon which a socio-legal researcher can 
draw in order to examine legal phenomena, and this is especially the case when it comes 
to the study of electronic surveillance and privacy.
94
 
Not only is it important for law to be open to the kinds of insights that sociology can 
provide, but it is also important for sociology to be open to insights emerging from the 
study of law; the two disciplines complement each other.
95
 In fact, some believe that the 
most valuable asset of socio-legal research is its ability to highlight issues that neither law 
nor sociology can articulate or study alone.
96
 In this interdisciplinary space, socio-legal 
research is still in its infancy and creates a large potential for law and sociology to learn 
from each other and generate new knowledge.
97
 
In my view, it is important to have a thorough understanding of social theory and law in 
order to more fully appreciate the questions raised in this dissertation. By studying social 
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theories of surveillance and privacy, it is possible to develop a deeper sense of the 
problem of the electronic surveillance gap in employment and generate unique insights 
when performing the legal analyses of the privacy provisions and the workplace privacy 
cases. I believe that reflecting on social theories of surveillance and privacy will lead to a 
higher likelihood of creating effective legislative provisions when crafting the proposed 
workplace privacy regime. 
For instance, Chapter 2 is written from a capitalist surveillance perspective of 
surveillance, which stresses the dangers of electronic surveillance. In particular, 
surveillance-based capitalism involves private-sector companies engaging in the 
extraction of individuals’ personal data to exploit their personal information. Theorists 
point out the dangers of ubiquitous surveillance as it relates to the general sphere outside 
employment, and also workplace monitoring as it relates to electronic surveillance inside 
the workplace. Many draw on panoptic concepts when highlighting the potential for an 
abuse of electronic surveillance power. The Chapter also stresses the consequences of the 
exploitation concerning the panoptic sort, which involves dangerous outcomes involving 
discrimination and profiling.  
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the origins of surveillance with the Panopticon. 
This discussion highlights the potential of the exploitation of power and manipulation 
when conducting surveillance. Subsequently, Chapter 2 articulates the nature of 
electronic surveillance and the pervasiveness of everyday surveillance in the general 
sphere. This is important because employees operate in the general sphere during their 
off-duty conduct; aspects of their private lives can be detected using electronic 
surveillance technologies outside work and subsequently affect their status inside the 
workplace, and this can lead to exploitation and discrimination. The capitalist 
surveillance perspective highlights the high potential for exploitation to control behaviour 
using manipulation, domination, and power. The discussion regarding the panoptic sort 
emphasizes the potential for discrimination against minority groups including racialized 
individuals; there is also a potential for exploitation of women as described by feminist 
surveillance theorists. 
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Theories that consider surveillance in the workplace review the reasons for conducting 
surveillance, the technologies used to monitor employees, and the competing interests of 
employers and employees at work. This discussion allows one to grasp the complicated 
nature of electronic surveillance in the workplace and the effect of electronic surveillance 
on employees on a psychological level. Chapter 2 reinforces the view that there is a 
serious potential for employers to exploit their electronic surveillance powers and take 
advantage of their vulnerable employees using electronic surveillance. This Chapter also 
underscores the fact that current understandings of privacy do not articulate a conception 
of privacy that can protect individuals from unreasonable intrusions. 
Chapter 3 investigates several privacy theories and asks the question, “What is privacy?” 
The social theories provide an understanding of what is being analyzed when studying 
the privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases. Further, these theories help to 
explain what is being protected with the newly proposed legislative provisions.  
During the analysis of the social theories of privacy, the problem of conceptualizing 
privacy is approached from different angles to create a rich knowledge base from which 
to draw during the subsequent legal analyses. Reductionist theorists are critical of 
singling out privacy as a right, whereas non-reductionist theorists believe there is some 
coherent value in privacy, but disagree about how the value is conceptualized. This 
difference is noteworthy because the framing of the concept of privacy affects legal 
analyses of privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases. 
While some reductionist theories understand privacy as a cluster-of-rights instead of a 
single right, another reductionist theory, the economic perspective on privacy, considers 
privacy to be useful and worth protecting only if it creates value in a data exchange.  
Non-reductionist theories are more impactful since they attach a value to privacy. One 
theory explains the idea of privacy as a tort, discussing a right to be free of privacy 
intrusions. Other theories consist of discussions regarding the feminist legal theory of 
privacy and shed light on the darker side of privacy, where privacy may be used as a 
shield to conceal the negative treatment of women. Several theorists also discuss the idea 
of privacy as control-over-information, and this helps to understand modern societal 
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struggles between data owners and those who wish to manipulate and control through the 
use of electronic surveillance. The pragmatic contextual approach to privacy emphasizes 
the importance of understanding complicated privacy issues in a flexible and practical 
manner. 
The dignity/human rights approach to privacy, the approach that I prefer, is different 
from all of the other theoretical approaches to privacy. This perspective of privacy 
provides an appropriate understanding of privacy and allows for a purposive 
interpretation that does not ignore the interests of the most vulnerable citizens. Chapter 3 
aims to understand on a deeper level the nature of dignity, trust, and how individuals are 
inherently worthy and deserving of privacy. The animating idea is that individuals are not 
means to an end, but rather ends in themselves. Privacy is not used to get something and 
create value during an exchange. When looking at privacy with this lens, one can see that 
the interpretation of privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases will take a different 
route compared to others such as the economic theory of privacy. Not only does this 
affect the interpretation of privacy in a legal analysis, but it also influences how one may 
draft a new workplace privacy regime. 
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation takes a capitalist surveillance theoretical approach to electronic 
surveillance. This approach highlights the dangers involving the abuse of electronic 
surveillance power. In particular, this approach to electronic surveillance argues that, 
since there is a high potential for employers to exploit vulnerable employees by taking 
advantage of their electronic surveillance power, it is necessary to provide employees 
with the proper protections by closing the electronic surveillance gap. 
This dissertation also adopts a dignity/human rights approach to privacy. I argue, in other 
words, that adequate privacy protections that respect the dignity of employees are not 
currently in place in Canada, and they must be created and implemented as soon as 
possible to close the electronic surveillance gap. 
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1.8 Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation has an Introduction, five Chapters, and a Conclusion.  
The introductory Chapter 1 describes the problem statement, the focus and justification 
for the dissertation, and the dissertation’s objective. Following this, it sets out the 
research question, hypotheses, and methodology used in this dissertation. The detailed 
methodology section explains the comparative legal doctrinal methodology (concerning 
the legal analyses) and interdisciplinary legal methodology (regarding social theory) used 
in this dissertation. Lastly, Chapter 1 sets out the theoretical framework that is used in 
this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 explores surveillance theories from a capitalist surveillance theoretical 
framework. The examination commences with understanding the beginnings of 
surveillance with the Panopticon, and moves through a discussion regarding the dangers 
of ubiquitous surveillance, the struggles regarding surveillance in the workplace, and the 
problems with surveillance theorists’ views of privacy. Chapter 2 argues that there is a 
serious potential for employers to exploit their electronic surveillance powers and take 
advantage of their vulnerable employees using electronic surveillance. Employers have 
the potential to take advantage of the electronic surveillance technologies involved in 
ubiquitous surveillance as they pertain to off-duty conduct, and also directly in the 
workplace with electronic surveillance as they concern on-duty conduct. Chapter 2 
concludes that conceptualizations of privacy by surveillance theorists are inadequate and 
it is clear that privacy rights, as envisioned by privacy theorists in Chapter 3, must be 
created and upheld for all individuals in society. 
Chapter 3 investigates privacy theories from a dignity/human rights theoretical 
perspective of privacy. It advances the claim that it is necessary to proceed with a 
dignity/human rights approach when answering the question, “What is privacy?” 
Regardless of whether they are reductionist or non-reductionist, most privacy theories are 
problematic because they do not appropriately capture the concept of privacy. It is only 
the dignity/human rights approach to privacy that provides an appropriate understanding 
of privacy and allows for a purposive interpretation that does not leave the most 
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vulnerable citizens behind. Recognizing that privacy is fundamental, this flexible 
approach helps law drafters and decision makers make incremental modifications to 
adapt with an evolving society and also to achieve appropriate balances when assessing 
competing interests. Chapter 3 highlights the importance of using the dignity/human 
rights approach to treat individuals as ends and not means. 
Chapter 4 examines selected privacy provisions, organized thematically, from Canada, 
the United States, and the European Union. Three themes, each containing selected 
privacy provisions of the various jurisdictions, have been created in order to compare a 
small number of provisions regarding common topics that are important for 
understanding how to close the electronic surveillance gap. First, I note the provisions 
that fall within each theme. Second, I analyze the provisions of each theme and discuss 
the principles and values that emerge from the analysis. The analysis contains a thorough 
examination of privacy provisions that ties into the discussion various relevant social 
theory ideas involving surveillance and privacy. Third, I set out ideas for incorporating 
the detected principles and values into the proposed workplace privacy regime to close 
the electronic surveillance gap. 
Chapter 5 examines selected workplace privacy cases from Canada, the United States, 
and the European Union. There are two workplace privacy cases examined from each 
jurisdiction; each workplace privacy case is examined one by one. First, I thoroughly 
describe the workplace privacy case because an understanding of the background of 
employment cases is critical for conducting a sufficient analysis. Second, I analyze the 
case and note the principles and values that emerge from the analysis. The analysis 
contains a thorough examination of the workplace privacy cases that ties into the 
discussion various relevant social theory ideas involving surveillance and privacy. Third, 
I set out ideas for incorporating the detected principles and values into the proposed 
workplace privacy regime to close the electronic surveillance gap.  
Chapter 6 has two main goals. First, it considers how the new proposed workplace 
privacy regime can be incorporated into the Canadian legal system. It examines the 
challenges involving the competing areas of law that are relevant to privacy, and 
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consequential jurisdictional issues in the Canadian federated system. It also sets out a 
plan for designing the new workplace privacy regime, and incorporates previous 
guidance provided by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that is 
examined throughout the dissertation. Second, it provides some examples of proposed 
legislative provisions for the new workplace privacy regime. These examples are based 
on my ideas generated in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 7 provides the Conclusion. It contains a brief review of what transpired during 
the dissertation, discusses limitations of the dissertation, and provides ideas for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Social Theory: Examination of Surveillance Theories 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that 
Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up 
by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the 
metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of 
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given 
moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on 
any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they 
watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire 
whenever they wanted to. You had to live–did live, from habit that became 
instinct–in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, 
except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. 
              —George Orwell
98
 
“Surveillance” comes from the French “sur”, meaning “over”, and “veiller”, meaning 
“watch”, and also from the Latin “vigilare”, meaning “keep watch”.
99
 Together, the 
French term “surveiller” means “to watch, keep an eye on, or watch over”.
100
 
While dictionaries discuss watching over, many surveillance theorists agree that 
surveillance goes beyond watching because it depends on some capacity to control, 
regulate, or modulate behaviour.
101
 For example, Torin Monahan and David Murakami 
Wood maintain that the term “surveillance” suggests that there is a power relationship 
involved, where there is some oversight that intervenes to shape behaviour.
102
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And while many associate surveillance with mass surveillance conducted by a State 
against its own citizens similar to what was revealed in 2013 by Edward Snowden,
103
 
ideas involving surveillance go beyond this conceptualization as well. 
In fact, there is a rich body of theoretical work conducted by several surveillance 
theorists who attempt to understand surveillance. For example, an early surveillance 
theorist, James B. Rule, states that surveillance is about social control; it involves the 
mechanisms that discourage disobedience that either punishes such behaviour once it 
occurs, or prevents individuals with inclinations to disobedience from acting on those 
inclinations.
104
 Rule notes that the workings of social control, especially efforts to impose 
or resist it, give rise to some of the most conflict-ridden chapters of social life.
105
 He 
explains that this is why Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four
106
 is so disturbing for many: 
“For the ugliest and most frightening thing about that world was its vision of total control 
of men’s lives by a monolithic, authoritarian state”.
107
 The main goal is to enforce instant 
obedience.
108
 Another example is David Lyon’s definition of surveillance as the focused, 
systemic, and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, 
protection, or direction.
109
 He states that surveillance, a normal part of everyday life, is 
both focused and systemic because attention to personal details is not random or 
spontaneous, but rather, deliberate and depending on certain protocols and techniques.
110
 
Lyon states that marketers wish to influence consumers, high schools attempt to manage 
students, and security companies wish to protect buildings; control is the common 
element, which may or may not involve malevolent intentions.
111
 
                                                 
103
 Edward Snowden, Permanent Record (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019). Snowden disclosed 
information to the public relating to the mass surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) of 
citizens in the United States and abroad. Snowden worked as a contractor with the NSA in the role of 
systems administrator; some view him as a whistleblower, and others view him as a traitor. 
104
 James B Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (London: Penguin Books, 1973) at 20. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Orwell, supra note 98. 
107
 Rule, supra note 104 at 19. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) at 14 [David Lyon, 
“Surveillance Studies”]. 
110
 Ibid at 14–15. 
111
 Ibid at 15. 
28 
 
Monahan and Wood refer to surveillance studies as a transdisciplinary field given that 
surveillance theorists draw upon a wide range of sources and use different disciplinary 
perspectives to raise different concerns, methods, and theoretical positions to the study of 
surveillance in society.
112
 A useful approach for understanding surveillance theories is to 
categorize them into specific topics and study the various approaches within categories 
that are most relevant to a particular research endeavor.
113
  
To that end, the purpose of this Chapter is to examine the selected surveillance theories 
that are most relevant to this dissertation topic. I will focus on categories of theories that 
directly and indirectly relate to electronic surveillance in the employment context, both 
inside and outside the workplace. These categories of theories are not competing schools 
of theories, but are instead informative theories that can add to our knowledge of the 
nature and implications of electronic surveillance affecting the employment context from 
different angles. These theories form a foundation of instructive information concerning 
the sophisticated electronic surveillance technology for the purposes of creating the new 
workplace privacy regime.  
If we picture a coin as the employment context, then ubiquitous surveillance and 
workplace surveillance are two sides of that same coin: ubiquitous surveillance theories 
are involved indirectly (outside the workplace), and workplace surveillance theories are 
involved directly (inside the workplace). If we imagine the rim of that coin running 
through and affecting both sides of that coin as the Panopticon (to be discussed below) 
we can view it as a vital component that touches on both ubiquitous and workplace 
surveillance theories. And if we step back and use a particular lens when examining this 
coin, that lens is the capitalist surveillance perspective of surveillance.  
When using this lens, I stress throughout this Chapter that there are dangers associated 
with electronic surveillance. Surveillance capitalist theorists are relevant to electronic 
surveillance both inside and outside the workplace. These theorists draw on Karl Marx 
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and use his ideas regarding managing human capital by way of the appropriation of the 
surplus value of labour through exploitation of the working class.
114
 When applying these 
ideas to surveillance, we see that surveillance-based capitalism involves private-sector 
companies engaging in capital extraction of individuals’ personal data to manipulate and 
control them by means of the exploitation of their personal information.
115
 The theorists 
point out the dangers of ubiquitous surveillance as it relates to the general sphere outside 
employment, and also workplace monitoring as it relates to electronic surveillance inside 
the workplace. Many draw on panoptic concepts when aggressively warning against the 
dangers of the abuse of surveillance power. The Chapter highlights the consequences of 
this exploitation such as the panoptic sort, which involve dangerous outcomes involving 
discrimination and profiling. Ultimately, the perspective taken in this Chapter opposes 
the exploitation of individuals in the surveillance economy. And finally, it paves the way 
for Chapter 3 by criticizing surveillance theorists’ views of privacy and arguing for the 
need to have individual privacy protections as conceptualized by privacy theorists.  
2.1 The Beginning: The Panopticon 
La visibilité est un piège…Le Panopticon fonctionne comme une sorte de 
laboratoire de pouvoir. 
           —Michel Foucault
116
  
While the first notions of surveillance have been discovered in population documents 
from ancient Egypt and records of English landholding with the Domesday Book of 
1086,
117
 an effective starting point for studying surveillance issues is with the Panopticon, 
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the “all-seeing prison”,
118
 and Jeremy Bentham.
119
 In fact, Bentham’s early ideas about 
the Panopticon are referred to as a “touchstone of surveillance theory”.
120
  
To Bentham, while punishment is both evil and yet necessary for the common good, cruel 
punishment is unnecessary.
121
 Bentham rejects the idea that by 1770, over 150 offences 
are punishable by death.
122
 Therefore, Bentham’s ideas regarding punishment involve 
milder punitive actions instead of the death penalty.
123
 In fact, Bentham believes that 
perpetual imprisonment should take the place of death because it is more economical for 
the labour of criminals to benefit society, and because the idea of perpetual imprisonment 
holds more terror for criminals than extinction.
124
 
Bentham describes the Panopticon as a beautiful and pleasant building, which he 
compares to a lantern and a glass bee-hive without a drone.
125
 The structure is a circular 
or polygonal shape with cells around the circumference; the core has a central inspection 
area with galleries and a lodge that is disjoined from the main building and linked to the 
outer perimeter only by stairways.
126
 From the lodge in the center inspection area, the 
watchers can carry out constant surveillance of the inmates while remaining invisible.
127
 
This center lodge is the focal point, and the central aperture must remain clear; the 
labyrinth of galleries, stairs, and passageways exist to separate and protect the warders 
from the inmates.
128
 Architecturally, Bentham uses glass for skylights and two large 
windows in each cell, along with iron for pillars, arches, staircases, and galleries.
129
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One important design goal of the Panopticon is to reverse the logic of the dungeon by 
spreading light and reason to the dark space where evil might flourish through 
illumination; by removing physical and moral evils, it is possible to reform and 
rehabilitate prisoners for the larger good.
130
 So for Bentham, it is critical that the 
prisoners are stripped and washed upon arrival, constantly clean, and regularly shaven in 
order to remain morally pure.
131
 The prisoners stay in a cell that is no larger than between 
nine and 13 feet deep and six feet wide, and at least nine feet in height.
132
 The Panopticon 
is known for its paradox of “crowded solitude”,
133
 which is the chilling vision of human 
beings packed together, yet alone.
134
 According to Bentham, labour can be converted to 
profit, even if combined with the expense of imprisonment.
135
 Inmates of the Panopticon 
work 14 hours at sedentary labour each day.
136
 Bentham refers to the Panopticon as “a 
mill for grinding rogues honest”.
137
 In addition to generating profits, work in the 
Panopticon leads to a significant reformation.
138
 
Although Bentham ultimately rejects the idea of the Panopticon,
139
 his ideas are later 
reconsidered and similarly rejected by an important surveillance theorist, Michel 
Foucault.
140
 
Foucault examines Bentham’s prison ideas and explores the Panopticon, where he notes 
the efficient control of individuals using the architecture of the building that allows for 
complete visibility of the individuals.
141
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Foucault states that it is more efficient and profitable, when considering the economy of 
power, to place people under surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary 
penalty.
142
 In fact, he states that the prison is meant to be an instrument in a project of 
transformation that is comparable with and no less perfect than a school, barracks, or 
hospital.
143
 
Foucault describes the architecture of the Panopticon as a building that is in the form of a 
ring, where the center has a tower that is pierced by large windows opening onto the 
inner face of the ring.
144
 The outer building is divided into cells, each of which traverses 
the whole thickness of the building; each cell has two windows, one opening onto the 
inside that faces the central tower, and one opening to the outside that allows daylight to 
pass through the whole cell.
145
 There is an overseer in the tower who watches the 
prisoners in the cells, and there is a backlighting in the cells that enables the overseer to 
pick out from the central tower silhouettes in the ring of cells.
146
 
To Foucault, the combination of daylight, interiorization, and the overseer’s gaze 
removes any protection a prisoner may have, increases visibility, and captures the inmate 
more effectively.
147
 Indeed, he states that power is created through transparency.
148
 
Foucault notes that the inexpensive model involves using a simple gaze—there is no need 
for arms, physical violence, or material constraints.
149
 He states:  
An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end 
by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus 
exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: 
power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost.
150
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According to Foucault, the illusion of power has considerable force, whereby individuals 
become virtuous by the simple fact of being observed.
151
 Foucault discusses the 
relationship between discipline and “docile bodies”.
152
 He explains that a body is docile if 
it can be subjected, used, transformed, and improved.
153
 He elaborates by outlining the 
methods (what he calls “disciplines”), which are typically general formulas of 
domination: scale of control (power over the active body); object of the control (the 
efficiency of movements and their internal organization); and the modality (an 
uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its 
results).
154
 He maintains that, while discipline produces docile bodies, the manipulation 
of the body, its gestures, and its behaviour creates a mechanics of power.
155
 What is 
more, he contends that discipline dissociates power from the body, turns it into an 
aptitude and capacity, and creates a relation of strict subjection.
156
  
Foucault also explores ideas involving using disciplinary power as a way to train 
individuals such that, “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of 
power that regards individuals both as objects and instruments of its exercise”.
157
 He 
considers hierarchized, continuous, and functional surveillance and states that it, “may 
not be one of the great technical ‘inventions’ of the eighteenth century, but its insidious 
extension owed its importance to the mechanisms of power that it brought with it”.
158
 He 
notes that the power in hierarchical surveillance functions like a piece of machinery.
159
 
He states: 
This enables the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it 
is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone 
of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted 
with the task of supervising; and absolutely ‘discreet’, for it functions 
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permanently and largely in silence. Discipline makes possible the operation 
of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism and which, 
for the spectacle of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of 
calculated gazes.
160
 
Foucault asserts that disciplinary power is exercised through its invisibility—at the same 
time, it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility.
161
 In 
particular, visibility maintains the hold of the power that is exercised over the subjects.
162
 
He curtly states, “Visibility is a trap”.
163
 Another important element for Foucault when 
describing the Panopticon is ensuring that inmates never know whether they are being 
watched at any one moment, so they must be sure that they may always be watched.
164
 In 
fact, since anyone could be watching, there is a greater risk that the inmate will be 
anxious about being continuously watched by anonymous observers.
165
 What is visible is 
the constant tall outline of the central tower from which the individual is spied on; what is 
invisible is the not knowing whether the individual is actually being watched at any one 
moment.
166
 
While the architecture of the Panopticon is fascinating, there is no question that the 
design is extremely manipulative. Foucault notes that the goal is to trap individuals using 
compulsory visibility, and to create anxiety among inmates so they are constantly worried 
about being watched by anonymous, invisible observers. The result is that the subjects 
self-censor and change their behaviour to become obedient. It is not surprising that 
Foucault describes the Panopticon as a “marvelous machine which, whatever use one 
may put it to, produces homogenous effects of power”.
167
 
What is most disturbing is that, when Foucault describes the Panopticon, he states that it 
can be used as a laboratory to carry out experiments and monitor their effects; for 
example, one can manipulate different punishments for different prisoners and then study 
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the effects.
168
 He goes so far as to say that the Panopticon is “a privileged place for 
experiments on men”.
169
 What is more, Foucault states: 
The Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its 
mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to 
penetrate into men’s behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, 
discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power 
is exercised.
170
 
Foucault also points out that the productive increase of power can be assured only if it is 
exercised continuously in the very foundations of society, in the subtlest possible way.
171
 
There is only one way to describe the panoptic schema aimed at perfecting the exercise of 
power
172
—devious and unscrupulous. 
Foucault states that what he describes as a “circular cage”
173
 is a great failure of penal 
justice since prisons do not diminish the crime rate; he accepts that detention causes 
recidivism.
174
 More specifically, Foucault notes that prisons may be multiplied or 
transformed, but still, the quantity of crime and criminals remains stable or even 
increases.
175
 Further, those who leave prison have more chance than before of returning 
to it—convicts are in very high proportion former inmates.
176
 He states that prisons 
cannot fail to produce delinquents, and they make it possible and even encourage the 
organization of delinquents who are commit future criminal acts.
177
 He adds that 
conditions to which free inmates are subjected, including surveillance by police, create a 
situation where recidivism is more likely.
178
 To this, he encourages the use of the seven 
universal maxims of the good “penitential condition”.
179
 He argues that delinquency is 
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one result of the system, but it also becomes part of and an instrument of it—it forms part 
of a circuit that is never interrupted: “police surveillance provides the prison with 
offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of 
police supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number of them to prison.”
180
   
There is no doubt that the design of the Panopticon is troubling in that it has a strong 
potential to create an exploitive abuse of surveillance power in order to control 
individuals. Given that this type of disciplinary power creates mechanisms of power that 
facilitate a relation of strict subjection, there is no attempt to preserve any sense of self-
determination among the inmates. Likewise, there is no attempt to treat the inmates as 
real people because they are simply viewed as pawns that are used in a game of 
manipulation. Indeed, Janet Semple characterizes the concept of ceaseless invisible 
inspection as profoundly disturbing, stating: 
The Panopticon can too easily become the prototype of a fiendishly efficient 
instrument of totalitarian control, of ruthless social engineering, and 
psychological manipulation. It has been deployed by his philosophic 
adversaries to suggest that the whole of Benthamite political theory is 
authoritarian and repressive…And for Michel Foucault, the Panopticon is a 
cruel and ingenious mechanism of the new physics of power designed to 
subjugate the individual.
181
 
 
In sum, I have explained the Panopticon as initially envisioned by Bentham, including 
its architectural design and Bentham’s goals to replace the death penalty with milder 
forms of punitive action. I then discussed how Foucault views the Panopticon, and how 
he examines the combination of daylight, interiorization, and the overseer’s gaze for the 
purposes of increasing visibility. I also noted the dangers of the Panopticon and its 
potential to dominate and control through an abuse of surveillance power. It was 
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important to study the Panopticon since the abuse of panoptic power applies both inside 
and outside the workplace.  
I will now turn to the issues involving ubiquitous surveillance—this is important since it 
is the first side of the coin that involves activities that take place outside the workplace 
that can affect the employment context. 
2.2 The Dangers of Ubiquitous Surveillance  
In this part I will discuss the nature of ubiquitous surveillance, and also the dangers 
associated with it. These dangers are relevant because what is discovered outside the 
workplace can affect what happens inside the workplace. 
Today’s surveillance theorists acknowledge that surveillance is ubiquitous in modern 
times; for instance, David Lyon maintains that systemic, routine, everyday surveillance 
has rapidly multiplied.
182
  
Roger Clarke and Graham Greenleaf define the ever-growing concept of dataveillance as 
“the systematic creation and/or use of personal data for the investigation or monitoring of 
the actions or communications of one or more persons”.
183
 Dataveillance can involve 
surveillance of an individual (defined as the surveillance of an identified person of 
interest for a specific reason) or mass surveillance (defined as the surveillance of groups 
of people to identify individuals who belong to a class of interest).
184
 They discuss the 
underlying concept of the “digital persona”, which is an individual’s public personality 
based on data and maintained by transactions; this digital persona is used as a proxy for 
the individual.
185
  
Gavin Smith elaborates on the concept of a “data-proxy”, and explains that exhaust, or 
data trails, give rise to “an abstracted figure created from the amalgamation of data traces 
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which serves as a representational signifier of selfhood in networked transactions 
between social actors and audiences”.
186
 Moreover, he states that data-proxies paint 
virtual portraits of a person’s habits and situation, like a networked impression of self for 
the purposes of establishing positive social relations and identity.
187
 Further, individuals 
aim to project a successful networked profile in order to avoid suffering data-derived 
harm and to enhance autonomy.
188
 
Clarke and Greenleaf believe that the purpose of dataveillance is to watch the shadow of 
a person that is cast as that person conducts economic, social, or political transactions.
189
 
They contend that dataveillance is conducted by using several techniques, some of which 
include profiling, data matching, and the monitoring of search terms.
190
 They also explain 
that a full understanding of any instance of surveillance requires that it is considered with 
respect to four temporal dimensions: the timeframe in which the surveillance is 
conducted (ephemeral, across a single span of time, across recurrent spans such as within 
24-hour cycles, or scattered across time following a trigger); the intensity with which 
surveillance is conducted (once, repeated, or continuous); the persistence of 
consequences of surveillance (ephemeral because it is limited to observation, short-to-
medium term because it is recorded, or long-term or permanent because it is archived); 
and the time period within which surveillance is applied (the present, real-time use, the 
past through retrospective use, or the future through prospective or predictive use).
191
 
Clarke and Greenleaf describe several forms of surveillance that have electronic features, 
such as: physical observation accompanied with audio or video streaming to another 
location; communications surveillance which can include metadata about the messages; 
location surveillance which can be caught in logs of vehicle movements; experience 
surveillance noting patterns of behaviour which can be captured on CCTV images or with 
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lists of search terms; and bodily surveillance including biometrics used with streaming to 
another location.
192
 
To recap for a moment, I have noted that there are several theorists such as Lyon, Clarke 
and Greenleaf, and Smith, who provide a foundation of understanding regarding the 
nature of electronic surveillance and the digital persona involving ubiquitous 
surveillance.  
But other theorists more adamantly point out some of the dangers associated with 
ubiquitous surveillance. For instance, Mark Andrejevic contemplates automated data 
collection and processing, and argues that surveillance goes beyond what even Foucault 
imagined with the internalization of the monitoring gaze; automated surveillance replaces 
deterrence by simply predicting and pre-empting.
193
 The “always-on” monitoring that 
enables predictions requires digital infrastructures and platforms, and most importantly, 
automation.
194
 Automation is a critical feature because large quantities of information are 
generated using embedded sensors, and this can only be accomplished technically with 
automated data processing.
195
 
Though the technology is intriguing, Andrejevic insists our dependence on digital media, 
together with the omnipresent monitoring, can lead to unwanted consequences: 
We are rapidly headed toward a world in which all aspects of our lives 
become increasingly dependent upon digital media that, in turn, create 
comprehensive records of our activities, communications, purchases, and—
to the extent that these can be rendered in digital form—our thoughts, 
hopes, and dreams.
196
 
Andrejevic points to the dangers and asserts that ubiquitous surveillance creates a 
potential for exploitation of individuals through the abuse of surveillance power, stating: 
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When we speak of surveillance, we also typically invoke asymmetrical 
power relations between watcher and watched, with the former in the 
dominant position.
197
 
He notes that, while there are several benefits associated with recent technological 
development associated with ubiquitous monitoring, there is also an accompanying deep-
seated social anxiety: “that we all fundamentally depend on forms of trust that can be 
abused and disappointed”.
198
 Andrejevic states that the necessary forms of trust built into 
our daily lives and our dependence on them have become a “vector of vulnerability”.
199
  
Most importantly, however, Andrejevic posits that the endpoint of data-driven decision-
making is the automation of judgment.
200
 He identifies a serious problem: the idea of 
mechanic neutrality is not possible given the incomplete, inaccurate, or biased data and 
algorithms that are crafted by humans using human limitations—this occurs when we 
attempt to clean the data, make it accurate, and turn the development of automated 
systems over to the machines themselves.
201
 Ultimately, Andrejevic concludes that we 
are developing systems that replace societal decisions governing life, liberty, and 
opportunity.
202
  
Moreover, Andrejevic considers big data surveillance, and states that the strategy has 
recently transformed from starting with a suspect to monitor due to suspicion, to starting 
with generalized surveillance and subsequently generating suspects.
203
 That is, using 
surveillance and simulations, the strategy is to intervene in the future by modeling it.
204
 
Andrejevic explains that data mining and profiling involves managing information and 
communications, and subsequently using control mechanisms by forecasting all 
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conceivable outcomes in advance.
205
 In order to accomplish this goal, it is necessary to 
have comprehensive monitoring, which is also known as ubiquitous surveillance.
206
 He 
says that to model the future and then modulate the present to intervene in it, several 
elements must be present: tracking everyone in the group; studying correlations for 
revealing predictability; monitoring in a pre-emptive manner so that outcomes are not 
only predicted but also altered; ensuring that the tracking is interventionist in that there 
can be forms of experimentation to generate even more data; collecting all information 
because it is relevant; and tracking anonymously because the goal is to detect patterns of 
correlations (however, he admits that some tracking leads to individuals being identified 
simply by scraping data off the Internet).
207
 
Andrejevic reflects on the ethics of big data and pervasive surveillance, and argues that 
data becomes a form of power when it is used to manipulate individuals and to shape the 
information that is available to them.
208
 He contends that this is particularly concerning 
when dealing with the level of influence, the categorization of individuals, and 
consequent decision-making.
209
 Similarly, he notes the dangers associated with “function 
creep”, which is the repurposing of personal information for new uses, other than those 
for which the information was originally collected, so that additional purposes are created 
unbeknownst to the data subject.
210
  
I have just noted Andrejevic’s concerns about this powerful and complicated technology. 
But the next few theorists stress that we are exposing ourselves when we participate in 
our own surveillance—making the situation worse. 
For example, Colin J Bennett, Kevin D. Haggerty, David Lyon, and Valerie Steeves state 
that opportunities to conduct ubiquitous surveillance have expanded because of our new 
digital existence and also because of the increased sophistication of surveillance 
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systems.
211
 They highlight that we encounter surveillance everywhere—in our cars, 
buildings, and homes.
212
 Moreover, Bennett et al note that social media use and mobile 
devices have created an explosion of possibilities to monitor individuals.
213
 We watch 
each other; it can be playful to be watched and to watch others, to stay connected with 
people, and to engage in activities such as posting content, tagging photos, and liking 
pictures or videos.
214
 However, they emphasize that every time we post personal 
information online, we inadvertently participate in our own surveillance because 
information can be easily captured by anyone, ranging from marketers, stalkers, the State, 
employers, or identity thieves, who use the information for their own purposes.
215
 What is 
dismaying is that surveillance conducted by organizations involves the more powerful 
governments, employers, and businesses watching the less powerful.
216
 Bennett et al. 
state: 
The contemporary expansion of surveillance, such that monitoring becomes 
an ever more routine part of our lives, represents a tremendous shift in the 
balance of power between citizens and organizations. Perhaps the greatest 
danger in all of this is therefore not that a specific surveillance measure will 
be too intrusive, or that mistakes will be made in identifying or processing 
people, or that data will be lost. Instead, the most significant—but 
impossible to quantify—danger comes from the simple fact that we are 
creating, step by step, a society that is hard-wired for surveillance and that 
such devices can easily be turned to oppressive uses.
217
 
Perhaps this is why Andrejevic asserts that individuals are creating their own digital 
enclosures; he suggests that the exploitation involved with being constantly watched has 
created a situation where there is a shift in control over personal information from 
individuals to private corporations.
218
 Also disconcerting is that he states that, for the 
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sake of creating a customized experience, individuals provide various details such as 
behavioural habits and consumption preferences.
219
  
Indeed, Lyon argues that we live in a surveillance society and exist in a culture of 
surveillance whereby our daily lives are recorded, monitored, and tracked in 
unprecedented ways—everyday life routines play an increasing role in constituting 
surveillance through interactivity and user-generated surveillance, to the point where 
surveillance has become part of a way of seeing and being in the world.
220
 He opines that 
it is hard if not impossible not to participate in the culture of surveillance.
221
 In fact, he 
asserts that corporations are involved in extensive surveillance, and perhaps even more so 
than State agencies, because they do so in less obvious ways; as a result, surveillance is 
taken for granted and ultimately becomes a less perceptible “part of the furniture”.
222
  
Likewise, Bernard E. Harcourt emphasizes that we live in an expository society: 
In our digital frenzy to share snapshots and updates, to text and video chat 
with friends and lovers, to “quantify” ourselves, we are exposing ourselves 
—rendering ourselves virtually transparent to anyone with rudimentary 
technological capabilities. We are exhibiting ourselves through petabytes of 
electronic traces that we leave everywhere, traces that can be collected, 
linked together, and amalgamated, traces that paradoxically, although they 
are virtual, have become more tangible, more provable, more demonstrable, 
and more fixed than our analog selves.
223
 
Harcourt warns that by exposing ourselves in this way, we make it easy, tempting, and 
cheap to watch us, monitor us, target us, track us, detain us, and for some, to extract and 
punish us—we allow ourselves to be shaped in unprecedented ways, intentionally or 
unwittingly.
224
 He asserts that our new social condition is radically transforming our 
relations to each other, our community, and ourselves.
225
 What is most troubling is that 
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he cautions that we are no longer being coerced; we are exposing or exhibiting ourselves 
knowingly with love, lust, passion, and politics.
226
 
Even though we seem to understand that there are dangers, Lyon states that we still give 
up our personal information freely and fully, and voluntarily participate in the 
surveillance culture through our regular social media activity.
227
 We continue to engage 
in social networking sites because it is fun and entertaining—a phenomenon referred to 
as the “privacy paradox”.
228
 Susan B. Barnes notes that we reveal intimate thoughts and 
behaviours online, while at the same time, government agencies and marketers are 
collecting personal data about us.
229
 As articulated by Alyson Leigh Young and Anabel 
Quan-Haase, the privacy paradox is the willingness to disclose personal information on 
social network sites, despite expressing high levels of concern about privacy.
230
 
To this point, I have discussed how theorists such as Bennett et al., Lyon, Harcourt, 
Susan B. Barnes, as well as Alyson Leigh Young and Anabel Quan-Haase stress that we 
regularly encounter ubiquitous surveillance, and we are aggravating the situation by 
willingly exposing ourselves and putting ourselves at risk for mistreatment. 
Still, other theorists more aggressively point out that we are being exploited by capital in 
a surveillance economy. 
More specifically, Nicole S. Cohen alerts us that social networking companies capitalize 
on time spent participating in communicative activity and information sharing; she states 
that producer-consumers (prosumers) provide the content to generate the traffic, and the 
companies leverage this content into advertising sales.
231
 For example, Facebook 
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capitalizes on the productivity of community members by using surveillance.
232
 Cohen 
shares the unsettling fact that, as the community members are enjoying the social features 
provided by the company, these companies “obscure economic relations that reflect 
larger patterns of capitalist development in the digital age”.
233
 
But Christian Fuchs goes further than this. He discusses the growing phenomenon of the 
progressive blurring of the line separating producers and consumers, as these prosumers 
engage in “prosumption” when they generate online content.
234
 He warns that the 
combination of surveillance and prosumption is at the heart of capital accumulation on 
web 2.0—the surveillance conducted on individuals and groups is aimed at controlling 
behaviour because they know that their appearance, movements, location, or ideas could 
be watched by surveillance systems.
235
 He urges that ultimately, users produce surplus 
value and are largely exploited by capital; companies like Google and Facebook exploit 
the surplus value while providing free access to the services and platforms so users can 
continue to produce the content.
236
 This is especially common in scenarios involving 
entertainment, play, and fun.
237
 Fuchs boldly claims that: 
Surveillance is a specific kind of information gathering, storage, processing 
and assessment, and its use involves potential or actual harm, coercion, 
violence, asymmetric power relations, control, manipulation, domination 
and disciplinary power. It is an instrument and a means for trying to derive 
and accumulate benefits for certain groups or individuals at the expense of 
other groups or individuals. It tries to bring about or prevent certain 
behaviours of groups or individuals by gathering, storing, processing, 
diffusing, assessing and using data so that potential or actual physical, 
ideological or structural violence can be directed against humans in order to 
control and steer their behaviour.
238
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One of the most dynamic and persuasive capitalist surveillance theorists to highlight 
concerns about the abuse of surveillance power, Shoshana Zuboff, continues and goes 
even further when she vigorously stresses that a new form of information capitalism aims 
to predict and modify human behaviour to produce revenue and market control.
239
 She 
explains that big data comes from: data from computer-mediated economic transactions 
with companies; data from billions of sensors embedded in several objects, bodies, and 
places such as wearables; data from corporate and government databases such as banks or 
credit card companies; and surveillance cameras that are private or public such as Google 
Street View.
240
 She points to the distressing fact that large tech companies such as 
Google have engaged in data extraction and exploitation through monitoring efforts and 
creating profiles.
241
 She states: 
Surveillance capitalism establishes a new form of power in which contract 
and the rule of law are supplanted by the rewards and punishments of a new 
kind of invisible hand.
242
 
Zuboff unapologetically insists that surveillance capitalism has become a new breed of 
economic power in which every casual search, like, and click is claimed as an asset to be 
tracked, parsed and monetized by a large tech company.
243
 Zuboff reminds us that in this 
world, netizens are neither customers nor products; they are sources of raw material 
supply (behavioural data surplus) in a raw material extraction operation, and the products 
are about predicting individuals’ future behaviour without caring about them at all.
244
 She 
cautions that the goal of the main Internet companies is to assess behavioural data and 
subsequently know what a particular individual is thinking, feeling, and doing at any 
moment in time in any place.
245
 Zuboff states: 
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That this no longer seems astonishing to us, or perhaps even worthy of note, 
is evidence of the profound psychic numbing that has inured us to a bold 
and unprecedented shift in capitalist methods.
246
 
In fact, Zuboff goes so far as to say that companies such as Google use additional data 
from services such as Google Search to create new capabilities to infer and deduce the 
thoughts, feelings, intentions, and interests of individuals and groups with an automated 
architecture that operates as a one-way mirror irrespective of one’s awareness, 
knowledge, and consent; this enables privileged secret access to behavioural data, and 
subsequently, these raw materials transform into surveillance capital.
247
 She explains the 
process of discovering behavioural surplus as follows: 
Surveillance capitalism begins with the discovery of behavioral surplus. 
More behavioral data are rendered than required for service improvements. 
This surplus feeds machine intelligence – the new means of production – 
that fabricates predictions of user behaviour. These products are sold to 
business customers in new behavioral futures markets.
248
 
What is most concerning is that Zuboff uncovers the attitudes of the main Internet 
companies who aim to avoid government regulation and the voicing of privacy 
concerns.
249
 Zuboff insists that surveillance capitalists are impelled to pursue lawlessness 
by the logic of their own creation: 
Google and Facebook vigorously lobby to kill online privacy protection, 
limit regulations, weaken or block privacy-enhancing legislation, and thwart 
every attempt to circumscribe their practices because such laws are 
existential threats to the frictionless flow of behavioral surplus.
250
 
Zuboff  provides an example of the danger of having no checks in place: Internet 
companies can easily exploit their powers, such as with the Google Street View operation 
(pictures were taken on the ground to organize the world’s information) consisting of a 
covert data sweep, secretly collecting personal information from private Wi-Fi networks 
in people’s homes, where stolen personal information included names, telephone 
numbers, credit information, passwords, messages, emails, chat transcripts, records of 
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online dating, pornography, browsing behaviour, medical information, location data, 
photos, along with audio and video files—enough information to create data packets that 
could be assembled to form a detailed profile of an identifiable person.
251
 
Zuboff’s main concern here is inevitabilism, a situation where no room is left for humans 
to believe that they have free will and that they are the authors of their futures.
252
 In short, 
she is concerned that humans will not be able to be allowed to enjoy the right of self-
determination. One example that raises several questions is the Google City in connection 
with Sidewalk Labs, where all smart devices are connected, collecting and sharing 
behavioural data—Zuboff asks what a smart product knows, who it tells, who knows the 
information, who makes decisions, and who decides the actors who make these 
decisions.
253
 What is most alarming with respect to these smart devices and applications 
is the absence of meaningful privacy policies.
254
  
Also unsettling, Zuboff sheds light on the goal of large Internet companies: to be able to 
accurately predict behaviour after rendering the data.
255
 And, not only is the goal to 
predict behaviour, but it is also to shape behaviour by modifying real-time actions in the 
real world since connected smart sensors can register and analyze any kind of behaviour 
and determine how to manipulate it by using nudges (tuning), controlling a person’s 
context (herding), and mastering schedules of reinforcement (conditioning).
256
 These 
strategies are based on learning theories by behaviourists such as Watson, Pavlov, and 
Skinner.
257
 Zuboff warns that the end goal is to automate information flows about people 
to automate people for the purposes of modification, prediction, monetization, and 
control.
258
 She suggests that the ultimate goal is to create a collective, where behaviour is 
carried out for the greater good, and where there is social pressure for harmony through 
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the use of social physics and the weakening of individuality.
259
 To that end, Zuboff insists 
that there needs to be a freedom of will and a right to the future tense for us to live a fully 
human life.
260
 What she is arguing for then, in other words, is a right to be treated as a 
human being with self-determination and autonomy in the midst of endless corporate 
attempts to continuously monitor and control behaviour for their own benefit. 
Let me pause here for a moment. I have discussed several theories regarding the nature 
and the associated dangers of ubiquitous surveillance. I just emphasized the views of the 
most assertive and convincing theorists such as N. Cohen, Fuchs, and Zuboff, when it 
comes to the exploitation of users in the surveillance economy. 
I will now focus on some of the consequences that arise due to the abuse of surveillance 
power in this regard. 
More precisely, social surveillance in the ubiquitous realm creates a potential for 
discriminatory practices. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. refers to the “panoptic sort”
261
 to describe a 
system of social control where the State and corporate bureaucracies collect, process, and 
share massive amounts of personal information to track, command, coordinate, and 
control individuals to an unimaginable extent.
262
 He stresses that the panoptic sort is “a 
kind of high tech cybernetic triage through which individuals and groups of people are 
sorted according to their presumed economic or political value” and insists that the 
poorer classes of individuals, especially minorities, are “increasingly being treated as 
broken material or damaged goods to be discarded or sold at bargain prices to scavengers 
in the marketplace”.
263
 
In fact, Gandy Jr. cautions that this sorting mechanism only exacerbates the massive and 
destructive inequality that characterizes the political economy as it moves forward into 
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the information age.
264
 He notes that the panoptic sort increases the ability to organize 
interests and communicate differentially with individuals to influence behaviour.
265
 And 
he asserts that the panoptic sort is a technology that is continually revised to serve the 
interests of the decision makers within both government and corporate bureaucracies.
266
 
Gandy Jr. warns that, although corporations need accurate and timely information for the 
purposes of efficiency of their production process, strategic planning, and making 
analytical models of performance and potential, the quality of information is suspect and 
susceptible to errors of measuring, misinterpretation, and strategic modification such that 
the analysis only becomes more flawed with compounding errors.
267
  
Gandy Jr. states that the information that is collected, processed, and shared is generated 
through the daily lives of citizens, employees and consumers.
268
 He argues that the 
panoptic sort is a system of disciplinary surveillance that sorts individuals into categories 
and classes on the basis of their routine measurements; in this way, it is discriminatory 
since it allocates options and opportunities on the basis of those measures and the 
administrative models that they inform.
269
 
What is more, Gandy Jr. states that inequality is inherent in situations where individuals 
are dealing with organizations; the power that individuals exercise over the organization 
when they withhold personal information is almost always insignificant, compared with 
the power of the organization that chooses to withhold goods or services unless 
information is provided.
270
 Gandy Jr. explains that prediction is of central importance to 
the panoptic sort for forecasting outcomes that are likely for classes of individuals; this is 
important because predictability reduces uncertainty about individual behaviour, and the 
use of power can induce a desired and predictable reaction.
271
 He suggests that the heart 
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of the panoptic sort is the pursuit of improvement of predictability.
272
 Gandy Jr. states 
that, “The panoptic sort is a system of power”.
273
 
As a result, we see such things as racial profiling, which Gandy Jr. describes as, “a low-
level form of predictive technology”.
274
 For example, with respect to the discriminatory 
consequences of sorting in the criminal justice system, while criminal profiles used by 
police typically contain several characteristics in the analysis, he says that racial profiles 
collapse the entire set of characteristics and place a greater weight on the race of the 
individual.
275
 Gandy Jr. explains that the reason this is troubling is because many of the 
analytical models contain indicators or variables that are biased.
276
 For instance, Gandy 
Jr. stresses that authority acts on the assumption that African Americans are more likely 
to be engaged in criminal behaviour; this translates into more stops, searches, and 
arrests.
277
 As a result, African Americans are on average subject to significantly more 
extensive policing, and this affects the quality of the relationship between the parties.
278
  
In addition to racial profiling, there are other groups who experience differential 
treatment as a result of surveillance and panoptic sorting; for example, feminist 
surveillance scholars, Corinne Mason and Shoshana Magnet, note the history of 
inequality associated with surveillance practices, especially stalking and violence against 
women.
279
 They define stalking as obsessive behaviour directed toward another person 
involving persistent, malicious, and unwanted surveillance that is seen as a constant 
threat to the victim’s personal security.
280
 Mason and Magnet explain that electronic 
technologies can be used by abusers to monitor the actions and movements of victims; 
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some of these technologies that can be used to harass and track targets include GPS, 
electronic records, Internet search engines, text messages, and social media.
281
 Another 
unsettling consequence of using electronic surveillance is the use of spyware to monitor 
online activities of targets and learn the locations of crisis centers and shelters.
282
 Mason 
and Magnet emphasize that surveillance technologies reflect the cultural context which is 
filled with persistent inequalities and the perpetuation of violence against women.
283
  
I have therefore examined issues involving ubiquitous surveillance, and this was 
important since it was the first side of the coin involving activities that take place outside 
the workplace that can affect the employment context. As noted above, the dangers 
discussed have undesired consequences such as discrimination and violence as noted by 
Gandy Jr. and Mason and Magnet respectively. 
I will now turn my attention to the other side of the coin—the theories that deal with 
electronic surveillance inside the workplace.  
2.3 The Struggles Regarding Surveillance in the 
Workplace 
In this part I will discuss the nature of surveillance that is conducted inside the 
workplace, and also the dangers associated with it. As will be seen below, this part 
explores the impact of electronic surveillance in employment relationships characterized 
by power imbalances, and notes the effects on employee trust in management. 
Kirstie Ball provides significant insights into the area of electronic surveillance and 
monitoring of employees in organizations. She provides a solid foundation for 
understanding the nature of electronic surveillance that arises in the workplace. Ball 
states that surveillance in the workplace refers to management’s ability to monitor, 
record, and track employee performance, behaviours, and personal characteristics in real 
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time or as part of broader organizational processes.
284
 Ball explains that surveillance 
generally functions as a way of controlling access to different levels of the organizational 
hierarchy and to the organization itself.
285
 She notes that information is collected on 
employees using surveillance with a range of techniques from computer and telephone 
logging, to CCTV, to mobility tracking, to electronic recruitment.
286
 She attributes the 
increase in employee monitoring to the Internet, and notes that it is very common for 
companies to monitor worker communications and on-the-job activities.
287
 She also states 
that surveillance techniques are rarely the subject of collective bargaining.
288
 
Ball simply accepts that workplace surveillance and business organizations go hand-in-
hand and employee monitoring is nothing new.
289
 To support this point, she cites older 
types of surveillance such as clocking-in or counting and weighing output for payment by 
piece-rate.
290
 Nevertheless, she then admits that business organizations are hierarchies 
that function by superordinate positions monitoring and controlling positions below them 
in the hierarchy; drawing from concepts associated with the Panopticon, she explains that 
a supervisor is the same thing as an overseer.
291
 She emphasizes that throughout history, 
controlling and monitoring employees in the workplace is a central part of management; 
both recent technological developments and a management culture that emphasizes 
individual measurement and management have intensified individual monitoring.
292
 
Despite the dangers, Ball is comfortable with the idea that surveillance at work is 
necessary and a normal element of working life that has been taken for granted.
293
 She 
goes so far as to say that employees expect to have their performance reviewed and 
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information gathered on their activities and whereabouts—she says that this is a sign of 
good management practice.
294
 
However, she finally admits that there are some controversies in this regard: when 
employee monitoring goes beyond what is considered reasonable or necessary; when 
employers demand exacting and precise information as to how employees use their time; 
and when the monitoring compromises working practices and negatively affects existing 
levels of control, autonomy, and trust.
295
 Consequently, she explains that this is why 
some aspects of surveillance are considered acceptable to workers, while other aspects 
are opposed because they are considered to be too intrusive to workers.
296
 She detects 
two concerns that go hand-in-hand: many employers lack specific policy provisions, and 
there is a lack of awareness of monitoring policies and practices among employees.
297
 
For Ball, employers monitor performance and behaviours as part of ongoing production 
processes in real time, or personal characteristics as part of a one-off event to control 
access to the organization.
298
 She provides some examples of the technologies involved 
for each type of monitoring. First, some examples of electronic measurements of 
performance include: keystrokes or telephone call content, or communications such as 
email and web monitoring.
299
 Second, some examples of electronic tracking of behaviors 
include: location devices such as pagers, CCTV, GPS, and RFID, or covert surveillance 
(for instance, hidden cameras) to counter employee theft.
300
 Third, some examples of 
electronic monitoring personal characteristics include: biometrics (bodily measurements 
such as electronic fingerprinting or retina and iris scanning), data mining, headhunting, 
and e-recruitment.
301
 Ball notes that monitoring personal characteristics is more pervasive 
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given that employers can make conclusions about employees’ lifestyles, and this raises 
questions as to whether the employers should have this information.
302
  
Ball casually notes that surveillance in the workplace is developing in respect of 
increased use of personal data, of biometrics, and covert surveillance; for instance, there 
is an increased use of human resources information systems or Internet activities such as 
e-recruitment and data mining of curriculum vitae databases.
303
 She explains that 
“flipping” is becoming more common, whereby certain individuals covertly search for 
potential applicants by accessing user chat rooms or secretly going into organizations’ 
Intranets to poach current employees.
304
 But then she does recognize that there are 
privacy concerns associated with covert surveillance of email communications, especially 
since the employer has the capacity to record and store these communications.
305
 She 
notes that this is because the communications may contain private conversations that 
include confidential information, and also information that could be stored on offshore 
servers in different jurisdictions that are subject to different rules.
306
 Ball appreciates the 
fact that policies differ in workplaces, and this causes challenges for privacy 
protection.
307
 
According to Ball, there are three main reasons why an employer would want to monitor 
employees: to maintain productivity and monitor resource use by employees; to protect 
corporate interests and trade secrets (this includes minimizing risks of defamation, 
sabotage, data theft, and hacking); and to protect the company from legal liability.
308
 In 
fact, she points out that employee monitoring can serve as a significant risk management 
tool in order to limit costs and risks, protect value, and maintain quality.
309
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Yet, Ball appreciates the dangers, namely, that excessive monitoring can be detrimental 
to employees when she states that privacy can be compromised if the employees do not 
authorize the disclosure of their information and it is subsequently broadcast to unknown 
third parties.
310
 Also, she notes that there is the risk of function creep, as described by 
Andrejevic above.
311
 And when employees know that they are being monitored, creative 
behaviour is reduced for fear of being judged negatively.
312
 Further, Ball contends that 
using surveillance sends a strong message about what is expected and valued based on 
what tasks are monitored; monitored tasks are considered to be more valuable.
313
 She 
points to another peril: there is a danger of “anticipatory conformity”, where employees 
behave in docile and accepting ways, and this reduces commitment and motivation 
levels.
314
 She admits that trust levels also reduce and can even be damaged when 
monitoring is improperly implemented.
315
 Lastly, she cautions that excessive monitoring 
can actually produce the behaviours it was designed to prevent—when workers perceive 
excessive control using surveillance, they may manipulate the boundaries, sabotage the 
workplace, or simply refuse to comply with management’s expectations.
316
 
Ball elaborates on what can happen when employers use excessive electronic surveillance 
on employees; studies of call centers demonstrate that intense surveillance increases 
resistance, sabotage and non-compliance with management.
317
 That is, workers who are 
extensively monitored are impacted quantitatively and qualitatively; they manipulate 
measures by dialing through call lists, leaving the lines open after the customer has 
already hung up, pretending to talk on the phone, providing minimal responses to 
customer queries, and misleading customers.
318
 Likewise, the same can be said for 
managers who are under excessive electronic surveillance; they have been found to 
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collude with workers in order to produce the desirable results.
319
 Ball explains that 
workers apply “tacit knowledge”, which means getting the better of monitoring, but not 
actively challenging the overall practice.
320
 She notes that an example of more active 
employee resistance includes participating in “gripe” or “sucks” sites, where employees 
make online posts describing negative experiences they have with organizations.
321
  
It is encouraging that Ball admits that privacy, ethics, and human rights issues are 
endemic to workplace surveillance.
322
 Furthermore, she explains that discrimination in e-
recruitment is also a major issue, especially since there is a temptation to create more of 
the same in an organization.
323
 Indeed, the consequences of the panoptic sort manifest in 
the workplace, especially when relying on electronic surveillance technologies. Though 
she describes these considerations, she does not propose any solutions. But she explains 
that there are a few strategies to mitigate some of the negative consequences of employee 
monitoring by structuring task design, supervisory style, and employee cognition of 
monitoring.
324
 For instance, she states that task design involves whether the employee has 
a choice in the pace and timing of their task; in situations where the monitoring is 
constant, it is likely that there will be more of an adverse effect compared to monitoring 
that is conducted intermittently or at regular intervals, and tasks that are not easily 
monitored must be evaluated in other ways.
325
 Also, when supervisors rate employees 
negatively using monitoring, they are less likely to change their minds; also, workers tend 
to reach the same conclusions, and this leads to resistance and retaliation.
326
 She proposes 
that the solution is to provide a mix of feedback and coaching that does not depend solely 
on monitoring, and when monitoring is used, supervisors need to clearly explain the 
criteria.
327
 Also, cognitive factors relating to monitoring include employees’ 
predispositions towards monitoring, and whether employees have a prior level of trust in 
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the supervisors using monitoring; where employees perceive the monitoring as too 
invasive or unreasonable, the opposite of the desired effect can occur.
328
  
What is most concerning is that, while Ball mentions that there are issues regarding how 
to balance competing interests in the workplace, she does not provide any solutions; for 
instance, she merely notes that there are issues when dealing with the question of 
allowing employees to blog publicly versus the employer’s interest to covertly monitor 
off-duty Internet activity outside the workplace.
329
 This is disappointing, because she 
presents an issue that amounts to the crux of the issue when it comes to electronic 
surveillance in employment, and leaves the reader hanging. 
Therefore, although Ball provides information that is helpful for understanding the 
background concerning electronic surveillance in the workplace, and also some tips on 
how to monitor performance in the workplace using task design, supervisory style, and 
predispositions involving trust, she does not provide assistance on how to solve the more 
contentious problems that she describes. In particular, she points to some of the dangers 
that can lead to the abuse of surveillance power by employers, and their consequences, 
but she does not provide a balanced solution that allows for the respect of privacy of 
employees and the legitimate business needs of employers. She similarly does not spend 
sufficient time examining the trust dynamics in the employment relationship 
characterized by unequal bargaining power. 
That said, Ball and Stephen T. Margulis together note that there are significant 
psychological effects associated with employee monitoring.
330
 They caution that when 
employees experience stress due to monitoring, the consequences include physical 
symptoms such as pain (manifested as conditions such as repetitive strain injury and 
musculoskeletal discomfort), and psychological symptoms (manifested as conditions 
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such as low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression).
331
 Further, Ball, Elizabeth M. Daniel, 
and Chris Stride recognize that employees are typically not permitted to make the same 
types of choices to protect their privacy compared to regular citizens and consumers, 
because they are usually subject to the working practices and environment dictated by 
their employers.
332
 Additionally, they note that, in situations where employers provide 
effective data protection training dealing with the handling of customer data and privacy, 
employees’ concerns about their own privacy increase; therefore, they recommend that 
employers also demonstrate that employee data is held in the same regard as customer 
data and worthy of similar treatment with strict rules and processes.
333
 
To this point, I have discussed some important information regarding the nature of 
electronic surveillance in the workplace as explained by Ball and also Ball et al.  
Now, I will move on and explore the effects of electronic surveillance on employees, 
considering the power imbalances at play. 
For instance, Graham Sewell, James R. Barker, and Daniel Nyberg delve deeper into 
performance measurement and employee perceptions, and find that employees are likely 
to have one of two views when making sense of how and why surveillance is used to 
regulate conduct: “Care” and “Coercion” perspectives.
334
 That is, the “Care” perspective 
views surveillance as a means of minimizing opportunistic behaviour such as free-riding, 
whereas the “Coercion” views surveillance as a means of increasing the subordination of 
an employee.
335
 On one hand, the Care viewpoint entails using surveillance as a source of 
protection against antisocial behaviour and broadly legitimizes performance measurement 
in almost all circumstances since it is seen as beneficial.
336
 On the other hand, the 
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Coercion viewpoint involves the phenomenon of the few watching the many in the 
interests of the few.
337
 Sewell et al. state that, regardless of which viewpoint is taken, 
performance measurement is conducted in the same way—performance standards are set, 
performance is measured, and there is a determination of whether these standards are met 
when assessing individual performance.
338
 They assert that this is a rational way of 
determining individual performance, and at this point, it is possible to draw on the results 
to assess outcomes such as setting remuneration levels, determining severity of 
punishment, and making disciplinary decisions—the answers to these questions depend 
which viewpoint is used.
339
 For example, when using the Care viewpoint, performance 
measurement is considered to be protective since it serves the interests of the majority; it 
rewards employees who meet the norms of behaviour, and punishes employees who 
reject these norms.
340
 In this scenario, the interests of the parties are mutual and the 
organizational dynamic is characterized by convergent interests because most recognize 
the legitimacy of the performance measurement.
341
  
But it is clear that the Coercion viewpoint provides a more realistic picture of current 
workplace dynamics involving electronic surveillance. Sewell et al. find that, when using 
a Coercion viewpoint, the performance measurement is viewed as an instrument of 
domination seeking to subordinate the interests of the majority to those of the minority; 
consequently, this creates a situation where managers and employees have opposite 
interests, and where they pursue purposeful behaviors in order to further their interests.
342
 
Using this lens, the goal of performance measurement is for employers to maximize 
productivity and police the conduct of employees who must work at their maximum 
capacity.
343
 They state that managers are the overseers who must ensure visibility of 
workers, and workers are the overseen who must avoid the managers’ gaze.
344
 In their 
efforts to maximize performance, the employers, the subjects of performance 
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management, identify the employees who fall above and below the acceptable standards, 
and provide rewards and punishments accordingly.
345
 They contend that, an employer’s 
goal is to eliminate autonomy, intensify work to unprecedented levels, and eliminate 
dissent.
346
 In contrast, the employees, the members of the working class, become objects 
of performance measurement and wish to avoid subjugation and assert their autonomy.
347
 
They state that a broader dystopian vision of this dynamic would be intensive 
performance measurement that, if left uncorrected, would ultimately lead to the 
subjugation of employees as they recognize the futility of being disobedient.
348
 Sewell et 
al. claim that this type of work dynamic can lead to various objections focusing on 
control and subordination; some examples include collective industrial action and 
manipulation or sabotage of performance management systems.
349
 In fact, they contend 
that, when surveillance is everywhere, one consequence could be opposition at every 
opportunity through localized political activity.
350
 
Sewell et al. study performance management in call centers and find that there are high 
levels of frustration as a result of the performance measurement involving close 
surveillance and constant comparison of performance levels among workers.
351
 In fact, 
the workers view the performance measurement as an instrument of domination and 
express a sense of resignation about its impact.
352
 It is unsettling that workers grudgingly 
express that there is little they can do to challenge this use of surveillance, to the point 
where it appears that there is an elimination of autonomy and a complete submission of 
the workers to the will of the managers and their performance management systems.
353
  
Further, Sewell et al. also note that performance measurement can create or exacerbate 
asymmetrical power relationships in organizations as they can become forceful forms of 
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control or the focus of political struggles in the organization.
354
 They suggest several 
questions that arise when scrutinizing the legitimacy of power relationships, including 
how much choice the workers have about the extent to which they are monitored.
355
 
Interestingly, when considering whether it is possible to prevent performance 
measurement from becoming oppressive, Sewell et al. note that at the individual level, it 
is common for surveillance to be viewed as onerous and offensive, while at the collective 
level, we often see surveillance as an essential means for maintaining important features 
such as fairness and social cohesion.
356
 They state, “Like it or not, we are participants in 
our own understanding of organizational surveillance”.
357
 They question the political and 
ethical implications of ever-increasing monitoring in organizations, asking who gets to 
use it and for what purposes it is used.
358
  
Pointing to the dangers of workplace electronic surveillance, Peter Jeffrey Holland, Brian 
Cooper, and Rob Hecker find that electronic monitoring and surveillance can have 
negative effects on the employment relationship through the loss of trust in management, 
particularly for manual workers.
359
 What is discouraging is that this effect manifests as 
withdrawal behaviour, namely exiting the organization.
360
 Holland, Cooper, and Hecker 
discuss trust in management as a critical element for organizations to foster in the 
workplace; they highlight that it is essential when seen as the basis for quality 
relationships, cooperation, and stability in the workplace.
361
 Also, they emphasize the 
importance of trust in power relationships involving employers and employees.
362
 
Drawing on the social exchange theory, they see the employment relationship as a series 
of ongoing exchange relationships, which over time, establishes the nature and structure 
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of the employment interactions; this is how reciprocity is manifested in the workplace.
363
 
They state that trust is the confidence that parties in the exchange have to not exploit each 
other’s’ vulnerabilities; the key characteristics of the trust relationship are ability, 
benevolence, and integrity.
364
 By ability, they mean the expertise that facilitates the 
relationship, and by benevolence, they mean the intention to do good rather than simply 
seek rewards within the relationship.
365
 They refer to integrity as the set of principles 
upon which the relationship is based that are acceptable and consistent, based upon 
previous interactions.
366
  
Holland et al. warn that in situations of monitoring and surveillance, a balance must be 
struck between the parties to ensure the trust that underpins the employment relationship 
is not negatively affected.
367
 They flatly reject the idea of, “if you are doing nothing 
wrong, you have nothing to fear”;
368
 rather, they insist that the relentless monitoring of 
employees can create a perception that the workforce cannot be trusted.
369
 In fact, they 
argue that constant monitoring of work reflects distrust in the three main areas involving 
expertise, benevolence, and integrity.
370
 Strategically speaking, they note that from a 
human resources (HR) perspective, high levels of trust are linked to employee 
commitment levels, overall organizational performance, employee well-being, and lower 
turnover rates.
371
 And they clarify that HR management strategies involve using effective 
HR policies and practices that foster open communication, empowerment, and justice to 
increase trust in the employment relationship.
372
 
Most disquieting, Holland et al. state that rapidly expanding electronic monitoring and 
surveillance techniques provide management with the opportunity to record work 
patterns, communications, and employee movements inside and outside the workplace, 
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while on-duty and off-duty; these capabilities increase the perceived level of control over 
the workforce and affect the balance of trust in the employment relationship.
373
 They 
highlight that these technologies can create significant tensions and stressors in the 
employment relationship and actually contribute to the erosion of employment relations 
through the increased powerlessness of the employee.
374
 Accordingly, they contend that 
controlling electronic surveillance technologies aimed at forced obedience can send a 
contradictory message to employees and negate the impact of effective HR policies and 
practices that are based on trust.
375
 
Ultimately, Holland et al. confirm with their study that electronic monitoring and 
surveillance is connected to overall trust in management—employees who report their 
employers as being deceptive increase with the number of electronic monitoring and 
surveillance practices used in the workplace.
376
 These employees also report that they 
have a lower perception that management can be trusted to make sensible or competent 
decisions for their organization when there are more monitoring and surveillance 
technologies present in the workplace.
377
 It appears that increased use of electronic 
monitoring and surveillance practices can induce a negative perception of management 
and affects the employment relationship in a way that undermines trust.
378
 These effects 
are significantly more present with manual workers who are subject to more overt and 
continuous electronic surveillance practices such as overt cameras and electronic 
tracking.
379
 Thus, Holland et al. recommend that employers develop a balanced policy 
strategy that promotes the fostering of trust in the employment relationship in regards to 
electronic monitoring and surveillance techniques in the workplace.
380
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But it is Zuboff who most thoroughly examines electronic surveillance and power 
dynamics in the workplace—and effectively stresses the concerns.
381
 She states that when 
authority fails, managers frequently look to a second dimension of power, which she calls 
a “technique”.
382
 She claims that these techniques are essentially management practices 
that shape and control behaviour.
383
 She contends that techniques such as surveillance 
constitute a source of comfort and relief for authority figures because they circumvent the 
imperfections of imperative control.
384
 Zuboff boldly states that the techniques of control 
effectively diminish the likelihood of disobedience because there is a probability of 
detection.
385
 
Zuboff draws on the Panopticon to show that the techniques of control in the workplace, 
through the use of computers at work, have a considerable impact on the American pulp 
mills she studies; that is, the “Overview System” present in one of the companies she 
examines enables visibility throughout the plant and allows management to observe and 
discipline employees based on the system’s output.
386
 More explicitly, she states: 
Information systems that translate, record, and display human behaviour can 
provide the computer age version of the universal transparency with a 
degree of illumination that would have exceeded even Bentham’s most 
outlandish fantasies. Such systems can become information panopticons 
that, freed from the constraints of space and time, do not depend upon the 
physical arrangement of buildings or the laborious record keeping of 
industrial administration. They do not require the mutual presence of objects 
of observation. They do not even require the presence of an observer. 
Information systems can automatically and continuously record almost 
anything their designers want to capture, regardless of the specific 
intentions brought to the design process or the motives that guide data 
interpretation and utilization. The counterpart of the central tower is a video 
screen.
387
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Zuboff explains why managers would want to use panoptic power, referring to the 
constant pressures that are on managers to provide feedback, listen, coach, manage 
objectives, provide vision, and so on.
388
 What is more, the authority relationship is one of 
mutual dependency, characterized by reciprocity, where the manager and the managed 
have the means to counter the behaviour of the other.
389
 Given that this relationship of 
reciprocity requires significant psychological effort to maintain, she states that it is 
tempting for managers to avoid reciprocal relationships and instead rely on the alternative 
technique of control and panoptic power.
390
 She points to the alarming fact that the 
technique of surveillance enables management to refrain from dealing with face-to-face 
interactions altogether simply by using the presence of the omniscient observer.
391
 
Zuboff notes the relevant business interests, and finds that the Overview System enables 
management to observe a wide range of behaviours for: evidence of irregularities for 
coaching and disciplining; opportunities to accelerate learning and improve performance; 
avoidance of personal supervision to allow managers to distance themselves from 
subordinates; and a transformation of administrative assumptions and practices of the 
managerial hierarchy.
392
 Still, she discovers that, at each level of the organization she 
studies, workers constantly search for ways to adapt to the intense illumination of the 
information Panopticon—she states that the workers recognize the Overview System’s 
supervisory power and try to accept the nature of the involuntary display.
393
 In one 
interview, one worker claims that the system can be used to see how workers are doing, 
and that is a good thing, unless someone is trying to hide something; the worker notes 
that is not possible to hide mistakes from the system.
394
 Zuboff states: 
To some, it seemed that only the human heart retained its privacy, out of 
reach and recalcitrant.
395
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Zuboff explains that a lack of confidence in the shared values of the authority relations 
can ultimately lead to a situation where superiors doubt their own legitimacy and turn to a 
technique as a means of enforcement; in turn, subordinates “cast about for extralegitimate 
techniques of defence”.
396
 This leads to the use of adversarial vocabulary, including “us” 
versus “them”, and as a result, mistrust is “invoked in the silent dance of the observer and 
the observed”.
397
 Zuboff cautions that visibility creates a sense of vulnerability and 
powerlessness, and causes the observed to question whether they are being exposed in 
ways they would not wish to be exposed.
398
 Consequently, the observed resists such 
exposure in order to retain a sense of self-control either by circumventing the observer to 
reduce power in the Panopticon, or by anticipating behavioural expectations of the 
observer to conform to standards (anticipatory conformity).
399
 Zuboff insists that many 
workers cherish autonomy and a sense of self-control, and when they contemplate the 
prospect of a socially integrated high-technology workplace, they feel despair.
400
 In 
particular, they anticipate a loss of their unique identities and freedom, and fear that 
without traditional sources of protection set out in their job descriptions and employment 
contracts, they will “become prey to every capricious whim of management”.
401
  
To recap, I have just explained the theories that deal with electronic surveillance inside 
the workplace. This side of the coin was important to examine, since these ideas directly 
apply in the employment context. As can be seen above, there are some notable 
challenges when it comes to electronic surveillance in the workplace, given the power 
imbalances, as explained by theorists such as Sewell et al., Holland et al., and Zuboff. 
I will now do the last thing that I said I would do—I will pave the way to Chapter 3 by 
explaining why the surveillance theorists’ views of privacy are problematic, and argue 
that it is necessary to have individual privacy protections as conceptualized by the 
privacy theorists that are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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2.4 The Problem with Surveillance Theorists’ Views of 
Privacy  
In this part, I will highlight the challenges associated with surveillance theorists’ views of 
privacy and argue that it is necessary to create individual privacy protections as 
conceptualized by privacy theorists. 
Let me begin with Monahan and Wood. They state that privacy is the thing that most 
people think of as being compromised by surveillance.
402
 As they put it: 
It may seem counterintuitive, especially given the centrality of privacy in 
public discourses about surveillance, but the field of surveillance studies has 
an uncomfortable relationship with the privacy concept, sometimes 
bordering on an aversion.
403
 
Why is there such an aversion? Monahan and Wood draw on several critiques and 
suggest that this phenomenon could be because of the argument that an individual 
concept of privacy is poorly suited to account for discrimination against groups, does not 
fully consider marginalized populations with issues of domination and survival, and it is 
universalizing to the point that it is unable to address issues of power imbalances.
404
 
In line with Monahan and Wood’s comments, Priscilla Regan emphasizes that there is an 
overreliance on an individualistic framing of privacy whereby privacy is considered 
important to the individual and is viewed as some type of boundary that shields the 
individual from others.
405
 She contends that this is because the idea of privacy is rooted in 
liberal thinking, where privacy is considered to be an essential part of the individual for 
self-development and human relationships.
406
 Regan asserts that, as a result, policy 
discussions focus on protecting an individual value or interest in privacy.
407
 Regan states 
that privacy has a framing problem that views privacy primarily as a value to the 
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individual, and as such, “this line of discourse has served to weaken the concept of 
privacy as a policy goal”.
408
 She states that this inaccurate framing creates the lack of 
development of a broader social importance to privacy.
409
 More precisely, she states, 
“When privacy competes with another social value or interest, the social basis of the 
other interest is explored while the individual basis of the privacy interest is 
examined”.
410
 Also, Regan asserts that privacy is not absolute and has to be balanced 
against other rights and interests—and it usually loses the competition.
411
 She explains 
that in policy debates, the individual interest is on a weaker footing than a societal 
interest; privacy is on the defensive because it has the burden of proving that certain 
activity invades privacy and that the individual privacy interest is more important than 
the societal interest.
412
  
Therefore, Regan states that privacy is a common value (all individuals value some 
privacy), public value (it involves the democratic political system as well as the 
individual), and collective value (all persons have the same minimum amount of 
privacy).
413
 Thus, it is important to explicitly acknowledge the social importance of 
privacy.
414
 Regan insists that rather than individual preferences, privacy’s importance can 
come from a sense of connection and mutuality; recognizing these common foundations 
could change the nature of policy debate and create stronger public policy privacy 
protection.
415
 
Likewise, Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah Johnson argue that it is important to 
view privacy in terms of the social benefits of forgetfulness, rather than in terms of 
individual privacy protection.
416
 They conclude that data retention and disposal should be 
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addressed as a part of a broader and comprehensive policy approach rather than in a 
piecemeal fashion or ad hoc.
417
 Blanchette and Johnson state that in the past, there has 
been an institutional forgetfulness that parallels the human memory—the paper-and ink 
world has several challenges of archiving, storage space, and budgeting for file 
cabinets.
418
 The electronic environment favours data retention, and this has changed in 
the default position from forgetfulness to one of memory.
419
 They say that currently, we 
are in a world that captures endless data and decides how long to retain it; they question 
the social implications of the lack of institutional forgetfulness.
420
  
Further, they assert that privacy is both an individual good and a social good, and these 
goods are inextricably tied together.
421
 They state that privacy is good for society because 
it promotes the development of individuals in a way that is good for democracy.
422
 They 
argue that, where there is no forgetfulness because everything is recorded and never 
forgotten, it creates a world that is not conducive to the development of democratic 
citizens.
423
 Thus, it is important to achieve a balance between the appropriate degree of 
social forgetfulness and the need to hold people accountable.
424
 They examine the areas 
of bankruptcy law, juvenile crime records, and credit reporting and note that, in these 
areas, there has been a historical recognition of the social value of forgetfulness.
425
 
However, social forgetfulness is an important social value that is quietly slipping away.
426
 
As a result, they claim that, instead of balancing social goods of information against 
individual rights or interests of privacy, there should be an understanding that involves 
“tensions between social goods, the social good of privacy (and forgetfulness), and other 
social goods”.
427
 They state that data retention must be addressed as part of a 
comprehensive data protection policy that consistently uses a variety of strategies 
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including an overarching set of standards, legislation in specific sectors, a structured 
market, and privacy-enhancing technologies.
428
  
Along the same lines, Julie E. Cohen states that privacy has an image problem, since it is 
“cast as old-fashioned at best and downright harmful at worst”.
429
 Indeed, she views it as 
“anti-progressive, overly costly, and inimical to the welfare of the body politic”.
430
 Cohen 
asserts that the consequences of privacy’s bad reputation is predictable; when balancing 
outdated values against cutting edge imperatives like national security, efficiency, and 
entrepreneurship, “privacy comes up the loser”.
431
 She suggests that, since privacy has 
been conceptualized as a form of protection for the liberal self, it is reactive and 
inessential, and could chill the exercise of constitutionally protected liberties.
432
 Cohen 
clarifies that this type of thinking is mistaken, and the liberal self who is the subject of 
privacy theory and privacy policy making does not actually exist.
433
 Indeed, she states 
that the self who is the real subject of privacy law and policy is socially constructed.
434
 
Cohen insists that viewing privacy as an individual right is a mistake.
435
 
Cohen states that privacy’s inadequate conceptual vocabulary, along with its inadequate 
institutional grammar, leads to significant contradictions in terms of privacy theories.
436
 
However, she believes that these contradictions can constitute an opportunity to “turn 
privacy inside out”.
437
 Cohen wants to rescue privacy theory by focusing on the 
conditions that are needed to produce sufficiently private and privacy-valuing subjects 
(for individuals), and by focusing on the design, production, and operational practices 
best suited to preserve those conditions (for institutions).
438
 Cohen states that it is 
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problematic to justify privacy in a way that promotes and protects individual autonomy, 
because the experience of having identities and making choices is socially shaped.
439
 
Similarly, she finds it problematic to justify privacy in terms of dignity because she says 
that this creates similar paradox—like experienced subjectivity, conceptions of dignity 
are culturally constructed.
440
 In particular, different societies articulate dignity differently 
and have different norms.
441
 Cohen does not agree that privacy is justified because it 
promotes and protects an essential degree of separation between the self and society for 
dissent and critique.
442
 She goes so far as to say that formulations of privacy in the 
liberty-based language of human rights discourse are grand, inspiring, and difficult to 
dispute—but they are also “operationally meaningless”.
443
  
Lastly, Colin Bennett discusses several objections to privacy theorists’ views of privacy, 
and defends the concept of privacy using the surveillance theorists’ conceptions 
instead.
444
 Bennett points out that there are several framing problems associated with the 
concept of privacy as described by privacy theorists.
445
  
First, Bennett maintains that there tends to be a reinforcement of individuation, rather 
than community, sociability, and trust—he describes it as, “It is about me, and nobody 
else”.
446
 He asserts that individualistic conceptions of privacy do not capture the whole 
problem because privacy is not the sole answer.
447
 Second, Bennett states that there are 
spatial implications inherent in privacy discourse whereby there is a type of bubble that 
surrounds each person in a cell that others cannot invade.
448
 He insists that, practically 
speaking, it is not possible to protect the bubble because the issue is more complex and 
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relational.
449
 Third, Bennett contends that it is problematic when privacy is articulated as 
a “right” because privacy battles tend to pit vulnerable individuals, or poorly resourced 
civil liberties groups, against very powerful public or private organizations.
450
 He posits 
that there is an emphasis placed on controlling excessive surveillance rather than the 
private interest in privacy protection, individual privacy claims are limiting in that they 
do not necessarily trigger regulatory action, and rights discourse fails to serve the people 
most at risk since they cannot fit their experiences of surveillance into a legal claim.
451
 
Fourth, Bennett explains that the concept of privacy and policies never challenge larger 
questions of categorical discrimination; to him, the problem is discrimination, not 
privacy, since individuals are at risk merely because of their membership in a group, 
rather than because of their individual identities and personal information they 
generate.
452
 Fifth, Bennett contends that the concept of privacy is too narrow; even 
though it is conceptually confusing and vague, “still leaves aside a number of crucial 
questions that surveillance scholars take very seriously”.
453
 For example, there is a 
problem with determining the point at which information becomes personal information 
(as seen with re-identification of data); also, power relations are present between the 
watcher and watched even when personal information is not collected (as can be seen 
when the presence of cameras changes behaviour, even if they are not monitored or 
operational).
454
 He states, “It is in these examples that we find, I think, the crucial point at 
which privacy analysis ends and surveillance analysis begins”.
455
  
However, Bennett’s assertions regarding surveillance theorists’ views of privacy can be 
rebutted. Firstly, it remains a fact that privacy regimes are necessary in order to affect 
meaningful change and protect citizens from the abuse of surveillance power. What also 
weakens the individualistic argument is that groups of individuals can benefit from 
making privacy claims and privacy disputes do not necessarily involve only one 
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individual in a “me, me, me” situation; for instance, there could be groups of people in a 
privacy dispute such as a group of employees, and this redistributing of power can benefit 
society as a whole and create a social good. Secondly, it is a natural human need for 
individuals to want to exercise self-determination and autonomy by setting healthy spatial 
boundaries. Thirdly, it is problematic to discount the balancing of interests for four 
reasons. Here is the first reason: when balancing interests, it is not a necessary condition 
for both parties to have exactly the same level of power in a privacy dispute; in fact, in 
most surveillance scenarios, one party is more vulnerable than the other, and this does not 
make the balancing of interests any less important. Here is the second reason: the reason 
for attempting to control excessive surveillance is because there needs to be a limit to 
establish when one has crossed the line and gone too far to ensure the dominant party is 
not abusing its surveillance power. Here is the third reason: it is not necessary for 
regulatory action to be triggered every time there is a privacy dispute; over time, decision 
makers become attuned to what is happening on a grand scale so that decisions can 
evolve with societal values. Here is the fourth reason: it is indeed possible to make and 
succeed with legal claims.  
Fourthly, against the suggestion that discrimination is the real problem, it is more likely 
that discrimination is rather a consequence of the abuse of surveillance power that leads 
to the excessive surveillance of the weaker party and the privacy intrusion, which causes 
additional information to be learned. Without the abuse of surveillance power and 
consequent privacy intrusion in the first place, the information would not be discovered, 
the panoptic sorting would not take place, and discrimination would not take place. 
Fifthly, the contention that privacy is too narrow is likely exaggerated. One may question 
whether there is a crucial point at which privacy analysis ends and surveillance analysis 
begins. Another way of looking at this issue is that surveillance theorists and privacy 
theorists both take crucial questions seriously; they just approach the issues from 
different angles.  
Ultimately, Bennett insists that the critiques of surveillance theorists address a dated 
conception of privacy with a framing that only partially covers privacy protection in 
practice and that ineffectively addresses power imbalances between individuals and 
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organizations that use the latest information technologies.
456
 Yet, Bennett finally admits 
that realistically speaking, without privacy regimes, there would be few if any actual 
mechanisms of social redress.
457
 He states that privacy as a concept and regime is 
resilient and will not disappear, and surveillance scholars must live with it.
458
 
To this point, I have explained the views of surveillance theorists such as Regan, 
Blanchette and Johnson, J. Cohen, and Bennett when discussing conceptualizations of 
privacy I have also rebutted the main arguments of the theories in order to show why it is 
important to examine the privacy theories set out in Chapter 3. 
Now, I will look at one more thing—I will delve into ideas regarding resistance and 
opposition, which involve actions that are taken in response to surveillance and that are in 
line with one’s views of privacy. 
That is, while surveillance theorists may disagree with the framing of privacy and have 
an uncomfortable relationship with the privacy concept, it is important to recognize their 
ideas involving opposition and resistance. Lyon notes that in each case, objections are 
raised and expressed to some surveillance process where individuals feel that some line 
has been crossed.
459
 Monahan and Wood explain that when it comes to surveillance, 
some have strong reactions and work to challenge the abuses of power.
460
 On one hand, 
resistance involves quieter practices that seek to avoid or otherwise manage a system; one 
example is when people install ad-blocker programs on their web browsers.
461
 On the 
other hand, opposition involves public efforts to block or significantly change policy; an 
example involves public campaigns and lawsuits by groups such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) or the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
462
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More specifically, with respect to resistance, Gary T. Marx explains that most 
surveillance systems have inherent contradictions, ambiguities, gaps, blind spots and 
limitations; the natural human tendency is to attempt to beat surveillance systems and 
avoid observation.
463
 He proposes 11 techniques that are focused on resisting particular 
privacy-evading information technologies.
464
 They include: discovery moves (also called 
surveillance detection in the intelligence trade, where the goal is to find out if 
surveillance is in operation and where it is); avoidance moves (passive withdrawal); 
piggybacking moves (control is evaded or information is protected by attaching it to a 
legitimate subject); switching moves (in testing situations, authentic results are 
transferred to someone else); distorting moves (manipulating the surveillance collection 
process so that invalid inferences are drawn); blocking moves (calling explicit attention 
to the communicative aspects of surveillance where subjects physically block access to 
the communication to render the information unusable); masking moves (manipulation 
beyond blocking, in order to deceive regarding identity, status, and so on); breaking 
moves (rendering the device inoperable in the crudest form); refusal moves (moving 
away from participation or just saying “no”); cooperative moves (insider perpetration in 
cooperation with violators beyond the organization); and counter-surveillance moves 
(turning around and conducting surveillance on the watchers).
465
  
An example of resistance is counter-surveillance move that Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, 
and Barry Wellman call “sousveillance”, coming from the French words for “sous”, 
meaning “below” and “veiller”, meaning “to watch”.
466
 They state that individuals use 
tools to observe the organizational observer in order to enhance the ability to assess and 
collect data about their surveillance and to neutralize it.
467
 They contend that digital 
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technology can help individuals feel more empowered.
468
 They note that sousveillance 
disrupts the power relationship of surveillance and restores balance.
469
 Jean-Gabriel 
Ganascia states that sousveillance is made possible because we are living in the 
Catopticon, where there is total transparency, and this allows everyone to watch, 
communicate, and consequently control each other.
470
  
Another example of resistance is a masking technique whereby artistic projects are 
generated to conceal oneself from ambient surveillance in public places; Manahan states 
that the goal is to mask identity to undermine technological efforts to separate someone 
from the crowd.
471
 These strategies can involve such things as face paints, hairstyles, 
hoodies, scarves, materials that block thermal emissions to avoid tracking by drones, and 
hats that emit infrared light to blind camera lenses.
472
 Manahan explains that, in this way, 
individuals may hide in plain sight without having to acquiesce to the surveillance or end 
up becoming a recluse to avoid the gaze.
473
  
One more example of resistance is a distorting move that Finn Brunton and Helen 
Nissenbaum call, “obfuscation”.
474
 They explain that obfuscation is the deliberate 
addition of ambiguous, confusing, or misleading information to interfere with 
surveillance and data collection.
475
 It can be understood as the production of noise in 
order to make data collection more ambiguous, confusing, harder to exploit, difficult to 
act upon, and therefore less valuable.
476
 For example, one strategy that can be used to 
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interfere with surveillance and data collection is a software strategy that prevents 
profiling of user searches by blending genuine and artificial search queries.
477
 
With respect to opposition, Colin Bennett thoroughly examines opposition actors, 
“privacy advocates”, who he defines as “people who, at least in journalistic parlance, 
challenge the development of the increasingly intrusive ways by which personal 
information is captured and processed”.
478
 He notes that there are several groups that 
promote the cause of personal privacy protection; the types of groups include privacy-
centric advocacy groups (such as Privacy International), privacy advocacy and civil 
liberties (such as the ACLU), privacy advocacy and human rights (such as Amnesty 
International), privacy advocacy and consumer protection (such as the Privacy Advisory 
Group), and privacy advocacy and digital rights (such as the EFF).
479
 He contends that 
there are several privacy advocacy types, including activists, researchers and teachers, 
consultants, technologists, journalists, and artists.
480
 He states that, while these 
individuals make up an extremely diverse group, they have one thing in common—they 
are animated by a fundamental belief that privacy is critical.
481
 
I have just explained the surveillance theorists’ views of privacy. I noted that these 
conceptualizations are problematic, and that there is a need to explore the privacy 
theories in Chapter 3. I also explored some of the resistance and opposition strategies 
individuals use in response to surveillance that are in line with their views of privacy. 
2.5 Conclusion 
As explained in the opening of this Chapter, the study of surveillance is a 
transdisciplinary field made up of a large number of different perspectives and theories. 
Taken together, the surveillance theories paint a fuller picture of the nature of electronic 
surveillance that can be encountered both inside and outside the workplace. In each 
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category, there are a handful of theorists that do not necessarily disagree; in fact, the 
theories discussed simply build on each other and enhance knowledge from various 
vantage points when describing the nature and implications of surveillance. It was 
important to investigate these instructive surveillance theories explaining the complicated 
nature of electronic surveillance technology because I will be relying on the information 
in my analyses in Chapters 4 and 5; these analyses will provide the necessary foundation 
for creating the new workplace privacy regime. 
If we picture a coin as the employment context, then ubiquitous surveillance and 
workplace surveillance are two sides of that same coin: ubiquitous surveillance theories 
are involved indirectly (outside the workplace), and workplace surveillance theories are 
involved directly (inside the workplace). If we imagine the rim of that coin running 
through and affecting both sides of that coin as the Panopticon, we can view it as a vital 
component that touches on both ubiquitous and workplace surveillance theories. And if 
we step back and use a particular lens when examining this coin, that lens is the capitalist 
surveillance perspective of surveillance.  
I examined selected categories of surveillance theories, beginning with the Panopticon. 
This was the starting point for the study of surveillance. I noted that the design goal of the 
Panopticon was to reverse the logic of the dungeon by spreading light and reason to the 
dark space where evil might flourish using illumination; the architecture of the building 
played a crucial role in understanding how the combination of daylight, interiorization, 
and the overseer’s gaze increased visibility. These panoptic concepts work to dominate 
and control individuals both inside and outside the workplace. 
I also investigated several theories involving ubiquitous surveillance. These theories 
highlight what can happen when electronic surveillance is conducted in the outside 
world, and the information is subsequently obtained and used in the workplace to make 
employment decisions regarding employees. The theories surveyed several topics 
associated with ubiquitous surveillance, including the nature of electronic surveillance 
and the temporal dimensions involved (timeframe, intensity, persistence of consequences, 
and time period). In addition, the theories discussed sophisticated automated data 
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processing and big data surveillance; not only has the level of sophistication increased, 
but so too has the opportunity for conducting electronic surveillance because surveillance 
is everywhere and can be used by governments, employers, and businesses. That is, we 
live in a surveillance society. The theories also cover core issues dealing with social 
media and how, though it can be fun, we ultimately participate in our own surveillance 
when we use these platforms and create user-generated content. As a consequence, we 
open ourselves up to exploitation. 
I then considered theories concerning surveillance inside the workplace. The workplace 
surveillance theories provided insights on how common it is to monitor employees in the 
workplace, the technology types involved in the electronic surveillance of employees, the 
concerns about excessive and overly intrusive surveillance, and the effects of electronic 
surveillance on employees when an employer’s surveillance goes too far. The theories 
also considered the impact of electronic surveillance on trust in the employment 
relationship, and the detrimental effects of excessive monitoring on employees. The 
workplace surveillance theories also explored why employers monitor employees, and 
how employees cannot make the same kinds of surveillance decisions as regular 
consumers because they are subject to the direction of their employers. Workplace 
surveillance theories also explained the Coercion viewpoint of electronic surveillance; the 
aggravating effect of electronic surveillance on asymmetrical power relationships; the 
need to strike a balance between the parties when dealing with electronic surveillance in 
an employment relationship; and the power dynamics involved with electronic 
surveillance in the employment relationship.  
Finally, I noted the problems with surveillance theorists’ take on privacy. I explained that 
surveillance theorists have an uncomfortable relationship with the idea of privacy, mostly 
because they believe that there are problems with the framing of the concept. For 
example, they do not like that privacy is individualistic, competes with other rights that 
are valued by society, and can be considered a human right. I set out several challenges 
with the way that surveillance theorists view privacy. Indeed, there is an eventual 
admission that traditional conceptions of privacy are the main way to obtain redress from 
excessive surveillance; I also reviewed some types of opposition and resistance strategies 
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regarding how individuals respond to surveillance. I noted that it was necessary to 
examine privacy from the considerably distinct and disparate theories of privacy in 
Chapter 3. This section served as a transition from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3. 
I examined the surveillance theories using a capitalist surveillance perspective of 
surveillance, which emphasizes the dangers of electronic surveillance and opposes the 
exploitation of individuals in the surveillance economy. It is clear that surveillance is 
about control—it all starts with the Panopticon. The increased visibility, internalization, 
and constant gaze create a transparency which Foucault views as a trap, since the 
watched ultimately self-censor and modify their own behaviour in order to become 
obedient. The invisible watchers exert their power by ensuring compulsory visibility of 
the watched, and this causes a situation where the watched are constantly worried about 
being monitored by anonymous invisible observers.  
The Panopticon is a foreshadowing of what presently occurs in general society and in the 
workplace. Foucault’s profoundly disturbing image of a circular cage does not stop with 
the Panopticon. Rather, the effect continues firstly with ubiquitous surveillance in 
modern times. Social media use is a good example of how information is collected and 
aggregated to compile a profile of each individual that can be used by private 
corporations when making decisions, including employment decisions. The watcher no 
longer begins the process with picking a suspect to monitor due to suspicion—the 
watcher simply watches everyone continuously and generates subjects. Since the goal of 
private corporations involves making future predictions, data becomes a form of power 
when it is used to manipulate people and shape the information they see. Modifying 
human behaviour is accomplished by discovering behavioural surplus, the extra data 
exhaust left over after engaging in various online services, and this surplus is used to 
make predictions about user behaviour and ultimately control the behaviour through the 
use of learning theories and the sale of information to companies in the behavioural 
futures markets. Clearly there is a concern, especially since this phenomenon has a 
potential of leading to the inevitable situation where we as humans have no ability to 
control anything about our lives—we could be left without a sense of self-determination. 
82 
 
In this scenario, the watched are simply pawns in a game, and there is the dangerous 
possibility of discrimination based on what information emerges from the panoptic sort.  
This is not all. The effect continues secondly with even more noteworthy opportunities 
for employers to abuse their surveillance power against the weaker employees 
specifically in the workplace. Essentially, surveillance functions as a way of controlling 
employees. The employers, the overseers in this panoptic arrangement, have a high 
potential to abuse their surveillance power without the proper checks in place. While 
many accept that monitoring in the workplace is nothing new and a sign of good 
management practice, there is reason for concern. There are times when the monitoring 
can go too far and go beyond what is reasonable, and the undesired intrusiveness affects 
trust in the employment relationship. This is so, whether the employer is monitoring 
employees’ performance, behaviours, or personal characteristics. This applies regardless 
of whether the goal of monitoring is used for maintaining productivity and efficiency, 
protecting corporate interests and trade secrets, or protecting the company from legal 
liability. The problem is that workplace monitoring can be detrimental to employees 
when it goes too far or is too intrusive, when there is function creep involved, when 
employees experience anticipatory conformity, when employees become docile and 
accepting to the point where their commitment and motivation levels are reduced, and 
when trust levels are reduced. As a result, employees may feel that they have no choice 
but to manipulate work rules, sabotage the workplace, or refuse to comply with 
management. Other negative consequences involve troubling effects of discrimination 
due to the panoptic sort, and physical and psychological symptoms.   
Since employees do not have as many choices about the extent of surveillance to which 
they are subjected compared to regular consumers and citizens, they are more vulnerable. 
The Coercion model clarifies that employment involves the few watching the many in the 
interests of the few. The goal of performance management is for employers to maximize 
productivity and police the conduct of employees who must work at their maximum 
capacity. Managers are the overseers who must ensure visibility of workers, and the 
workers are the watched who must avoid the managers’ gaze. Indeed, the employees 
become the objects of performance measurement, try to avoid subjugation, and attempt to 
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assert their autonomy. Without anything in place to protect the employees, the result is 
the ultimate subjugation of employees, where resistance would be futile. Indeed, 
employees view performance measurement as an instrument of domination and feel that 
there is nothing that can be done about the surveillance. This causes an exacerbation of 
the unequal bargaining power in the employment relationship, and leaves employees 
wondering if they have any choice at all regarding the extent of the employer’s 
monitoring. What is most troubling is the effect of trust in the employment relationship in 
cases of an employer’s use of electronic surveillance. When there is monitoring in the 
workplace, the result is distrust in the areas of expertise, benevolence, and integrity. A 
useful approach to dealing with electronic surveillance in the workplace is to create a 
balanced strategy that respects trust in the relationship.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Social Theory: Examination of Privacy Theories 
The point is not the hypocrisy of those who disparage the value of privacy 
while intensely safeguarding their own, although that is striking. It is that 
the desire for privacy is shared by us all as an essential, not ancillary, part of 
what it means to be human. We all instinctively understand that the private 
realm is where we can act, think, speak, write, experiment, and choose how 
to be, away from the judgmental eyes of others. Privacy is a core condition 
of being a free person. 
         —Glenn Greenwald
482
 
The term, “private”, comes from the Latin word, “privatus”, meaning “withdrawn from 
public life”, and from “privus”, meaning “single, individual”.
483
 “Privacy” comes from 
the Latin words, “sōlitūdō, sēcrētum”, meaning “solitariness, secret”.
484
 
The term “privacy” is enigmatic and elusive. No single definition can encapsulate the 
entire concept. As a result, it is hardly surprising that there are several social theories 
attempting to provide an interpretation of what privacy means and what rights and 
interests it protects. The inevitable result is frustration in trying to understand and define 
privacy. However, with each new attempt to demystify the concept, there is a potential 
for further confusion given the accumulation of divergent approaches. This frustration 
experienced by theorists has led to several theorists agreeing that “privacy is a concept in 
disarray”.
485
 Indeed, the struggle to answer the question, “What is privacy?” presents 
several challenges to the theoretical field.  
In Chapter 2, I delved into different theories of surveillance in order to understand the 
nature of electronic surveillance, and explored theories that are relevant to the 
employment context both inside and outside the workplace. I examined two sides of a 
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coin (with the ubiquity of surveillance on the one side and surveillance inside the 
workplace on the other) with a panoptic rim, and did so using a capitalist surveillance 
theoretical lens. 
In this Chapter, I plan to examine views of what privacy means in a more philosophical 
way.  
There are two main categories of privacy theories—reductionist and non-reductionist—
and my goal is to explain why most of these privacy theories are problematic and indicate 
why I prefer one particular theory of privacy.  
More specifically, the reductionist theorists I discuss either understand privacy as a 
cluster-of-rights, or use an economic perspective when conceptualizing privacy. On the 
other hand, the non-reductionist theories variously regard the invasion of privacy as a 
tort, or adopt a feminist legal theory of privacy, or view privacy primarily involving 
control-over-information, or adopt a pragmatic contextual approach to privacy. 
The theory of privacy that I prefer is the dignity/human rights approach to privacy. This 
perspective provides an appropriate understanding of privacy and allows for a purposive 
interpretation that does not ignore the interests of the most vulnerable citizens. When 
examining privacy with this lens, the interpretation of privacy provisions and workplace 
privacy cases will help me draft a more effective workplace privacy regime. 
It is important to understand all of the selected theories in order to build a rich foundation 
for vibrant socio-legal analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. In fact, I will be relying on all of 
these conceptualizations throughout the analyses to some extent in order to understand 
what is being protected when creating the new workplace privacy regime.  
To that end, the purpose of this Chapter is to review and critique selected different 
theoretical approaches to privacy using a dignity/human rights theoretical perspective on 
privacy.  
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3.1 The Problem with Most Privacy Theories 
The problems associated with the two types of theories, reductionist and non-reductionist 
theories, are set out below. 
3.1.1 Reductionist Theories 
Reductionists are critical of singling out privacy and see no reason for treating it as 
particularly special.  
For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson believes that there is no unique right to privacy that 
requires separate protection because there is no part of privacy that is not covered by 
some other right.
486
 In her overly-skeptical discussion of privacy, she attempts to 
determine whether every so-called violation of the right to privacy is that, or is instead 
the violation of some other right.
487
 In order to accomplish this task, she uses a 
hypothetical example, and explains that what is happening when a person observes a 
quiet fight behind closed windows using an amplifier is indeed a violation of a right, but 
not that of the right to privacy; rather, it is a violation of the right not to be listened to, 
which is one of the rights included in the “right over the person”.
488
  
Thomson is unconvincing when she states that the privacy cluster-of-rights is not distinct 
because it overlaps with the cluster-of-rights dealing with owning property.
489
 She 
suggests that there is nothing detectable that needs to be isolated because everything 
about privacy is encapsulated in a different set of rights. Thomson assumes that all 
aspects of privacy are the same as those dealing with property; however, there are unique 
features that pertain to privacy that do not involve the protection of property—but 
Thomson dismisses this idea without even exploring it. It would have been useful for 
Thomson to attempt to isolate some features that are unique to both privacy and property 
protection, in addition to identifying any overlapping features—before making this kind 
of assertion.  
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Thomson puts forth a theory that is problematic. On one hand, Thomson contends that 
there are no rights in the right to privacy cluster that are not also in some other rights 
cluster, and on other hand, she maintains that the term, privacy, is unclear and it is not 
known what would be included in this privacy cluster.
490
 Thomson then points to other 
factors that are involved with privacy, including rights to life, liberty, property, and the 
right to not to be harmed.
491
 In fact, Thomson suggests since every right in the right to 
privacy cluster is also in some other right cluster, there is no need to find what is in 
common to all rights in the right to privacy cluster and no need to settle disputes about 
boundaries.
492
 She argues that wrongs involving privacy can be explained without ever 
mentioning the word, privacy, and concludes that a person need only ask whether an act 
is a violation of any other right, and if not, whether the act really violates a right at all.
493
 
The problem with this idea, simply put, is that there is no way of confirming the 
conclusion that everything about privacy is covered under some other cluster-of-rights.  
But most disconcerting, Thomson characterizes privacy as “derivative”
494
 and evades the 
necessary consideration of what privacy really entails, and in so doing, she neglects to 
consider the fundamental nature and importance of privacy. It is not acceptable to argue 
that, since every right in the right to privacy cluster is also in some other right cluster, 
there is no need to bother analyzing privacy. Concluding that wrongs involving privacy 
can be explained without ever mentioning the word “privacy” is like asking a question 
about the rain without discussing the weather. This analysis is far too dismissive of the 
essential nature of privacy; this is because privacy is not covered by any other right. 
Thomson fails to consider the dignity and self-respect of individuals who are in need of 
real privacy protection—with a right to privacy.  
Amy L. Peikoff also adopts a reductionist approach to privacy. She agrees with Thomson 
and maintains that there is no legal right to privacy since the legal protection of privacy is 
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grounded in other rights to liberty, property and contract.
495
 She goes even further than 
Thomson and rejects the idea of privacy as a legal concept, claiming that it is not even a 
derivative legal concept.
496
 To Peikoff, any law protecting privacy would be subjective 
and unjust, and laws directed specifically at invasions of privacy would erode 
fundamental rights to liberty and property.
497
 Consequently, she recommends a move 
toward the jurisprudence of liberty, property, and contract so long as these changes 
provide a net increase in the protection of individual rights.
498
 Moreover, Peikoff asserts 
that the reductionist defence lies in showing why property and liberty are fundamental 
compared to privacy, and also showing why recognizing a distinct legal right to privacy 
would be improper.
499
 
Peikoff’s discussion is just as flawed as Thomson’s because it fails to truly appreciate the 
value of privacy or consider privacy as something in need of separate protection. Rather, 
Peikoff frames privacy as a villain that stands in the way of fundamental rights of liberty, 
property and contract. Harsher than Thomson, Peikoff assumes that anything related to 
the idea of a right of privacy would be subjective and therefore unjust. Thus, it is decided 
that a subjective analysis that considers the surrounding circumstances is something 
negative and undesirable. But this conclusion fails to take into account how important it 
is to have some flexibility in order to balance interests and evolve with society when it 
comes to understanding fundamental values such as privacy. Peikoff simply does not see 
privacy except as an obstacle that interferes with liberty, property, and contract.  
Another reductionist, the economic theorist and modern utilitarian Richard A. Posner, 
believes that privacy involves the withholding or concealing of information.
500
 Using an 
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economic perspective, he focuses on the demand for private information and views it as 
something that can create opportunities for gain by the demander.
501
  
That said, even Posner acknowledges that framing privacy in this way presents 
opportunities for exploitation through misrepresentation.
502
 One may reject his ideas 
about privacy since there is no discussion about the circumstances that might surround 
the demand for private information or the holder of information. One may also wonder 
how unequal bargaining power affects this analysis, and how the analysis is affected 
where third parties experience costs while others gain. There is certainly no discussion 
about how this conceptualization of privacy affects vulnerable parties. 
Posner argues that the process of voluntary exchange of personal information ensures that 
the information is put to its most valuable use, and the attractiveness of the solution 
depends on the nature and provenance of the information, along with transaction costs.
503
  
But even Posner can see that at some point nondisclosure becomes fraud, and this can 
take place when a transacting party has crossed the line and the information that party 
seeks to conceal is a product of significant investment.
504
 One may find that, practically 
speaking, there currently are instances where individuals provide their information in 
exchange for some benefit. However, one may denounce the idea of treating personal 
information as a commodity and using it as a pawn in a data exchange for value. One 
may wonder whether persons appreciate what has been given up and whether they are 
able to appreciate how the information can be put to its most valuable use. 
Unquestionably, when treating data as a commodity like this, there is a large potential for 
exploitation of the weaker party. 
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What is most troubling is that Posner argues that very few people want to be left alone; 
rather, he says that they want to manipulate the world around them by selective 
disclosure of facts about themselves.
505
 One difficulty with this approach is that many do 
not agree that the main goal of seeking privacy is to manipulate others in the world 
around them. Another difficulty is that the approach neglects to appreciate that there are 
several benefits to privacy, and hence, there are several motivators. For example, a 
person may want privacy in order to derive creative benefits or solve a problem and to be 
free to experiment and generate alternatives in a safe place. There is simply no 
acknowledgment that privacy fulfills the goal of maintaining dignity and self-respect and 
preserving aspects of humanity. 
Although Posner contends that there is a difference between prying by means of casual 
interrogation versus electronic surveillance, he problematically focuses on the narrow 
topics of efficiency and transaction costs.
506
 That is, Posner maintains that conversation is 
more costly because of the external effects, and the increased costs would result in less 
effective communication since people would be more guarded in their speech.
507
 Indeed, 
the main concern with this theory is about efficiency—Posner argues that the trend 
toward expanding the privacy protections of individuals while contracting interests of 
organizations is inefficient.
508
  
One may frame this analysis as something that appears to be all about hidden agendas to 
hide information, manipulate others, or to get something to increase value and efficiency. 
Using this reasoning, the protection of privacy becomes a nonpriority because it does not 
maximize wealth in society. Posner asserts that privacy should only be protected when 
access to the information would reduce its value. The theory promotes transparency as 
the default position, with privacy only becoming worthwhile if it can increase 
opportunities for gain without increasing costs.  
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And one may insist that this economic approach is irresponsible since long-term 
consequences and a consideration of the circumstances are completely ignored; for the 
sake of short-term gains, individuals may be tempted to surrender pieces of information 
that could be used in ways they do not understand at the time. This puts the weaker party 
at risk of being exploited and left behind. It also neglects to even consider the 
fundamental nature of privacy and its essential value when it comes to promoting dignity 
and self-respect. Simply put, on Posner’s view privacy is treated as a means to various 
other ends, and as something that can be interfered with or violated if doing so is 
necessary to protect other, more valuable goals. This is problematic. 
James B. Rule agrees with Posner and uses a similar economic analysis of privacy.
509
 In 
fact, he believes that the rise of cyberspace has led to new sources and possibilities for 
appropriation and use of personal information in several spheres of life, given all of the 
ways of knowing who people are, what their interests and susceptibilities are, what they 
are willing to buy, and how much they can be expected to pay.
510
 Rule proposes a new 
right over the commercial exploitation of personal information on oneself.
511
 In fact, he 
maintains that individual ownership of the right to commercialize data on oneself, 
properly implemented, creates broad and meaningful possibilities for ordinary private 
citizens to curtail commercial use of their data or to shape the character of such use.
512
 
Rule contends that this brings clarity because there is no commercial exploitation of 
personal data allowed without the permission of the individual concerned.
513
  
Rule cites what is sometimes called the total utility principle: the best use of such 
personal data is the highest use, or the one commanding the highest price in some sort of 
open market.
514
 Clearly, the economic theory evolves from the classic 
positivism/utilitarian theory aimed at making some people better off and no one worse 
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off, to generate an overall societal improvement.
515
 The principle of utility is: “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number”.
516
 The reasoning process is that one must: 
examine the available options for action at the time, identify the outcomes of those 
actions, and then evaluate each outcome by how much well-being it contains, and the best 
outcome is the outcome that contains the greatest total sum of well-being to provide 
clarity, simplicity, explanatory power, coherence, and consistent prescriptions.
517
 In fact, 
the economic theory is derived from the positivism/utilitarian theory.
518
  
What is most disquieting about both the utilitarian and economic theory is that they carry 
significant dangers, especially for the most vulnerable in society. In exchange for 
certainty and simplicity, weaker individuals may not benefit and could even become 
subject to serious exploitation. Essentially, using utilitarian principles could lead to 
pleasing the highest number of individuals, and failing to take into account the dignity 
and self-respect of the most vulnerable citizens. There is a mistaken assumption made in 
this theory that individuals are able to make competent decisions about how to maximize 
their own value and the value of their information. There is simply no discussion about 
how to empower the weaker individuals during these data exchanges aimed at 
maximizing value—it is merely accepted that they will be left behind. 
In short, my criticism of reductionist theories of privacy is that they fail to truly grapple 
with or address what makes privacy, or the right to privacy, unique and important. 
Thomson and Peikoff suggest that the right to privacy is really nothing over and above 
the right to one’s person, property, or liberty, or the right not to have one’s person or 
property damaged or harmed; while Posner and Rule view the right to privacy as a barrier 
                                                 
515
 Bykvist, supra note 500 at 1. 
516
 Harris supra note 500 at 24, 36. See also Ben Eggleston & Dale E Miller, The Cambridge Companion to 
Utilitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2014); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed by C B 
MacPherson (London: Penguin Looks Ltd, 1985); John Stuart Mill, The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill, 
ed by Dale E Miller (New York: The Modern Library, 2002); Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). 
517
 Bykvist, supra note 500 at 16–17, 22–24. 
518
 Eggleston & Miller, supra note 516 at 42–44; Jon L Mills, Privacy: The Lost Right (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2008) at 70–72.  
93 
 
to the efficient allocation of resources. What all these approaches share in common is a 
skepticism about the coherence and utility of the concept of privacy. 
3.1.2 Non-Reductionist Theories 
Non-reductionist theorists believe that there is some coherent value in privacy, although 
they disagree on how the value is understood, conceptualized, and operationalized.  
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ 1890 article is the first of its kind to suggest 
that the law must recognize the right to be let alone.
519
 Warren and Brandeis assert that 
there should be a law that acknowledges the right to privacy to protect people from the 
growing interference of the press to address serious concerns about instantaneous 
photographs, newspapers and the circulation of portraits.
520
 They maintain that numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction: “what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops”.
521
 In describing mechanical devices as a 
threat, it is clear that Warren and Brandeis are expressing a dystopian perspective 
concerning technology, suggesting that technology can threaten the established ways of 
life and can even be viewed as a regressive force.
522
 This, in turn, strongly influences 
their perspective regarding the value and protection of privacy. For instance, they 
describe the invasion of privacy by the newspapers as “evil”, state that the press is 
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of “decency”, and 
express distaste regarding personal gossip attaining the “dignity of print”.
523
 Invasions of 
privacy are considered unquestionably unethical, and appear to be rooted in the use of 
technology. These types of publications causing injury are considered an “intolerable 
abuse”.
524
 Ultimately, Warren and Brandeis argue that if one were to examine solely the 
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right to privacy, one would be left with a more general right to the immunity of the 
person, or the right to one’s “inviolate personality”.
525
 
Here is the first problem: Warren and Brandeis mistakenly use ambiguous words and 
phrases, such as “right to liberty”, “immunity of the person”, and “inviolate personality” 
which leads to a conceptualization of privacy that is overly broad, unclear regarding 
reconciling competing interests, and lacking in precision. It is unclear what these terms 
mean, yet the authors do not provide any explanation—this is critical given that the terms 
form the foundation of their argument. For instance, the “right to liberty” does not 
explain what interests are contemplated; surely, it cannot mean freedom to do anything a 
person wants to do, and yet there must be some limit to what is protected under the 
umbrella of the right to privacy. One may wonder whether a person’s privacy can be 
protected even when that person is doing something that is considered by society to be 
ethically unsound. Similarly, another aspect that weakens the argument is that it is not 
clear how privacy could be protected in circumstances where there are competing liberty 
interests, and there is no assistance on how to conduct this analysis. The dilemma of how 
to resolve competing interests remains unresolved in this analysis. Indeed, Warren and 
Brandeis admit the inevitable difficulty in identifying where to draw the line.
526
 
Additionally, “immunity of the person” and “inviolate personality”, make no sense in the 
context in which they are used. It is difficult to understand what the authors mean 
because the argument is based on puzzling phrases that read more like a set of riddles 
rather than a clear logical argument. Dictionaries are not helpful: “immunity” is defined 
as “officially granted exemption from legal proceedings or liability”, or “lack of 
susceptibility, especially to something unwelcome or harmful”, from the Latin, 
“immunitas” and “immunis”, meaning “exempt from charge”.
527
 Also, “inviolate” is 
defined as “free or safe from injury or violation”, from the Latin, “inviolatus”, meaning 
“not violate”.
528
 One may question exactly what the authors have reduced privacy to. 
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Here is the second problem: the strong language, the dystopian view of technology, and 
the link created between morality, justice, and privacy results in a view of privacy that is 
anything but neutral, giving the concept of privacy positive value without clearly 
explaining why. While I agree that there is value to privacy, I believe that it is important 
to provide a reason that justifies why there is such value. In Warren and Brandeis’ article, 
there is no elucidation of their reasoning in this regard. In light of the strong tone of the 
article, it is clear there is something causing the reaction, but nothing is particularly 
explicated concerning what the value of privacy actually is. Indeed, there is an absence of 
a well-articulated discussion regarding the benefits of privacy, why individuals would 
want it, and how dignity and self-respect can be maintained by providing it. 
Notwithstanding the rigorous language used in this article, there is no discussion about 
how the weaker, more vulnerable, individuals they are aiming to defend are potentially 
taken advantage of with these “evil” and threatening technological devices as described 
by Warren and Brandeis. 
William L. Prosser does not agree with Warren and Brandeis and provides a different 
take on torts involving invasions of privacy.
529
 He maintains that the invasion of privacy 
covers intrusion upon the plaintiff’s solitude; publicity given to his or her name or 
likeness or to private information about him; placing him or her in a false light in the 
public eye; and commercial appropriation of elements of his or her personality.
530
 Prosser 
believes that the right to privacy is subject to a privilege to publish matters of news value 
or of public interest of a legitimate kind.
531
 Not only does he argue that there are four 
torts involving the invasion of privacy without any justification for his choices, but he 
also does not provide any clarification about what he considers as the exception, 
involving matters that are of news value or of public interest of a legitimate kind. 
Prosser takes a cynical approach when referring to Warren and Brandeis’ article and 
characterizes it as an outstanding (and not in a good way) illustration of the influence of 
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legal periodicals upon the courts.
532
 Prosser argues that in reality, the right to privacy 
appears to be a complex of four distinct wrongs, which have little in common except that 
each is an interference with the plaintiff’s right “to be let alone”.
533
 If matters are 
examined more closely, it may be concluded that the success of this argument is highly 
questionable as it is puzzling that Prosser compartmentalizes aspects of privacy into four 
categories consisting of traditional forms of protection and then claims that they are not 
related. There is a complete failure to appreciate that privacy is a fundamental right that 
individuals enjoy simply by virtue of being human. This concept cannot be divided and 
placed into separate categories. 
What is most troubling about this conceptualization of privacy is that Prosser is reluctant 
to accept that there is a separate, freestanding right of privacy. In fact, he appears to be 
most concerned about the importance of privilege to publish, and the unquestionable 
freedom of the press—he asserts that those who put themselves in the public eye, 
including actors, inventors, explorers, or public officers, have no right to complain of any 
publicity which reasonably bears on their activity.
534
 Even individuals who live more 
public lives are still human, and deserve to be protected from powerful parties who have 
the potential to abuse monitoring power—they are still worthy of protection. That said, 
Prosser states that the publishing privilege is not unlimited and there is a line, but the line 
is difficult to draw.
535
 Yet, when he draws the line, he only stops at outrageous behaviour 
that would outrage the common decency beyond what the public will tolerate: unless a 
person is liable for intentional infliction of mental suffering, the plaintiff would be 
expected to endure all other privacy intrusions for the sake of sensational reporting.
536
 
This fragmented approach seems more declaratory than analytical, and it also takes an 
extremely narrow view of privacy in that the right of privacy is only protected in rare, 
exceptional cases. Privacy is given a very low value, and appears to be outweighed by 
ideas of security and other interests such as freedom of expression in almost every case. 
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In this extremely skewed analysis, it is clear that the dignity and self-respect of 
individuals are not a priority. 
Contrastingly, various feminist legal theorists provide a compelling perspective on 
privacy that highlights some of the considerations that tend to be overlooked in other 
analyses of privacy. For example, Judith Wagner DeCew asserts that the main concern of 
feminist scholars is about the darker side of privacy and the use of privacy as a shield to 
conceal negative treatment of women, including domination, degradation, and abuse.
537
 
Furthermore, according to the feminist perspective, the distinction between the public and 
private realms has the effect of allowing the private realm to be free from scrutiny, and 
by completely refraining from getting involved in the private domain, the State allows 
repression and physical harm to be perpetuated.
538
 Certainly, this approach sheds light on 
a minority perspective and signals that there can be a danger in having an overly broad 
and categorical approach to privacy. 
In a balanced analysis, DeCew states that while it is important to acknowledge the danger 
of privacy acting as a shield for abuse, it is unacceptable to reject privacy completely just 
because of the potential for harm done in private.
539
 DeCew maintains that allowing 
everything to be public and transparent, leaving the domestic sphere open to complete 
scrutiny, is unworkable, and as such, it is not appropriate to simply collapse the 
public/private dichotomy.
540
 In fact, DeCew suggests that this type of transparency is 
unacceptable and even dangerous because it grants excessive power to the State.
541
 Using 
a broader conception of privacy, DeCew contends that it is possible to appreciate the 
pitfalls of the dichotomy, while still retaining a meaningful concept of privacy.
542
 She 
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argues that privacy is not an absolute value, but can be viewed as the default, requiring 
government and others to justify their need to intrude.
543
  
Similarly, Carole Pateman agrees that the public/private dichotomy is central to almost 
two centuries of feminist writing and political struggle, and is essentially what the 
movement is all about.
544
 She explains why feminists reject liberal conceptions of the 
private and public and view the social structure of liberalism as the political problem, not 
the starting point, from which equal rights can be claimed.
545
 In fact, Pateman states that 
feminists stand alone when raising the generally neglected problem of the patriarchal 
character of liberalism.
546
 Ultimately, Pateman posits that a proper understanding of 
liberal social life is possible only when it is accepted that the two spheres (the private 
domestic and the public civil society) that are separate and opposed, become inextricably 
interrelated.
547
 Pateman believes that, presently, women have been almost completely 
excluded from public life, or alternatively, they have been included in patriarchal 
ways.
548
  
Although DeCew and Pateman highlight the dark side of privacy, they do not provide any 
solutions regarding how public and private spheres can coexist in an interrelated manner. 
In modern society, it appears to be possible to have a right to privacy where these spheres 
can exist in an interrelated manner, so that there is more equality in both spheres. In more 
progressive households, men and women share in the domestic work, and, both men and 
women work in the public sphere in paid employment. However, at this point, it cannot 
be said that what Pateman is suggesting has actually taken place to the extent that she 
envisions given the different allocations of work, gender wage gap, and glass ceiling 
effects. 
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Given the narrow focus, what is especially missing with this theory is a discussion about 
how fundamental privacy can be in this context. In their attempt to argue for transparency 
to expose the dark side of privacy, whether it is complete or partial, there is a consequent 
failure to discuss any potential value of privacy in a meaningful way. 
Some feminist theorists are more aggressive when exploring the nature of a right to 
privacy and its impact on the private and public spheres. For instance, Catherine A 
MacKinnon, a radical feminist, asserts that over and over again that the State protects 
male power by ensuring male control over women at every level.
549
 Further, she argues 
that women are kept socially dependent on men and are kept poor—the law merely stands 
passively by reflecting the scene.
550
 MacKinnon states that the law of privacy treats the 
private sphere as the sphere of personal freedom; for men, this is the case, but for women, 
the private sphere is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse which is 
neither free nor personal.
551
 According to MacKinnon, men enjoy personal freedom, 
whereas women are subject to collective subordination since public repression 
masquerades as private freedom.
552
 MacKinnon argues that privacy law assumes women 
in the private sphere have the same privacy that men do, just as equality law assumes that 
women are essentially equal to men in the private sphere.
553
 In her view, this is the 
problem, because realistically speaking, it is not the case.
554
 
MacKinnon maintains that while the law of privacy proposes to guarantee individual 
bodily integrity, personal exercise of moral intelligence, and freedom of intimacy, 
women’s rights to access those values have not been guaranteed.
555
 Yet the privacy ideal 
holds: as long as the public does not interfere, autonomous individuals interact freely and 
equally.
556
 To MacKinnon, for women, the measure of intimacy has been the measure of 
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oppression, so feminism has had to “explode the private”.
557
 Essentially, MacKinnon 
asserts that women have no privacy to lose or to guarantee.
558
 
In one sense, it is understandable that MacKinnon would wish to reject the private/public 
distinction, given that the distinction perpetuates the mistreatment suffered by women. In 
this way, she could be preventing or at least minimizing the darker side of privacy. 
However, MacKinnon then goes on to argue that women do not benefit either way from 
privacy protections because they have no privacy to lose or to guarantee in light of the 
inequality that exists. If this is the case, it is unclear why the private sphere would have to 
be exploded. One may object to her arguments and point to their confusing and 
impractical nature; one may also object to the idea of “exploding” an entire sphere of life. 
If the goal is to eliminate the private sphere so that there is no distinction between private 
and public, the end result will be complete transparency. There are dangers associated 
with complete transparency, opening the door to further potential for exploitation. This 
may help prevent the darker side of privacy because any previously hidden abuse could 
be revealed, but this complete transparency would lead to everything being subject to 
intervention and scrutiny. There is a failure to acknowledge the fundamental value of 
privacy. 
One may raise a further objection to MacKinnon’s use of combative language when she 
indicates that the right to privacy looks like an injury presented as a gift, a sword in 
men’s hands presented as the shield in women’s hands.
559
 She criticizes privacy law as 
isolating women from each other and from public recourse, and makes this classic 
statement: the right to privacy is “a right of men “to be let alone” to oppress women one 
at a time”.
560
As one of the pioneers of the feminist perspective, she may believe that this 
is the only way to make the point. In fact, it is common for social movements to begin 
and gain momentum with extreme leaders, and gradually progress with more tempered 
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leaders using compromise.
561
 In the end, MacKinnon leaves us with no real solution, and 
there is no guarantee that collapsing the spheres would rectify any of the problems she 
cites, since there are situations where individuals are aware of one’s mistreatment, but 
they do not act or influence a change of any kind. Ultimately, MacKinnon’s conflicting 
arguments leave us to wonder how they can be reconciled, and whether it is even possible 
to have privacy free from the darker side of privacy. 
Let me pause here to recap what I have discussed to this point. I have so far examined 
two types of non-reductionist theories. The first set of theories involved viewing privacy 
as the tort of invasion of privacy, as explained by Warren and Brandeis and also Prosser. 
The second group of theories concerned various feminist approaches to privacy, where 
theorists such as DeCew, Pateman, and MacKinnon highlight the dark side of privacy. 
Now I will discuss theories pertaining to the control-over-information perspective.  
Theorists who view privacy as control-over-information provide a unified description and 
account of privacy. For example, Ruth Gavison argues that it is important to ensure that 
there is a neutral concept of privacy that can enable us to identify when a loss of privacy 
has occurred; privacy has coherence as a value; and privacy is a concept that is useful in 
legal contexts so that it enables us to identify occasions calling for legal protection.
562
 
Gavison concludes that privacy is coherent and useful in these three situations, and that 
losses of privacy, invasions of privacy, and actionable violations of privacy are related 
because each is a subset of the previous category.
563
 
In fact, Gavison states that our interest in privacy is related to our concern over our 
accessibility to others and the extent to which we are known to others; the extent to which 
others have physical access to us; and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ 
attention.
564
 To her, viewing privacy as limited accessibility enables the identification of 
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when losses of privacy occur—the reasons why we claim privacy involves the function 
that privacy has in our lives, including the promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and 
human relations.
565
 Gavison warns however, that since privacy is seldom protecting an 
interest in absence of some other interest, the danger is that one might conclude that 
privacy is not an important value in itself.
566
 However, Gavison states that, when 
considering the meaning and function of privacy, privacy is a value that is in need of 
protection.
567
  
What is especially unique in Gavison’s approach is that she proposes that individuals 
enjoy perfect privacy when they are completely inaccessible to others, with no one 
having information about the person, no one paying any attention to the person, and no 
one having any physical access to the person.
568
 Gavison states however, that perfect 
privacy is impossible in any society.
569
 A loss of privacy takes place as others obtain 
information about the person (loss of secrecy), pay attention to the person (loss of 
anonymity), or gain access to the person (loss of solitude).
570
 According to Gavison, 
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude are distinct but interrelated.
571
 
Several other theorists agree with Gavison. Anita Allen, for example, argues that privacy 
denotes a degree of inaccessibility of persons, their mental state, and information about 
them to the senses and surveillance devices of others.
 572
 According to Allen, in order to 
say that a person is enjoying privacy, that person must be beyond the range of others’ 
senses and any devices that can enhance, reveal, trace, or record human conduct, thought, 
belief, or emotion.
573
 Alan F. Westin argues that privacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent 
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information about them is communicated to others.
574
 Westin asserts that privacy is the 
voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society to physical or 
psychological means, either in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy or, when 
among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve.
575
 He states that individuals 
are continually engaged in a personal adjustment process where they balance the desire 
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of themselves to others in 
light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by society in which the person 
lives.
576
 To Westin, individuals go through this process in the face of pressures from the 
curiosity of others and from the processes of surveillance that every society sets to 
enforce social norms.
577
  
Similarly, W. A. Parent maintains that privacy is the condition of not having 
undocumented personal information about oneself known by others.
578
 Parent states that 
personal information consists of facts about a person which most individuals in a given 
time do not want widely known about themselves.
579
 However, since some people are 
more sensitive than others and may take extreme measures to make sure people do not 
find out more benign information, Parent suggests that personal information consists of 
facts that most people in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves or of facts 
about which particular individuals are acutely sensitive and therefore do not choose to 
reveal about themselves, even if most persons do not care if these facts are widely 
known.
580
 Likewise, Raymond Wacks argues that the best account of privacy is limited 
accessibility, a cluster of three related but independent components: secrecy (information 
known about an individual); anonymity (attention paid to an individual); and solitude 
(physical access to an individual).
581
 Wacks maintains that the essence of his argument is 
that at the center of the concern about privacy is the use and misuse of personal 
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information about an individual.
582
 Ultimately, Wacks defines personal information as 
facts, communications, or opinions which relate to the individual and which it would be 
reasonable to expect them to regard as intimate or sensitive and therefore to want to 
withhold or at least restrict their collection, use or circulation.
583
 
Although this theory is a more modern take on personal information in light of 
technology, accepts that there cannot realistically be complete privacy, and recognizes 
the importance of balancing interests in the circumstances, there are some shortcomings. 
Here is one shortcoming: there is a failure to specifically identify types of information 
over which individuals have control, making the theory somewhat vague. Here is another 
shortcoming: there are issues regarding how certain words are defined, such as control 
and personal information. Here is another shortcoming: it is unclear how this information 
that is controlled can have a realistic limit without being overly broad, and one may 
wonder whether all the information about a person may end up being within a person’s 
control, especially in the case of sensitive individuals. 
But the most bewildering shortcoming of the control-over-information theories is this: it 
is unclear how this theory differs from the economic theory given that personal 
information can be viewed as any other commodity and used as a tool to achieve 
something, especially in the context of technology. In particular, a person could actually 
make decisions in the spirit of controlling their information, but incidentally or purposely 
exploit their information to gain value in a transaction. This would lead to the same 
problems that were discussed when criticizing the economic theory of privacy. For 
example, all of the dangers of putting weaker individuals at risk of exploitation would be 
present. Most troubling would be that privacy would be used as a means to get 
something, manipulate something, or gain value in some way at the expense of the 
dignity and self-respect of the most vulnerable citizens. Simply put, some individuals 
may remain exposed since they may not be in a position make wise decisions regarding 
how their information will be used in a data transaction to gain value and efficiency. 
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Lastly, the pragmatic, contextual approach attempts to be realistic, flexible, and open to 
maintaining contextual integrity. Andrew McStay explains that theorists who take a 
pragmatic, contextual view of privacy attempt to remove binary terms such as 
public/private.
584
 Instead, they focus on expressing privacy with respect to 
appropriateness, context, the type and nature of information, and with whom information 
is being shared.
585
 In fact, the main feature of the pragmatic, contextual point of view is 
that people do not require complete privacy, and different norms apply in different 
circumstances.
586
 McStay describes the contextual approach as an attempt to deal with 
the fact that privacy matters are informationally and technologically complex.
587
 He 
points out that recognition of situation dependency allows for flexibility that is not found 
in the absolutes of the other privacy theories.
588
  
While theorists who adopt non-reductionist approaches clearly have good intentions and 
are trying, in a pragmatic and realistic way to disentangle the conceptual mess of privacy, 
they unfortunately cause a series of unintended consequences. In particular, they break 
the concept of privacy using explanations that are not helpful—the explications are 
overly complicated, shapeless, and without an anchor to support a meaningful 
understanding of privacy or how to go about assessing competing claims. 
Simply put, there is nothing undergirding their analyses. There is no appreciation of the 
value of privacy because it shifts back and forth, depending on the direction in which the 
wind is blowing. Ultimately, these sorts of non-reductionist theories provide no solid 
understanding of what privacy is, and consequently, no north star to guide us. 
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3.2 Proceeding with the Dignity/Human Rights 
Approach 
What is needed, in short, is an account of privacy that (1) recognizes privacy as a 
freestanding right or concept, not reducible to rights to persons or property, or subject to 
limitation in the service of economic goals; and that (2) indicates what makes privacy 
important. In my view the dignity/human rights approach to privacy can accomplish both 
of these tasks. At its core, this approach is a more sophisticated version of the right to be 
let alone—the main point being that individuals are to be treated as ends in themselves 
rather than as means to furthering another person’s or society’s goals.
589
 In fact, the idea 
that invasions of privacy constitute offenses to dignity can be traced back to Kantian 
times.
590
  
One strong advocate for the dignity/human rights approach to privacy is Edward J. 
Bloustein. His method of highlighting the importance of dignity in respect to privacy is to 
criticize Prosser, the theorist advancing the claim that privacy should be conceptualized 
as a tort.
591
 Essentially, Bloustein rejects Prosser’s analysis and argues that assaults on 
privacy have been transmuted into the torts of defamation, infliction of mental stress, and 
misappropriation—using this analysis, there is no new tort of invasion of privacy, but 
only new ways of committing old torts.
592
 Bloustein asserts that Prosser’s analysis leads 
to the social value of privacy becoming a composite of the value our society places on 
protecting mental tranquility, reputation, and intangible forms of property.
593
  
Bloustein insists that since Warren and Brandeis there has obviously been something 
unique about privacy, even if it has never been completely set out; the most significant 
indication of the interest is that it protects against “inviolate personality”, which he 
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interprets to be an individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity.
594
 He maintains that 
this value in privacy is a person’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.
595
 
Against this, it might be observed that Bloustein creates the same problems as Warren 
and Brandeis in terms of not adequately defining critical phrases that form the foundation 
of the argument to justify his point. One may ask how Bloustein comes to understand the 
meaning of “inviolate personality” since he commits the same blunder as Warren and 
Brandeis by simply deciding that the phrase means independence, dignity, integrity, and 
the essence as a unique and self-determining being without further elaboration to support 
the contention. 
Yet, when discussing the difference between small-town gossip and the emergence of 
newspapers and other mass means of communication, Bloustein asserts that it is only 
with the emergence of newspapers and other mass means of communication that 
degradation of personality by the public disclosure of private intimacies become a legal 
significant reality.
596
 It is only at this point that the everyday threat to personal dignity 
and individuality is realized.
597
  
It is curious that Bloustein distinguishes between different levels of intrusion that can be 
involved when invading privacy—Bloustein is forward-thinking in that he is able to 
imagine that human dignity has the potential to be affected in different ways depending 
on types of technology that are used. He is able to envision that small-town gossip is not 
the same thing as newspapers and other mass means of communication. 
Ultimately, Bloustein states that the common conceptual character of privacy that runs 
through all the cases he reviews involves the injury to individual freedom, personality, 
and dignity—in stark contrast to Prosser, Bloustein says that he can identify a single tort 
with a common thread.
598
 In fact, he maintains that an intrusion on privacy threatens our 
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liberty, just as an assault, battery, or imprisonment threatens our person.
599
 When 
referring to electronic forms of eavesdropping and the electronic storage of personal data, 
Bloustein maintains that, while the applicable torts may differ, the social interest at issue 
in all cases is the preservation of individual dignity, as he so declares: “The common 
thread is dignity”.
600
  
At this point, it is helpful to understand what “dignity” actually means. It is another 
elusive term, which is defined as, “the state or quality of being worthy of honour or 
respect”; it comes from the Latin word, “dignitās”, from “dignus”, meaning “worthy”, 
and “deserving”.
601
  
Donna Hicks states that dignity is an attribute that we are born with; plainly put, it is our 
inherent value and worth.
602
 She distinguishes between dignity and respect; while we are 
all born worthy, we must earn respect.
603
 She also identifies several ways in which 
dignity can be expressed, some of which include acknowledgment, safety, fairness, 
understanding, and giving others the benefit of the doubt.
604
  
According to Hicks, the inevitable result of treating people with dignity is the creation of 
enhanced trust.
605
 In fact, it is established that trust is essential for organizations to work 
properly, for commitment levels to remain high, and for individuals to constantly be 
willing to make a positive contribution.
606
 What is more, trust between managers and 
employees is confirmed to be the primary defining characteristic of the very best 
workplaces.
607
 She states that, when trust vanishes in the employment relationship, there 
are feelings of violation and betrayal that lead to a complete breakdown in the 
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relationship.
608
 In fact, with breakdowns in trust in the employment relationship, the 
human reaction is immediate and can lead to feelings of disgust.
609
 
Ari Ezra Waldman states that trust is a social norm of interactional propriety based on 
favorable expectations of others’ behaviour.
610
 Moreover, he contends that trust is a 
significant factor in our decisions to share our personal information since it reduces the 
vulnerabilities associated with sharing.
611
 He maintains that “trust is at the core of our 
expectations of privacy”.
612
 
Ultimately, Waldman argues that the relationship between privacy and trust is functional, 
in that privacy builds trust, and trust yields disclosure.
613
 In fact, he asserts that if we 
want privacy to thrive in a world that requires significant disclosures to participate in 
modern life, we need sharing in some contexts to be compatible with privacy.
614
 When 
doing so, it is important to recognize that many disclosures are not purely voluntary, and 
privacy that factors in trust can rebalance power relationships; for example, the power 
dynamics of doctor-patient relationships are situations where disclosure is necessary, but 
the trust norms that have been developed over time through ethics and duties of loyalty 
operate to soften the disclosure risks so the information holders are less vulnerable.
615
 
In the workplace, trust allows individuals to deal with uncertainty and complexity, take 
risks, cooperate with others, and create order in chaos, because the norms we expect 
others to follow, namely confidentiality and discretion, are essential for creating 
circumstances for sharing information.
616
 Consequently, the existence of trust in work 
relationships can lead to outperformance of competitors, increased efficiency of 
teamwork and cooperation, and an increase in the level of dedication to a company 
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mission; most importantly, trust helps individuals connect and share more meaningful 
interactions.
617
 Privacy provides benefits to both individuals and corporations because 
privacy is bound to trust, and this is a fundamental requirement in life.
618
 
George Kateb states that, while human dignity is perceived to be the basis for human 
rights, not many understand what dignity is and why it matters for the claim to rights.
619
 
He argues that the idea of human dignity is something that is necessary to the theory of 
human rights; he insists that human dignity must be affirmed.
620
 In fact, he explains that, 
“the idea of human dignity not only serves to help defend the theory of individual rights 
but also gives a perspective on the dignity of the human species”.
621
 He begins with the 
assumption that the dignity of every human being has a status that is equal to that of all 
others.
622
 Consequently, equal status means that no one person is better than another, 
despite the fact that individual talents and innate abilities may vary.
623
 In particular, such 
variations in humans are irrelevant to human status.
624
 
Alexandra Rengel draws on natural law and applies the dignity/human rights approach to 
the concept of privacy, asserting: “Privacy is an essential human need”.
625
 According to 
Rengel, humans need to know that they can keep some things secret from others, and the 
right to have secrets is so embedded in human nature that it would be very difficult to 
imagine satisfying human interactions without the ability to keep certain things secret 
from each other and to lead lives unmonitored by others.
626
  
Rengel argues that the need for humans to have a certain degree of privacy is natural, and 
due to this intrinsic need, privacy is recognized in a social and legal sense in most 
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cultures.
627
 She stresses the importance of acknowledging the intrinsic and natural quality 
of the human need to privacy. 
Lastly, James Griffin provides further clarification on the underlying reasons for the 
existence of human rights.
628
 Griffin describes human rights as rights we have simply by 
virtue of being human.
629
 He suggests that the Latin word, “ius” is a “right” that an 
individual has and that derives from the natural law that all human beings are, in a very 
particular sense, equal.
630
 What is more, the link between freedom and dignity has been 
carried through to the present.
631
 Griffin maintains that human rights are currently seen as 
protections of our normative agency, or personhood.
632
 However, Griffin states this is not 
exactly clear where the line should be drawn; he proposes that to answer this question, it 
is necessary to consider whether the right is too complicated to achieve its goal, or too 
demanding, and also how human beings in societies actually work and consider the 
practicalities.
633
 
Griffin suggests that it is possible to make a case for a human right of privacy, because 
without privacy, autonomy would be threatened.
634
 According to Griffin, we are social 
animals and we seek acceptance by the group; in fact, it is rare to swim against strong 
social currents.
635
 He contends that if our deliberation decisions about how we live were 
open to public scrutiny, we would self-censor and act in self-defence.
636
 Griffin states 
that autonomy is a feature of deliberation and decision, and liberty is a feature of action 
concerned with pursuing one’s aims without interference.
637
  
Notwithstanding this helpful clarification of human rights, Griffin subsequently states 
that, while informational privacy is not the ideal name given that it is too narrow, current 
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appeals to the human right of privacy are too broad.
638
 He takes a peculiar turn and 
proceeds to argue that human rights can be reduced to two rights when privacy claims are 
involved: the right to informational privacy, and the right to liberty.
639
 This strategy 
attempts to negate the approach initially taken, namely drawing on an understanding of 
human rights in order to argue for a right to privacy.  
One may challenge this proposal and refer to it as another case of déjà vu, where a 
theorist attempts to divide the concept of privacy into a certain number of rights that are 
to be protected in the courts. This fragmentation of the concept of privacy is just another 
example of what takes place in Prosser’s analysis. One may introduce another challenge: 
Griffin writes from the privacy perspective of dignity/human rights, but then highlights 
the necessity of considering whether the right is too complicated to achieve its goal and 
too demanding; he questions how human beings in societies actually work and considers 
the practicalities. Griffin appears to be struggling with how to apply this theory in a 
practical manner, and his solution is to divide privacy into informational privacy and 
liberty.  
Perhaps this is because the theory of dignity/human rights appears to run into roadblocks 
when realistically converting broad, vague, utopian ideas of what “should” be into what 
can be done realistically. Indeed, this is one of the main criticisms of the theory—the 
concept of dignity is too broad to be practical and lacks detail, and this prevents any kind 
of meaningful application. Another roadblock is that the theory uses complex terms such 
as personality and liberty without providing any solid explanation. Certain terms are also 
conflated with dignity, including autonomy and personality. Another roadblock that 
weakens the theory is that some of these terms pertain to competing interests, and the 
theory does not explain how competing interests can be balanced or dealt with in any 
way.   
While at first glance there is concern about realistic application of this theory, it is 
important to remember that the use of ambiguity in the language of human rights enables 
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a more organic and flexible approach for understanding privacy, adapting to the evolving 
society, and balancing competing interests.
640
 Given that privacy is fundamental and 
something to which individuals are equally entitled by virtue of their status as persons, it 
is critical to keep in mind that this approach enables a liberal and purposive interpretation 
where privacy rights receive a broad interpretation and exceptions are narrowly 
construed.
641
 As a starting point, the dignity/human rights approach appreciates the 
inherent value and worth of all individuals.  
Practically speaking, if the dignity/human rights perspective is to be the prevailing 
approach in Canada, then it would follow that a core societal value is that privacy is to be 
treated as an end, and Canadians deserve to be treated with dignity in a way that respects 
self-determination, autonomy, self-respect, and personality. It would also follow that the 
privacy of Canadians is to be regarded as fundamental and not something that can be 
taken away, given up, or used as a means to manipulate or gain value. Accordingly, using 
this theory, individuals (and their personal information) would therefore need to be 
respected so that their innate worthiness is maintained. 
3.3 Conclusion 
As can be seen from the above analysis, even when using a neutral investigation of 
privacy as a starting point, most theories of privacy are non-reductionist. By this I mean 
that they appreciate that there is a coherent value to privacy, that there is something that 
is inherently unique and valuable that cannot be covered off by some other law or set of 
laws. All the same, many non-reductionist theories fall short of sufficiently answering the 
question, “What is privacy, and why is it important?” Many of the theories, when 
combined, could create a more complete picture of what privacy involves, but if this is 
what is required in order to disentangle the concept of privacy, than these theories are 
neither sufficient nor necessary answers to the question. 
This Chapter explored the strengths and weaknesses of selected theories of privacy.   
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The reductionist theories are the most problematic as they are lacking in depth. The 
cluster-of-rights perspective adopted by, for example, Thomson, is unconvincing. The 
analysis is shallow, overly skeptical, and short-sighted. Posner’s economic theory of 
privacy treats information as a commodity and does not acknowledge that some may not 
appreciate what is being sacrificed in an exchange until it is too late. In this cold and 
mechanical analysis, the main motivation of privacy is to hide information, manipulate 
others, or gain something in exchange for value and efficiency. It leaves minority groups 
and vulnerable citizens behind. 
Many of the non-reductionist theories are also problematic, but for different reasons. 
Approaches that adopt the idea that invasion of privacy is a tort uses undefined terms, 
operates from a dystopian view of technology, and links privacy to morality and justice 
without explaining why it is a good idea to do this. This viewpoint comes across as 
declaratory rather than analytical. Some advocates for the tort attempt to partition the 
concept of privacy into separate rights without providing enough explanation to justify 
the action. This also results in the concept of privacy becoming nothing separate in itself 
that is worth protecting. 
Although the feminist theories may shed light on the interests of vulnerable citizens, they 
do not provide any real solutions to the problems that they identify, while the control-
over-information perspective fails to identify the types of information that are within a 
person’s control and is consequently too vague. Certain words such as “control” and 
“personal information” are left undefined. The problem is that even if one adopts this 
perspective it is unclear how this theory differs from the economic theory, since a person 
can decide when to allow someone to become aware of certain information within a 
person’s control—typically when a person wants something in exchange. Also, there are 
no clear limits especially in the case of sensitive persons. 
While the pragmatic, contextual approach offers a realistic, flexible, and open 
understanding of privacy that is aligned to the reasonable expectations of an evolving 
society, in my view it is too complex and has the effect of diluting the meaning of 
privacy. Though it is more realistic than most, with its modern inclination and attempt to 
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grasp the complexities of the technological context, the theory’s unintended 
consequences are simply too high a price for society to pay. There needs to be something 
representing core societal values that can undergird all analyses. 
The dignity/human rights approach, the dominant approach that I use during this 
dissertation, provides a more helpful understanding of privacy that enables the use of 
language to broadly and liberally interpret the law. The approach allows for a purposive 
interpretation and helps decision makers make incremental modifications to adapt with an 
evolving society and also to achieve appropriate balances when assessing competing 
interests.  
Since the dignity/human rights theoretical perspective of privacy is the lens that I use 
when understanding privacy and constructing a new workplace privacy regime, I spent a 
considerable amount of time discussing the nature of dignity, trust, and how individuals 
are inherently worthy and deserving of privacy. This ultimately affects how I approach 
the task of interpreting the upcoming privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases, 
and building the new workplace privacy regime.   
Recognizing privacy as a fundamental right, the dignity/human rights perspective 
emphasizes viewing and treating individuals and their privacy as ends rather than means. 
Privacy is not something to use in order to get something. Privacy is not something to 
utilize in order to create value. The message is simple. Privacy is always valuable—for 
everyone. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Analysis: Examination of Privacy Provisions 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose of this Chapter is to analyze various 
privacy provisions from Canada, the United States, and the European Union. 
The Canadian privacy provisions are from: Québec Charter;
642
 PIPEDA
643
 (including the 
PIPEDA Breach Regulations
644
); BC PIPA;
645
 and the QC Act.
646
 There is also a 
discussion of Canada’s Bill S-21(Privacy Rights Charter).
647
 The privacy provisions from 
the United States have been chosen from: California Constitution;
648
 California 
Consumer Privacy Act;
649
 California Labor Code,
650
 and the California Civil Code 
(Customer Records).
651
 There is also an examination of privacy provisions in these 
American bills: Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act);
652
and Bill SB 6280 (Washington 
Facial Recognition).
653
 The privacy provisions from the European Union come from: EU 
Convention;
654
 and the GDPR.
655
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Although it may be tempting to import entire bills, statutes, regulations, or conventions 
from what appear to be stronger, privacy-protective jurisdictions, this kind of 
transplantation from one jurisdiction to another is not recommended by comparative legal 
methodologists, because when rules of one jurisdiction cross boundaries, they may 
undergo a transformation to the point where their meaning can become displaced.
656
 
Rather, it is important to respect the cultural contexts of the jurisdictions examined and 
find more effective ways of borrowing ideas and fitting them into the Canadian 
jurisdiction following a careful analysis of similarities and differences between the 
provisions of the jurisdictions, for the purpose of finding practical solutions to similar 
problems in areas with different legal systems.
657
  
In line with this reasoning, Elizabeth Denham,
658
 the United Kingdom Information 
Commissioner and former Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, 
has recognized the benefits of the most recent European Union privacy instrument, the 
GDPR, and has remarked during a podcast by Michael Geist:  
I’m not advocating for the details and prescription of the GDPR to be 
translated into Canadian law, but I think some of the rights and some of the 
powers for regulators need to find an even playing field, a harmonized 
approach.
659
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Thus, in the interests of harmonization of law,
660
 it is advantageous to investigate several 
types of strong privacy provisions from the selected jurisdictions and determine whether 
it is possible to borrow ideas from them in order to close the electronic surveillance gap 
in the Canadian context.  
A useful approach for maintaining the focus of this dissertation is to compare a small 
number of privacy provisions that concern common topics. A mix of selected privacy 
provisions of the various jurisdictions are discussed under three themes: (1) foundational 
principles touching on privacy and electronic surveillance;
661
 (2) consent and balancing 
rights with legitimate interests;
662
 and (3) order-making powers, penalties, and fines.
663
  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the privacy provisions fall under the three features of 
privacy provisions, which represent areas of law relevant to privacy: (1) constitutional 
and human rights provisions; (2) data protection provisions; and (3) employment 
provisions. Aspects of each of the features of privacy provisions are discussed within the 
three themes as they become relevant. Each of these features must be examined in order 
to form a complete understanding of privacy and electronic surveillance.  
I have chosen these themes because they encapsulate several interesting issues relating to 
the electronic surveillance gap in employment. Theme 1 investigates foundational 
principles for understanding privacy and electronic surveillance: data collection and 
processing; profiling and unreasonable electronic surveillance; fair information 
principles; legislative purposes; privacy by design; data impact risk assessments; rights-
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based data protection provisions; and data fiduciaries. Theme 2 explores: definitions of 
consent; employees’ ability to provide, withhold, and revoke consent in situations 
involving electronic surveillance; and strategies for facilitating an effective balance of 
employees’ privacy interests and employers’ legitimate business interests. Theme 3 
considers the creation and enforcement of meaningful orders, penalties, and fines to 
strengthen the privacy regime. As can be seen from the chart below, a mix of core 
privacy provisions are examined in each theme.  
Table 1: Jurisdictions and Themes of Privacy Provisions in Chapter 4 
Themes Canada  United States  European Union  
1- Foundational 
principles touching 
on privacy and 
electronic 
surveillance 
PIPEDA 
Québec Charter 
Bill S-21 (Privacy 
Rights Charter) 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act  
Bill S5642 (New 
York Privacy Act) 
Bill SB 6280 
(Washington Facial 
Recognition) 
California 
Constitution 
GDPR 
EU Convention  
 
2- The consent of 
individuals and the 
legitimate interests 
of organizations 
PIPEDA 
PIPEDA Breach 
Regulations 
BC PIPA 
QC Act 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act 
California Labor 
Code 
California Civil 
Code (Customer 
Records)  
GDPR 
 
3- Order-making 
powers, penalties, 
and fines 
PIPEDA 
BC PIPA 
QC Act 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act 
 
GDPR 
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I examine several Canadian privacy provisions in order to understand what currently 
exists in Canada and to identify any gaps that need filling with respect to electronic 
surveillance in the employment context.
664
 I examine privacy provisions in the United 
States and the European Union in order to understand how the privacy provisions are 
crafted, especially in situations where concepts in the theme are not covered in the 
Canadian privacy regime at all.
665
 The provisions that I have picked are relatively 
stronger privacy provisions so that I can glean as much information as possible from the 
analyses and ultimately strengthen protections in Canada.  
This dissertation asks how the principles and values that emerge from selected privacy 
provisions can be used to close the electronic surveillance gap in employment using a 
design that fits into Canada’s legal system. By “principles”, I mean fundamental truths or 
propositions that serve as the foundation for a system of belief, behaviour, or chain of 
reasoning; it is the fundamental source of something.
666
 By “values”, I mean the regard 
that something is held to deserve, and the importance, worth, or usefulness of something; 
it includes the standards of behaviour that are judged to be important in life.
667
  
When conducting my analysis, I will pay particular attention to the language and the 
structure of the provisions to isolate useful elements that can be used when crafting the 
proposed workplace privacy regime. Since the priority is on identifying and filling gaps 
in Canada’s regime, it is advantageous to compare similar provisions side-by-side and 
note subtle differences for the purposes of construction. Further, it is useful for the 
comparison to go beyond the level of legislation, and aim to understand the social reality 
involved.
668
 To that end, this Chapter contains a thorough analysis of privacy provisions, 
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and ties into the discussion various relevant social theory ideas involving surveillance and 
privacy. 
As will be seen below, this Chapter suggests that there are currently insufficient 
legislative privacy protections in Canada’s legal regime compared to other jurisdictions 
for closing the electronic surveillance gap in employment. Moreover, it will show that 
principles and values can be extracted from the privacy provisions, and can be used to 
design a new workplace privacy regime that sufficiently closes the electronic surveillance 
gap in a way that fits into Canada’s current legal system.   
This Chapter is organized by theme. It begins with broad concepts, and gradually 
becomes more focused on specific issues. In this Chapter, I examine each theme for the 
purposes of achieving three goals. First, I note the provisions that fall within each theme. 
Second, I analyze the provisions of each theme, discuss the principles and values that 
emerge from the analysis, and discuss how the identified gaps in Canada’s regime can be 
filled through the exploration of privacy provisions of the studied jurisdictions. And third, 
I set out my ideas for incorporating the detected principles and values into the proposed 
workplace privacy regime to close the electronic surveillance gap. These ideas stem from 
my discussion of the implications for the new workplace privacy regime. At this stage, 
the ideas are not yet crafted into detailed provisions. In Chapter 6, I will discuss how I 
propose to fit my ideas into the framework of Canada’s legal system. 
4.1 Theme 1: Foundational Principles Touching on 
Privacy and Electronic Surveillance 
The first theme discusses selected provisions involving foundational principles for 
understanding privacy and electronic surveillance. I list the provisions in the theme, 
analyze the provisions, and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy 
regime.  
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4.1.1 The Privacy Provisions Examined in Theme 1 
As can be seen in the chart below, there are two features of privacy provisions, namely 
data protection provisions, and constitutional and human rights provisions, which will be 
examined in Theme 1: 
Table 2: The Privacy Provisions Studied in Chapter 4, Theme 1 
 
Theme Canada  United States  European Union  
1- Foundational 
principles touching 
on privacy and 
electronic 
surveillance 
PIPEDA 
Québec Charter 
Bill S-21(Privacy 
Rights Charter) 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act  
Bill S5642 (New 
York Privacy Act) 
Bill SB 6280 
(Washington Facial 
Recognition) 
California 
Constitution 
GDPR 
EU Convention  
 
 
4.1.2 Analysis of the Privacy Provisions in Theme 1 
My goal in this section is to argue that PIPEDA contains significant gaps and does not 
sufficiently address issues related to electronic surveillance; additionally, there are ways 
to fill those gaps by examining how other jurisdictions have legislatively tackled the 
issues.  
I will argue for this conclusion in three steps. First, I will discuss problematic definitions 
and conceptualizations regarding certain terms in PIPEDA. Second, I will show that there 
are challenges with provisions in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
669
 regarding electronic 
surveillance in employment, and it is necessary to create new provisions to deal with 
them. Third, I will explain that, given these gaps in PIPEDA, it is necessary to examine 
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the strategies used by other jurisdictions to enhance trust in the new workplace privacy 
regime.  
To that end, the first thing to mention is that Canada’s PIPEDA does not define 
“collection”, “processing”, “automated”, “monitoring”, or “electronic surveillance”.
670
 
The most helpful guidance in this regard is found in the guidelines created by the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada when dealing with monitoring of employees’ 
social media,
671
 and also covert video surveillance in the private sector.
672
 In both cases, 
the same conclusion is reached: tracking employees’ personal-based or work-based social 
media and the capturing of images of identifiable individuals through covert video 
surveillance are both considered to be a “collection” of personal information.
673
 In sum, 
PIPEDA does not provide clear definitions of what I consider to be important and distinct 
concepts, as I will explain below.
674
 
In contrast, California explicitly defines both collection and processing in its California 
Consumer Privacy Act.
675
 There “collection” is broadly described as buying, renting, 
gathering, obtaining, receiving, or accessing any personal information pertaining to a 
consumer by any means; it includes receiving information from the consumer, either 
actively or passively, or by observing the consumer’s behaviour.
676
 “Processing” is 
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broadly defined and means “any operation or set of operations that are performed on 
personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means; it does not 
provide a list of actions that pertain to processing”.
677
  
Article 4(2) of the European Union’s GDPR,
678
 broadly defines the single term of 
“processing” as any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or 
on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction; it provides an 
extensive list of actions that involve processing, including collection, use, and disclosure. 
When placing these definitions side-by-side, it is clear that PIPEDA provides the least 
amount of legislative direction compared to the provisions in the California Consumer 
Privacy Act
679
 and the GDPR.
680
 Relatively speaking, in other words, Canada is in the 
worst position compared to California and the European Union. Canada needs to 
explicate in PIPEDA what is meant by “collection” and “processing”, either by providing 
definitions of both collection and processing, or a single wider definition of processing 
that encapsulates both concepts. Either way, there must be a definition of processing by 
automated means. 
To be sure, I am not suggesting that processing by automated means and electronic 
surveillance can be understood to be exactly the same; on the contrary, I believe they are 
distinct concepts, and I use them as such throughout this dissertation. Automated 
processing, a subset of processing, involves electronic or automatic processing to perform 
most tasks.
681
 Although electronic surveillance may be a subset of automated processing, 
it is important to discern the unique features of electronic surveillance because they 
                                                 
677
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involve active targeted monitoring of one or more persons, synonymous with monitoring 
or tracking; this distinct and exclusive concept of “electronic surveillance” has been 
considered to be “the systematic creation and/or use of personal data for the investigation 
or monitoring of actions or communications of one or more persons”.
682
 The idea of 
monitoring is incorporated in this definition of electronic surveillance; indeed, “to 
monitor” is defined as “observe or check the progress or quality of something over a 
period of time”, “keep under systemic review”, and “maintain regular surveillance 
over”.
683
 The point made in this part is that there are no definitions in PIPEDA regarding 
any of these terms involving collection, processing, automated, monitoring, or electronic 
surveillance; in my view, it is useful to examine how other jurisdictions have approached 
the issue legislatively so that some of the ideas can be included in PIPEDA. I would like 
to suggest that there be an addition of “processing”, which would include “collection”, 
and also an addition of “electronic surveillance” as described above as having an 
unparalleled focus on the targeted monitoring of individuals.  
Not only is there an absence of essential definitions relating to electronic surveillance in 
PIPEDA, but there are also no specific provisions that expressly address data privacy 
concerns that arise as a result of electronic surveillance.
684
 This makes Canada 
unresponsive to rapidly changing electronic surveillance technologies, and insensitive to 
the needs of Canadians who require sufficient protections. 
There are serious threats associated with electronic surveillance, since automated data 
collection and processing go even further than what Foucault imagined with the 
monitoring gaze, internalization, and self-censorship of subjects in his circular cage, the 
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Panopticon;
685
 in particular, “always-on” monitoring can facilitate predictions using 
automation.
686
 Most strikingly, electronic surveillance creates a potential for exploitation 
of individuals and an abuse of surveillance power.
687
 One hazardous aspect of this 
phenomenon is that of function creep, or the repurposing of personal information for new 
uses, where the new purposes are created without the knowledge of data subjects.
688
 
That is, when we engage in online activity, the opportunities for monitoring escalate as 
we participate in our own surveillance, captured by all entities including governments, 
employers, and businesses; what is most disturbing is that these entities use the 
information generated by ubiquitous surveillance efforts for their own purposes.
689
 For 
instance, we as a society like to stay connected with people online, posting content, 
tagging photos, and liking pictures or videos.
690
 The danger is that electronic surveillance 
is primarily conducted by capital to control behaviour and exploit surplus value generated 
by users.
691
 The alarming result is that large tech companies extract data, exploit users 
through monitoring efforts, and create profiles to assess behavioural data to determine 
what individuals are thinking and feeling at any moment.
692
 Even though this extracted 
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data may be taken from outside the workplace, it can be used in concerning ways that 
affect all aspects of life, including employment.
693
 Indeed, the combination of 
increasingly frequent social media and digital device use alone has led to a troubling 
situation where we as a society are becoming hard-wired for electronic surveillance—and 
digital devices can easily become tools that are used for oppressive purposes.
694
 What is 
more, through the use of learning theories, the ultimate goal of technology companies is 
to predict behaviours and modify real-time actions using various manipulation strategies 
to the point where inevitabilism may ensue and individuals believe that they have been 
stripped of their free will.
695
  
And still, there remains a privacy paradox.
696
 The paradox is this: even though we know 
about the dangerous potential of the abuse of power by larger technology companies, we 
still give up our personal information freely and fully, and voluntarily participate in the 
surveillance culture.
697
 The result is that we end up voluntarily rendering ourselves 
virtually transparent to anyone, thereby making it easier to monitor us, target us, track us, 
and even punish us.
698
 We even expose ourselves to potential discrimination based on 
panoptic sorting, where people are sorted according to their presumed economic or 
political value and may become subject to discrimination based on these groupings, 
including racial profiling.
699
 
Not only are employees exposed outside the workplace through ubiquitous surveillance, 
but they are also unveiled inside the workplace; electronic surveillance during working 
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hours creates a certain visibility through the use of panoptic power, whereby information 
systems can translate, record, and display human behaviour with high degrees of 
illumination.
700
 The result of this unsettling transparency is that employees feel 
vulnerable, untrusting, powerless, and filled with despair at the thought of losing self-
control, unique identities, and autonomy.
701
 
This is why Canadian citizens, who all have inherent value and worth,
702
 are in need of 
protection from acts of unreasonable electronic surveillance in the form of strong data 
protections provisions. Trust is at the core of our expectations of privacy and is a 
significant factor in our decisions to share our personal information, since it reduces the 
vulnerabilities related to sharing.
703
 Affording individuals with protections helps to build 
trust, which then leads to further comfort with the notion of disclosing personal 
information.
704
 Moreover, these protections have the potential to rebalance power 
relationships since they soften the disclosure risks and cause individuals to become less 
vulnerable.
705
 This makes a difference in the workplace, since trust bolsters human 
connections and can lead to outperformance of competitors, increased efficiency of 
teamwork and cooperation, and an increase in the level of dedication to a company 
mission.
706
 In fact, the inevitable result of treating people with dignity is the creation of 
enhanced trust, and trust is essential for organizations to work properly.
707
 This is 
demonstrated when individuals rate higher on workplace performance measures and are 
more willing to work together to help each other and the company as well.
708
 
While PIPEDA is silent on the issue of electronic surveillance, it is important to note that 
other jurisdictions have made considerable progress in providing necessary protections, 
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and have created provisions that are particularly instructive when it comes to 
understanding the sorts of features that are essential in a legislative framework to tackle 
issues regarding electronic surveillance. 
As mentioned above, “processing” in Article 4(2) of the GDPR
 709
 is broadly defined and 
includes a wide array of operations that can be performed on personal data, automated or 
not. What is most relevant to this discussion is the definition of “profiling” in Article 4(4) 
of the GDPR,
710
 which involves any form of automated processing of personal data that 
has a goal of using personal data to analyze, evaluate, and predict aspects relating to a 
natural person. Article 9(1) of the GDPR
711
 prohibits the processing of personal data 
regarding special categories of personal data such as a person’s racial or ethnic origin.
712
 
In fact, Article 21(1) of the GDPR
713
 provides individuals with the right to object to the 
processing of personal data, including profiling.
714
 Article 22 of the GDPR
715
 goes even 
further and discusses automated individual decision-making including profiling, and it 
provides individuals with the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling. These rights are balanced with legitimate 
interests set out in Article 23 of the GDPR
716
 so there is a fair consideration of competing 
interests, such as defence or national security. Still, when there is a restriction, there are 
specific requirements that must be met.
717
  
The panoptic sort has been considered a system of social control where more vulnerable 
individuals, including groups whose information could be subject to the automated 
processing referred to in Articles 4(4) and 9(1) of the GDPR
718
 are organized based on 
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unjust categorizations.
719
 Consequently, this creates a situation of exacerbated inequality 
and increased ability to communicate directly with targeted individuals to influence 
behaviour.
720
 Not only is the goal to manipulate behaviour, but it is also to predict 
behaviour to forecast outcomes that are likely to create a desired reaction.
721
  
One can see how this ability to engage in the panoptic sort could lead to an abuse of 
surveillance power.
722
 For instance, one consequence of the panoptic sort is racial 
profiling and its effects in the criminal justice system; typically, criminal profiles used by 
police contain several characteristics in the analysis, but when racial profiling collapses 
the entire set of characteristics and places a greater weight on the race of the individual, 
the concern is that several analytical models contain indicators or variables that are 
biased, and reinforce the bias.
723
 For example, when it is assumed that African Americans 
are more likely to be engaged in criminal behaviour, the consequence is that there are 
more stops, searches, and arrests, to the point where African Americans are on average 
subject to significantly more extensive policing.
724
 
To be clear, racial profiling occurs in Canada in the same manner as in the United States. 
Using the same example, the Ontario Human Rights Commission has recently recognized 
that racial profiling is a systemic problem in policing; both African Canadians and 
indigenous peoples face systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system.
725
 It is 
established that racial profiling does not work—it is neither efficient nor effective for 
fighting crime.
726
 Still, racial profiling manifests through over-policing.
727
 This creates a 
situation where certain minority groups experience disproportionately more frequent 
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contact with police, which is often for less serious matters.
728
 Racial profiling can be 
exhibited through police decisions to stop, question or detain someone; it can also take 
place prior to a stop and affect the balance of the interaction involving anything from 
checking a license plate, conducting searches, making arrest decisions, or using force.
729
  
Specifically dealing with racial profiling in the information age, a suspicionless stop-and-
frisk on the street is one thing, but using power in the cyber domain is another thing 
altogether; in fact, new forms of racial profiling have been created in subtle ways.
730
 This 
is manifested through predictive policing, sentencing algorithms, targeted hacking tools, 
and mass surveillance.
731
 More precisely, predictive policing aims to prevent crime by 
predicting where crime will take place next using algorithms that analyze large amounts 
of data and provide a “heat score” that indicates likelihood of committing a crime; the 
problem is that the algorithms that are used can have a built-in racial profiling bias, and 
can additionally be trained on data that is not objective.
732
 Similarly, algorithms used to 
rate each convict to determine the likelihood of recidivism for sentencing purposes may 
also be biased.
733
 Targeted hacking tools can involve hacks into suspects’ smartphones, 
laptops, tablets, internet-connected home devices, and so on, in order to listen in using the 
built-in microphones or cameras on the devices.
734
 It is also technologically possible to 
conduct mass surveillance of communications using algorithms to automate the process, 
and machine learning algorithms can be used to engage in predictive policing.
735
  
That is not all. Recent reports have surfaced indicating that the RCMP and other police 
authorities in Canada have been using controversial facial recognition technology, made 
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by a company known as Clearview AI, when conducting police investigations.
736
 It 
appears that some police authorities have admitted to using the technology, and the 
situation has prompted investigations into the issue.
737
 With facial recognition, a type of 
biometric identification, unique markers are used to identify someone; this is 
accomplished by using computer algorithms that discern specific distinctive details in a 
face from a photograph or video, and compare it to data associated with other faces stored 
in a database in order to find a match.
738
 But there are some dangers associated with this 
technology; some of the main issues that are encountered involve accuracy, the undesired 
capturing of individuals’ sensitive information, misuse and consequent chilling effects, 
and the disproportionate negative impact on minority groups due to misidentification and 
racially biased databases stemming from years of racially biased police practices.
739
 This 
means that, not only are minority groups vulnerable because of additional instances of 
misidentification, but they are also vulnerable due to the presence of biased databases.
740
  
Racial profiling is completely unacceptable, and electronic surveillance technology has 
the potential to magnify its negative effects if there are no checks in place that protect the 
human dignity of individuals, prevent the abuse of surveillance power, and avoid the 
negative consequences of profiling.  
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This may be why the forward-thinking Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition) has 
recently been created to become a groundbreaking law that aims to proactively tackle the 
problem of law enforcement using facial recognition technology by requiring State and 
local government agencies to create reports, use a data management policy, minimize 
inadvertent collection of additional data beyond the amount necessary, use security 
measures, test prior to deployment, and meet breach notification requirements.
741
 More 
specifically, section 1(1) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)
742
 recognizes 
the broad social ramifications of the unconstrained use of facial recognition services, and 
insists that safeguards be put in place to allow State and local government agencies to use 
the facial recognition services in a manner that benefits society, without threatening 
individuals’ democratic freedoms. Section 2(9) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial 
Recognition)
743
 defines “ongoing surveillance” as using a facial recognition service to 
track the physical movements of a specified individual through one or more public places 
over time, whether in real time or through application of a facial recognition service to 
historical records; section 2(10)
744
 defines “persistent tracking” as the use of a facial 
recognition service to track the movements of an individual on a persistent basis without 
identification or verification of that individual, confirming that  tracking becomes 
persistent as soon as the facial template that permits the tracking is maintained for more 
than 48 hours after first enrolling that template, or data created by the facial recognition 
service is linked to any other data such that the individual who has been tracked is 
identified or identifiable. Furthermore, section 8(1) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial 
Recognition),
745
 forces State or local government agencies to disclose their use of facial 
recognition service on a criminal defendant to that defendant in a timely manner prior to 
trial. 
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What is most essential for the purposes of this discussion is section 11 of Bill SB 6280 
(Washington Facial Recognition),
746
 because meaningful limits have been put in place to 
prevent the abuse of electronic surveillance power, and in particular, the dangerous 
inevitable consequences of profiling. More specifically, pursuant to section 11(1) of Bill 
SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition),
747
 State or local government agencies are not 
allowed to use a facial recognition service to engage in ongoing surveillance, conduct 
real-time or near real-time identification, or start persistent tracking unless: a warrant is 
obtained authorizing the use of the service for those purposes; exigent circumstances 
exist; or a court order is obtained authorizing the use of the service for the sole purpose of 
locating or identifying a missing person, or identifying a deceased person. Moreover, 
section 11(2) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)
748
 makes it clear that it is 
prohibited to apply a facial recognition service to any individual based on their religious, 
political, or social views or activities, participation in a particular noncriminal 
organization or lawful event, or actual or perceived race, ethnicity, citizenship, place of 
origin, immigration status, age, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or 
other characteristic protected by law—it specifically states that “this subsection does not 
condone profiling including, but not limited to, predictive law enforcement tools”.
749
 And 
section 11(5) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)
750
 states that State or 
local law enforcement agencies cannot use the results of a facial recognition service as 
the sole basis to establish probable cause in a criminal investigation; the results can only 
be used in conjunction with other information and evidence lawfully obtained by a law 
enforcement officer to establish probable cause in a criminal investigation. Also, section 
11(7) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)
751
prohibits substantively 
manipulating an image for use in a facial recognition service in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the facial recognition service provider's intended use. 
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What the foregoing suggests is that it is critical to have limits in place that prevent 
ongoing, persistent, or real-time electronic surveillance, and also acts of profiling and 
predictive policing. As well, boundaries are established so that facial recognition 
technology cannot be used on its own; any results must be used in conjunction with other 
lawfully obtained pieces of information for the purposes of a criminal investigation.  
These ideas are clearly applicable in the context of State and local government, with a 
focus on the criminal law context; however, I would like to suggest that they can be 
borrowed from this context and tailored to the employment context. That is, the 
definitions and prohibitions can act as a guide for the purposes of drafting provisions in 
the new workplace privacy regime. In my view, the concepts discussed above, together 
with the above discussion of the concepts in the GDPR, can be instructive; this is 
especially true regarding ongoing surveillance, persistent tracking, prohibitions against 
using the surveillance technology unless certain rare conditions are met, prohibitions 
against applying electronic surveillance technology to special groups of individuals or 
categories of sensitive personal data, using the results of the electronic surveillance 
technology as the sole basis in the decision-making process, profiling, and predictive 
decision-making that are all important to consider when creating the workplace privacy 
regime. Considering these essential facets of electronic surveillance during the drafting 
process can introduce additional dimensions to the discussion when creating a new 
workplace privacy regime.  
Let me pause for a moment to recap my argument to this point. I have explained how 
there are some issues with PIPEDA’s definitions and conceptualizations, and this creates 
complications with respect to dealing with the electronic surveillance gap. I also 
examined approaches used by other jurisdictions to glean information that can help me to 
close the electronic surveillance gap. 
What I would like to do now is delve into Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
752
 which contains the 
Fair Information Principles set out in the CSA Standard.
753
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These Principles set out 10 obligations that must be complied with by all organizations.
754
 
While these Principles were appropriate back in 1980 when the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines
755
 were first created, in 1996 when the CSA Standard
756
 was created based on 
those guidelines, and in 2000−2001 when PIPEDA took effect,
757
 I would like to suggest 
that they are no longer sufficient as they currently are for Canada’s privacy regime. That 
is, it may be precarious to assume that the fine technological intricacies of electronic 
surveillance and their implications would have been sufficiently appreciated in 1980, 
1996, or even 2001 for that matter.  
And when it comes to employment, I argue that there is a serious electronic surveillance 
gap that needs to be closed in this regard. Since provisions addressing concerns regarding 
electronic surveillance in employment are simply not explicated anywhere in the 
legislation, I believe that it is necessary to address this problematic issue of the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment immediately. 
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For instance, when examining Canada’s Principle 4 in clause 4.4 of Schedule 1 of 
PIPEDA,
758
 we see that the way in which collection has been envisioned and set out in 
the legislation cannot effectively address electronic surveillance challenges that may 
arise. Principle 4 in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
759
 has three clauses discussing limiting 
collection, following an opening that requires that collection be limited to what is 
necessary for the purposes, and information be collected by fair and lawful means. First, 
clause 4.4.1
760
 prevents personal information from being collected indiscriminately, 
requiring that the amount and type of information collected is limited to what is necessary 
to fulfill the purposes that are identified; organizations must specify the type of 
information collected in accordance with their policies and procedures. Second, clause 
4.4.2
761
 requires personal information to be collected by fair and lawful means in order to 
prevent organizations from collecting information by misleading and deceiving 
individuals about the purpose for which the information is collected; the clause also states 
that there is an implied requirement that consent to the collection is not obtained through 
deception. Third, clause 4.4.3
762
 states that limiting collection is linked to two other 
principles involving purposes and consent.
763
   
Again, no discussion of electronic surveillance is included under Principle 4 in clause 4.4 
of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.
764
 In my view, while the existing clauses may be helpful in 
general situations involving data collection, they would not be instructive in situations 
involving electronic surveillance, and certainly not ones involving employment, since 
some problematic assumptions have been made. 
The first problematic assumption is that employees are able to provide, withhold, or 
revoke consent to the collection in the first place; clauses 4.4.2
765
 and 4.4.3
766
 specifically 
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refer to the need to obtain consent in a manner that is not misleading or deceiving about 
the purposes of the collection, which must be necessary. Issues of consent and 
employees’ ability to consent will be tackled in Theme 2. What is important to note at 
this point is that Principle 4 involving collection
767
 is in the majority of cases unworkable 
in the employment context in relation to the concept of consent; I will be arguing that 
employees are in most cases not in a position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent, and 
some other strategy is necessary to close the electronic surveillance gap.
768
 
The second assumption, which I will address here, is that clause 4.4.2
769
 is sufficient to 
prevent organizations that are collecting personal information from engaging in function 
creep in situations involving electronic surveillance. Function creep involves the 
repurposing of personal information for new uses without the knowledge of the owner of 
the data.
770
 Function creep carries a high potential for abuse of electronic surveillance 
power, given that employees are the more vulnerable party and employers have the power 
to use technology to their advantage as the overseer with heightened visibility.
771
 This is 
critical in the employment context, given the detrimental effects of excessive monitoring 
on employees.
772
 One major concern among employees is that personal information that 
is collected exclusively for one reason (for instance, to protect company property) could 
be used for another reason (for example, to make disciplinary decisions following a 
discovery of a breach of company rules).
773
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It might be objected that this problem is addressed under identifying purposes under 
Principle 2 in clause 4.2 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.
774
 Under clause 4.2.2,
775
 the purposes 
for which personal information is collected must be identified by the organization at or 
before the time the information is collected, in order to determine the information that is 
required to be collected to fulfil these purposes. Moreover, clause 4.2.4
776
 states that, 
when personal information that has been collected is to be used for a purpose not 
previously identified, the new purpose must be identified prior to use, because the 
consent of the individual would be required for this new purpose.
777
  
In response I would simply point out that clauses 4.2.2
778
and 4.2.4
779
 are insufficient for 
addressing current pressures to engage in function creep in light of the unequal 
bargaining power of the parties.
780
 This is because they do not take into account the 
sophistication of electronic surveillance technologies, and underestimate the simplicity of 
repurposing surveillance information.
781
 In my view, the unequal bargaining power of the 
parties, together with the elaborate technological capabilities of electronic surveillance, 
creates a situation where it could be effortless to find ways to take advantage and engage 
in function creep. Again, there is the problematic assumption that consent is something 
that employees can provide, withhold, or revoke; in clause 4.2.4,
782
 there is a requirement 
to obtain consent before information can be used for new purposes.
783
  
The third problematic assumption is that clause 4.4.1 in Principle 4 of Schedule 1 of 
PIPEDA
784
 is sufficient for dealing with situations involving electronic surveillance. In 
my view, the risk in employment is that employers, the dominant party in the 
relationship, would take advantage of their electronic surveillance power if these were the 
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only limits in place, and could gather and accumulate surveillance information that goes 
well beyond the parameters of “amounts and types of information” in clause 4.4.1.
785
 I 
therefore conclude that clause 4.4.1
786
 is insufficient and cannot be used to close the 
electronic surveillance gap.  
More precisely, one must consider the four temporal dimensions for a complete 
understanding of any instance of surveillance: the timeframe in which the surveillance is 
conducted (ephemeral, across a single span of time, across recurrent spans such as within 
24-hour cycles, or scattered across time following a trigger); the intensity with which 
surveillance is conducted (once, repeated, or continuous); the persistence of 
consequences of surveillance (ephemeral because it is limited to observation, short-to-
medium term because it is recorded, or long-term or permanent because it is archived); 
and the time period within which surveillance is applied (the present, real-time use, the 
past through retrospective use, or the future through prospective or predictive use).
787
 
Without proper boundaries in place for the watchers, the surveillance efforts have the 
potential to be overgeneralized and begin too broadly in hopes of finding a problem, 
rather than beginning with a reason to be searching in the first place.
788
  
In light of the above discussion, it may be beneficial to borrow the GDPR principles of 
purpose limitation,
789
 which states that personal data must only be collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes, and data minimization,
790
 which states that personal 
data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed. These provisions appear to have more depth and 
place more appropriate limits on the watchers.  
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As the above analysis illustrates, PIPEDA lacks clarification relating to electronic 
surveillance issues in the employment context. The kinds of provisions that are required 
for regulating electronic surveillance in the workplace do not currently exist in PIPEDA; 
I would like to suggest that, in order to close the electronic surveillance gap, it is 
imperative to add several new provisions that specifically address the dangers associated 
with this sophisticated technology when it comes to employment.  
To recap my argument to this point, I first showed that there are some difficulties with 
PIPEDA’s definitions and conceptualizations, and I then demonstrated that there are 
problems with Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
791
 with respect to addressing electronic 
surveillance issues in the employment context. The third thing that I will do is stress that, 
given the above-mentioned gaps, it is vital to build trust with respect to this new 
workplace privacy regime; indeed, trust is essential when addressing privacy concerns
792
 
in the workplace,
793
 and it is especially necessary if the goal is to encourage Canadians to 
adopt a new workplace privacy regime.
794
 In this part, I will argue that, when examining 
other jurisdictions, we can identify several strategies that can be used in order to build 
trust in the new workplace privacy regime. 
The first place to start is by examining the purpose of the legislation. In Canada, section 3 
of PIPEDA
795
 pragmatically recognizes the need to balance the right of privacy of 
individuals with the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information 
for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.
796
 
However, there is currently no reference to fundamental rights and freedoms; instead, it 
incorporates the question of what a reasonable person would consider to be appropriate in 
the circumstances.
797
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In contrast, Article 1 of the GDPR
798
 expressly states that the GDPR protects 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data.
799
 In my view, Canada should do the same, and if Canada 
intends to use a dignity/human rights approach to privacy in its private sector data 
protection legislation, it should be recognizing that dignity is critical when dealing with 
personal data of Canadians.
800
 For Canadians to feel included and experience a sense of 
fairness and empowerment,
801
 they must be shielded with data protection provisions that 
explicitly refer to fundamental rights and freedoms.   
There are a few more ways to ensure that there is increased trust in the new workplace 
privacy regime, so that individuals can more effectively deal with the uncertainty and 
complexity of privacy concerns in modern times.
802
  
One such way is to borrow some noteworthy features from Article 25(1) and (2) of the 
GDPR,
803
 which sets data protection as the default and requires controllers to take steps 
to ensure that processing is carried out with appropriate measures and safeguards in 
place. Although there is currently a policy to this effect in Canada, by Ann Cavoukian,
804
 
entitled, “Privacy by Design”,
805
 I would like to suggest that there should be an explicit 
legislative provision in PIPEDA that includes Cavoukian’s ideas. I am not alone with this 
contention; in February 2018, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy 
and Ethics recommended that PIPEDA be amended to make privacy by design a central 
principle and to include the seven foundational principles of this concept, where 
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possible.
806
 Briefly, the seven principles include: (1) Proactive not Reactive; Preventative 
not Remedial; (2) Privacy as the Default Setting; (3) Privacy Embedded into Design; (4) 
Full Functionality — Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum; (5) End-to-End Security — Full 
Lifecycle Protection; (6) Visibility and Transparency — Keep it Open; and (7) Respect 
for User Privacy — Keep it User-Centric.
807
 In my view, this can apply and be tailored to 
the employment context.  
Another way to build trust is to borrow from Article 35(1) and 35(7) of the GDPR,
808
 
stating that, where processing, particularly in respect of new technologies, is likely to 
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller must 
perform an assessment before processing of the impact of the processing operations on 
the protection of personal data; there are several factors to consider when completing the 
assessment, including the processing operations, legitimate interests, necessity and 
proportionality of processing in relation to the purposes, risks to rights and freedoms, and 
measures used to address the risks.
809
 
And another way that Canadians can build trust in the system is to incorporate language 
that is rights-based directly into the data protection legislation.
810
 In my view, this goal is 
necessary and achievable for three reasons. The first reason is because in Canada, we see 
the shift toward an acknowledgment of the importance of a right to privacy, which is in 
line with other jurisdictions. More specifically, Québec has created a right to private life, 
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as described in section 5 of the Québec Charter.
811
 The right is broadly constructed and 
simply stated, highlighting that every person has a right to private life.
812
 It is comparable 
to California’s section 1 of Article 1 of the California Constitution
813
 that states that all 
people are by nature free and independent and enjoy inalienable rights, one of which is 
privacy. What is more, Article 8(1) of the EU Convention
814
 has a relatively wider scope, 
given that it includes protections associated with privacy and electronic surveillance, and 
includes private life, family life, home, and correspondence.
815
 There is also a balancing 
provision in Article 8(2) of the EU Convention,
816
 to prevent interferences with the 
exercise of the right, except in rare specified situations such as national security or public 
safety. Article 8 of the EU Convention
817
 has been constructed broadly to enable a more 
organic and flexible approach to understanding current concerns regarding electronic 
surveillance in an evolving society.
818
 The openness of the language also allows for a 
liberal and purposive interpretation; at the same time, it provides for exceptions to be 
narrowly construed and an explicit balancing mechanism to ensure fairness.
819
   
The common denominator of the above provisions is that they emphasize the importance 
of treating all persons as worthy of honour and respect in accordance with the 
dignity/human rights theoretical approach to privacy.
820
 All persons are deserving of this 
right because they are equal in status whereby no one person is better than another.
821
 
Pursuant to the dignity/human rights perspective, privacy is viewed as an essential human 
need.
822
 By virtue of being human, we need to have some degree of privacy, and this is 
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natural and intrinsic.
823
 Individuals are to be treated as ends in themselves rather than as 
means to furthering another person’s or society’s goals.
824
 Without the human right to 
privacy, the autonomy of individuals would be threatened and this is troubling since 
autonomy is necessary to have a sense of liberty to pursue aims without interference.
825
   
In line with this reasoning, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have 
emphasized the importance of privacy for the flourishing of a free and democratic 
society; in fact, it has referred to the right to privacy in the broadest sense to include 
several aspects including secrecy, control-over-information, access to information, and 
anonymity.
826
 The Supreme Court of Canada has stressed that privacy is essential for a 
person’s sense of dignity and autonomy, and involves freedom from unwanted scrutiny, 
intrusion or attention (including through observation or recording).
827
 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that, “Canadians are not required to become 
digital recluses in order to maintain some semblance of privacy in their lives”.
828
 
The second reason is because privacy has historically been considered a quasi-
constitutional right in public sector privacy cases regarding data protection laws,
829
 and 
has also recently been acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada as an important 
quasi-constitutional right when deciding on private sector privacy cases regarding data 
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protection laws.
830
 But in my view, the nature of quasi-constitutional status of rights is 
not well understood or given due consideration in Canada, since it is complicated and 
confusing to fully grasp a right that is not quite constitutional but more than ordinary, and 
this leads to a lack of clarity for Canadians.
831
 I believe that Canada needs to be bold, 
move in the same direction as the other jurisdictions that are being studied in this 
dissertation, and go beyond what is currently provided; one way to achieve this goal is to 
explicitly create right-based data protections in PIPEDA.  
The third reason is because there has been a previous attempt to create a constitutional 
right to privacy in Canada, which would have included a freedom from surveillance. 
More precisely, on March 13, 2001, Senator Sheila Finestone introduced Bill S-21 
(Privacy Rights Charter)
832
 in the Canadian Senate.
833
 The purpose had been to establish 
a right to privacy for individuals, including: physical privacy; freedom from surveillance; 
freedom from monitoring or interception of their private communications; and freedom 
from the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information.
834
 No person would 
have been allowed to unjustifiably infringe on an individual’s right to privacy, and 
individuals would have been entitled to claim and enforce their right to privacy; an 
infringement would have been justifiable if it was reasonable and could be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.
835
 There would have been a four-part test for 
justifiable infringements; also, the interference would have been considered to be not 
infringing if there was free and fully informed consent.
836
 However, the Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology had several concerns about how 
Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter) would practically work with Canada’s existing laws, 
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and recommended further study.
837
 Ultimately, Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter) was 
dropped from the Senate Order Paper on April 16 2002.
838
  
What the foregoing suggests is that the law needs to adapt to evolving societal values and 
embrace the idea of including rights-based language in data protections provisions. The 
times have changed: technological capabilities, potential dangers, and societal attitudes 
have evolved.
839
 The lawmakers and policymakers must respond.  
One further way to build trust is to borrow and adapt a feature that has recently surfaced 
in a bill proposed in the United States, namely in section 1102 of Bill S5642 (New York 
Privacy Act)
840
 dealing with the idea of a data fiduciary.  
While Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act) applies to the consumer context,
841
 the concept 
of a data fiduciary could be adapted to fit the employment context. Employees are 
vulnerable and are in particular need of the very type of protection that is contemplated 
with the introduction of the data fiduciary in light of the blurring of workplace and 
personal digital devices as well as a blurring of work and personal time.
842
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Employers have an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the course of dismissals, 
which at minimum requires employers to be candid, reasonable, honest and forthright 
with their employees and should refrain from engaging in conduct that is unfair or is in 
bad faith by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive.
843
 In like 
manner, I believe that it may be possible to augment this duty of good faith by adding 
carefully defined obligations related to data protection. For this idea to be workable, 
employers would need to focus on more than just their own business goals of maximizing 
human capital and generating profits.
844
 
Let me begin with a definition of “fiduciary”, which means “involving trust, especially 
with regard to the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary: the company has a 
fiduciary duty to its shareholders”; it comes from the Latin “fiduciarius”, from “fiducia”, 
meaning “trust” and “fidere”, meaning “to trust”.
845
 When it comes to understanding the 
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nature of a fiduciary duty, there are differing approaches on the content of such a duty; 
the more common narrow approach includes proscriptive duties such as the no-profit rule 
and the no-conflict rule, whereas the broad approach may include additional duties such 
as the duty of good faith and the duty of confidence.
846
 The boundaries may be poorly 
defined, but there is consensus on its essence; the core element of the fiduciary duty is the 
duty of loyalty.
847
 That is, fiduciaries must act faithfully toward their beneficiaries.
848
 
More specifically, fiduciaries must not engage in disloyal conduct grounded in self-
interest.
849
 Another aspect is a conflict of duty rule that prohibits fiduciaries from acting 
under conflicting mandates, even if the conflicting duties involve two different third 
parties.
850
 In fiduciary relationships, the fiduciary exercises discretionary power over the 
practical interests of the beneficiary; this power is a type of authority derived from the 
legal capacity of the beneficiary or a benefactor that ensures the proper exercise of the 
power.
851
 These fiduciary duties are strict due to the reprehensibility of self-interested 
conduct, even if the beneficiary has suffered no losses; this could be in order to 
discourage the temptation of selfish behaviour in fiduciaries and to protect vulnerable 
persons against the abuse of their trust and confidence in others.
852
  
What is most relevant to this discussion is that section 1102(1) of Bill S5642 (New York 
Privacy Act)
853
 creates a requirement to meet the duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a 
consumer against a privacy risk, and must act in the best interests of the consumer 
without regard to any self-interests, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer 
under the circumstances. Risk is defined broadly in section 1102(2) of Bill S5642 (New 
York Privacy Act)
854
 to include many kinds of harm, some of which include: financial 
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harm, physical harm, psychological harm, and even adverse employment outcomes. 
Section 1102(1) of Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act)
855
 lists various strict and detailed 
prohibitions related to the three duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality.  
Some of the duties seem to be more practical to implement than others. For instance, the 
duty of care appears to be familiar to Canadians given the requirements regarding 
safeguards and breach reporting;
856
 however, the duty of loyalty, which is noted above as 
the core essence of the fiduciary duty, is seemingly more challenging to meet, especially 
in the employment context.
857
 In particular, the provision prohibits the fiduciary from 
using personal data or data derived from personal data in a way that benefits the fiduciary 
to the detriment of a user, and will either result in reasonably foreseeable and material 
physical or financial harm to a consumer, or would be unexpected and highly offensive to 
a reasonable consumer.
858
 I anticipate that there could be some interpretation issues with 
this requirement concerning what constitutes “detriment”, “reasonably foreseeable”, and 
“material harm”.  
Even more challenging is the duty of confidentiality, which outlines requirements of: not 
disclosing or selling to, or sharing personal data with, any other person except as 
consistent with the duties of care and loyalty; not disclosing or selling to, or sharing 
personal data with, any other person unless that person enters into a contract that imposes 
the same duties of care, loyalty, and confidentially toward the consumer as are imposed; 
and taking reasonable steps to ensure that the practices of any person to or with whom the 
fiduciary discloses, sells, or shares personal data fulfills the duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality assumed by the person under the contract, including by auditing, on a 
regular basis, the data security and data information practices of any such entity, or 
affiliate of such entity, controller or data broker.
859
 In my view, though the first 
requirement to operate in line with the duties of care and loyalty seems realistic, the rule 
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requiring organizations to form a contract and demand that others operate in accordance 
with these duties, and then regularly audit them to confirm compliance, appears to be too 
onerous for most to meet. To be fair, I can appreciate why there have been strong 
responses from technology companies in this regard.
860
 
Another section that appears challenging to implement is section 1102(3) of Bill S5642 
(New York Privacy Act),
861
 which states that this fiduciary duty supersedes any duty owed 
to owners or shareholders. This could have serious implications given the enforcement 
provisions of Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act)
862
 that refer to unfair or deceptive acts 
in trade or commerce and unfair methods of competition, and set out rights of action that 
are granted to any governmental body to enforce the section, or any person who has been 
injured to bring an action for damages or an injunction.   
In this part, my goal was to argue that PIPEDA contains significant gaps and does not 
sufficiently address issues related to electronic surveillance; moreover, other jurisdictions 
provide instructive information that can help to fill the identified gaps. I achieved this 
goal by showing that there were problems with PIPEDA’s definitions and 
conceptualizations, and with several provisions in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
863
 when it 
came to dealing with issues involving electronic surveillance in the employment context. 
I emphasized that it was therefore necessary to create new provisions to address these 
concerns and also find novel ways to enhance trust in the new workplace privacy regime. 
4.1.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
To conclude this section, I have argued that the meaning of collection and processing is 
not well articulated in PIPEDA and needs to be clarified. I pointed out that PIPEDA does 
not sufficiently address issues of electronic surveillance and the negative consequences of 
profiling, and this will require new provisions in order to address electronic surveillance 
challenges more specifically. There is also a need to build trust in this privacy regime; 
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this can be accomplished by referring to fundamental rights and freedoms in the purpose 
section of the legislation, using rights-based language in provisions, and adding 
provisions involving privacy by design, data impact risk assessments, and data 
fiduciaries.  
4.2 Theme 2: Consent and Balancing Rights with 
Legitimate Interests  
The second theme contains selected provisions involving consent and balancing rights 
with legitimate interests. I list the provisions in the theme, analyze the provisions, and 
discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy regime. 
4.2.1 The Privacy Provisions Examined in Theme 2 
As can be seen in the chart below, there are two features of privacy provisions, data 
protection provisions and employment provisions, which will be discussed in Theme 2: 
Table 3: The Privacy Provisions Studied in Chapter 4, Theme 2 
 
Theme Canada  United States  European Union  
2- The consent of 
individuals and the 
legitimate interests 
of organizations 
PIPEDA 
QC Act 
BC PIPA 
PIPEDA Breach 
Regulations 
California Labor 
Code 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act 
California Civil 
Code (Customer 
Records) 
GDPR 
 
 
4.2.2 Analysis of the Privacy Provisions in Theme 2 
My goal in this section is to argue that PIPEDA’s consent-based model is insufficient for 
dealing with the employment context, especially when it comes to electronic surveillance, 
and I will demonstrate that it is necessary to find an alternative approach. In addition, I 
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will show that PIPEDA does not appropriately balance the rights of employees with 
legitimate business interests of employers, and that other jurisdictions use more effective 
strategies to do so.  
I plan to argue for these points in three steps. First, I will suggest that employees are in 
most cases not in a position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent in situations 
involving electronic surveillance. Second, I will demonstrate that other jurisdictions have 
closely examined this issue and have provided some useful insights. Third, I will 
illustrate how PIPEDA does not properly balance the rights of employees with the 
legitimate business interests of employers, and how other jurisdictions attempt to achieve 
this goal in more effective ways. 
To this end, the first thing to point out is that employees are in most cases not in a 
position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent in situations involving electronic 
surveillance. More specifically, the parties in an employment relationship possess 
inherently unequal bargaining power, and this affects employees’ ability to freely 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent to such monitoring.
864
 This is so regardless of 
unionization status—regardless of whether they are members of a union, employees are 
still vulnerable and subject to the direction of their employers, and cannot control the 
nature and extent of the electronic surveillance they experience inside or outside the 
workplace.
865
 Employers are in the dominant position and have many opportunities to 
abuse their electronic surveillance power at any point during the employment 
relationship, from the hiring stage through to the post-termination stage.
866
 As will be 
illustrated in Chapter 5, employees can become subject to excessive and/or overly 
intrusive electronic surveillance that is unilaterally commenced by their employers; the 
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two surveillance scenarios arise in both unionized and nonunionized workplaces, and 
notwithstanding the degrees of seniority or clout of the employees.
867
 This is because, 
unlike levels of negotiated wages, working conditions, or benefits, where some 
employees may enjoy higher levels of protection and certain advantages, employers’ 
decisions to use sophisticated electronic surveillance technologies on employees applies 
to any and all employees, regardless of the employees’ status—any employee can 
become a data subject in the employer’s information Panopticon—and exploited through 
the abuse of electronic surveillance power.
868
 
It is therefore concerning that the definition of consent in PIPEDA does not specifically 
discuss an employee’s ability to consent and assumes that it can be freely provided, 
withheld, or revoked. More specifically, section 6.1 of PIPEDA
869
 states that, for the 
purposes of clause 4.3 in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
870
 dealing with consent, the consent of 
an individual is only valid if it is reasonable to expect that an individual to whom the 
organization’s activities are directed would understand the nature, purpose and 
consequences of the collection, use or disclosure of the personal information to which 
they are consenting.
871
   
Also, section 14 of the QC Act
872
 states that consent to the collection, communication or 
use of personal information must be manifest, free, and enlightened, and must be given 
for specific purposes, and that consent is valid only for the length of time needed to 
achieve the purposes for which it was requested. Section 7 of the BC PIPA,
873
 states that 
an organization must not, as a condition of supplying a product or service, require an 
individual to consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information beyond 
what is necessary to provide the product or service. In fact, if an organization attempts to 
obtain consent for collecting, using or disclosing personal information by providing false 
or misleading information respecting the collection, use or disclosure of the information, 
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or using deceptive or misleading practices, then any consent provided in those 
circumstances is not validly given.
874
  
Aspects of consent included in the above definitions cannot practically apply in an 
employment situation given the asymmetrical power dynamics present in the employment 
relationship.
875
 Since the current definitions insufficiently touch on the vulnerability of 
employees, it would be advantageous for there to be a provision in PIPEDA following the 
definition of consent that expressly states that employees are not in a position to freely 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information. 
The other reason why novel provisions governing consent are needed is that, in addition 
to the lack of acknowledgment regarding employees and the ability to provide, withhold, 
or revoke consent in section 6.1 of PIPEDA,
876
 there is no recognition of this fact under 
Principle 3 in clause 4.3 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
 877
 dealing with consent. In my view, 
this is a serious problem. Let me explain.   
This legislative oversight can be seen in clause 4.3 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
878
 where it 
states: 
The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, 
use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. 
Note: In certain circumstances personal information can be collected, used, 
or disclosed without the knowledge and consent of the individual. For 
example, legal, medical, or security reasons may make it impossible or 
impractical to seek consent. When information is being collected for the 
detection and prevention of fraud or for law enforcement, seeking the 
consent of the individual might defeat the purpose of collecting the 
information. Seeking consent may be impossible or inappropriate when 
the individual is a minor, seriously ill, or mentally incapacitated. In 
addition, organizations that do not have a direct relationship with the 
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individual may not always be able to seek consent. For example, seeking 
consent may be impractical for a charity or a direct-marketing firm that 
wishes to acquire a mailing list from another organization. In such cases, the 
organization providing the list would be expected to obtain consent before 
disclosing personal information.
879
 
What is most striking is that there is a part of the opening phrase of clause 4.3 of 
Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
880
 that deals with situations where consent may be impossible or 
inappropriate, including when the individual is a minor, seriously ill, or mentally 
incapacitated, and where organizations do not have a direct relationship with the 
individual as in a charity.
881
 However, there is no mention here of employees who are 
vulnerable parties in an employment relationship and who are not in a position to freely 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent, even though they are just as vulnerable as minors, 
seriously ill persons, or mentally incapacitated persons who are not able to consent.
882
  
Against this, one might insist that employees are not as vulnerable as minors, or ill or 
incapacitated individuals. In response, I would return to the fact that it has already been 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada that employees are vulnerable members of 
society.
883
 As explained by Iacobucci J., the power imbalance that is present in the 
employment relationship “is not limited to the employment contract itself” and “informs 
all facets of the employment relationship”.
884
 Iacobucci J. has clarified that employees 
constitute a vulnerable group: “The vulnerability of employees is underscored by the 
level of importance which our society attaches to employment”.
885
 Moreover, Dickson 
C.J. has also elucidated that employment is one of the most fundamental aspects of life: 
“A person’s employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, 
self‑worth and emotional well‑being”.
886
 However, there are no protections in PIPEDA 
that recognize this reality. 
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Both the opening phrase and the clauses under Principle 3 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
887
 
assume that consent is something that can be freely given or refused in the employment 
context, and do not address the concern regarding employees being vulnerable members 
of society. There are a number of situations where consent is considered to not be freely 
given; one situation that would negate one’s ability to consent would be where deception 
is used to obtain the consent.
888
 Another situation that would be where organizations try 
to obtain consent by requiring individuals to provide consent beyond what is required to 
meet the legitimate purposes.
889
   
The same can be said in respect of consent provisions in the BC PIPA;
890
 the truth is that 
employees are not able to decline for the purposes of negating implicit consent,
891
 or to 
withdraw their consent.
892
 The power imbalances that are present in employment are 
similarly not addressed sections 7−9 of the BC PIPA.
893
 
These clauses are not helpful when it comes to the employment relationship. The above 
discussion suggests that privacy legislation in Canada is based on the prevailing notion 
that consent is central and that it can be provided, withheld, or revoked by employees. In 
this sense, the Canadian model uses a control-over-information framework of privacy, 
and assumes that individuals have the ability to control information and limit access to 
information about them, presupposing that they are in a position to decide what personal 
information about themselves can be known by others.
894
 Indeed, the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, Daniel Therrien, has stated that his current mandate is to 
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increase the control Canadians have over their personal information.
895
 Moreover, the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has recently created guidelines for 
obtaining meaningful consent,
896
 and it becomes clear that there has been an application 
of principles stemming from clause 4.3 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
897
 and the same 
assumption has been made that individuals have the ability to freely provide consent in 
the first place. For example, one of the guidelines states that it is important to provide 
individuals with clear options to say “yes” or “no”.
898
 Individuals cannot be required to 
consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information; they must be given a 
choice whether to do so.
899
  
But in employment relationships, employees do not have a choice when dealing with 
their employers, because there is an unequal bargaining power between the parties and a 
large potential for employers to take advantage.
900
 When it comes to electronic 
surveillance technology in the workplace, the potential for employees to be exploited by 
employers is apparent given the unquestionable asymmetrical power relationships.
901
 In 
particular, employees are typically not permitted to make the same types of choices to 
protect their privacy compared to regular citizens and consumers, because they are 
subject to the working practices and environment dictated by their employers; if they 
want to keep working and making a living, they need to agree to the conditions that are 
set by their employer.
902
 The abuse of the electronic surveillance power to which I refer 
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can be seen when examining the effects on employees who experience an increased sense 
of vulnerability, powerlessness, and a loss of trust in their employer.
903
  
To this point I have shown how employees are in most cases not in a position to provide, 
withhold, or revoke consent in situations involving electronic surveillance. What I would 
like to do now is argue that, although there are no provisions in PIPEDA dealing with the 
ability of employees to provide, withhold, or revoke consent, the European Union 
appears to provide some significant insights in this regard.  
More specially, Article 4(11) of the GDPR
904
 defines consent as any freely given, 
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of data subjects’ wishes by which they, 
by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signify agreement to the processing of 
personal data about them. Also, Article 7(4) of the GDPR
905
 sets out the conditions for 
consent, and it appears to tackle the problem of freely providing consent in power 
relationships: 
When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be 
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the 
provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of 
personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.
906
 
The Article 29 Working Party
907
 has stated that this provision aiming to determine 
whether consent has been freely given plays an important role, because it takes on the 
situation of bundling consent with the acceptance of terms or conditions, or tying the 
provision of a contract to a request for consent to process personal data that is not 
necessary for the performance of the contract, and considers this to be “highly 
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undesirable”.
908
 Any consent provided in this situation is presumed to not be freely 
given.
909
 The purpose of Article 7(4) of the GDPR
910
 is to ensure that any unnecessary 
processing is not disguised or bundled with the performance of a contract.
911
 This is 
especially the case when there is a clear imbalance of power between the data subject and 
the controller.
912
  
The Article 29 Working Party has confirmed that an imbalance of power is present in the 
employment context, and has concluded that for that reason it is unlikely that an 
employee will be able to withhold consent to data processing without experiencing the 
fear or real risk of detrimental effects as a result of the refusal.
913
 And it is just as unlikely 
that an employee would be able to respond freely to a request for consent from an 
employer to activate monitoring systems in the workplace without feeling any pressure to 
consent.
914
 The concept of “free” implies a real choice and consent is not considered to be 
free if the employee is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment.
915
 In my 
view, the above discussion helps to illustrate why it is problematic to assume that 
employees, who are the weaker party in the power relationship, can always freely 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent. 
What the preceding discussion suggests is that, when it comes to the electronic 
surveillance by employers, employees feel real pressures to provide consent; likewise, 
they cannot realistically withhold or revoke consent without experiencing the fear or real 
risk of detrimental effects as a result of a refusal. When employees face consequences to 
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the point where they cannot genuinely provide an answer to their employers, consent is 
not considered to be freely provided, withheld, or revoked.  
This is concerning, given that employees are more frequently becoming the subjects of 
electronic surveillance in the workplace using a range of technologies from computer and 
telephone logging, to CCTV, to mobility tracking, to electronic recruitment.
916
 A 
significant contributor of the increase in employee monitoring is the Internet, and the 
truth is that it is not uncommon for companies to monitor worker communications and 
on-the-job activities.
917
 If the supervisor is the overseer and the employers are the 
overseen who attempt to avoid the manager’s gaze,
918
 then it should not be surprising that 
both recent technological developments and modern management culture have together 
magnified the incidence of individual monitoring to the point where electronic 
surveillance in the workplace may be considered normal and taken for granted.
919
 
All the same, it is important to keep in mind that employer-employee relations need to be 
afforded sufficient flexibility in light of the unique labour relations environment. To 
address this concern, Article 88 of the GDPR
920
 allows Member States, by law or by 
collective agreements, to provide for more specific rules to ensure the rights and 
freedoms regarding the processing of employees’ personal data in the employment 
context relating to all aspects of the employment relationship; there is an attempt in the 
European Union to force the parties to include “suitable and specific measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s human dignity, legitimate interests and fundamental rights, 
with particular regard to the transparency of processing, the transfer of personal data 
within a group of undertakings, or a group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic 
activity and monitoring systems at the work place”.
921
 This novel strategy can be 
translated into Canadian workplaces by allowing for the flexibility of the parties to jointly 
create further specific rules concerning electronic surveillance, while still ensuring that 
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there is not an abuse of surveillance power by stipulating that employers are required to 
ensure that adequate safeguards are in place for employees to prevent the use of excessive 
or overly intrusive electronic surveillance.
922
  
However, keeping in mind the inherent unequal bargaining power between the parties 
and the discussion regarding consent above, this provision would be adapted and 
practically used in the Canadian employment context in only rare situations. Hence, I 
would endorse this option only as an exception to the main point that employees are not 
typically in a position to freely provide, withhold, or revoke consent in situations 
involving electronic surveillance.
923
 When it comes to jointly creating these rules that 
pertain to electronic surveillance in the workplace, I believe that more egalitarian 
interactions between the parties allowing for free consent of employees are uncommon 
for a few reasons. Firstly, the rate of unionization in Canada continues to decline: 
according to Statistics Canada, overall unionization rates have fallen considerably since 
1981, where the percentage of men aged 17 to 64 who belonged to unions dropped from 
42 percent in 1981 to 26 percent in 2018.
924
 It is also important to keep in mind that 
unionization rates in the public sector are four times higher than those in the private 
sector;
925
 this suggests that there may be fewer opportunities for private sector employees 
to achieve a fair balance with their employers regarding electronic surveillance. 
Secondly, even if there is a union present or a high-level nonunionized employee with 
more bargaining power, this does not necessarily mean that electronic surveillance 
concerns will be the subject of collective bargaining or negotiations; in many cases, the 
focus of both contract negotiations and collective bargaining is typically on higher wages, 
better working conditions, and other benefits such as pensions or seniority-based benefits 
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involving access to training and protection from layoffs,
926
 to the point where the issue of 
protection from unreasonable electronic surveillance may often be overlooked. Thirdly, 
even collective bargaining in unionized workplaces may not necessarily lead to a 
consensus on the issue of electronic surveillance in the workplace, depending on the 
power dynamics at play between the particular union and employer; it may be the case 
that an employer has considerably more power than a union during a collective 
bargaining session (the bargaining power may not necessarily be even),
927
 and can more 
effortlessly dominate and choose to not include any further protections in a collective 
agreement or policy. Along the same lines, protections in workplace documents such as 
policies and procedures regarding electronic surveillance vary substantially among 
workplaces,
928
 and this could be due to the various levels of power employers have 
relative to each other. Fourthly, it is not necessarily the case that a negotiated contract or 
a bargained collective agreement or policy actually prevents an employer from 
conducting unreasonable electronic surveillance. By way of illustration, Chapter 5 
discusses cases where employers unilaterally commence excessive and/or overly 
intrusive electronic surveillance of both unionized and nonunionized employees, some 
being long-term employees with seniority and more influence, during an employment 
relationship with agreements, rules or policies in place.
929
 Since even in the most ideal 
employment situations employees are still vulnerable and subject to the direction of their 
employers, employees are often not in a position to control the nature and extent of 
employers’ electronic surveillance to which they are subjected by relying on consent as 
an option, agreeing to certain arrangements on electronic surveillance, and ensuring that 
there are adequate safeguards in place in the workplace to respect employees’ dignity.
930
 
Let me pause to recap my argument to this point. I first explained why, in most cases, 
employees are not in a position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent in situations 
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involving electronic surveillance; I then demonstrated that other jurisdictions have 
provided useful insights into this matter. The third thing that I will do is argue that 
PIPEDA is not particularly good at balancing the interests of employers and employees, 
and as a consequence, that there is a skewed set of legislative provisions where the 
legitimate business interests of employers are ultimately given more attention compared 
to the privacy interests of employees. This situation can lead to an exacerbation of power 
imbalances that are inherently present in the employment relationship. Fortunately, there 
are more useful methods used in the other jurisdictions and I will examine them after 
noting the problems with PIPEDA. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that employers should never be able to collect, use and 
disclose employees’ personal information or that there should be no protections in place 
when organizations attempt to meet their legitimate business interests such as protecting 
the data of their clients and customers. Rather, I am suggesting that the amount and 
quality of PIPEDA provisions are currently asymmetrical and in favour of employers 
relative to employees, preventing a healthy balance of interests. 
There are five problematic issues that illustrate the one-sided nature of PIPEDA’s 
provisions.  
The first problematic issue is that there is a specific provision that allows employers to 
enjoy what appears to be a substantial amount of power to collect, use and disclose 
personal the information of employees without consent; if relied upon in situations 
involving electronic surveillance, there could be a serious abuse of surveillance power. 
Section 7.3 of PIPEDA
931
 has two parts: it permits employers to collect, use and disclose 
personal information without the consent of the employee if: (1) the collection, use or 
disclosure is necessary to establish, manage or terminate an employment relationship 
between the employer and the employee; and (2) the employer has informed the 
individual that the personal information will be or may be collected, used or disclosed for 
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those purposes. PIPEDA would be improved if this provision
932
 were removed. 
Regarding the first part, there is a lack of clarity since there is no definition of what is, 
“necessary to establish, manage or terminate an employment relationship”
933
 for the 
purposes of understanding how personal information of employees are to be collected, 
used and disclosed without consent. This is a considerable weakness, since there is no 
explanation whatsoever in the definitions in section 7.1 of PIPEDA
934
 or in anywhere in 
section 7.3 of PIPEDA
935
 that provides any guidance as to the boundaries within which 
employers can operate in this regard. And the second part of section 7.3 of PIPEDA
936
 
uses the phrase “has informed the individual that the personal information will be or may 
be collected, used or disclosed for those purposes”,
937
 proceeding as though it is 
appropriate in the employment context. Moreover, the definition of “personal 
information” in section 2(1) of PIPEDA
938
  is quite wide, including several items that 
could fall under the category of “information about an identifiable individual”.
939
 This 
weak requirement to inform amounts to an employer letting the employees know that 
there will or may soon be a privacy violation, and there is typically nothing that the 
employees can do about it because of their position in the relationship. Of the 
jurisdictions studied in this dissertation, this provision is unique to Canada (for instance, 
similar language is also found in other Canadian jurisdictions such as in the BC PIPA).
940
 
These were the comments of the then Privacy Commissioner of Canada regarding British 
Columbia’s Bill 38, Personal Information Protection Act
941
 in 2003, before sections 
7.1−7.4 of PIPEDA
942
 were enacted through the Digital Privacy Act:
943
  
Third, the Bill is clearly inferior to the PIPED Act with regard to privacy 
rights in employment. Sections 13, 16 and 19 specifically allow the 
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collection, use and disclosure of employee personal information without 
consent. This completely deprives an employee, or a prospective employee, 
of any control over his or her information. 
Although the Bill requires that the collection, use or disclosure of employee 
personal information be reasonable for the purposes of establishing, 
managing or terminating an employment relationship, this is a weak test that 
would not protect employees or prospective employees concerned about 
their privacy. An employer could argue that almost any intrusion on 
employee privacy is “reasonable” in the sense that it is potentially helpful 
for establishing, managing or terminating an employment relationship. 
The employee could complain after the fact that this intrusion was not 
reasonable, but the information would have already been collected and 
disclosed. Once privacy has been violated, it cannot be unviolated. The 
damage has been done.
944
 
The second problematic issue is that there is an even greater potential for employees to be 
exploited through the abuse of electronic surveillance power with section 7.4 of 
PIPEDA.
945
 It allows organizations to use and disclose employees’ personal information 
for purposes other than those for which the information was collected in any of the 
circumstances set out in section 7.3 of PIPEDA
946
 —all without consent and without any 
stipulations on what the phrase, “for purposes other than those for which it was collected 
in any of the circumstances set out in” means.
947
 Surely, this provision flies in the face of 
fairness; it is difficult to see how the dignity of employees has been considered at all.
948
 
The reference to section 7.3 of PIPEDA
949
 in section 7.4 of PIPEDA
950
 needs to be 
removed. In regards to establishing, managing, or terminating an employment 
relationship,
951
 it is unacceptable to create a provision that enables this type of use or 
disclosure without consent of employees and without any set boundaries within which 
                                                 
944
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Report to Parliament Concerning Substantially Similar 
Provincial Legislation” (June 2003) at 6, online (pdf): Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/2360/leg-rp_030611_e.pdf>.  
945
 PIPEDA, supra note 643 at s 7.4. 
946
 Ibid at s 7.3. 
947
 Ibid at s 7.4. 
948
 Hicks, supra note 702 at 16–17. 
949
 PIPEDA, supra note 643 at s 7.3. 
950
 Ibid at s 7.4. 
951
 Ibid at s 7.3. 
167 
 
employers are to operate, relying on mysterious other purposes—there must be protection 
of employees’ dignity and self-respect.
952
  
The third problematic issue is that there is further potential for employers to abuse 
electronic surveillance power by relying on section 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA,
953
 where they 
may collect personal information without the knowledge or consent of employees if “it is 
reasonable to expect that the collection with the knowledge or consent of the individual 
would compromise the availability or the accuracy of the information and the collection 
is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a 
contravention of the laws of Canada or a province”.
954
 In line with the above discussions 
regarding “collection” in Theme 1, I suggest that “collection” is insufficient for 
addressing situations involving electronic surveillance in employment, especially if it is 
performed without knowledge or consent and constitutes excessive or overly intrusive 
surveillance that is covert in nature.
955
 Indeed, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada has pointed out that covert video surveillance is an, “extremely privacy-invasive 
form of technology”.
956
 In fact, given the nature of the technology such as the ability to 
gather extraneous information and make judgements about the subject that have nothing 
to do with the purpose, covert video surveillance should be considered, “only in the most 
limited cases”.
957
 Thus, my concerns with section 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA
958
 are confirmed.  
The fourth problematic issue is that there appear to be some hidden dangers with sections 
7(1)(b.2), 7(2)(b.2), and 7(3)(e.2) of PIPEDA,
959
 specifically mentioning information that 
is produced by individuals in the course of their employment; these provisions state that 
employers can collect, use or disclose this information without knowledge or consent if 
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the collection, use or disclosure is consistent with the purposes for which the information 
was produced. While these provisions seem less troubling in that they deal with 
producing a work product and meet legitimate interests of employers to collect, use and 
disclose information regarding that work output, there is a potential for the abuse of 
surveillance power—especially since the collection, use or disclosure is permitted 
without knowledge or consent. What is more, section 7(4) of PIPEDA
960
 sets the stage for 
the unlimited abuse of surveillance power by allowing for the use of personal information 
without consent for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any of the 
circumstances that are set out in section 7(2)—including section 7(2)(b.2);
961
 likewise, 
section 7(5) of  PIPEDA
962
 enables a situation where there can be a disclosure of personal 
information without consent for purposes other than those for which it was collected in 
any of the circumstances in section 7(3)(a) to (h.1)—this includes section 7(3)(e.2).
963
 As 
noted above, it is not clear what is captured with the broad phrase, “for purposes other 
than those for which it was collected in any of the circumstances set out in”,
964
 and this is 
concerning. In particular, the ability to allow for other purposes negates the requirement 
of consistency with the purposes for which the information was produced, and this could 
lead to a serious abuse of surveillance power.  
The fifth problematic issue is that PIPEDA contains several provisions that allow 
employers to protect their legitimate business interests such as protecting the data of their 
clients and customers. While this is not problematic in itself, what makes it concerning is 
that employees are simply not provided with protections that are reciprocal in nature and 
that protect their interests with equivalent amounts of detail. In addition to the sections 
mentioned above,
965
 it is important to note that section 10.1 of PIPEDA
966
 sets out several 
requirements that require proper notification to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in 
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cases of breaches. More specifically, pursuant to section 10.1(1) of PIPEDA,
967
 
organizations must report to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada any breach of security 
safeguards involving personal information under their control if it is reasonable in the 
circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to an 
individual. “Risk of significant harm” is defined in section 10.1(7) of PIPEDA
968
 as 
including bodily harm, humiliation, damage to reputation or relationships, loss of 
employment, business or professional opportunities, financial loss, identity theft, negative 
effects on the credit record and damage to or loss of property. When deciding whether 
there is significant harm, section 10.1(8) of PIPEDA
969
 provides three factors to consider: 
the sensitivity of the personal information involved in the breach; the probability that the 
personal information has been, is being or will be misused; and any other prescribed 
factor. Sections 10.1(2) to 10.1(6) of PIPEDA
970
  contain several reporting requirements 
involving the reporting as soon as feasible, notifications to individuals, contents of the 
notification, form and manner, and time limits for giving notification. Moreover, sections 
10.2(1) to 10.2(2) of PIPEDA
971
 state that organizations must notify any other 
organizations and also government institutions as soon as feasible if it can reduce the risk 
of harm, or if prescribed conditions are met. Section 10.3 of PIPEDA
972
 also contains 
record-keeping requirements. What is more, sections 2 to 6 of the PIPEDA Breach 
Regulations
973
 have even more requirements concerning the report to the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, notification to affected individuals, and record-keeping. One 
example involves the direct and indirect ways to notify the affected individuals of a 
breach.
974
 Another example involves section 2(1) of the PIPEDA Breach Regulations,
975
 
which requires reports of a breach of security safeguards to be in writing and to contain 
several pieces of information, some of which include: a description of the circumstances 
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of the breach and, if known, the cause; the day, period or approximate period during 
which the breach occurred; a description of the personal information that is the subject of 
the breach; the number or approximate number of individuals affected by the breach; the 
steps taken to reduce the risk of harm to affected individuals that could result from the 
breach or to mitigate that harm; the steps that the organization has taken or intends to take 
to notify affected individuals of the breach; and the name and contact information of a 
person who can answer questions about the breach.  
Therefore, it becomes clear that PIPEDA provides an uneven distribution of protections 
to employers and employees. This is so, notwithstanding a provision that appears to 
provide some job protection to employees in section 27.1(1) of PIPEDA,
976
 which 
prohibits employers from dismissing, suspending, demoting, disciplining, harassing or 
otherwise disadvantaging an employee, or denying an employee a benefit of employment, 
because the employee acts in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, and 
discloses to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that the employer or any other person 
has contravened or intends to contravene a provision of Division 1 (protection of personal 
information) or Division 1.1 (breaches of security safeguards).
977
  The same is true in 
cases where employees refuse to violate these Divisions or experience mistreatment 
because they comply with PIPEDA.
978
 I would like to suggest that this protective 
provision is insufficient to provide an adequate balance of the interests, and more is 
required to achieve an equally balanced set of protections for the parties. 
If PIPEDA provides an unequal distribution of protections in favour of meeting the 
legitimate interests of employers, it might be said that provisions in California provide a 
more balanced approach by creating privacy protections on one hand, such as sections 
1798.120 and 1798.125(a)(1) the California Consumer Privacy Act
979
 or section 980 of 
the California Labor Code,
980
 while simultaneously providing explicit provisions that 
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protect the legitimate interests of organizations on the other hand, such as in sections 
1798.145(a) and (b) the California Consumer Privacy Act
981
 and extensive breach 
notification provisions in its California Civil Code (Customer Records).
982
 Some 
provisions are examples applying to the consumer context, but we see that they illustrate 
how protections can be provided to the parties in a way that is more equally balanced.  
For example, California provides employees with specific protective legislative measures 
in its employment provisions by enacting a provision that prevents employers from 
forcing employees to provide usernames and passwords for their social media 
accounts.
983
 Section 980 of the California Labor Code
984
 is technologically responsive in 
that it deals with practical concerns of job applicants and current employees who feel 
pressured to provide this information to employers.
985
 “Social media” is broadly defined 
as an electronic service or account, or electronic content, some of which include videos, 
still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online 
services or accounts, or Internet website profiles or locations.
986
 Section 980(b) of the 
California Labor Code
987
 states that employers are not allowed to require or request 
employees or job applicants to: disclose a username or password for the purpose of 
accessing personal social media; access personal social media in the presence of the 
employer; or divulge any personal social media. And section 980(e) of the California 
Labor Code,
988
 prohibits employers from discharging, disciplining, threatening to 
discharge or discipline, or otherwise retaliating against employees or job applicants for 
not complying with requests that violates the rules in section 980. Yet, employers’ 
interests are taken into account; employers can still request that an employee divulge 
personal social media reasonably believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegations 
of employee misconduct or employee violation of applicable laws and regulations, 
provided that the social media is used solely for purposes of that investigation or a related 
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proceeding.
989
 Similarly, employers are also allowed to require or request that an 
employee disclose a username, password, or other method to access an employer-issued 
electronic device.
990
 In my view, section 980 of the California Labor Code,
991
 is a 
forward-thinking law and addresses valid concerns about intrusions into the personal 
lives of employees and their coveted social media data; simultaneously, it provides a 
balance and allows employers to meet their legitimate business interests.  
While there are protections in place to prevent the abuse of surveillance power and 
exploitation of employees’ personal data, California also has provisions to protect the 
legitimate business interests of employers such as protecting client data. For instance, in 
section 1798.81.5 (a) and (b) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records),
992
 
encourages businesses that own, license, or maintain personal information about 
Californians to provide reasonable security for that information; in fact, businesses that 
own, license, or maintain personal information about a California resident are required to 
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the 
nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. Section 1798.82 (g) of the California Civil 
Code (Customer Records)
993
defines “breach of the security of the system” as an 
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the person or business. 
Section 1798.82 (a) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records),
994
 requires 
businesses in California that own or license computerized data including personal 
information to disclose a breach of the security of the system following discovery or 
notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of California: whose 
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired 
by an unauthorized person; or whose encrypted personal information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person and the encryption 
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key or security credential was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person and the person or business that owns or licenses the encrypted 
information has a reasonable belief that the encryption key or security credential could 
render that personal information readable or usable. Further, section 1798.82 (a) of the 
California Civil Code (Customer Records),
995
 requires that these businesses make the 
disclosure in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay. Section 
1798.82 (b) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records),
996
 states that, in the event 
of a security breach, businesses must notify the owner or licensee of the information of 
the breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized 
person. There are several requirements regarding the format of the notification, as set out 
in 1798.82 (d) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records).
997
 
A more attractive approach can be found in Article 6(1) of the GDPR
998
 on the 
lawfulness of processing of personal data, where several factors are considered, and 
processing is considered to be lawful only if at least one of the following applies: 
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her 
personal data for one or more specific purposes; 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data 
subject prior to entering into a contract; 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the controller is subject; 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject or of another natural person; 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; 
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(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the 
data subject is a child.
999
 
A fair balancing is more likely to occur using this novel approach. In the employment 
relationship, since consent is in most cases not possible due to the unequal bargaining 
power and consequent lack of ability to freely consent, other factors can be considered 
such as section 6(1)(f) of the GDPR,
1000
 requiring a balance between the legitimate 
interests of the controller or third party and the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of data subjects. In my view, this provision is well-structured. It also takes into 
account other possibilities, such as the need to protect the vital interests of the 
employee
1001
 or comply with a legal obligation,
1002
 while still leaving open the possibility 
of consent in the rare circumstances where consent can be freely provided, withheld, or 
revoked.
1003
 While Articles 33 and 34 of the GDPR
1004
 also set out breach notification 
requirements that are similar to sections 10.1−10.3 of PIPEDA,
1005
 sections 2 to 6 of the 
PIPEDA Breach Regulations,
1006
 and sections 1798.81.5 and 1798.82 of the California 
Civil Code (Customer Records),
1007
 we see that the novel balancing approach set out in 
section 6(1) of the GDPR,
1008
 is beneficial because it uniquely and efficiently takes into 
consideration the crux of the data protection issue regarding balancing of rights with 
legitimate interests in the employment context. 
The Article 29 Working Party clarifies issues related to consent and legitimate interests, 
and explains how one would go about conducting what I will call an “assessment of 
proportionality”, in line with section 6(1) of the GDPR:
1009
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Employees are almost never in a position to freely give, refuse or revoke 
consent, given the dependency that results from the employer/employee 
relationship. Given the imbalance of power, employees can only give free 
consent in exceptional circumstances, when no consequences at all are 
connected to acceptance or rejection of an offer.  
The legitimate interest of employers can sometimes be invoked as a legal 
ground, but only if the processing is strictly necessary for a legitimate 
purpose and the processing complies with the principles of proportionality 
and subsidiarity. A proportionality test should be conducted prior to the 
deployment of any monitoring tool to consider whether all data are 
necessary, whether this processing outweighs the general privacy rights that 
employees also have in the workplace and what measures must be taken to 
ensure that infringements on the right to private life and the right to secrecy 
of communications are limited to the minimum necessary.
1010
 
To this end, to address the above problematic issues involving the asymmetry of PIPEDA 
protections in the employment context, I would like to suggest that many legitimate 
employment-related concerns dealing with electronic surveillance could be more 
effectively addressed as proposed above by balancing privacy rights of employees with 
legitimate business interests of employers using an assessment of proportionality. This is 
especially the case when dealing with situations involving electronic surveillance, for 
instance, with the above example regarding section 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA.
1011
 
However in my view, the word “lawful” leaves me with an impression that the decision is 
fixed on a single analysis, where processing is considered to be either lawful or not; given 
the fluid and multi-dimensional nature of electronic surveillance, I would like to suggest 
that, instead of asking whether the electronic surveillance is lawful as in section 6(1) of 
the GDPR,
1012
 more appropriate questions to ask include whether an employer may 
conduct the electronic surveillance, and whether the employer may continue to conduct 
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the electronic surveillance upon further assessments of proportionality to ensure that the 
electronic surveillance remains necessary and proportionate at the current levels, or 
whether any aspects of the electronic surveillance have become excessive and/or overly 
intrusive and it is time to modify or cease the unreasonable electronic surveillance.  
Employers have legitimate business interests that must be recognized during the 
assessment of proportionality. More specifically, there are three main reasons why 
employers might want to monitor employees: to maintain productivity and monitor 
resource use by employees; to protect corporate interests and trade secrets (including 
minimizing risks of defamation, sabotage, data theft, and hacking); and to protect the 
company from legal liability.
1013
 Thus, it is important to appreciate that employee 
monitoring can serve as a significant risk management tool for employers to limit costs 
and risks, protect value, and maintain quality.
1014
  
All the same, there are significant threats to the employment relationship that cannot be 
ignored.
1015
 There are challenges when the electronic surveillance goes beyond what is 
considered necessary and when the monitoring negatively affects existing levels of 
control, autonomy, and trust.
1016
 One consequence of excessive or overly intrusive 
monitoring is a fear among employees that their employers may disclose personal 
information to unknown third parties.
1017
 Another consequence is that it may cause some 
employees to experience physical symptoms such as pain and psychological symptoms 
such as low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression.
1018
 A further disturbing consequence is 
that there is a danger of anticipatory conformity, where employees behave in docile and 
accepting ways; as a result, employees become less committed and less motivated.
1019
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Some employees even bend and manipulate company rules or sabotage the workplace.
1020
 
Therefore, a fair balance must be achieved between the parties to minimize the negative 
effects of the abuse of surveillance power and ensure that underlying trust is not 
destroyed—this is what is required to prevent employees from being excessively 
controlled and exploited.
1021
 
In this part, I have argued that PIPEDA’s consent-based model was insufficient for 
dealing with the employment context, especially in situations involving electronic 
surveillance, and also that PIPEDA did not effectively balance the rights of employees 
with legitimate business interests of employers. I did this by showing that employees 
were often not in a position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent in situations 
involving electronic surveillance, and examining how other jurisdictions tackled this 
issue. I also explained how PIPEDA did not properly balance the rights of employees 
with the legitimate business interests of employers, and how other jurisdictions have done 
so in more effective ways. 
4.2.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
I have argued that Canada’s consent-based model of privacy protections is insufficient for 
dealing with current issues involving relationships characterized by power imbalances, 
particularly the employment relationship. It certainly does not help to solve the problem 
of closing the electronic surveillance gap in employment. This is why, in my view, new 
provisions are required to squarely address these increasingly important issues. That said, 
given the need to attend to the rare circumstances where parties require the flexibility to 
create further specific data protection rules that apply in their specific workplaces, it 
seems to me that new provisions are warranted—attached with extra protections that 
ensure that adequate safeguards are in place. In addition, I argued that there are critical 
problems with PIPEDA when it comes to its ability to balance the interests of the parties 
in the employment context. Currently, the provisions are skewed in favour of protecting 
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the interests of employers, and this creates a situation where employees’ data protection 
concerns of employees are being forgotten. In my view, it is necessary to create more 
suitable provisions that properly deal with the electronic surveillance of employees in a 
balanced manner, and this can be achieved by using an assessment of proportionality. 
There are also several ideas that can be borrowed from other jurisdictions and 
incorporated into the new workplace privacy regime to protect employees, such as 
prohibiting employers from forcing employees to provide their social media usernames 
and passwords.  
4.3 Theme 3: Order-Making Powers, Penalties, and 
Fines 
The third theme contains selected provisions involving order-making powers, penalties, 
and fines. I list the provisions in the theme, analyze the provisions, and discuss the 
implications for the new workplace privacy regime.  
4.3.1 The Privacy Provisions Examined in Theme 3 
As can be seen in the chart below, there is one feature of privacy provisions, namely data 
protection provisions, which will be discussed in Theme 3: 
Table 4: The Privacy Provisions Studied in Chapter 4, Theme 3 
 
Theme Canada  United States  European Union  
3- Order-making 
powers, Penalties, 
and Fines 
PIPEDA 
BC PIPA 
QC Act 
California 
Consumer Privacy 
Act 
 
GDPR 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of the Privacy Provisions in Theme 3 
My goal in this section is to argue that PIPEDA does not provide the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada with the necessary order-making powers or the ability to 
impose proportional penalties, especially in regards to electronic surveillance.   
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I will argue for this conclusion in three steps. First, I will point out that it is not clear why 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada does not have order-making powers or the ability to 
impose meaningful penalties. Second, I will show that provisions in other Canadian and 
American jurisdictions provide these powers. And third, I will examine the European 
Union and stress that there are several useful strategies for creating penalties and 
imposing fines in cases of noncompliance.  
It is important to highlight at the outset that it is not clear why the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada does not have binding order-making powers or the ability to impose 
meaningful proportional penalties for non-compliance with PIPEDA; unlike 
Commissioners in other Canadian jurisdictions, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
must go to the Federal Court to obtain a court order.
1022
 More specifically, one avenue 
that the Privacy Commissioner of Canada can take is to enter into a compliance 
agreement with an organization to ensure the organization’s compliance with PIPEDA—
and when the agreement is not complied with, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada may 
then apply to the Federal Court for an order requiring the organization to comply with the 
terms of that agreement.
1023
 More specifically, section 17.1(1) of PIPEDA
1024
 states that 
compliance agreements are created when the Privacy Commissioner of Canada believes 
on reasonable grounds that an organization has committed, is about to commit, or is 
likely to commit an act or omission that could constitute a contravention of a provision of 
Division 1 (protection of personal information) or Division 1.1 (breaches of security 
safeguards)
1025
 or a failure to follow a recommendation set out in Schedule 1 of 
PIPEDA.
1026
 Another avenue that the Privacy Commissioner can take is to rely on section 
15(a) of PIPEDA
1027
 and apply to the Federal Court, with the consent of the complainant, 
for a hearing in respect of any matter that it did not initiate and seek such orders as are 
necessary to ensure an organization’s compliance with PIPEDA. The Federal Court 
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would then be able to order an organization to do several things, one of which could 
include correcting its practices in order to be in compliance with PIPEDA.
1028
   
If the goal is to provide protections equally to all Canadians in line with the idea that all 
Canadians are worthy of the same types of privacy protections to preserve their human 
dignity,
1029
 then it is not clear why the consequences for privacy violations would vary 
throughout the country, and for the most part, be weakest when dealing with PIPEDA.  
Indeed, in his recent statements discussing the 2018−2019 Annual Report
1030
 the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, Daniel Therrien,
1031
 stated: 
Canadians want to enjoy the benefits of digital technologies, but they want 
to do it safely. It is the role of government to give Canadians the assurance 
that legislation will protect their rights. 
Given that privacy is a fundamental human right and a necessary 
precondition to the exercise of other fundamental rights such as freedom 
and equality, the starting point should be to give privacy laws a rights-based 
foundation. 
In other words, new privacy laws should reflect fundamental Canadian 
values… 
It is untenable that organizations like Facebook are allowed to reject my 
office’s findings as mere opinions. The law should no longer be drafted as 
an industry code of suggested best practices, but rather as a set of 
enforceable rights and obligations. 
Third, we need enforcement mechanisms that offer quick, effective 
remedies for people whose privacy rights have been violated, and that help 
to ensure ongoing compliance by organizations. 
This includes empowering the Privacy Commissioner to make binding 
orders and impose consequential, but proportional penalties for non-
compliance with the law. 
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As well, my office should be enabled to conduct proactive inspections to 
ensure organizations are demonstrably accountable for their privacy 
practices… 
Before closing, I want to emphasize that a rights-based law is not an 
impediment to innovation. To the contrary: good privacy laws are key to 
promoting trust in both government and commercial activities. 
Without that trust, innovation, growth and social acceptance of government 
programs can be severely affected.
1032
 
The Privacy Commissioner of Canada stresses that enforcement mechanisms should 
result in quick and effective remedies for individuals and broad and ongoing compliance 
by organizations; true order-making powers and fines would change the dynamics during 
investigations and lead to quicker resolution for Canadians.
1033
 However, these calls have 
not yet been answered, despite years of the Privacy Commissioner reiterating this point: 
“For several years, my predecessors and I have been calling for fundamental reform of 
Canada’s privacy laws”.
1034
 There appears to be a disconnect between what the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada believes is required and what is being enacted by Parliament. In 
my view, it is necessary to move from the soft-resolution approaches of the past to a 
deterrence approach through the imposition of enforceable rights and duties.
1035
 What 
currently exists is no longer appropriate in today’s rapidly evolving technological 
context, especially given the global nature of the informational economy and 
organizations’ growing tendency to disregard data protection rules.
1036
  
I take myself to have shown that it is not clear why the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
does not have order-making powers or the ability to impose meaningful penalties. Let me 
move on to the second thing that I said I would do in this section, namely show how 
provisions in other Canadian and American jurisdictions provide these powers.  
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With respect to order-making powers, the Information and Privacy Commissioner for 
British Columbia has several order-making powers, and organizations must comply with 
these orders.
1037
 Section 52(1) to (4) of BC PIPA
1038
 sets out order-making powers, 
including: dealing with access requests such as requiring an organization to give access to 
all or part of a person’s personal information or disclosing how personal information has 
been used; dealing with access refusals such as confirming the decision of the 
organization or requiring the organization to reconsider its decision; and making other 
orders such as dealing with fees, confirming a decision not to correct personal 
information, requiring an organization to stop collecting, using or disclosing personal 
information, or requiring an organization to destroy personal information that was 
improperly collected. Moreover, the section 55 of the QC Act
1039
 more generally states 
that the Commission d’accès à l’information has all the powers necessary for the exercise 
of its jurisdiction, and may make any order it considers appropriate to protect the rights of 
the parties and rule on any issue of fact or law. Not only is it necessary for the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada to have these types of order-making powers in PIPEDA, but it 
is also important, at least in my view, to add a power to make an order prohibiting acts of 
unreasonable electronic surveillance, and an offence relating to acts of unreasonable 
electronic surveillance. In addition to the existing powers relating to regular 
investigations, I believe that it is also essential to add an explicit power for the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada to proactively inspect, as it sees fit and without the need for an 
investigation to be taking place, organizations’ evidence of compliance to more 
effectively facilitate its order-making powers and to impose meaningful penalties.  
When it comes to penalties, I believe that the Privacy Commissioner of Canada must 
have the ability to impose proportional fines as well. For example, section 56 of the BC 
PIPA
1040
 sets out the offences and penalties, and there are consequences for 
noncompliance. Individuals who commit an offence can be fined up to $10,000; persons 
other than an individual can be fined up to $100,000. Likewise, the QC Act allows for the 
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ability to issue fines for noncompliance.
1041
 However, the penal provisions set out a range 
of fines, depending on the type of offence; typically, fines go up to $10,000, and there is 
also a feature of adding an additional fine of up to $20,000 for subsequent offences.
1042
 It 
is important to note that there are some fines that are up to $50,000 and up to $100,000 
for subsequent offences.
1043
 In addition, section 1798.155(b) of the California Consumer 
Privacy Act
1044
 similarly sets out the consequences for violations against consumers, 
businesses, service providers, or other persons that commit a violation are subject to an 
injunction and liable for a civil penalty of not more than $2,500 for each violation or 
$7,500 for each intentional violation.
1045
 While this information regarding California 
applies to the consumer context, we can see that there has been an attempt to provide 
financial consequences and consider intent, where intentional violations have higher 
penalties attached to them.
1046
 In my view, the fines can be more meaningful if they 
correspond to the offence based on categories of severity, intention, and continuity of 
offences. Further, it is my contention that gross profits and size of the business/enterprise 
are useful factors to list in PIPEDA when considering the imposition of fines.  
Another essential consideration is the effect of the order. Section 57(1) of the BC 
PIPA
1047
 states that where the Commissioner has made an order against an organization 
and the order has become final as a result of there being no further right of appeal, an 
individual affected by the order has a cause of action against the organization for 
damages for actual harm suffered as a result of the breach by the organization of 
obligations. Likewise, section 58 of the QC Act
1048
 states that a decision by the 
Commission d’accès à l’information the Commission becomes executory as a judgment 
of the Superior Court and has all the effects of such a judgment once filed with the court. 
And in section 1798.155(b) of the California Consumer Privacy Act,
1049
 while there is no 
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Privacy Commissioner in this jurisdiction, we can see that the civil penalties must be 
exclusively assessed and recovered in a civil action. Again, it is my view that the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada should be able to have this impact when making orders to 
prevent unnecessary time delays and hassles—I believe that it is a waste of time and 
money for everyone involved to have to force the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to go 
to the Federal Court as with the recent matter involving Facebook, demonstrate with 
evidence and arguments that an organization did not comply with PIPEDA by explaining 
the findings of its investigation to show that the organization refused to implement the 
recommendations, and subsequently ask for a declaration that there was a contravention 
along with several orders to comply with PIPEDA.
1050
 That is, PIPEDA would be 
improved if the problematic provisions forcing the matter to be resolved by the Federal 
Court
1051
 were removed, and the necessary order-making powers described above were 
given to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. 
Again, I have demonstrated that it is not clear why the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
does not have order-making powers or the ability to impose meaningful fines, and I 
illustrated that provisions in other Canadian and American jurisdictions provide these 
powers. The third thing that I will do is show how the European Union goes even further. 
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More precisely, when it comes to the order-making powers, Article 58 of the GDPR
1052
 
gives each supervisory authority several investigative, corrective, and authorization and 
advisory powers. Let me focus on a few examples. Article 58(1)(b) of the GDPR
1053
 
provides each supervisory authority with the power to carry out investigations in the form 
of data protection audits; also, Article 58(1)(d) of the GDPR
1054
 provides each 
supervisory authority with the power to notify the controller or the processor of an 
alleged infringement of the GDPR. What is most interesting is Article 58(2) of the 
GDPR,
1055
 which sets out several corrective powers for supervisory authorities, some of 
which include: issue warnings to controllers or processors regarding likely infringements 
of the GDPR;
1056
 issue reprimands where processing operations have infringed the 
GDPR;
1057
 order controllers or processors to comply with the data subjects’ requests to 
exercise rights pursuant to the GDPR;
1058
 order controllers or processors to bring 
processing operations into compliance with the GDPR;
1059
 order the controller to 
communicate a personal data breach to the data subject;
1060
 impose a temporary or 
definitive limitation including a ban on processing;
1061
 order the rectification or erasure of 
personal data or restriction of processing under the GDPR;
1062
 and impose administrative 
fines pursuant to Article 83, in addition to, or instead of measures referred to in Article 
58(2) the GDPR.
1063
 These powers are extensive, and I would like to suggest that the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada should be equipped with some of these powers as 
applicable to the Canadian employment context.
1064
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In terms of fines, Article 83(1) to 83(6) of the GDPR
1065
 sets out administrative fines and 
assigns them to two categories of either administrative fines up to €10,000,000, or in the 
case of an undertaking, up to two percent of the total worldwide annual turnover of the 
preceding financial year, whichever is higher, or administrative fines up to €20,000,000, 
or in the case of an undertaking, up to four percent of the total worldwide annual turnover 
of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Also, there are 11 listed factors to 
consider when imposing the administrative fines, since the fines depend on the 
circumstances of each case.
1066
 Briefly, the factors involve these ideas: (1) nature, 
severity, and duration of the infringement; (2) the intentional or negligent character of the 
infringement; (3) any action taken to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects; (4) 
the controller/processor’s degree of responsibility of the controller considering technical 
and organizational measures implemented; (5) any relevant previous infringements by the 
controller/processor; (6) the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority; (7) the 
categories of personal data affected by the infringement; (8) how the infringement 
became known to the supervisory authority (manner of notification of the infringement); 
(9) compliance with measures previously ordered to be taken; (10) adherence to approved 
codes of conduct under Article 40, or approved certification mechanisms under Article 
42; and (11) any other aggravating or mitigating factors such as financial benefits gained 
or losses avoided.
1067
 
It is important to mention that powers given to supervisory authorities regarding the 
imposition of administrative fines are taken very seriously. This is in part due to the need 
to ensure that legal remedies in national courts are effective and have an equivalent effect 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
supervisory authorities, who are independent public authorities which are established by Member States; 
see Article 4(21). But all the same, I believe that there are some important powers that can be borrowed and 
given to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, such as imposing fines.  
1065
 GDPR, supra, note 655 at art 83(1)−(6). 
1066
 Ibid at art 83(2). 
1067
 Ibid. 
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as the administrative fines imposed by supervisory authorities where a the legal system of 
a Member State does not provide for administrative fines.
1068
  
However, while I agree with many aspects of the European Union’s approach to 
enforcement of orders, in my view the fines are too high and are not appropriate for the 
Canadian privacy context. This is also my view when considering the fines associated 
with the Canadian employment context, since maximum penalties are not that high. For 
instance, the fines set out in Ontario’s Employment Standards Act
1069
are up to $50,000 
for individuals and $100,000 for corporations;
1070
 repeated offences carry fines of up to 
$250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations.
1071
 Likewise, the fines set out in 
Ontario’s Labour Relations Act
1072
are up to $2,000 for individuals and $25,000 for 
corporations, trade unions, councils of trade unions or employers’ organizations;
1073
 
continued offences occur for each day the contravention persists, and constitutes a 
separate offence.
1074
 Similarly, fines set out in the Canada Labour Code
1075
 are up to 
$10,000 (first offence), $20,000 (second offence), and $50,000 (for each subsequent 
offence) for those other than corporations;
1076
 they are up to $50,000 (first offence), 
$100,000 (second offence), and 250,000 (for each subsequent offence) for 
corporations.
1077
 
                                                 
1068
 Ibid at arts 58(5)−(6), 83(9). More specifically, Article 58(5) requires Member States to provide by law 
that its supervisory authority must have the power to bring infringements of the GDPR to the attention of 
the judicial authorities and where appropriate, to commence or engage otherwise in legal proceedings. 
Article 58(6) gives Member States the power to provide by law additional powers to supervisory 
authorities. Article 83(9) states that, where the legal system of a Member State does not provide for 
administrative fines, Article 83 may be applied in such a manner that the fine is initiated by the competent 
supervisory authority and imposed by competent national courts, while ensuring that those legal remedies 
are effective and have an equivalent effect to the administrative fines imposed by supervisory authorities. 
1069
 Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41. 
1070
 Ibid at s 132(a)−(b). 
1071
 Ibid at s 132(c) 
1072
 Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A.
  
1073
 Ibid at s 104(1). 
1074
 Ibid at s 104(2). 
1075
 Canada Labour Code, RSC, 1985, c L-2. 
1076
 Ibid at s 256(1.1)(b). 
1077
 Ibid at s 256(1.1)(a).   
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Comparative legal methodologists recommend that it is important to respect the cultural 
contexts and refrain from mechanically performing legal transplants.
1078
 Indeed, it is 
telling that the fines compared in Canadian data protection and employment are much 
lower than those imposed in the European Union’s GDPR; in accordance with the 
dignity/human rights theoretical approach to privacy, the European Union may be 
operating with an agenda to proactively protect the dignity of citizens and deter large, 
wealthy technology companies from misusing their personal data and abusing 
surveillance power by creating the potential to award very high fines.
1079
 Yet, it has been 
noted in a recent report by the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
1080
 
that many of the fines that have been levied so far have posed little threat to cash-rich 
companies, since most have been relatively minor: 
Although fines were imposed on 91 different companies in GDPR’s first 
year of implementation, most were relatively minor; a single fine accounted 
for 89 percent of the total €56 million in fines issued. And even this €50 
million fine levied against Google is far from the maximum allowable fine 
of €3.7 billion (which would be four percent of Google’s entire global 
revenue).
1081
 
Thus, realistically speaking, the fines have not been as high as one might assume given 
the structure of the European Union’s privacy regime. Still, I believe that the amounts 
articulated in the GDPR
1082
 are too high for Canadian private sector organizations, and I 
would like to suggest that values be set lower so that Canadians will be more willing to 
accept a new workplace privacy regime.
1083
 
That said, for the organizations that take advantage and severely abuse their electronic 
surveillance power, I would like to suggest that there be an additional offence in PIPEDA  
dealing with mass electronic surveillance for the purposes of manipulating individuals for 
political, advertising, or other controlling purposes. In this situation, I believe that it 
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 Samuel, supra note 656 at 124–134; Van Hoecke, supra note 656 at 3−6, 11, 28, 30; Siems, supra note 
656 at 136−138.  
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 GDPR, supra, note 655 at art 83(1)−(6) 
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would be useful to create higher maximum penalties so that there can be extra leeway for 
decision makers to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate and create meaningful 
deterrence. That is, just as stunt driving and racing leads to more serious consequences 
compared to regular speeding on a highway, in my view, the reckless exploitation of 
individuals using mass electronic surveillance should carry more severe penalties 
compared to other forms of unreasonable electronic surveillance.
1084
 In this way, 
penalties in Canada can meet the general goal of being more effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive as proposed by Articles 83(9) and 84(1) of the GDPR,
1085
 and also align more 
closely to what overseers in other jurisdictions are awarding in response to similar types 
of misconduct.
1086
  
In this part, I have argued that PIPEDA does not provide the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada with the necessary order-making powers and penalties, especially in regards to 
electronic surveillance. I stressed that it was not clear why the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada did not have order-making powers or the ability to impose meaningful penalties, 
and noted that provisions in other Canadian and American jurisdictions provided these 
powers. I also considered the strategies of the European Union and recommended several 
ways to provide the Privacy Commissioner of Canada with the necessary tools for 
dealing with cases of noncompliance. 
4.3.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
This analysis suggests that there are some deficiencies in PIPEDA when it comes to 
order-making powers and proportional penalties. In my view, it is necessary to address 
these deficiencies by removing provisions requiring the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
                                                 
1084
 For example, in Ontario, driving a motor vehicle on a highway in a race or contest, while performing a 
stunt or on a bet or wager, can lead to fines between $2,000 to $10,000, the suspension of a driver’s licence 
for a period of no more than two years (up to ten years on subsequent conviction), a seven-day vehicle 
impoundment, and possible imprisonment for up to six months. See Highway Traffic Act, RSO 1990, c H.8, 
ss 128(14)−(14.1), 172.  
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Privacy Restrictions on Facebook” (24 July 2019), online: Federal Trade Commission 
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to obtain an order from the Federal Court, and adding provisions so that the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada has order-making powers. Other jurisdictions have such 
provisions, and I would argue that if it is to fulfill its mandate, the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada must also be empowered to make orders and impose meaningful penalties in 
order to properly address issues of unreasonable electronic surveillance in the workplace.     
4.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter examined a variety of privacy provisions. I chose to focus on three themes 
in particular because they touched on several interesting issues relating to the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment.  Theme 1 discussed foundational principles for 
understanding privacy and electronic surveillance: data collection and processing; 
profiling and unreasonable electronic surveillance; fair information principles; legislative 
purposes; privacy by design; data impact risk assessments; rights-based data protection 
provisions; and data fiduciaries. Theme 2 considered: definitions of consent; employees’ 
ability to provide, withhold, and revoke consent in situations involving electronic 
surveillance; and strategies for facilitating an effective balance of employees’ privacy 
interests and employers’ legitimate business interests. Theme 3 dealt with order-making 
powers, penalties, and fines in order to strengthen the privacy regime. 
I examined several Canadian privacy provisions in order to understand what currently 
exists in Canada and to identify any gaps that need filling with respect to electronic 
surveillance in the employment context. The privacy provisions I selected for Theme 1 
included: PIPEDA, Québec Charter, and Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter). The privacy 
provisions I selected for Theme 2 included: PIPEDA, PIPEDA Breach Regulations, QC 
Act, and BC PIPA. The privacy provisions I selected for Theme 3 included: PIPEDA, BC 
PIPA, and QC Act. 
I specifically chose privacy provisions in the United States and the European Union in 
order to understand how the privacy provisions were crafted, especially for addressing 
situations where concepts in the theme were not covered in the Canadian privacy regime 
at all, which was what I found in most cases. I examined stronger provisions that 
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provided variety to uncover as much information as possible from the analyses and 
strengthen protections in Canada.  
In the United States, the privacy provisions I selected for Theme 1 included: California 
Consumer Privacy Act, Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act), Bill SB 6280 (Washington 
Facial Recognition), and California Constitution. The privacy provisions I selected for 
Theme 2 included: California Consumer Privacy Act, California Labor Code, and 
California Civil Code (Customer Records). The privacy provisions I selected for Theme 
3 included: California Consumer Privacy Act. 
In the European Union, the privacy provisions I selected for Theme 1 included: GDPR 
and EU Convention. The privacy provisions I selected for Theme 2 included: GDPR. The 
privacy provisions I selected for Theme 3 included: GDPR.  
The privacy provisions fell under the three types of features of privacy provisions as 
mentioned in the Introduction: (1) constitutional and human rights provisions; (2) data 
protection provisions; and (3) employment provisions. Each of the features of privacy 
provisions contributed to the discussion, and was discussed within the three themes as 
they became relevant. 
When conducting the analysis, I focused particular attention on the language and the 
structure of the provisions to isolate useful elements that can be used when crafting the 
proposed workplace privacy regime. Since the priority of this dissertation has been to 
identify and fill gaps in Canada’s regime for the purposes of creating a new and improved 
workplace privacy regime, it was beneficial for me to compare similar provisions side-
by-side and note subtle differences for the purposes of construction. Since the end goal 
was to draft a new workplace privacy regime, I examined the language of the chosen 
provisions to discover the various drafting strategies that could be borrowed and used to 
fill gaps in Canada’s regime.  
In this Chapter 4, the goal was not to undergo an extensive case analysis, but rather to 
closely scrutinize the provisions dealing with common themes to ascertain principles and 
values, note any beneficial construction elements, and identify any gaps in the Canadian 
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regime that could be filled by examining how concepts in the themes were addressed 
legislatively in other jurisdictions. I used this strategy so I could more effectively codify 
ideas when converting them into proposed provisions under the new workplace privacy 
regime. 
This Chapter suggested that there are insufficient legislative privacy protections in 
Canada’s legal regime compared to other jurisdictions for closing the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment. Moreover, principles and values were extracted from the 
privacy provisions, and this led to the generation of ideas that could be used to design a 
new workplace privacy regime to sufficiently close the electronic surveillance gap in a 
way that could fit into Canada’s current legal system. I will discuss in Chapter 6 how I 
propose to fit these principles and values into Canada’s legal system. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Analysis: Examination of Workplace Privacy Cases 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose of this Chapter is to conduct a legal 
analysis of the selected workplace privacy cases of the chosen jurisdictions in order to 
extract useful principles and values for the purposes of designing the new workplace 
privacy regime and closing the electronic surveillance gap in employment. 
To achieve this goal, it is important to examine workplace privacy cases of more than one 
jurisdiction to enable an insightful comparative analysis. Therefore, I will consider 
various workplace privacy cases of the selected jurisdictions, namely Canada, the United 
States, and the European Union. 
Likewise, it is important to choose a variety of workplace privacy cases that contain 
several features of workplace privacy cases that provide insights into a workplace privacy 
situation. As mentioned in the Introduction, the key features of workplace privacy cases 
include: (1) employee success in the wrongful termination/privacy claim versus failure in 
the claim; (2) court versus labour arbitrator; (3) surveillance scenario (proactive 
surveillance operations versus discovery of employee misuse of technology); (4) 
electronic surveillance technology type; and (5) on-duty versus off-duty conduct. 
Two workplace privacy cases from each jurisdiction will be discussed. The workplace 
privacy cases selected from Canada are: Steel
1087
 and Maxam Bulk Services.
1088
 The 
workplace privacy cases chosen from the United States are: Graphic Packaging
1089
 and 
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 Steel v Coast Capital Savings Credit Union, 2015 BCCA 127, aff’g 2013 BCSC 527 [Steel]. 
1088
 Maxam Bulk Services and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 115 (Lebrun) (2015), 
2015 CarswellBC 2277 (Arbitrator: McConchie) [Maxam Bulk Services]. 
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 In re Graphic Packaging International, Inc and Graphic Communications Conference International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 77-P, 134 LA (BNA) 369 (2014) (Wolff, Arb) [Graphic Packaging]. 
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Baker Hughes.
1090
 And the workplace privacy cases coming from the European Union 
are: Bărbulescu
1091
 and López Ribalda.
1092
  
The above workplace privacy cases that I have selected, based on several years of 
preliminary research, are significant because they contain a balanced mix of jurisdictions 
and a good cross-section of the features of workplace privacy cases. The selections have 
been made in order to avoid a skewed analysis favouring only one jurisdictional 
perspective (for example, exploring workplace privacy cases only from the European 
Union), or one kind of situation (for instance, examining workplace privacy cases 
decided only by courts, dealing solely with employees who are successful with their 
claims, looking at only one type of surveillance scenario, examining just one type of 
technology such as video surveillance, or investigating solely off-duty conduct). Variety 
can enhance the discussion and allow for the creation of a more durable workplace 
privacy regime. 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the goal of this Chapter 5 is to extract 
useful elements from the workplace privacy cases in order to create the new workplace 
privacy regime. The goal is not to provide a description of the state of the law in each 
jurisdiction; accordingly, I have chosen the most pertinent cases from each jurisdiction 
for the purposes of extracting components to generate ideas and ultimately create 
proposed provisions for the new workplace privacy regime. No single case can contain all 
of the features of workplace privacy cases; when taken together, however, these six cases 
provide a balanced mix of the core features of workplace privacy cases.   
The workplace privacy cases I have selected also contain helpful analyses by decision 
makers that lead to a more effective discernment of principles and values that can be 
extracted for the purposes of creating a new workplace privacy regime. While some 
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 In re Baker Hughes, Inc (Claremont, OK) and United Steelworkers International Union Region VII, 
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chosen cases are more recent than others and come from different locations within the 
jurisdictions, there are notably interesting aspects about each selected case that will 
generate new insights and enable a rich and deeper analysis and produce ingredients that I 
can use to make the new workplace privacy regime. These aspects are considered when 
delving deeper and contrasting the cases for the purposes of isolating additional relevant 
insights for the purpose of crafting the new workplace privacy regime. Further, there are 
several relevant principles stemming from employment and arbitral jurisprudence that 
will be discussed as they become relevant; I will refer to these principles as “employment 
principles”.
1093
 When conducting the analysis, it is also useful to understand the social 
reality concerning electronic surveillance and privacy that operates in the background of 
these cases.
1094
 
There are several reasons why I have selected these six cases to examine in this 
dissertation. In their own way, the cases provide insights that are appropriate for studying 
issues related to workplace privacy in light of electronic surveillance, and making 
considerable contributions to the new workplace privacy regime.  
The first two cases from Canada involve representative cases of the discovery of 
employee misuse of technology, an increasingly common phenomenon that raises a host 
of interesting and important issues. That said, there are some critical differences between 
these cases that help shed light on why one employee is successful in getting reinstated, 
and the other employee is unsuccessful in a wrongful termination claim where the 
dismissal is upheld. One case deals with a labour arbitrator and off-duty misconduct 
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ones that become relevant to the discussion. Also important to note is that employees in workplace privacy 
cases are referred to as employees, grievors, or grievants, depending on the jurisdiction and unionization 
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involving ubiquitous surveillance of social media, and the other deals with a court and 
on-duty misconduct involving the monitoring of corporate systems.  
More precisely, Steel is a case about a senior-level employee who is terminated after 
improperly accessing a file on the corporate server. The case involves the discovery of 
misuse of technology while the employee is on-duty. Steel highlights core issues 
involving trust in the employment relationship. As well, the case focusses on the 
importance of balancing the legitimate interests of employers with the privacy interests of 
employees, and proportionality between the misconduct and the sanction imposed. Steel 
makes considerable contributions to the new workplace privacy regime in that it proposes 
provisions that require balanced company policies and procedures in ways that build trust 
in the employment relationship and ensure employees’ interests are protected in 
workplace monitoring situations, while also protecting employers’ legitimate interests to 
prevent the misuse of technology and consequent potential damage to the employer’s 
reputation, clients, employees, confidential information, or property. Also, there is a 
focus on creating provisions that require the creation of policies and procedures that 
focus on the concerns of both employers and employees. 
Maxam Bulk Services involves a labour arbitration. Due to a misunderstanding, the 
employee makes inappropriate comments on various Facebook walls using profanities. 
He is dismissed, but is ultimately reinstated by the arbitrator. The case deals with the 
discovery of misuse of technology that takes place while the employee is off-duty. This 
case raises a number of key issues regarding the importance of social media policies, and 
also draws attention to the dignity/human rights approach to privacy when examining an 
employee’s misconduct. Maxam Bulk Services makes significant contributions to the new 
workplace privacy regime, especially when it comes to the contents of social media 
policies to address concerns about the use of ubiquitous surveillance that can harm an 
employer, an employer’s clients, or the employees themselves. The proposed provisions 
specifically address the need to explain the disciplinary consequences of noncompliance 
with the policies and procedures.  
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The second set of cases from the United States both involve off-duty conduct, which is 
becoming a challenging issue given the increased sophistication of technology and 
prevalence of digital devices owned and used by individuals that can capture the actions 
of employees outside the workplace. However, although both are decided by a labour 
arbitrator, some of the differences in these cases explain why the arbitrator reinstates one 
employee, and upholds the dismissal of the other. That is, the reinstated employee is 
subjected to an abuse of surveillance power through proactive surveillance operations 
using photography and video surveillance. The extent of abuse of surveillance power in 
this more extreme case shows how far things can go when there are no protections in 
place. On the other hand, the employee who is unsuccessful in getting reinstated is 
discovered to have misused technology to create inappropriate online posts that are 
ultimately connected to the workplace policies. While this case more typically arises in 
the workplace, it stresses the importance of preventing inappropriate misconduct with 
effective company policies and procedures, and provisions in the collective agreement.  
More specifically, in Graphic Packaging, a senior employee is wrongly suspected of 
being dishonest about his functional limitations following a work injury, and the 
employer begins electronic surveillance of him. He is reinstated, but he suffers as a result 
of the mistreatment. The case involves proactive surveillance operations conducted by a 
private investigator, which takes place while the employee is off-duty. The case touches 
on several employment principles, including the need for employers to respect 
disciplinary procedures, and have key provisions in collective bargaining agreements as 
well as company policies and procedures. Graphic Packaging makes essential 
contributions to the new workplace privacy regime concerning off-duty covert 
surveillance, the importance of knowing when to commence surveillance based on 
suspicion, and interpreting and responding to surveillance information. In particular, it 
proposes several important provisions requiring employers to respect the human dignity 
of employees by giving them the benefit of the doubt and attempting to understand their 
version of the story before hastily commencing electronic surveillance, interpreting 
electronic surveillance reports, and imposing discipline.   
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Baker Hughes involves an employee who, while off work, posts a racist blog on his 
MySpace account that is specifically and unquestionably aimed at one of his managers. 
The case involves the discovery of misuse of technology that takes place while the 
employee is off-duty. It deals with a labour arbitration. However, unlike what takes place 
in Maxam Bulk Services, the employee is unsuccessful in getting reinstated following a 
considerably different analysis that focusses on the nexus doctrine and connecting the 
off-duty misconduct with critical company policies and procedures, as well as the 
collective agreement. The case is essential for highlighting employers’ responsibilities to 
protect employees from online harassment by their coworkers, and confirms that this is a 
core legitimate interest of the employer. Baker Hughes makes notable contributions to the 
new workplace privacy regime, unique to those contributed by Maxam Bulk Services, by 
focussing on the protection of the employer’s own employees from each other rather than 
on protecting the employer’s corporate reputation. Baker Hughes contributes to the new 
workplace privacy regime by proposing provisions aimed at preventing the online 
discrimination and harassment of coworkers with specific social media policies and 
procedures that set out employers’ expectations regarding acceptable online use. It also 
enables the creation of provisions stressing that, while employees may have and use 
social media accounts while they are off-duty, they can never disparage coworkers and 
then use as an excuse that they were away from work or using their own digital devices.  
The third set of cases from the European Union deals with very recent and leading court 
cases regarding on-duty misconduct. Yet, they contribute to our understanding of privacy 
in different and noteworthy ways. For instance, one deals with the discovery of misuse of 
instant messaging communications technology at work, and the other deals with proactive 
surveillance operations involving overt, covert, and also continuous video surveillance. In 
particular, the employee caught using instant messaging for personal reasons is ultimately 
successful with his privacy claim; on the other hand, the employees who are continuously 
monitored with overt and covert CCTV cameras are unsuccessful with their claims.   
More explicitly, Bărbulescu concerns an engineer who works with a private company. 
The employee is asked to open a Yahoo! Messenger account to deal with customer 
concerns and after he does so, he learns that his communications have been monitored by 
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his employer without his knowledge. He is terminated for disobeying a company rule 
prohibiting the use of company equipment and communications software for personal 
purposes, but eventually succeeds in his privacy claim. Bărbulescu involves the 
discovery of misuse of technology and employer surveillance that takes place while the 
employee is on-duty; unlike a case such as Steel for instance, he is successful with his 
claim and the analysis places more emphasis on notification of the nature and extent of 
the electronic surveillance of electronic communications. The case highlights the 
importance of balancing the privacy interests of employees with the legitimate business 
interests of employers for the smooth operation of the business. There are core principles 
that emerge, such as the need to be informed of the nature, extent, and consequences of 
employee monitoring; I refer to these principles as the “Bărbulescu Principles” that are 
characteristic of the European Union’s unique and novel approach. The case deals with 
the treatment of sensitive information, which is an important factor that requires extra 
attention in relation to the electronic surveillance of employees. Bărbulescu makes 
material contributions to the new workplace privacy regime and incorporates the 
Bărbulescu Principles to help construct essential provisions regarding the electronic 
surveillance of communications in the workplace. 
López Ribalda is a very recent decision, involving five employees who are cashiers in a 
supermarket. The employer is concerned because thousands of euros of product have 
gone missing over five consecutive months. In response, the employer decides to conduct 
both overt and covert video surveillance in the workplace to catch the thieves and impose 
discipline. The case involves the continuous monitoring of the employees while they are 
on-duty. Ultimately, the employees are caught and are terminated, and unlike Bărbulescu, 
they are ultimately unsuccessful in their privacy claims in court.  The case relies on and 
applies the Bărbulescu Principles in the consideration of electronic surveillance of 
employees regarding video surveillance. It also touches on important concepts related to 
continuous and covert video surveillance, along with the meaning of suspicion. López 
Ribalda makes important contributions to the new workplace privacy regime since there 
is a focus on creating provisions that incorporate the Bărbulescu Principles for the 
regulation of overt, covert, and continuous video surveillance of employees by 
employers. 
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As can be seen in the chart below, the examination of workplace privacy cases provides a 
balanced mix of jurisdictions and the features of workplace privacy cases.  
Table 5: Jurisdictions and Features of Workplace Privacy Cases in Chapter 5 
Jurisdiction:  
Canada (red) 
United States 
(blue) 
European 
Union 
(orange) 
Features:  
1-Employee 
success in 
the wrongful 
termination 
/privacy 
claim vs 
failure in the 
claim  
 
2-Court vs 
labour 
arbitrator  
 
3-
Surveillance 
scenario 
(proactive 
surveillance 
operations 
vs discovery 
of misuse of 
technology) 
 
4-Electronic 
surveillance  
technology 
type 
 
5-On-
duty vs 
off-duty 
1-Steel      
(red) 
Unsuccessful 
(dismissed) 
Court Discovery of 
misuse of 
technology 
Monitoring 
of corporate 
systems 
On-duty 
2-Maxam 
Bulk Services 
(red) 
Successful 
(reinstated) 
Arbitration Discovery of 
misuse of 
technology 
Social media Off-duty 
3-Graphic 
Services 
(blue) 
Successful 
(reinstated)  
Arbitration Proactive 
surveillance 
operations 
Photography 
and video 
camera 
Off-duty 
4-Baker 
Hughes 
(blue) 
Unsuccessful 
(dismissed) 
Arbitration Discovery of 
misuse of 
technology 
Social media Off-duty 
5-Bărbulescu 
(orange) 
Successful 
(damages 
won) 
Court Discovery of 
misuse of 
technology 
Yahoo! 
Instant 
Messaging  
On-duty 
6-López 
Ribalda 
(orange) 
Unsuccessful 
(no damages) 
Court Proactive 
surveillance 
operations 
Video 
surveillance 
(CCTV: 
overt, covert, 
continuous) 
On-duty 
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I have discovered from preliminary research that both social media and video 
surveillance are more typical types of electronic surveillance technology that are used in 
the employment context; to that end, two of each technology types have been included in 
the study in order to be more representative. That said, the two selected cases differ in 
outcomes and analyses to better understand the principles and values emerging from 
those types of cases.  
As with the previous Chapter 4, I attempt to respect the cultural contexts of the 
jurisdictions examined and find more effective ways of borrowing ideas and fitting them 
into the Canadian jurisdiction following a careful analysis of similarities and differences 
that emerge from the workplace privacy cases, for the purpose of finding practical 
solutions to similar problems in areas with different legal systems.
1095
 
In like manner, this dissertation asks how the principles and values that emerge from 
selected workplace privacy cases can be used to close the electronic surveillance gap in 
employment using a design that fits into Canada’s legal system. By “principle”, I mean 
the ordinary meaning of the word, namely, a fundamental truth or proposition that serves 
as the foundation for a system of belief, behaviour, or chain of reasoning; it is the 
fundamental source of something.
1096
 By “value”, I mean the ordinary meaning of the 
word, namely, the regard that something is held to deserve, and the importance, worth, or 
usefulness of something; it includes the standards of behaviour that are judged to be 
important in life.
1097
  
This Chapter will argue that principles and values can be extracted from all the examined 
workplace privacy cases, and can be used to design a new workplace privacy regime that 
sufficiently closes the electronic surveillance gap in a way that fits into Canada’s legal 
system.   
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I examine each workplace privacy case with an eye to achieving three goals. First, I 
thoroughly describe the workplace privacy case. Second, I analyze the case and note the 
principles and values that emerge from the analysis. And third, I set out my ideas for 
incorporating the detected principles and values into the proposed workplace privacy 
regime to close the electronic surveillance gap. These ideas stem from my discussion of 
the implications for the new workplace privacy regime. At this stage, the ideas are not yet 
crafted into detailed provisions. Chapter 6 will discuss how I propose to fit these ideas 
into Canada’s legal system.  
5.1 Steel 
The first Canadian workplace privacy case that is discussed in this dissertation is Steel. I 
first describe the facts, history, and decision of the workplace privacy case; I then analyze 
the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy regime. 
5.1.1 The Facts, History, and Decision 
Susan Steel (Steel) worked with Coast Capital Savings Credit Union (Coast) as a 
Helpdesk Analyst in Coast’s IT Department.
1098
 As a Helpdesk Analyst, Steel provided 
internal technical assistance to other employees when they experienced network 
issues.
1099
 Steel worked unsupervised and could access any file at Coast.
1100
 
In her role, Steel was required to: follow company policies including the Code of 
Conduct, Conflict of Interest Policy, and Policy of Dishonest Conduct; be a positive role 
model and lead by example; help maintain security of the physical premises, property, 
and information in accordance with the internal control procedures; and respect the 
privacy and confidentiality of all information of customers and staff.
1101
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Coast had a policy where all employees on the internal system were assigned a personal 
folder that was kept on the network for the sole use of each employee.
1102
 Confidential 
company information was put into these folders, which could only be read or edited by 
the individual assigned to the file.
1103
 The exception to this rule was that Steel could 
access other employees’ personal folders where she was required to assist employees 
with their technical problems.
1104
  
There were strict rules regarding the procedure for a Helpdesk Analyst to access a file; 
one important feature was that Helpdesk Analysts had to obtain permission from the 
owner of the personal file or obtain authorization from the VP of corporate security.
1105
 
Steel was aware of this rule and signed that she read and understood the company 
Acceptable Use Policy, Code of Conduct Policy, and Information Confidentiality 
Policy.
1106
 
Leslie Kerr (Kerr), a manager, kept a spreadsheet in her folder on priorities for the 
limited employee parking spaces for the IT group, which also contained confidential 
information such as employee pay grades and seniority dates; Steel was aware of this file 
and its location.
1107
 In short, following a meeting regarding parking spaces, Steel went 
into Kerr’s folder without authorization, and opened the list.
1108
 Kerr complained to 
Steel’s supervisor, Brian Vidal, when she was unable to access the file because there was 
a message on the screen saying that the document was already in use by Steel, and she 
never gave Steel permission to access the document.
1109
 
Steel was immediately terminated for cause for accessing a confidential file in a private 
folder without permission.
1110
 Steel sought damages for wrongful dismissal, and Coast 
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sought to have the action dismissed.
1111
 Ultimately, the trial judge, Ross J., decided that 
Coast had just cause to terminate Steel’s employment.
1112
 
Steel appealed the trial decision to the Court of Appeal.
1113
 Goepel J.A., writing for the 
majority, dismissed the appeal.
1114
 The court agreed with the trial judge that McKinley v 
BC Tel
1115
 applied, and stressed that a single act of misconduct could justify a dismissal if 
the misconduct was of a sufficient character to cause the irreparable breakdown of the 
employment relationship.
1116
 The court confirmed that the sole issue for the trial judge 
was to consider whether the conduct caused a breakdown in the employment relationship, 
and the trial judge did not err in the analysis.
1117
 More specifically, the court had to ask 
whether the employment relationship could no longer viably subsist, and the inherent 
value of the job to the employee did not need to be expressly considered in determining 
whether there was just cause to dismiss.
1118
 Furthermore, the court stated that the trial 
judge was aware of the circumstances, and was open to find that there was a fundamental 
breakdown in the employment relationship.
1119
 The appeal was dismissed.
1120
  
Steel sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
1121
 and leave to appeal was 
dismissed.
1122
 
5.1.2 Analysis of Steel 
Steel involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: Steel’s termination was 
upheld; the matter took place in a court; the surveillance scenario involved the discovery 
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of employee misuse of technology; the technology involved the employer’s corporate 
monitoring of systems; and the misconduct took place while Steel was on-duty.  
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from Steel.  First, I will argue 
the importance of trust in both employment and data protection. Second, I will point to 
the critical role of balance in terms of the misconduct and the sanction imposed. And 
third, I will discuss the struggles faced and competing approaches used when attempting 
to balance the interests of the parties. 
Because trust played a significant role during the analysis, it is important to examine this 
feature from the outset. The trial judge pointed out the critical nature of trust in this case 
because Coast operated in the financial industry, which is associated with higher 
standards when it comes to the protection of confidential information.
1123
 Steel also 
worked with a great deal of autonomy, thus the trial judge stressed that the fundamental 
nature of trust was of paramount importance in this employment relationship.
1124
 
The trial judge found that Steel violated the trust by opening the confidential document, 
and by violating the company procedures regarding remote access of the document when 
accessing the file without permission.
1125
 Although this was not mentioned in the 
decision, one may question whether Steel’s multiple explanations for why she needed to 
access the document in the first place contributed to this finding of broken trust.
1126
 Steel 
appeared to be sneaking into a folder to snoop, since she did not have a parking spot and 
was one of the employees on the waiting list; she opened the confidential document right 
after the meeting touching on parking priorities.
1127
 Both courts upheld Coast’s decision 
to terminate Steel, a long-term employee working with Coast for 21 years.
1128
 
When trust disappears in the employment relationship, the parties experience feelings of 
violation and betrayal that lead to a complete breakdown in the relationship, where the 
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human reaction is immediate and can lead to feelings of disgust.
1129
 Trust is a core aspect 
of the employment relationship, and when trust is broken, it is common for terminations 
to be upheld, even for what could be viewed as minor breaches.
1130
 Trust is essential in 
the employment relationship to achieve harmonious workplace relations, especially given 
the imbalance of power that weighs in favour of employers.
1131
 This inherent unequal 
bargaining power involves virtually all facets of the employment relationship.
1132
  
It has been noted in unionized cases that a breach of trust conveys the gravity of certain 
misconduct whose main defining characteristic is dishonesty, such as theft, falsification 
of time-keeping, attendance or production records, and benefits fraud.
 1133
 Other 
examples include: failure to follow prescribed procedures for handling money or other 
assets; misuse of one’s position to derive some illicit gain for oneself, family, or friends; 
gross dereliction of duty as it affects the interests of the employer’s clients, customers, 
patients or others; engaging in an inappropriate personal or business relationships that 
could compromise the employer’s interests; misrepresenting the reasons for requesting a 
leave of absence; malingering while on sick leave or long-term disability leave or 
providing inaccurate medical information; and failure to advise the employer of the 
revocation of a licence or professional certification required to carry out a job.
1134
  
In nonunionized workplaces such as in this case, when courts determine whether there 
has been an irreparable breakdown of the relationship, they consider factors such as the 
context and the seriousness of the dishonesty; to decide whether there has been an 
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irreparable undermining of trust that is required in the employment relationship, courts 
are likely to set a higher standard for employees when they work in roles involving a 
great deal of autonomy, positions of authority, or positions requiring special trust.
1135
 
When misusing company technology, employees typically access the information of 
coworkers, clients, or the employer; regardless of the type of misconduct, the motivations 
are primarily to engage in various illegal or unethical activities for personal gain, or to 
damage the employer’s property, information, or reputation.
1136
 With respect to data 
breaches alone, about 33 percent of reported breaches are caused by an insider who is 
typically an authorized individual with valid credentials within the organization.
1137
 
Furthermore, in organizations that experience economic crime and fraud, more than half 
of the perpetrators are internal actors.
1138
 In other words, not every invasion comes from a 
malicious external attacker, and it is necessary to focus on misuse of technology by 
authorized individuals.
1139
  
Cyber security incidents have serious financial consequences; Statistics Canada has found 
that Canadian businesses reported spending approximately $14 billion to prevent, detect 
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and recover from cyber security incidents in 2017.
1140
 21 percent of businesses reported 
they were impacted by a cyber security incident that affected their operations.
1141
  
It appears that banking institutions need to better protect their data compared to 
businesses operating in other industries. For instance, banking institutions were more 
likely to be impacted by cyber security incidents and reported some of the highest levels 
of incidents at 47 percent, which prevented employees from working, created downtime, 
and added repair or recovery costs; this may explain why 81 percent of banking 
institutions were required to implement cyber security measures by their suppliers, 
customers, partners or regulators in 2017 compared to 29 percent of businesses 
overall.
1142
 While 13 percent of businesses had a written policy in place to manage or 
report cyber security incidents overall, 66 percent of banking institutions had such a 
written policy.
1143
 And whether the motives were to steal money, demand a ransom 
payment, access unauthorized areas, or steal personal or financial information, 65 percent 
of businesses reported that they believed an external actor was involved, and thus it can 
be deduced that 35 percent believed an internal actor was involved.
1144
 
When it comes to dealing with internal actors, most of whom are employees, recent 
research suggests that an effective strategy is to go beyond using strong compliance 
systems, and address root causes of the problem that involve leadership and corporate 
culture; employers can combat illicit employee behaviour, such as what took place in the 
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recent Desjardins data breach,
1145
 by setting social norms within the organization and 
managing the risk of misconduct.
1146
 Further, it is important to send a message that 
misuse of personal information is unacceptable and the policies and procedures 
prohibiting this misconduct will be consistently enforced.
1147
 Organizations need to 
actively recruit and promote managers who value integrity, and create policies and 
procedures that reduce the opportunity for committing unethical acts.
1148
  
On the issue of data breaches alone, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
has recently reported that, between November 1, 2018 and October 31, 2019, the Privacy 
Commissioner received 680 breach reports, and the number of Canadians who have been 
affected by a data breach was over 28 million;
1149
 this number included two major data 
breaches that occurred during this time period, namely the Desjardins and Capital One 
breaches.
1150
 In fact, 58 percent or 397 breach reports involved unauthorized access, 
some of which was caused by employee snooping and social engineering hacks such as 
phishing and impersonation.
1151
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Organizations are recommended to balance entrepreneurship and responsibility by 
creating a code of conduct and asking employees to follow it.
1152
 It is also important to 
have internal and external whistleblower systems to ensure behaviour remains consistent 
with the company vision.
1153
 An essential indicator of an ethical culture is when an 
organization has a zero-tolerance policy for wrongdoing; when members of upper 
management break the rules, it is necessary for these managers to be punished in the 
same manner as other employees who break the rules.
1154
 Organizations can help 
employees develop moral humility, which is the recognition that we all have the capacity 
to transgress if we are not careful.
1155
 When it comes to ethics in the workplace, it is 
recommended that there be a development of a three-stage approach: (1) prepare in 
advance for moral challenges to overcome the bias of overestimating the virtuousness of 
our future selves using strategies such as goal setting and if-then planning; (2) make good 
decisions in the moment by stepping back, searching for moral issues, and exploring 
ethical implications; and (3) reflect on and learn from moral successes and failures for the 
purposes of future growth.
1156
 
It seems evident that organizations have a legitimate business interest in protecting client 
and employee information, as well as employer information, property, and reputation; 
one way to accomplish this goal is to approach management with the aim of creating an 
ethical workforce. It may be useful to support organizations in building ethical 
workplaces and view this as a strong legitimate business interest. 
In this case, Coast was upholding cherished company values and enforcing its own clear 
policies and procedures, of which Steel was aware.
1157
 Coast did not lessen the penalty 
merely because Steel was in a more senior position, or because the file she accessed had 
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to do with employee parking spaces; instead, Coast took the approach that it was 
important to treat all employees who engaged in dishonesty equally in order to send a 
message that this type of misconduct would not be tolerated.
1158
 Coast bolstered the 
integrity of its workforce, and the courts supported it.
1159
 
To recap, I have just explained the importance of trust in employment and data 
protection. The second thing that I will do is delve into the concept of balance regarding 
the misconduct and the sanction imposed. 
To that end, the trial judge first referred to McKinley v BC Tel,
1160
 and highlighted that, 
considering the need to use a contextual analysis and the principle of proportionality, 
there had to be a balance struck between the severity of the misconduct and the sanction 
imposed.
1161
 While the trial judge emphasized that terminations constituted the most 
severe punishment in employment and were reserved for only the most serious kind of 
misconduct, there were instances where a termination was appropriate, and the question 
was ultimately whether there was an irreparable breakdown of the employment 
relationship.
1162
 In this case, Steel was found to have engaged in dishonesty that led to a 
breakdown in the employment relationship, which was evident when examining Coast’s 
language in the termination letter, stating that Steel’s actions “flew in the face of the 
trust”
 1163
 that was required in the position involving access to confidential and private 
information.
1164
 Coast even used the phrases such as, “serious loss of confidence”
1165
 and 
“irreparably damaged the employment relationship”.
1166
  
The Court of Appeal confirmed the trial judge’s decision, and stated that the only issue to 
address was whether the conduct caused a breakdown of the employment relationship; 
the court was not willing to perform an extensive analysis of additional surrounding 
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factors that were raised by the dissenting judge, Donald J.A.
1167
 The Court of Appeal held 
that the seriousness of the misconduct violated the trust in the employment relationship 
and caused an irreparable breakdown of the employment relationship.
1168
 The Court of 
Appeal made it clear that the trial judge considered all the relevant factors when 
performing the balancing process; in this case however, the positive aspects of Steel’s 
employment, such as length of service, were outweighed by the severity of the 
misconduct, namely the breach of trust in this case.
1169
 In fact, the Court of Appeal 
highlighted several of the factors that justified the trial judge’s decision, including the 
seriousness of the misconduct, policies on privacy-related matters, and the trust that was 
violated, and confirmed that the trial judge was open to find a fundamental breakdown in 
the employment relationship.
1170
 
I have therefore shown the noteworthy aspects of balance in terms of the misconduct and 
the sanction imposed. The third thing that I will do is illustrate the consequential 
struggles that arise and the competing approaches used when attempting to balance the 
interests of the parties.   
To this end, it is worth noting that the dissent in the case was substantial.
1171
 More 
explicitly, Donald J.A. disagreed with the analyses of both the trial judge and the 
majority of the Court of Appeal, mainly because the dissenting analysis aimed at 
examining more than just whether the severity of the misconduct and the sanction 
imposed were proportionate.
1172
 In the discussion concerning proportionality, the dissent 
focused on additional factors that had to be considered given the wider appreciation of 
the employment relationship; these factors included the inherent value of the job to the 
employee, length and quality of service, and the unequal bargaining power that put 
employees in a vulnerable position.
1173
 The dissenting judge even referred to the Dickon 
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dissent,
1174
 and insisted that it was important to use a more humane approach during the 
analysis.
1175
 Donald J.A. referred to the range of sanctions in the policy that could apply 
in instances of noncompliance, and asserted that it was not fair to allow one instance of a 
breach of privacy rules to end a 21-year career.
1176
  
When reviewing the decision at both levels, there appears to be a struggle between the 
idea of an organization using strict rules to ensure the protection of confidential 
information stored on its server, and the contention that employment principles should be 
used to support saving the job of a long-term employee who made a single mistake. What 
can be taken from this case is that it is not an easy balance to strike—these opposing 
interests are valid, and there is no easy answer. Employing a balancing exercise appears 
to be one of the most effective strategies for dealing with the challenge of resolving 
strong opposing interests, but this means that a judge or a labour arbitrator uses discretion 
and performs the balancing, deciding which interests carry more weight. One thing that 
can be said is that company policies and procedures play a large role during this decision-
making process.  
In this part, I extracted principles and values from Steel.  I did this by discussing trust, 
balance with respect to the misconduct and the sanction imposed, and the challenge of 
balancing the interests of the parties. It is important to stress that, since the notion of trust 
will act as a through-line for all cases that I will be discussing, I spent a considerable 
amount of time examining it in my analysis of this first case. As will be seen throughout 
this dissertation, when there is a violation of trust in the employment relationship, there is 
a strong likelihood that there will be consequent feelings of betrayal.  
5.1.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
What the above analysis suggests is that there are a few themes that are present in 
workplace privacy cases that need to be addressed when creating provisions in the new 
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workplace privacy regime. For example, trust and balance are core features of the 
employment relationship and also in data protection. Thus, there needs to be the creation 
of provisions that require a balancing of opposing interests of the parties in a way that 
aims to build trust in the employment relationship; for example, this can be accomplished 
by requiring the creation of fair policies and procedures where employees are protected 
from unreasonable electronic surveillance, and employers’ legitimate interests are also 
protected in order to prevent the misuse of technology, including data breaches and illicit 
behaviour, which could lead to damage to the employer’s reputation, clients, employees, 
or property. Given the inconsistencies associated with data protection and employment 
principles, it is also necessary to ensure that there is a fair balancing to resolve strong 
opposing interests in an employment relationship. Thus, it is necessary to create 
provisions that require the creation of policies and procedures that focus on the concerns 
of both employers and employees. 
5.2 Maxam Bulk Services 
The second Canadian workplace privacy case that is discussed in this dissertation is 
Maxam Bulk Services. I first describe the facts and decision of the workplace privacy 
case; I then analyze the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy 
regime. 
5.2.1 The Facts and Decision 
Sheldon Lebrun (Lebrun) had been employed with Maxam Bulk Services (Maxam), a 
manufacturer and distributor of explosives, for four and one half years.
1177
 Maxam had 
one main customer, Teck Coal Limited (Teck), which made up 90 percent of its business 
in Canada; without Teck, Maxam would not be operating in this location. One of the 
tasks Lebrun performed in his role as spare lead hand was to record any safety concerns 
at the site on a daily basis.
1178
 Lebrun noted over many months that there was a 
deficiency, namely there was a malfunction of one of the two electric gates that protected 
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the site silo from wandering animals.
1179
 One part of a gate had been severed 
accidentally, and since the deficiency had not been fixed, the silo was exposed to 
encroachment by animals.
1180
 Though Lebrun noted this deficiency repetitively, no 
improvements were made, and eventually some sheep got into the silo enclosure, 
consumed some chemicals, and died.
1181
  
Lebrun learned about the deaths the next day when his supervisor called.
1182
 For some 
unknown reason, Lebrun got the impression from his supervisor during this call that the 
main client, Teck, was blaming Maxam for the sheep deaths.
1183
 In response, Lebrun 
became frustrated because he thought that Maxam was being accused, and he believed 
that the real problem was Teck’s failure to repair the gate.
1184
 Over a few days, Lebrun 
posted inappropriate comments on several Facebook walls while he was at home and off-
duty; he criticized Teck and his supervisor, used highly offensive swearwords aimed 
directly at Teck, and ranted about how Teck was not taking responsibility for what 
happened to the sheep.
1185
 The VP of Maxam learned about the posts when he received a 
phone call from Teck’s general manager, and was directed to the posts that were on 
Lebrun’s wall; he could easily see the posts since Lebrun did not use any privacy 
settings.
1186
 Maxam apologized to Teck and dismissed Lebrun.
1187
 
At the grievance, Maxam argued that the discharge should be upheld and the grievance 
should be dismissed.
1188
 Maxam argued that Lebrun broke the trust with Maxam, 
damaged the relationship between Maxam and Teck, damaged Teck’s reputation, and 
slandered his supervisor.
1189
 Maxam asserted that there was no serious expectation of 
privacy regarding the Facebook posts, and although Lebrun claimed that he did not know 
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the comments were public, ranting without being aware of the privacy settings was 
reckless.
1190
 Maxam also argued that Lebrun’s off-duty conduct met the test in Millhaven 
Fibres
1191
 for discipline for off-duty conduct.
1192
 In contrast, the union argued that, 
though there was cause for some discipline, the termination was excessive in all of the 
circumstances, and reinstatement was appropriate.
1193
 For Lebrun, posting on Facebook 
was more like having a beer with a friend and complaining about work.
1194
 He had 
honestly not turned his mind to his Facebook privacy settings, and this was very common 
among Facebook users.
1195
 Also, if Maxam had a social media policy, Lebrun would have 
better understood that his conduct was serious and that Facebook was not the place to 
complain about the workplace.
1196
  
The arbitrator, McConchie, proceeded to examine the relevant mitigating and aggravating 
factors.
1197
 For instance, Lebrun was a very good employee who was middle of the 
seniority list, and this incident was considered to be shocking.
1198
 The arbitrator 
considered Lebrun’s attitude, honesty, demonstration of remorse, and clean record and 
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concluded that this was an isolated incident.
1199
 The arbitrator noted that there was an 
element of premeditation since Lebrun chose to demonstrate his anger on Facebook.
1200
 
Further, the arbitrator stated that the seriousness of the offence was a major factor in this 
case; Lebrun engaged in a brief but offensive campaign which slurred his own company's 
sole customer, criticized his employer, and involved insubordinate comments about one 
of his supervisors.
1201
 However, the arbitrator stated that it was notable that Lebrun 
apologized to Maxam, tried to apologize to Teck, and he would have apologized to his 
supervisor had he run into him.
1202
 The arbitrator discussed the significance of the 
absence of a social media rule or policy; while it was not an excuse for Lebrun, it did 
remove from Maxam’s “quiver of reasons for upholding the dismissal”
1203
 that Lebrun 
knew what was expected of him and the consequences of breaching that expectation.
1204
 
And there were no attempts of earlier, more moderate forms of corrective discipline.
1205
  
Ultimately, the arbitrator stressed that, though Lebrun’s misconduct was serious, it was 
not so serious that it should override the opportunity for progressive discipline for the 
benefit of the continued employment relationship.
1206
 The arbitrator briefly compared 
other instances of social media rants, and concluded that Lebrun’s misconduct was not as 
serious, relatively speaking.
1207
 There was a low risk of recurrence given that there was 
no violence or disparagement of other races and genders, and the motivation for ranting 
on social media was dissimilar from other cases since Lebrun thought his employer was 
unfairly treated.
1208
 The arbitrator reinstated Lebrun.
1209
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5.2.2 Analysis of Maxam Bulk Services 
This case involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: Lebrun was 
successful in being reinstated; the matter involved a labour arbitration; the surveillance 
scenario involved the discovery of employee misuse of technology; the electronic 
surveillance technology involved social media, namely Facebook; and the misconduct 
took place while Lebrun was off-duty.  
This case is interesting when comparing it to the previous case, Steel, since it had the 
exact opposite result. Steel worked with her employer for 21 years, accessed a file 
regarding employee parking spaces without permission, was terminated immediately with 
no notice, and was unsuccessful in her wrongful dismissal claim. In contrast, in Maxam 
Bulk Services, Lebrun worked with his employer for just four and one half years, made 
inappropriate posts on Facebook that were filled with profanities and aimed directly at 
the employer’s main client and his supervisor, was dismissed, and was subsequently 
reinstated by the arbitrator. Both employers had something at stake, including 
confidential information and online reputation. 
One reason for the difference in results could be that one case was resolved in courts, 
whereas the other was resolved in a labour arbitration. In my view, this made a 
significant difference because labour arbitrators tend to take relatively more time to 
thoroughly examine the entire situation and give the employee the benefit of the doubt 
before making any decisions about whether a dismissal should be upheld or substituted 
with a lesser penalty. For instance, the trial judge in Steel briefly noted the relevant legal 
principles in four paragraphs and subsequently made a decision in a discussion that lasted 
four paragraphs;
1210
 similarly, the majority in the Court of Appeal in Steel briefly decided 
in a discussion that lasted 10 paragraphs.
1211
 Conversely, the arbitrator’s discussion in 
Maxam Bulk Services lasted a considerable 62 paragraphs, where the arbitrator 
considered the entire context when examining each and every aggravating and mitigating 
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factor.
1212
 It appears that there may have been a more genuine attempt to understand the 
situation from Lebrun’s perspective and to use a more humane approach, where there was 
a wider appreciation of employment principles described by Donald J.A. in the Court of 
Appeal dissent in Steel.
1213
  
In addition, there was a difference in industry type (banking versus mining); as discussed 
in Steel, standards appear to be high when it comes to the protection of confidential 
information in the banking industry. Still, I believe that another crucial reason why these 
cases were so different had to do with the question of whether there was a strong 
company policy and set of procedures, as I will demonstrate below.  
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from Maxam Bulk Services.  
First, I will emphasize the importance of having a social media policy. Second, I will 
explain the use of the dignity/human rights approach to privacy. And third, I will discuss 
critical employment principles such as balancing mitigating and aggravating factors, 
progressive discipline, and the test for discipline involving off-duty conduct. 
Thus, I will first mention that this case highlighted the impact of having a company social 
media policy. More precisely, Lebrun argued that Maxam did not have a social media 
policy, and had there been one, he would have better understood the ramifications of his 
behaviour, known that it was not acceptable to complain about work online, and been 
aware that there were serious consequences.
1214
 The arbitrator clearly stated that, without 
having a rule or policy governing social media use, Maxam’s support for upholding the 
dismissal was weakened because Lebrun did not know exactly what was expected of him 
or the consequences of breaching those expectations.
1215
 Plainly put, it is critical for 
employers to have these policies and procedures setting out the company rules for 
Internet use, because decision makers refer to these policies and procedures when 
deciding whether to uphold a dismissal.
1216
 In fact, I believe that Steel was unsuccessful 
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with her claim because Coast had crystal clear policies and procedures that it took very 
seriously, which Steel breached; in contrast, Lebrun did not seem to understand what the 
rules were because there was no policy.
1217
 
In modern times, social media use and mobile devices have created an explosion of 
possibilities to monitor individuals.
1218
 In particular, every time we post personal 
information online, we inadvertently participate in our own surveillance because 
information can be easily captured by anyone.
1219
 We cannot escape ubiquitous 
surveillance, and it is important to be aware of the data trails that are left behind and the 
digital persona that we are creating as a consequence of our browsing and participating in 
online activity.
1220
 This is because the data proxies that are built over time paint a virtual 
portrait of a person, typically for the purposes of establishing positive social relations and 
identities, avoiding any data-derived harm, and enhancing autonomy.
1221
 We as a society 
have come to accept that we live in a surveillance society where the culture of 
surveillance involves our daily lives being recorded, monitored, and tracked through 
online interactivity and user-generated surveillance, to the point where it has been taken 
for granted.
1222
  
However, ubiquitous surveillance creates a potential for differential treatment and the 
exploitation of individuals through the abuse of surveillance power, especially when there 
are asymmetrical power relations involved between the watchers and the watched.
1223
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One consequence is the potential for differential treatment in cases such as stalking and 
violence against women.
1224
  
And when it comes to employment, where the watcher is the employer, the information 
we leave behind in the online world when we expose ourselves by leaving electronic 
traces can be collected, linked together, and amalgamated, can be used against us to 
punish us.
1225
 Furthermore, when we “share” all types of information online, we expose 
ourselves and become virtually transparent to anyone, and leave traces for all to see and 
use—including employers.
1226
  
This case discussed how Maxam was able to easily access Lebrun’s information from the 
outside world on Facebook, and use it to make disciplinary decisions in employment.
1227
 
This is why it is so important to establish clear company social media policies and 
procedures in order to set some standards as to what is and is not acceptable, and explain 
the consequences for noncompliance.
1228
 
In fact, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada stresses that there are privacy 
concerns when employees use social media, and employees should be aware that any of 
the information or communications posted on their social media can potentially be 
accessed by current or potential employers; recruitment agencies; co-workers; the 
employer’s competitors; government and law enforcement agencies; and others outside 
the employee’s trusted network.
1229
 And when it comes to monitoring social media use, 
employees should know that, subject to existing workplace policies and rules, some 
organizations monitor their employees’ social media, and thus, they should be aware that 
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when using social media in a workplace context, their personal information may be 
collected, used and disclosed by the employer (including off-duty comments and 
postings).
1230
 The employers and employees should be aware of the potential damages to 
individuals and the organization through inappropriate disclosures of personal or 
confidential business information on social media, some of which include: defamation 
lawsuits; copyright, patent or trademark infringement claims; privacy or human rights 
complaints; workplace grievances under a collective agreement or unfair labour practice 
complaints; criminal charges with respect to obscene or hate materials; and damages to 
the employer’s reputation and business interests.
1231
 Therefore, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada recommends developing and communicating a clear policy on 
social media; employers should inform employees in plain language why they should 
keep some personal and corporate information confidential or undisclosed.
1232
 Further, 
the policy should address: whether the organization permits the use of personal or 
employer-hosted social media in the workplace; where social media accounts  are 
permissible, the context and purposes that they be used; whether the employer monitors 
social media sites; what legislation applies to the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information in the workplace; what other rules (for example, contract or collective 
agreement) may apply to the use of social media in the workplace; the consequences of 
non-compliance with the policy; and any other existing policies about the proper use of 
electronic networks with respect to employee privacy and handling confidential 
information.
1233
 I would like to suggest that these recommendations for creating social 
media policies and also policies dealing with related topics such as privacy and security 
issues with personal digital devices in the workplace
1234
 be incorporated into the new 
workplace privacy regime. 
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I have just argued for the conclusion that it is important to have a social media policy. 
The second thing that I will do is examine the specific discussion about privacy and the 
arbitrator’s use of the dignity/human rights approach to privacy when making the 
decision.  
More specifically, Lebrun argued that, when he posted on Facebook, it was more like 
having a beer with a friend and complaining about work.
1235
 Moreover, he said that he 
had honestly not turned his attention to his Facebook privacy settings, and he was not 
quite sure whether his posts were public or private.
1236
 Maxam argued that, given the 
profanities Lebrun used, this behaviour of posting without checking privacy settings was 
reckless.
1237
 Despite the severity of the misconduct and Lebrun’s lackadaisical attitude 
toward checking Facebook privacy settings, the arbitrator briefly noted at the end of the 
analysis that Lebrun’s posts were not as serious as most rants on the Internet, since the 
comments did not display violence or disparagement of other races and genders, and the 
motivation for the rants was to blow off steam after he thought Maxam was being 
unfairly treated.
1238
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That is, Lebrun did not even know whether his posts were public or private—the 
arbitrator protected Lebrun on the privacy issue, by downplaying the nature of the rants, 
even though Lebrun did not responsibly check his privacy settings before engaging in the 
online ranting.
1239
 Instead, the arbitrator highlighted that there was a low risk of 
recurrence, and Lebrun’s motivation involved believing that Maxam was being blamed 
for the sheep deaths.
1240
 The arbitrator treated Lebrun with dignity by extending him the 
safety that he needed in order to express his frustrations with friends online; this, together 
with the lack of a company policy stipulating the expectations regarding online 
behaviour, enabled the arbitrator to give Lebrun the benefit of the doubt and the 
understanding that he required during the arbitration.
1241
 
I have just examined the arbitrator’s application of the dignity/human rights approach to 
privacy. The third thing that I will do is discuss some employment principles that applied 
in this case, such as a thorough balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, 
progressive discipline, and the test for discipline when there has been off-duty 
misconduct. 
To this end, there were some employment principles that played a critical role during this 
decision. More precisely, the arbitrator engaged in a thorough balancing of aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and methodically went through each factor before concluding that 
the balance tipped in favour of Lebrun.
1242
 The arbitrator pointed out that the employment 
relationship was still viable, and an essential factor in the decision was that he believed 
that Lebrun learned his lesson and would conduct himself as the good and reliable 
employee that he was before his misconduct.
1243
 The arbitrator noted that he was giving 
Lebrun the benefit of the doubt when attempting to understand the situation from his 
perspective.
1244
 In particular, the arbitrator acknowledged Lebrun’s attempts to apologize, 
show his remorse, explain that his motivations were not to compromise Maxam, and 
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promise that he would not repeat his behaviour.
1245
 The arbitrator used a humane 
approach and allowed Lebrun to explain his side of the story when discerning the relevant 
mitigating factors.
1246
 
In the same way, the employment principle of progressive discipline was vital in this 
case, because the arbitrator opined that Lebrun was a good candidate for the benefit of 
corrective discipline, something that had not yet been used with Lebrun.
1247
 The arbitrator 
emphasized the importance of continued employment in light of the circumstances.
1248
  
The doctrine of progressive discipline involves a system where an employer applies 
discipline for relatively minor infractions and misconduct on a progressive basis or in a 
series of steps; each step has a progressively more severe penalty until the final step, 
which is dismissal.
1249
 Employers typically use a progressive discipline policy that sets 
out various levels of discipline such as verbal warnings, written warnings, and 
suspensions, and ultimate discharge.
1250
 Progressive discipline is a pronounced feature of 
unionized employments, and a corrective approach is used in the interest of fairness.
1251
 
In particular, the approach provides employees with the chance to improve performance 
and behaviour.
1252
 Progressive discipline can also be used in nonunionized workplaces 
through the use of a progressive discipline policy.
1253
 Also, progressive discipline 
policies communicate the governing standards to employees, and ensure that instances of 
misconduct are addressed in a uniform manner.
1254
 Using such a policy sends a clear 
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message that the employer does not condone the misconduct.
1255
 By condonation, I do 
not mean approval of behaviour, but rather a situation where the employer is aware of the 
employee’s misconduct, but does nothing to address it.
1256
 Warnings given in line with 
the progressive discipline policy typically set out the performance or behavioural 
problem in detail, explain the standard that is expected of the employee, and list the 
actions that must be taken to improve.
1257
 In cases where performance is an issue, the 
employer explains how much time that the employee has to improve, along with how and 
when the performance is to be reassessed.
1258
 It is critical that employers clearly state 
(preferably in writing) what the consequences will be if the performance does not 
improve, and whether the warning constitutes a final warning.
1259
  
Lastly, another important employment principle is the test for discipline when there has 
been off-duty misconduct, namely the test in Millhaven Fibres, which makes it possible 
to connect off-duty misconduct with the workplace and justify a dismissal. In this case, 
the arbitrator did not specifically go through each of the criteria in the test and decide 
whether one or more of the criteria were met; instead, the arbitrator went straight into 
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and considered all of the 
circumstances when determining whether Maxam’s response was appropriate in light of 
those factors.
1260
 The arbitrator also compared the case to similar Internet rants when 
making the decision at the end of the balancing process.
1261
 In unionized workplaces, 
employers are typically unconcerned about how employees spend their time while they 
are off-duty, but they become very concerned once there is misconduct that could harm 
the employer’s reputation or other business interests.
1262
 Arbitrators determine whether 
the test in Millhaven Fibres, is met, where only one of the criteria needs to be met; yet as 
with each just cause case, the analysis involves considering all the circumstances and 
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balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
1263
 In unionized workplaces, 
employers must persuade an arbitrator that it had just cause to dismiss the employee.
1264
 
In this case for example, Maxam could not show just cause to dismiss Lebrun.  
In contrast, in nonunionized workplaces, employers must provide notice when 
dismissing, or they must be able to show that there was cause for summary dismissal.
1265
 
In off-duty misconduct situations involving social media, an employer must show that 
there is a nexus or connection between the employee’s behaviour and prejudice to the 
employer’s business interests, which can include economic interests, ability to have trust 
and confidence in the employee, or ensure there is not a poisoned work environment.
1266
 
Dismissals for just cause involve situations where the employee has engaged in conduct 
that constitutes a breach of the employee’s fundamental obligations to the employer, or is 
incompatible with the faithful carrying out of the employee’s duties to the employer, and 
where employers can terminate the employment relationship without providing notice.
1267
 
An on-duty nonunionized example would be Steel, where it was found that Coast had just 
cause to terminate Steel. 
In this part, I extracted principles and values from Maxam Bulk Services. I accomplished 
this goal by pointing out the importance of having a social media policy, using a 
dignity/human rights approach to privacy, and applying some important employment 
principles such as balancing mitigating and aggravating factors, progressive discipline, 
and using the test for discipline involving off-duty conduct. 
5.2.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime   
What the foregoing suggests is that it is essential for employers to have social media 
policies. Hence, I argue that there needs to be provisions requiring the creation of these 
policies that explain the public nature of social media, the realities of the online 
environment, and how ubiquitous surveillance can be used to aggregate their information 
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in ways that can harm employees, the employer, or the employer’s clients. This involves 
requiring employers to set out their expectations regarding social media use inside and 
outside the workplace, especially regarding choice of language when they are posting as a 
representative of the employer. This involves having a provision that requires employers 
to explain the consequences for noncompliance, taking into consideration crucial 
employment principles such as progressive discipline. 
5.3 Graphic Packaging 
The first American workplace privacy case that is discussed in this dissertation is 
Graphic Packaging. I first describe the facts and decision of the workplace privacy case; 
I then analyze the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy 
regime. 
5.3.1 The Facts and Decision 
The employee, who I will call “T”, had worked as a press operator with his employer, 
Graphic Packaging International, Inc (Graphic Packaging), for 34 years.
1268
 Following a 
work injury, he reported additional unresolved issues regarding his left shoulder and left 
lower back.
1269
 He was diagnosed with a lumbar strain and a left shoulder strain, and was 
referred to a chiropractor.
1270
 However, this led to further pain in his left leg, so he 
stopped the treatment, had an MRI, and was put on “seated work only” by his doctor.
1271
 
While he took time off in the form of vacation days and personal days, his doctor put him 
on different work restrictions, namely lifting only up to five pounds, pushing or pulling 
up to five pounds with the left side, and no work above the shoulder level with the left 
arm; Graphic Packaging had no such work at the time.
1272
  
T was involved in an unrelated family dispute, where T and his neighbours, his mother 
and sister, were involved in a property line boundary dispute that caused T to hammer in 
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some stakes into the ground and used connecting rope to denote the line.
1273
 Not only did 
T’s sister call the police, but she, as a former employee of Graphic Packaging, also called 
Graphic Packaging and stated that T had been hammering in stakes and violating his 
medical restrictions regarding his workers’ compensation.
1274
 The HR manager at 
Graphic Packaging then contacted a private investigator, who conducted video 
surveillance on T for a couple of days, took some photographs, and sent reports along 
with the police incident report containing photos of the stakes.
1275
 The video taken by the 
private investigator lasted a few minutes and showed T washing his car, and potentially 
using his arm in violation of his work restrictions; moreover, when stepping up into the 
car, he appeared to be pulling himself up using his left arm.
1276
 The HR manager emailed 
the surveillance information to the doctor and asked for his medical opinion on whether T 
was acting outside his work restrictions.
1277
 The doctor stated that when T hammered the 
stakes or pulled himself up in the car, he was performing activities that were outside his 
restrictions, and there were other activities where he could not make a determination.
1278
  
However, even before receiving the doctor’s email response, and before communicating 
with T on the issue, Graphic Packaging decided to terminate T.
1279
 The HR manager 
phoned the union steward and asked him to come to her office to discuss discipline for T, 
and when the union steward arrived, she called T at home.
1280
 When T did not answer the 
phone, the HR manager left a voice message telling him that he was dismissed, and to 
call her if he had any questions.
1281
 The termination letter dated the next day stated that T 
was fraudulent when he made the workers’ compensation claim.
1282
 About four weeks 
after this letter was sent, Graphic Packaging sent another letter, this time stating that the 
previous termination letter contained a scrivener’s error—the new letter stated that T was 
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dismissed for falsifying the restrictions that formed the basis of his unpaid leave of 
absence, and not for filing fraudulent workers’ compensation claim.
1283
 
T launched a grievance and asserted that he was unjustly dismissed, and requested 
reinstatement; a meeting was supposed to take place during the grievance process, but the 
HR manager told the union steward that the company did not want T to be on company 
grounds and he could not attend the meeting.
1284
 During the meeting, the union steward 
asked why T was dismissed, and the union was directed to the videotape, where Graphic 
Packaging suggested that the tape spoke for itself: “Well, you seen the tape, you 
know”.
1285
 The union asked why Graphic Packaging did not like T, and the response was, 
“Well, you know he’s not very well liked”, and the HR manager added that T gave false 
information to the doctors.
1286
  
At the grievance, Graphic Packaging argued that there was just cause for the dismissal 
because T was aware of the company Code of Conduct and Ethics, and the possibility of 
discharge for violations.
1287
 Graphic Packaging insisted that it properly notified the union 
of the disciplinary action pursuant to Article 25 of the collective bargaining agreement, 
and even had a union steward present during the phone call to T.
1288
 This was a clear case 
of falsifying medical restrictions.
1289
 On the other hand, the union argued that Graphic 
Packaging committed egregious violations of basic procedural fairness by not giving T an 
adequate opportunity to present his side of the story before being discharged, and by 
changing the reason for the discharge as seen in the two termination letters.
1290
 Also, 
there was no evidence to support the allegations of falsification of restrictions.
1291
 
The arbitrator, Wolff, decided that, while the collective bargaining agreement did have a 
discussion on discharge for just cause, T was denied due process twice because he could 
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not attend the meeting and be heard before being dismissed, and the reason for dismissal 
was changed in the second termination letter.
1292
 Also, Graphic Packaging could not 
prove that there was any falsifying of medical restrictions.
1293
 Essentially, Graphic 
Packaging accused T of committing fraud without even calling the doctor as a witness in 
the hearing.
1294
 The arbitrator also found that neither the videos nor the doctor’s 
responses proved that T exceeded the restrictions.
1295
 The arbitrator reinstated T and also 
awarded special remedies including reimbursement for medical bills and explaining to 
any creditor that T was without fault in any delay of payments because of the improper 
discharge.
1296
 And since T had difficulty refinancing his home because of this incident 
and experienced higher interest rates due to the loss of refinancing, the arbitrator 
remanded this issue to the parties to resolve on their own, or else they would have to 
return the issue to the arbitrator within 60 days.
1297
 
5.3.2 Analysis of Graphic Packaging 
This case involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: T was successful in 
being reinstated; the matter involved a labour arbitration; the surveillance scenario dealt 
with proactive surveillance operations; the electronic surveillance technology involved 
photographs and covert video surveillance using the private investigator’s video camera; 
and the conduct took place while the employee was off-duty.  
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from Graphic Packaging.  First, 
I will highlight the considerable abuse of surveillance power present in this case. Second, 
I will discuss employment principles that applied such as procedural fairness and also the 
absence of certain policies and procedures or clauses in the collective agreement to 
address electronic surveillance and privacy concerns. And third, I will examine the 
significance of further employment principles involving the impact of particular clauses 
in the collective bargaining agreement as well as policies and procedures.   
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Thus, the first thing to point out in this case was Graphic Packaging’s unquestionable 
abuse of surveillance power. Based on what was discovered after T’s sister called and 
notified Graphic Packaging that T hammered in some stakes into the ground, involving 
photographs and a few minutes of video footage by the private investigator showing T 
washing his car (where he was not exceeding any restrictions after all), the HR manager 
promptly emailed T’s doctor for an opinion about whether the activities fell outside T’s 
medical restrictions.
1298
 It was almost as if Graphic Packaging was looking for a reason to 
get rid of T, and the photographs and video footage could constitute a credible rationale. 
Even worse, it appeared as though Graphic Packaging automatically assumed that, since 
there existed photos and video footage, there was indeed proof of misconduct; 
correspondingly, since T’s sister called with the information, it was accepted as proof of 
wrongdoing without a great deal of probing on Graphic Packaging’s part as to the source 
of the information or the context of T’s hammering activities.
1299
 What transpired was a 
quick dismissal by phone and a meeting, which T was not allowed to attend, where 
Graphic Packaging admitted that T was not well liked and suggested that the surveillance 
information spoke for itself to justify the dismissal.
1300
 Graphic Packaging did not even 
scrutinize the surveillance information, wait for the opinion of the doctor, or discuss the 
issue with T before deciding to terminate T.
1301
  
The most troubling aspect occurred when, after interpreting the surveillance information, 
Graphic Packaging acted inappropriately by terminating T, an employee who had been 
working with the company for 34 years, by phone message during a meeting that he was 
not allowed to attend.
1302
 Graphic Packaging’s mishandling of the situation did not go 
unnoticed by the arbitrator; in fact, T was reinstated, and was entitled to receive special 
remedies because of the improper discharge.
1303
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Beyond a doubt, this case was an example of an employer using electronic surveillance in 
a manner that went too far, and the level of intrusiveness drove T directly into the 
Panopticon and forced him to be subject to Graphic Packaging’s gaze in two respects: 
first, T was exposed by the photos, in the police report due to the notification by his sister 
and also photos by the private investigator, and second, T was subjected to additional 
illumination with the video footage from the private investigator.
1304
 Though Graphic 
Packaging argued that it was common for employers to conduct surveillance in a 
workers’ compensation claim and to obtain doctors’ opinions about employees exceeding 
their restrictions,
1305
 in my view, Graphic Packaging’s actions went beyond what would 
be considered necessary or reasonable. 
Surely, it is understandable why employers would wish to overuse panoptic power and 
rapidly make decisions that affect employees’ ability to earn a living without delving 
deeply into the matter; managers face pressures, and the act of increasing visibility and 
transparency reduces the amount of effort that is required compared to the exertion that is 
necessary to maintain reciprocal employment relationships.
1306
 However, using the 
techniques of control and panoptic power limits what can be learned in the critical 
window of time prior to making a disciplinary decision, and does not contain the same 
quality as face-to-face interactions; in this case, it may have been helpful for Graphic 
Packaging to first talk to T before rashly jumping to the several conclusions that led to his 
hasty dismissal.
1307
 
This is why it is necessary to have protections in place for employees so they can be 
treated as ends in themselves rather than means to furthering some other goal; in order to 
protect the dignity and self-respect of employees, it is important to have policies and 
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procedures in place to prevent this mistreatment of an employee who was “not well 
liked”.
1308
 Clearly, some employees are more vulnerable than others because they are not 
the most popular employees in the workplace—since all employees are equally worthy by 
virtue of being human, these individuals need to be treated with dignity and respect in 
order to prevent the abuse of surveillance power and the targeting strategies aimed at 
justifying dismissals.
1309
 I would like to suggest that one way to achieve this goal is to 
have proper policies and procedures in place with respect to deciding when and how to 
commence conducting electronic surveillance, increase levels of intrusiveness, interpret 
surveillance evidence, cease surveillance activities, and make disciplinary decisions 
based on electronic surveillance evidence. 
I have therefore underscored the abuse of surveillance power that was present in this case 
and its ramifications. The second thing that I will do is consider the arbitrator’s reliance 
on important employment principles when deciding the case, such as procedural fairness, 
and also the absence of certain policies and procedures or clauses in the collective 
agreement to address electronic surveillance and privacy concerns.   
More precisely, the main principle that the arbitrator relied upon was procedural fairness, 
given that T was denied due process twice with respect to attending the meeting and the 
two different reasons for the dismissal.
1310
 With respect to procedure, in the labour 
arbitration process, there is a grievance procedure that must be followed.
1311
 The first step 
in the process involves filing a grievance, which triggers the legal process that is outlined 
in the collective bargaining agreement’s grievance procedure.
1312
 With individual 
grievances, employees file the grievance and make an allegation that a collective 
bargaining right has been violated by the employer.
1313
 The employee would 
subsequently provide information relating to the alleged breach of the collective 
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bargaining agreement and indicate what remedy is being sought.
1314
 The employer would 
be required to respond within a certain period of time as set out in the grievance 
procedure.
1315
  Where the employer accepts the grievance, there is a grievance settlement; 
where the employer denies the grievance, the grievance proceeds to the next stage in the 
grievance procedure.
1316
 At this point, there are a series of meetings that take place in 
order to attempt to arrive at a settlement between the parties.
1317
 In cases where a 
settlement is reached, the grievance is withdrawn and a settlement agreement is 
created.
1318
 Otherwise, the matter proceeds to arbitration.
1319
 The union decides whether 
the settle, withdraw, or refer the matter to arbitration.
1320
 After the arbitration, the labour 
arbitrator writes a decision that explains the reasoning and sets out the remedy.
1321
 The 
decision is final and binding on the parties who are affected; although it is not binding in 
the sense that it creates precedent as with courts, it becomes part of the labour arbitration 
decisions that are referenced by parties during labour disputes.
1322
  
Another thing that the arbitrator could have examined more thoroughly was whether 
Graphic Packaging violated T’s privacy in light of the surveillance that was conducted on 
T, but there appeared to be no workplace policies and procedures or clauses in the 
collective agreement specifically dealing with surveillance or privacy for the arbitrator to 
examine. Also, the arbitrator did not hesitate to admit the photographs and video footage 
into the hearing as evidence, and simply proceeded to focus on the violations of 
procedural fairness.
1323
 Indeed, the arbitrator used the standard of relevance to admit and 
examine the surveillance evidence; this involves admitting the evidence if it is relevant 
and probative, similar to the approach taken by courts.
1324
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Given the lack of privacy protections in place in the workplace documents, T’s only 
option was to insist that there had been procedural infractions, and rely on the 
surveillance evidence to show that there were no violations of his medical restrictions.
1325
  
I have just examined some of employment principles such as procedural fairness and 
noted the absence of protections in the workplace documents. The third thing that I will 
do is point to some further employment principles, such as the impact of particular 
clauses in the collective bargaining agreement along with company policies and 
procedures.  
More precisely, regarding management rights involving disciplinary decisions, the 
collective bargaining agreement required Graphic Packaging to notify the union in 
writing immediately if possible, but no later than within two days, of the employee’s 
offence, and also the action that was taken by Graphic Packaging in response.
1326
 
Furthermore, Graphic Packaging had a Code of Conduct and Ethics, and T was aware 
that he could be dismissed for violating it.
1327
 In fact, the arbitrator looked to the 
collective bargaining agreement and concluded that there was a discussion about 
discharges for just cause.
1328
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It is important to appreciate that the collective bargaining agreement is an important 
document in unionized workplaces because the jurisdiction of labour arbitrators comes 
from the collective agreement.
1329
 Not only does the collective agreement contain the 
grievance procedures as noted above, but it enables the creation of rules and policies that 
affect privacy and other relevant workplace issues that pertain to the workplace; there is 
no single set of rules or policies, and they differ depending on the circumstances of each 
bargaining situation between the particular parties.
1330
  
The creation of rules and policies is considered to be an inherent right of management, 
unless this right is taken away by the terms of the collective agreement.
1331
 Workplace 
rules and policies are created in one of two ways; the first way is through an agreement 
between the parties, and the second way is through the unilateral imposition of rules and 
policies by the employer.
1332
 Firstly, when the parties agree, the rule or policy is typically 
attached to the collective agreement by way of an appendix, for example, and then it 
becomes clear that the rule or policy must be followed.
1333
 In this situation, arbitrators do 
not interfere with penalties imposed by employers in accordance with those rules that are 
jointly agreed to by the parties.
1334
 Secondly, when the employer unilaterally imposes a 
rule or policy, there is a concern that the rule or policy may not be reasonable, and also 
that employees may not be aware of the rule or policy; this could be problematic in cases 
where employees are dismissed for failing to follow unreasonable rules, or rules they 
were not aware of.
1335
 To that end, rules or policies that are unilaterally imposed by the 
employer must: (1) not be inconsistent with the collective agreement; (2) not be 
unreasonable; (3) be clear and unequivocal; (4) be brought to the attention of the 
employee affected before the employer can act on them; (5) be known in that the 
employee was notified that a breach of such rule could result in discharge; and (6) have 
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been consistently enforced by the employer from the time that it was introduced.
1336
 
Where there is a dismissal because of a breach, and the breach forms the basis for the 
discharge, the employer would still have to show that there was just cause for the 
dismissal, since the very issue before the arbitrator may involve determining the 
reasonableness of the rule or policy.
1337
 When assessing the reasonableness of a rule or 
policy that is unilaterally imposed, arbitrators use the “KVP Test”
1338
 that has the six 
factors mentioned above; the heart of the test involves asking whether the rule or policy 
was consistent with the collective agreement and reasonable; arbitrators perform a 
balancing of the interests of the employer and the employee.
1339
 
Where the collective agreement expressly refers to an issue so as to bring the subject 
matter within the scope of the collective agreement, the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to 
decide whether the employer has complied with the terms, keeping in mind the limits of 
the arbitrator, who is charged with settling disputes arising out of the interpretation, 
application, administration, or alleged violation of the collective agreement.
1340
 
Regarding issues such as privacy, arbitrators look to the collective agreement, and where 
it is silent, they balance the interests of the parties.
1341
  
In this case, I would like to suggest that but for the procedural infractions regarding T’s 
disciplinary proceedings, T would not have been adequately protected against the abuse 
of electronic surveillance power, because there were simply no protections in place on 
examination of the company rules, policies, procedures, or the collective agreement.
1342
 
Indeed, many employers lack specific policy provisions, and there is also a corresponding 
lack of awareness of monitoring policies and practices among employees; this situation 
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crates a problematic hole that needs filling with the creation of basic protections.
1343
 This 
is why it is necessary to establish a floor of fair protections and boundaries for all parties 
in all employment relationships, so there can be more even and sufficient protection of 
employees’ dignity, while also balancing employers’ legitimate business interests.
1344
 
In this part, I extracted principles and values from Graphic Packaging.  I achieved this by 
stressing the considerable abuse of surveillance power present in this case, and examining 
several employment principles such as procedural fairness, the absence of certain policies 
and procedures or clauses in the collective agreement to address electronic surveillance 
and privacy concerns, and the impact of particular clauses in the collective bargaining 
agreement as well as policies and procedures.   
5.3.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
The previous analysis highlights the serious problem of the abuse of surveillance power. 
Employers are in a the more dominant position and have the potential to hastily order 
electronic surveillance of an employee, interpret surveillance information, and make swift 
disciplinary decisions that can harm employees. It is therefore necessary to have 
provisions in place that prevent the abuse of electronic surveillance power, including 
provisions requiring employers to respect the human dignity of employees by giving 
them the benefit of doubt and attempting to understand their version of the story before 
hastily commencing electronic surveillance, interpreting electronic surveillance reports, 
or acting upon any electronic surveillance information. It is also important to ensure that 
employers respect applicable policies and procedures, and contracts or collective 
agreements, when acting in good faith with employees. Another example could be adding 
a provision requiring employers to explain what is meant by suspicion in their policies 
and procedures for the purposes of deciding whether it is appropriate to conduct 
electronic surveillance of employees in the first place. There also needs to be clear 
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boundaries within which employers can operate when deciding to conduct electronic 
surveillance of employees while they are off-duty. 
5.4 Baker Hughes 
The second American workplace privacy case that is discussed in this dissertation is 
Baker Hughes. I first describe the facts and decision of the workplace privacy case; I then 
analyze the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy regime. 
5.4.1 The Facts and Decision 
The employee, who I will call “G”, worked as a machinery mechanic with his employer, 
Baker Hughes Inc (Baker Hughes), an industrial service company, for 29 years.
1345
 The 
plant manager, who I will call “H”, conducted a plant communications meeting with 
employees to discuss critical safety violations and to emphasize that violations could 
result in discharge.
1346
 G was at the meeting, and when H was reading the rules line by 
line, G became angry and frustrated by the information that was being presented.
1347
 The 
next day, H approached the HR Representative and mentioned that he discovered that G 
posted a blog on his MySpace account which contained discriminatory comments that 
were directed at H.
1348
 More specifically, G made racist comments criticizing someone in 
upper management at the plant, and H was shocked and concerned about the contents; it 
was clear that the message was directed at H since he was the only person in upper 
management belonging to the targeted group.
1349
 In a meeting with the HR 
Representative, G admitted that it was his blog on the website, and it was aimed at H; 
ultimately, G was dismissed.
1350
 In response, G launched a grievance.
1351
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At the grievance, Baker Hughes argued that there was just cause for the dismissal 
because G violated the company policies, of which he was aware.
1352
 The company rules 
were reasonable, and the discipline was reasonable in the circumstances since G’s off-
duty conduct created a hostile work environment sufficient to establish a claim of 
harassment.
1353
 Baker Hughes asserted that G’s misconduct had a nexus to the workplace, 
and G continued to disparage the plant management even after his discharge.
1354
 On the 
other hand, the union argued that there was no just cause for the dismissal, since there 
was no company work rule prohibiting inappropriate use of one’s personal computer at 
home, the comments were made while G was off-duty, and the remarks were not sent to 
or retrieved from a company computer.
1355
 That is, since the Anti-Harassment Policy only 
applied on company premises, it did not apply in this case.
1356
 G also claimed that he 
believed that his blog was a private account open only to friends.
1357
 
The arbitrator, Baroni, reviewed the provisions of the collective agreement and noted that 
there were clauses prohibiting discrimination against an individual because of race, 
colour, national origin, sex, or age.
1358
 Additionally, the non-discrimination clause had a 
specific reference to the Civil Rights Act.
1359
 Moreover, the arbitrator noted the company 
Anti-Harassment Policy that prohibited discrimination and harassment of any type in the 
working environment, encouraged mutual respect, and promoted respectful and congenial 
relationships between employees.
1360
 It applied to everyone in the workplace, including 
supervisors, coworkers, or non-employees who engaged in verbally or physically 
harassing behaviour that had the potential to be humiliating or embarrassing.
1361
 Also, the 
Plant Rules prohibited insubordination and any form of harassment.
1362
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The arbitrator concluded that there was a nexus between the misconduct and the 
workplace, and G’s actions were captured by the company Anti-Harassment Policy even 
though he was engaging in off-duty conduct away from the company premises; he 
created a hostile work environment sufficient to establish a claim of harassment on the 
ground of national origin.
1363
 The arbitrator also emphasized that protecting employees 
from harassment by coworkers was a legitimate business interest.
1364
 The arbitrator 
recognized that insubordinate off-duty language directed at a supervisor could have long-
lasting and harmful effects in the workplace; in this case, it could hurt H and also 
permanently disrupt the safe and efficient operations of the plant.
1365
  
The arbitrator noted that employees were more frequently being “dooced”, or dismissed 
from work because of employees’ derogatory online postings about their employers.
1366
 
The arbitrator stated that the point of upholding such terminations was to establish a 
precedent of common sense and fairness in the workplace, and to make it clear that 
inappropriate commentary about coworkers on blogs was not immune from an 
appropriate response from employers.
1367
 The arbitrator stated, “Character assassination 
is the same whether spoken to a crowd or posted on an Internet blog”.
1368
 The arbitrator 
also found that G opened his blog to the public when he ran for City Council.
1369
 During 
the investigation, G was bragging about the size of his readership and claiming that 
everyone in town must have been reading his posts; he continued to leave the offensive 
language and racist slurs on his blog during the investigation and also after his dismissal, 
and it was not until right before the hearing that he changed the settings to private.
1370
 
The arbitrator concluded that the blog was public and not private as G claimed, and G 
caused harm to H’s reputation and disrupted industrial harmony in the plant.
1371
 Also, the 
arbitrator noted that G showed no remorse, did not apologize, and already had five forms 
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of discipline on his record with a final warning.
1372
 The arbitrator concluded that there 
was just cause for G’s dismissal, and there could be no reinstatement in this case since 
that would send the wrong message in the workplace.
1373
 
5.4.2 Analysis of Baker Hughes  
This case involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: G’s dismissal was 
upheld; the matter involved a labour arbitration; the surveillance scenario involved the 
discovery of employee misuse of technology; the electronic surveillance technology 
involved social media, namely blogs on MySpace; and the misconduct took place while 
G was off-duty.  
One may question how this case was different than Maxam Bulk Services. In Baker 
Hughes, G made racist comments online, showed no remorse, offered no apology, had a 
prior disciplinary record, and violated clear company rules of which he was aware given 
his position in the company as a senior employee in a leadership role. Conversely, in 
Maxam Bulk Services, Lebrun was quite the opposite since, while he made inappropriate 
comments online that were filled with profanities, he was remorseful, he apologized, he 
was a good employee with no disciplinary record, he was mid-range in seniority, he was 
found to be just venting his frustrations, and there were no company policies prohibiting 
his misbehaviour. Both cases were decided by labour arbitrators, but the balance of 
interests tipped in opposite directions. 
While both cases dealt with online misconduct by employees while they were off-duty, I 
believe that the outcomes were opposite for a few reasons. Firstly, one main difference 
involved the presence of a clear company policy. In Maxam Bulk Services, it remained 
unclear what the rules were regarding employees’ social media use, and what the 
disciplinary consequences would be in cases of noncompliance. Yet in Baker Hughes, 
there were clear workplace policies and plant rules, and also clauses in the collective 
agreement, which prohibited insubordination and harassment of coworkers including 
                                                 
1372
 Ibid.  
1373
 Ibid. 
244 
 
supervisors. The employer ensured that the employees were aware of the rules. The goal 
was not so much on protecting the employer’s reputation or confidential information, but 
rather on protecting the employees in the workplace from harm and promote harmonious 
relations in the plant. Secondly, in Maxam Bulk Services, Lebrun nonchalantly used 
profanities on Facebook walls without checking privacy settings just to blow off some 
steam, and inadvertently harmed the reputation of his own employer, Maxam, along with 
that of Maxam’s main client. The arbitrator took this lack of intention to injure Maxam or 
Teck into account when making the decision. In contrast, in Baker Hughes, the 
misconduct was more calculated, since G deliberately used a public blog to target a 
specific manager, and did so with malevolent intentions. The result was a disruption in 
the workplace because of G’s destructive attack of H. Thirdly, in Maxam Bulk Services, 
Lebrun was remorseful and made efforts to apologize to Maxam and Teck; accordingly, 
the arbitrator could see the perceived potential for reinstatement and the continuation of 
harmonious employment relations. But in Baker Hughes, G kept his blog public until 
right before the hearing and never apologized to anyone. The situation was only made 
worse when considering G’s disciplinary record. In this case, the arbitrator could see that 
reinstatement would send the wrong message in the workplace. 
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from Baker Hughes.  First, I 
will address the question of the private versus public nature of the blog. Second, I will 
review the employment principles that applied such as policies and procedures, and also 
clauses in the collective agreement. And third, I will point to the legitimate business 
interests of employers to prevent employees from harassing coworkers in the workplace. 
Therefore, the first thing to pay attention to in this case was the question about whether 
G’s blog was private. More precisely, G argued that he believed that his MySpace 
account was a private account that was only open to friends.
1374
 However, the arbitrator 
found this argument difficult to believe, especially since G opened his blog to the public 
when he ran for City Council, bragged about the size of his readership, and kept the 
offensive and racist comments on his blog after his dismissal up to and until right before 
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the hearing.
1375
 Therefore, contrary to what G claimed, the arbitrator confirmed that G’s 
MySpace account was clearly a public account.
1376
  
In this situation, G appeared to be using more of an economic theoretical approach to 
privacy, where he viewed and treated privacy as something that could create 
opportunities for gain.
1377
 In particular, G seemed to be under the impression that the 
process of voluntary exchange of personal information ensured that the information was 
put to its most valuable use, considering factors such as the nature and provenance of the 
information, and transaction costs.
1378
 Indeed, G came across as an individual who 
wanted to manipulate the world around him by selective disclosure of facts about himself, 
and then turn around and claim that his privacy should be protected just at the moment 
when he needed to fight to keep his job.
1379
 This had the unintended consequence of G 
not being taken seriously when he tried to make a convincing argument about his account 
being private.
1380
 In fact, G was not viewed as credible and was not given the benefit of 
the doubt after exploiting his own information to further his political career, ego, and 
racist agenda, where he took advantage of the situation in the name of total utility.
1381
 
This may be why G showed no remorse and did not apologize.
1382
 Instead, G made 
targeted public comments aimed directly at H.
1383
 For the sake of furthering fairness in 
the workplace, the arbitrator found that it was appropriate for G to be dooced as a result 
of his making derogatory online postings about H, in order to send the message that this 
misconduct was unacceptable.
1384
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To be sure, this case was not one where an employee was exploited in a way that created 
a vector of vulnerability and a potential for the abuse of electronic surveillance power.
1385
 
This was certainly not a situation where G was controlled or manipulated for the purposes 
of shaping his behaviour using his exploited behavioural surplus.
1386
 On the contrary, G 
was focussing only maximizing his own value and the value of his information for 
personal gain.
1387
 In so doing, he injured H by threatening H’s well-being, and 
compromised Baker Hughes by disrupting safe and efficient plant operations.
1388
 
I have just addressed the question about whether the blog was public or private. The 
second thing that I will do is touch on the employment principles that applied in the 
decision, such as the examination of key workplace documents. 
For example, the arbitrator spent a considerable amount of time examining the relevant 
provisions in the collective agreement, company Anti-Harassment Policy, and the Plant 
Rules.
1389
 The arbitrator noted that there was a specific reference to the Civil Rights Act 
and discussed how it was becoming more common for employers to incorporate these 
types of principles directly into their policies and work rules.
1390
 The arbitrator also 
confirmed that Baker Hughes had the right to create reasonable work rules so long as 
they were to be posted, distributed, and made known to all employees.
1391
 
This close investigation of the key workplace documents enabled the arbitrator to make a 
decision as to whether the misconduct fell under the scope of these provisions, and 
whether there was a nexus between the off-duty online comments and the workplace.
1392
 
This was important since G argued that there was no company work rule prohibiting 
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inappropriate use of one’s personal computer at home, and since the comments were 
made while G was off-duty and the remarks were not sent to or retrieved from a company 
computer, the workplace policies and rules did not apply.
1393
 In this case, the arbitrator 
decided that G violated the rules and created a hostile work environment sufficient to 
establish a claim of harassment on the ground of national origin.
1394
 The arbitrator also 
confirmed that G’s insubordinate off-duty language defied the rules, of which he was 
aware.
1395
 
While the workplace documents were effective in capturing the type of misconduct that 
took place in this case because the misconduct was easily connected to workplace rules 
setting standards for the working environment, I would like to suggest that a more 
compelling way to tackle the issue of preventing online harassment of coworkers would 
be to create explicit policies and procedures that expressly prohibit online harassment and 
discrimination of coworkers contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act.
1396
 In this way, 
the message would more efficiently be sent to employees that the misconduct that is 
carried out in an online environment is just as unacceptable as when it is executed offline, 
and the disciplinary consequences of online harassment carry the same weight. 
I have therefore shown the impact of examining core workplace documents during a 
decision. The third thing that I will do is note the arbitrator’s emphasis of a key aspect of 
employers’ obligations—the arbitrator confirmed that protecting employees from 
harassment by coworkers constituted a legitimate business interest.
1397
  
The arbitrator concluded that this responsibility stemmed from the fact that it was 
harmful for employees to be subjected to demeaning and degrading behaviour, the effects 
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could be long-lasting and affect a person’s well-being, and the misconduct could wreak 
havoc on the plant’s operations.
1398
 
By extension then, one can deduce that protecting employees from online harassment by 
coworkers similarly constitutes a legitimate business interest for employers. 
In this case, the focus was not on applying the dignity/human rights approach to privacy 
to protect the employee, G, who made racist comments on his MySpace account; rather, 
the priority was placed more so on protecting the dignity and self-respect of H, the 
manager who was harassed on the ground of national origin, by dismissing G.
1399
 Put 
another way, the focus in this case was on protecting H’s inherent value and worth.
1400
 
When societal values were balanced, the scale was tipped in favour of protecting Baker 
Hughes’ legitimate business interests of protecting its employees from being harassed by 
coworkers. To that end, I would like to suggest that it is crucial for employers to be as 
clear as possible that there are certain expectations that employees need to respect when 
posting online. 
In this part, I extracted principles and values from Baker Hughes. I executed this by 
addressing the question of the private versus public nature of the blog, discussing 
employment principles such as examining clauses in the collective agreement and 
policies and procedures, and arguing the benefits of recognizing the legitimate business 
interests of employers to prevent employees from harassing coworkers online. 
5.4.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
What the prior analysis suggests is that employers have a legitimate business interest in 
protecting their employees from being harassed and discriminated against by coworkers. 
By extension, I argue that it is essential for employers to have social media policies that 
expressly prohibit the online discrimination or harassment of coworkers. Since the 
creation of comprehensive policies and procedures is critical, this can be accomplished 
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by adding provisions that require employers to set out their expectations regarding 
acceptable online use, refer to existing workplace anti-discrimination and anti-harassment 
policies and procedures, and emphasize that it is not acceptable to harass or discriminate 
against coworkers online. There needs to be provisions requiring explanations in policies 
about the nature of the online environment and the public nature of blogs. To that end, I 
propose that there should be a provision stressing the importance that, while employees 
may have and use social media accounts while they are off-duty, they can never 
disparage coworkers and then use as an excuse that they were away from work or using 
their own digital devices.  
5.5 Bărbulescu 
The first European Union workplace privacy case that it is discussed in this dissertation is 
Bărbulescu. I first describe the facts, history, and decision of the workplace privacy case; 
I then analyze the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy 
regime. 
5.5.1 The Facts, History, and Decision 
The Romanian employee, Bogdan Mihai Bărbulescu (Bărbulescu), worked with his 
employer, a private company that I will call “E”, for about three years as an engineer in 
charge of sales.
1401
 E asked Bărbulescu to create a Yahoo! Messenger account for 
responding to client inquiries, and he complied with the request.
1402
 E had Internal 
Regulations stating that it was strictly forbidden for employees to use computers, 
photocopiers, telephones, telex and fax machines for personal purposes.
1403
 Bărbulescu 
was aware of this rule; E later circulated a notice to employees citing this rule and 
stressing that E had a duty to supervise and monitor employees’ work, and take punitive 
measures against anyone at fault.
1404
 The notice stated, “Your misconduct will be 
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carefully monitored and punished!”
1405
 The notice referred to a coworker who 
disregarded these rules and was terminated.
1406
 Bărbulescu was also aware of this notice 
and signed it, but it is not clear exactly when he did so.
1407
 
After complying with E’s request to create the account, Bărbulescu was later told that his 
communications had been monitored for eight days, and the records showed that he used 
the Internet for personal purposes contrary to the Internal Regulations.
1408
 He responded 
by insisting that he had only used the account for professional purposes; yet, once he was 
shown the 45-page transcript of his communications, he asserted that E was violating 
criminal laws by intercepting his communications.
1409
 The 45-page transcript contained 
messages that Bărbulescu exchanged with his fiancé and his brother, and some of the 
messages were personal in nature.
1410
 E terminated Bărbulescu’s employment for breach 
of the company’s Internal Regulations.
1411
 
When Bărbulescu challenged E’s decision in the Bucharest County Court (County Court), 
and complained that E violated his rights protected by constitutional and criminal laws, 
he was unsuccessful.
1412
 He appealed this decision to the Bucharest Court of Appeal 
(Court of Appeal), and argued that his communications were protected by Article 8 of the 
EU Convention;
1413
 relying on the predecessor of the GDPR,
1414
 the Data Protection 
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Directive
1415
 in force at the time, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed 
that E’s conduct was reasonable since monitoring the communications was the only way 
to establish that there had been a disciplinary breach.
1416
 In response, Bărbulescu filed an 
application with the European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section (Fourth 
Section),
1417
 and argued that Romania violated Article 8 of the EU Convention
1418
 
because the domestic courts failed to protect his rights to private life and 
correspondence.
1419
 He argued that his communications were private and fell within the 
scope of Article 8 of the EU Convention;
1420
 also, he adamantly denied having been given 
proper notice of the monitoring, insisting that neither the Internal Regulations nor the 
notice to employees constituted proper prior notice of monitoring.
1421
 The Fourth Section 
noted that it had to examine whether Romania, in the context of its positive obligations 
under Article 8 of the EU Convention,
1422
 struck a fair balance between Bărbulescu’s 
right to respect for his private life and correspondence, and E’s legitimate business 
interests.
1423
 The Fourth Section concluded that there was no violation of Article 8 of the 
EU Convention,
1424
 since E acted within its disciplinary powers and accessed the Yahoo! 
Messenger account on the assumption that the information in question had been related to 
professional activities.
1425
 Therefore, the Fourth Section concluded that it was reasonable 
for an employer to want to verify that the employees were completing their professional 
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tasks during work hours; since E only examined the communications on the Yahoo! 
Messenger account, and not the content or any other data stored on the computer, the 
monitoring was limited in scope and proportionate.
1426
 Also, Bărbulescu could not 
explain why he used the Yahoo! Messenger account for personal reasons.
1427
 Therefore, 
the domestic courts did not fail to strike a fair balance.
1428
 
Bărbulescu appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber (Grand 
Chamber).
1429
 The Grand Chamber confirmed that the Internet instant messaging service 
was captured by Article 8 of the EU Convention,
1430
 which guaranteed a right to private 
life and correspondence.
1431
 Most importantly, the Grand Chamber emphasized that, 
although Bărbulescu had been informed of the ban on personal Internet use in the Internal 
Regulations, it was not so clear that he had been informed beforehand that monitoring of 
his communications was going to take place; he was certainly not informed about the 
nature and extent of the monitoring activity, or the possibility that E would be able to 
access the contents.
1432
 The Grand Chamber stated: 
[A]n employer’s instructions cannot reduce private social life in the 
workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of 
correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far 
as necessary.
1433
 
The Grand Chamber also noted that the employment relationship had special features to 
consider, and from a regulatory perspective, the law left room for negotiation between the 
parties regarding their employment contract; yet, the Grand Camber stated that the 
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discretion enjoyed by Member States could not be unlimited; there needed to be adequate 
and sufficient safeguards against abuse.
1434
 
To that end, the Grand Chamber stated that domestic authorities had to regard the 
following factors as relevant: (1) whether the employee was notified of the possibility 
that the employer might take measures to monitor correspondence and other 
communications, and of the implementation of such measures; (2) the extent of the 
monitoring by the employer and the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy; (3) 
whether the employer provided legitimate reasons to justify monitoring the 
communications and accessing their actual content; (4) whether it would have been 
possible to establish a monitoring system based on less intrusive methods and measures 
than directly accessing the content of the employees communications; (5) the 
consequences of the monitoring for the employee subjected to it; and (6) whether the 
employee was provided with adequate safeguards, especially when the employer’s 
monitoring operations were of an intrusive nature.
1435
 Also, the Grand Chamber 
highlighted that it was critical that the employee whose communications had been 
monitored had access to a remedy before a judicial body with jurisdiction.
1436
 
When applying these principles, the Grand Chamber concluded that, by virtue of the 
positive obligations under Article 8 of the EU Convention,
1437
 the national authorities 
were required to carry out a balancing exercise between competing interests, namely 
Bărbulescu’s right to respect for private life and correspondence with E’s business 
interests.
1438
 In this case, the domestic courts failed to determine: whether Bărbulescu had 
received prior notice of the possibility that his communications on Yahoo! Messenger 
might be monitored; whether he had been informed of the nature or the extent of the 
monitoring, or to the degree of intrusion into his private life and correspondence; the 
specific reasons justifying the introduction of the monitoring measures; whether E could 
have used measures entailing less intrusion into Bărbulescu’s private life and 
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correspondence; and whether the communications might have been accessed without his 
knowledge.
1439
  
Consequently, notwithstanding Romania’s margin of appreciation, the Grand Chamber 
(by 11 votes to six) concluded that there was a violation of Article 8 of the EU 
Convention
1440
 since the domestic courts did not afford adequate protection of 
Bărbulescu’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence, and they 
consequently failed to strike a fair balance between the interests at stake.
1441
 Bărbulescu 
was awarded a monetary amount for costs and expenses.
1442
 
5.5.2 Analysis of Bărbulescu 
This case involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: Bărbulescu was 
successful in his claim; the matter took place in a court;
1443
 the surveillance scenario 
involved the discovery of employee misuse of technology; the electronic surveillance 
technology involved the monitoring of electronic communications, namely Yahoo! 
Messenger activity; and the misconduct took place while Bărbulescu was on-duty. 
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from Bărbulescu. First, I will 
set out the challenges associated with balancing the competing interests and also the 
principles that emerge from this workplace privacy case. Second, I will stress the 
importance of being informed about the monitoring and related details. And third, I will 
consider the unique aspects of the employment relationship and the need for some 
flexibility, while still ensuring that there are adequate safeguards are in place.  
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To this end, the first thing to note about this case was that the Grand Chamber confirmed 
that it was necessary to conduct a careful balance of the competing interests; in this case, 
the domestic courts did not afford adequate protection of Bărbulescu’s right to respect for 
his private life and correspondence, since they failed to strike a fair balance between the 
interests at stake.
1444
 More precisely, the Grand Chamber concluded that the domestic 
courts failed to determine: whether Bărbulescu had received prior notice of the possibility 
that his communications on Yahoo! Messenger might be monitored; whether he had been 
informed of the nature or the extent of the monitoring, or to the degree of intrusion into 
his private life and correspondence; the specific reasons justifying the introduction of the 
monitoring measures; whether E could have used measures with less of an intrusion into 
Bărbulescu’s private life and correspondence; and whether the communications might 
have been accessed without his knowledge.
1445
  
The case highlighted the difficulties in balancing the interests of parties in employment 
relationships, where a prime feature is the unequal bargaining power.
1446
 Bărbulescu was 
repetitively unsuccessful since his termination in August 2007, and it was not until the 
decision of the Grand Chamber that he was successful with his claim in September 2017 
(10 years later).
1447
 However, the decision of the Grand Chamber was not unanimous, 
given that there was a split of 11 to six.
1448
 In light of the significant dissent in the Grand 
Chamber, the case showed the challenges that arise when attempting to simultaneously 
protect both the right to respect for private life and correspondence of employees and the 
legitimate business interests of employers.
1449
  
On one hand, there were several arguments justifying why E would want to conduct 
electronic surveillance of employees’ communications to meet its legitimate business 
interests, and why the domestic courts would put considerable weight on these interests 
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during the balancing. For instance, the County Court noted several reasons why E would 
want to monitor Bărbulescu and his coworkers, including preventing damage of company 
IT systems, preventing the commission of illicit activities in the company’s name, and 
preventing employees from revealing company secrets.
1450
 The Court of Appeal opined 
that it was necessary and reasonable to monitor communications because it was the only 
way to establish that there was a disciplinary breach.
1451
 In fact, the Court of Appeal went 
so far as to say that employers had the right and the obligation to ensure the functioning 
of their companies, and this included checking the manner in which employees 
completed their professional tasks.
1452
 Moreover, the Fourth Section was of the view that 
it was understandable that E accessed the Yahoo! Messenger account because there was 
an assumption that the information in question had been related to professional activities 
(since this was what Bărbulescu told E, and of course, that was the rule).
1453
 The Fourth 
Section stated that it was not unreasonable for an employer to want to verify that 
employees were completing their professional tasks during work hours.
1454
 Further, the 
dissenting judges at the Grand Chamber asserted that, while the domestic courts may 
have attached a greater weight to the employer’s right to ensure the smooth running of 
the company, those courts enjoyed discretion when striking the balance between the 
parties’ interests.
1455
 In this case, the dissenting judges were of the view that employers 
were entitled to check that their employees were carrying out their professional duties 
when making use of company equipment in the workplace and during working hours.
1456
 
They also pointed out that the monitoring in this case was limited in time and scope, and 
the domestic courts took into account Bărbulescu’s denial that he ever used company 
resources for personal purposes.
1457
 The dissenting judges emphasized that Bărbulescu 
never denied that he was informed about the monitoring, and he just could not remember 
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when he was informed.
1458
 Another relevant point was that the dissenting judges did not 
look favourably on the broken bond of trust in the employment relationship because of 
Bărbulescu’s attitude and denial of ever using the work account for personal reasons.
1459
 
They appeared to pick up on E’s feelings of betrayal, which had the potential of 
destroying the employment relationship.
1460
  
On the other hand, there were some noteworthy reasons why Bărbulescu would want to 
argue that he was entitled to protection of the right to respect for his private life and 
correspondence and why the domestic courts would give substantial weight on these 
interests during the balancing. This can be seen when examining Bărbulescu’s arguments. 
First, Bărbulescu argued that his communications were private since they were with his 
fiancée and brother, and also involved sensitive health issues.
1461
 Second, E accessed 
both his professional and his personal Yahoo! Messenger accounts, even though they had 
a different ID numbers, and this went beyond what was necessary.
1462
 Third, E generated 
a 45-page transcript, and somehow allowed all of his coworkers to see this transcript such 
that his sensitive health information was circulated and discussed among his 
coworkers.
1463
 Fourth, if he had known that his communications were not private, he 
never would have disclosed his intimate information or created a password.
1464
 Fifth, he 
truly did not know about the extent of the monitoring, and neither the Internal 
Regulations nor the notice to employees constituted proper notice of the monitoring.
1465
  
And the Grand Chamber agreed with Bărbulescu that there was a violation of Article 8 of 
the EU Convention,
1466
 since there was a failure to strike the proper balance between the 
competing interests of the parties.
1467
 There was some question about whether there really 
was a valid notice to employees warning of the nature, extent, and consequences of the 
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monitoring, and this caused decision makers to disagree; there were also some timing 
issues concerning when the notice was read and signed by Bărbulescu after it was 
circulated.
1468
  
Regardless of whether one agrees with the results of the balancing exercise performed by 
the Grand Chamber, it is important to note that several critical principles and values 
emerge from the discussion. For instance, the Grand Chamber referred to several 
important data protection principles stemming from the Data Protection Directive that 
was in effect at the time and that applied to the monitoring of Internet and email use in 
the workplace.
1469
 In particular, the principle of necessity requires monitoring to be 
necessary to achieve a certain aim.
1470
 The principle of purpose specification requires 
data to be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.
1471
 The principle of 
transparency requires employers to provide employees with full information about 
monitoring operations.
1472
 The principle of legitimacy requires data-processing 
operations to only take place for a legitimate purpose.
1473
 The principle of proportionality 
requires that the personal data being monitored had to be relevant and adequate in 
relation to the specified purpose.
1474
 The principle of security requires employers to take 
all possible security measures to ensure that the data collected are not accessible to third 
parties.
1475
 The Grand Chamber also clarified proportionality, citing the Article 29 
Working Party in its Opinion 8/2001,
1476
 and stated that any monitoring of employees had 
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to be proportionate to the risks employers faced, taking into account the legitimate 
privacy and other interests of workers.
1477
  
Additionally, the Grand Chamber listed several factors that were relevant when 
conducting the balancing of competing interests, which I will call the “Bărbulescu 
Principles”: (1) whether the employee was notified of the possibility that the employer 
might take measures to monitor correspondence and other communications, and of the 
implementation of such measures; (2) the extent of the monitoring by the employer and 
the degree of intrusion into the employee’s privacy; (3) whether the employer provided 
legitimate reasons to justify monitoring the communications and accessing their actual 
content; (4) whether it would have been possible to establish a monitoring system based 
on less intrusive methods and measures than directly accessing the content of the 
employees communications; (5) the consequences of the monitoring for the employee 
subjected to it; and (6) whether the employee was provided with adequate safeguards, 
especially when the employer’s monitoring operations were of an intrusive nature.
1478
 
Lastly, though not a numbered item, it is also required that the domestic authorities 
should ensure that an employee has access to a remedy before a judicial body with 
jurisdiction to determine, at least in substance, how the criteria outlined above were 
observed and whether the impugned measures were lawful.
1479
 
In my view, the essence of the above-mentioned principles could be harmonized into a 
new Canadian workplace privacy regime. One may disagree and point out that these 
principles were developed in a different cultural context and use what could be viewed as 
a different theoretical approach to privacy, namely the dignity/human rights approach.
1480
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In fact, one may wish to remind me of the importance of respecting cultural contexts of 
laws examined in other jurisdictions and refraining from hastily performing legal 
transplants.
1481
 However, I would like to suggest that, if we are operating under the 
assumption that data protection legislation will soon be revamped to become more rights-
based as I also proposed in Chapter 4,
1482
 then it would not be too far-reaching to 
carefully borrow some of these novel ideas that stem from the European Union 
workplace privacy cases, and strategically incorporate them into Canada’s workplace 
privacy regime. 
To recap, I have just explained the challenges associated with balancing the competing 
interests and also the Bărbulescu Principles. The second thing that I will do is highlight 
the importance of being informed about the monitoring.  
To that end, it is critical to ensure that employees are properly informed of any workplace 
rules and also the nature, extent, and consequences of monitoring communications.
1483
 
Most importantly, as explained by the Grand Chamber, the notice had to come before the 
monitoring was commenced by the employer.
1484
 Not only did the nature and extent of 
the monitoring activity have to be made clear to the employees, but the possibility of 
accessing the contents of the communications had to be spelt out as well.
1485
 
In this case, the Grand Chamber confirmed that there may have been notice of the ban on 
personal Internet use, but it was not so clear that Bărbulescu had been informed 
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beforehand that monitoring of his communications was going to take place, about the 
nature and extent of the monitoring activity, or of the possibility that E could access the 
contents.
1486
 
Additionally, the Grand Chamber clearly stated that employers were allowed to create 
workplace rules and put in place some restrictions that affected employees’ respect for 
private life and privacy of correspondence, but these restrictions could not be imposed 
entirely, to the point where the right to private social life in the workplace was reduced to 
zero—the right to private life and privacy of correspondence continued to exist, even if it 
was subject to restrictions.
1487
 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, the dissenting judge in the Fourth Section,
1488
 who would 
have found a violation of Article 8 of the EU Convention
1489
 in line with the Grand 
Chamber, provided some important clarifications regarding surveillance policies and 
notifications about monitoring in the workplace. More explicitly, he stated that it had to 
be clear to employees that there was an Internet usage policy, and only targeted 
surveillance regarding well-founded suspicions of policy violations were acceptable.
1490
 
He specifically elaborated on the reason for this principle: without a fair policy in place, 
Internet surveillance in the workplace could be abused by employers, “acting as a 
distrustful Big Brother lurking over the shoulders of their employees, as though the latter 
had sold not only their labour, but also their personal lives to employers”.
1491
 Essentially, 
he insisted that it was necessary to avoid such commodification of workers and make 
responsible policies on Internet use.
1492
 With respect to the notice of monitoring, Judge 
de Albuquerque stated that proper notice of monitoring was critical; not only did it have 
to be provided, but it also had to be properly drafted so that it was clear enough to 
understand.
1493
 And rules and consequences had to be proportionate.
1494
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Indeed, electronic surveillance that goes beyond what is necessary is detrimental to 
employees; it is important for management to avoid the temptation to extend the 
monitoring beyond what is required.
1495
 For instance, some of the dangers of excessive 
monitoring in the workplace include reduced motivation levels, increased negative 
physical symptoms such as pain, increased psychological symptoms such as anxiety and 
depression, reduced trust levels, and increased levels of behaviours that the surveillance 
was designed to prevent such as sabotage, refusal to meet expectations, and manipulation 
of the boundaries.
1496
 
Therefore, it is important to take heed of Judge de Albuquerque’s warning, acknowledge 
the dignity of workers, and treat them as ends in themselves rather than just as means to 
achieve a particular goal.
1497
 
I have therefore explained how important it is to inform and provide details about the 
monitoring, something that is unique to the European Union’s novel approach. The third 
thing that I will do is discuss the unique aspects of the employment relationship and the 
need for some flexibility, while still ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place.  
More precisely, the Grand Chamber recognized the uniqueness of the employment 
relationship, and how there were special features that had to be addressed.
1498
 The Grand 
Chamber emphasized that, from a regulatory point of view, the law left room for 
negotiation between the parties in respect of their employment contracts.
1499
 Moreover, 
the Grand Chamber stated that, although a small number of Member States explicitly 
regulated respect for private life and correspondence in the workplace because of the 
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margin of appreciation they enjoyed, it was important to keep in mind that their 
discretion could not be unlimited.
1500
 That is, it was still necessary for domestic 
authorities to ensure that employers used adequate and sufficient safeguards against 
abuse.
1501
 
There is a range of technologies that can be used in the workplace, from computer 
logging, telephone logging, CCTV monitoring, to mobility tracking.
1502
 The Internet has 
played a large role in the increase of employee monitoring, and it is fairly common for 
companies to monitor worker communications and activities on the work premises.
1503
 In 
fact, the Internet has allowed for electronic measurements of performance such as 
keystrokes or telephone call content, or communications such as email and web 
monitoring; likewise, it has allowed for the electronic tracking of behaviours including 
location devices such as pagers, CCTV, GPS, and RFID, or covert surveillance (for 
instance, hidden cameras).
1504
 Employers can also conduct electronic monitoring of 
personal characteristics such as biometrics (bodily measurements such as electronic 
fingerprinting or retina and iris scanning), data mining, headhunting, and e-
recruitment.
1505
 Electronic workplace surveillance and business organizations go hand-in-
hand; electronic surveillance in the workplace simply replaces older forms of surveillance 
such as clocking-in or counting and weighing output for payment by piece-rate.
1506
 
Viewed as a good management practice, it is often considered necessary and a normal 
element of working life that has been taken for granted, so much so, that employees often 
expect to have their performance reviewed and their information gathered on their 
professional activities and whereabouts.
1507
 
However, there is a potential for abuse of surveillance power in the workplace, and this is 
why it is necessary to have protections in place—especially when the monitoring goes 
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beyond what is considered reasonable or when employers demand exacting and precise 
information as to how employees use their time.
1508
 The privacy concerns associated with 
covert surveillance of electronic communications are significant, especially given the 
technological capacity to record and store these communications, some of which could 
contain sensitive confidential information as in this case.
1509
 Also concerning for 
employees is the fact that some of these communications could be stored on offshore 
servers in different jurisdictions that are subject to different rules governing privacy.
1510
  
It is clearly necessary to respect employees’ inherent value and worth.
1511
 As exhibited in 
the decision of the Grand Chamber, privacy is an essential human need, and employers 
are not permitted to completely prevent employees from enjoying this facet of human 
life.
1512
 Privacy cannot be reduced to zero.
1513
 
In this part, I extracted principles and values from Bărbulescu. I fulfilled this by noting 
the challenges associated with balancing the competing interests and the Bărbulescu 
Principles that emerged from this workplace privacy case, the importance of being 
informed about the monitoring and details of the monitoring, as well as the unique 
aspects of the employment relationship and the need to allow for some flexibility, while 
still ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place.   
5.5.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
The preceding analysis points to the challenges faced when attempting to balance 
interests of the parties in privacy cases. It also highlights essential principles that are used 
in order to accomplish this balancing analysis. I contend that there needs to be provisions 
that incorporate the Bărbulescu Principles, where employers are required to create 
policies and procedures regarding electronic surveillance of communications inside the 
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workplace. To prevent against the abuse of surveillance power, the policies and 
procedures would inform employees of the nature of electronic surveillance, extent 
(including the four temporal dimensions) of the electronic surveillance, degree of 
intrusion and exactly what the employer wishes to access (solely time codes, content, 
specific metadata involving the communications), and the disciplinary consequences that 
can result from the electronic surveillance of the communications. It is also necessary, 
when dealing with sensitive personal data, to have a provision requiring employers to 
conduct electronic surveillance of employees’ communications in the most ethical 
manner possible to enhance trust in the employment relationship. There also needs to be 
provisions enabling the employers and employees to have the flexibility required to 
jointly create further rules regarding electronic surveillance applying in their specific 
workplace (in the rare circumstances where employees can freely consent). 
5.6 López Ribalda 
The second European Union workplace privacy case that is discussed in this dissertation 
is López Ribalda. I first describe the facts, history, and decision of the workplace privacy 
case; I then analyze the case and discuss the implications for the new workplace privacy 
regime. 
5.6.1 The Facts, History, and Decision 
Five Spanish employees, who I will call “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”, worked as cashiers 
for MSA, a family-owned supermarket chain.
1514
 MSA noticed that there were some 
irregularities between supermarket stock levels and what was actually sold; in fact, the 
supervisor found monthly losses of over €7,780, €17,971, €13,936, €18,009, and €24,614 
over five consecutive months.
1515
 MSA decided to investigate by installing surveillance 
cameras, some of which were visible and some were hidden; the visible cameras were 
pointed toward the entrances and exits of the supermarket to detect any customer thefts, 
and the hidden cameras were zoomed in on the checkout counters and covered the area 
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behind the cash desk to detect any employee thefts.
1516
 MSA only gave the employees 
prior notice of the installation of visible cameras.
1517
 
Eventually, A, B, C, D, and E were caught, and they each admitted to the thefts in the 
presence of both their union representative and MSA’s legal representative.
1518
 More 
precisely, they were dismissed because they were caught on video helping coworkers and 
customers steal items and stealing items themselves; they accomplished this by scanning 
items from the grocery baskets of customers and coworkers and canceling the purchases, 
and then allowing the customers and coworkers to walk out of the store without paying 
for the items.
1519
 While C, D, and E signed settlement agreements agreeing to not bring 
any wrongful dismissal proceedings against MSA in exchange for MSA not bringing 
criminal charges against them for theft, ultimately, A, B, C, D, and E all ended up 
launching unfair dismissal proceedings at the Granollers Employment Tribunal no 1 
(Employment Tribunal), and were unsuccessful.
1520
 They appealed to the High Court of 
Justice of Catalonia (High Court), and were also unsuccessful.
1521
 Further appeals, 
including to the Constitutional Court, were all dismissed.
1522
  
In response, A, B, C, D, and E made applications to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Third Section (Third Section) against the Kingdom of Spain (Spain).
1523
 They 
argued that the covert video surveillance seriously interfered with their right to privacy, 
and MSA ordered covert video surveillance without previously informing them, thus their 
rights to private life protected by domestic data protection laws and the Article 8 of the 
EU Convention
1524
 were violated.
1525
 On the other hand, Spain argued that MSA was a 
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private company, and any violations (including lack of notice of monitoring) could not be 
attributed to Spain.
1526
 Also, the employees were informed of the installation of the overt 
video surveillance for theft prevention purposes, but not regarding the covert video 
surveillance near the cash desks; every citizen had the right to complain about covert 
video surveillance pursuant to domestic data protection laws to the Data Protection 
Agency, where MSA could be administratively sanctioned.
1527
  
The Third Section stated that private life was interpreted broadly and extended to aspects 
relating to personal identity, including name and picture.
1528
 Also, covert video 
surveillance of employees was viewed as a considerable intrusion into private life, since 
it involved recording and reproducing documentation about an employee’s conduct at 
work, which was a place where the employee had to be and could not evade.
1529
 The 
Third Section found that Spain did not strike a fair balance between the employees’ right 
to respect for their private life and MSA’s interests in protecting its property.
1530
 The 
domestic courts acknowledged that MSA did not comply with the obligation to inform 
the employees about the installation of the covert video surveillance or of their rights 
under the data protection legislation.
1531
 The surveillance did not involve suspicion aimed 
at particular employees; rather, there was a general suspicion against all staff, so the 
surveillance was aimed at all employees working on the cash registers.
1532
 Thus, the 
Third Section decided that there was insufficient proportionality of MSA’s measures with 
the legitimate aim of protecting interests in the protection of property rights.
1533
 The 
video surveillance was aimed at all staff on the cash registers, “over weeks, without any 
time-limit and during all working hours”;
1534
 MSA conducted the covert surveillance 
over a prolonged period of time, and did not comply with requirements to inform the 
employees of the existence of the system of video surveillance or provide them with the 
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necessary information about their rights under data protection laws.
1535
 Thus, there was a 
violation of Article 8 of the EU Convention
1536
 (by six votes to one), and the employees 
were awarded monetary amounts for non-pecuniary damage
1537
 and costs and 
expenses
1538
 incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts.
1539
  
Spain appealed to the Grand Chamber.
1540
 The Grand Chamber stated that there was no 
question that Article 8 of the EU Convention
1541
 applied in this case; the employees were 
subjected to video surveillance at work for a period of 10 days, where the covert cameras 
were directed towards the supermarket checkout area.
1542
 The Grand Chamber 
emphasized that, though the expectation of privacy was limited in public places, the 
creation of a systematic or permanent recording of images of identified persons and the 
subsequent processing of those images could raise questions affecting the private life of 
the employees.
1543
  
The Grand Chamber also clarified the margin of appreciation, and stated that the choice 
of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 of the EU Convention
1544
 regarding 
individuals between themselves fell within the Member State’s margin of appreciation, 
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and regardless of the discretion enjoyed by Member States when choosing the most 
appropriate means for protecting rights to respect for private life and correspondence of 
employees, an employer’s monitoring had to be proportionate and have adequate and 
sufficient safeguards against abuse.
1545
 In this case, the Grand Chamber found that Spain 
had an adequate legal framework with adequate safeguards.
1546
 
Also, the Grand Chamber confirmed that the Bărbulescu Principles were transposable to 
the circumstances of this case on video surveillance in the workplace.
1547
 To that end, it 
examined the Bărbulescu Principles.
1548
 It decided that the domestic courts found that 
there were legitimate reasons for the video surveillance, namely suspicion, given the 
amount of losses.
1549
 Also, the legitimate interests were taken into account by the 
domestic courts, namely protection of property and smooth functioning of the 
company.
1550
 The degree of intrusion was limited because the covert cameras were only 
pointed at the checkout area where the losses were likely to occur, so this was 
reasonable.
1551
 Further, the employees worked in a place that was open to the public and 
involved permanent contact with customers, so there was a lower expectation of privacy 
(this was in line with the Working Party’s Opinion 4/2004
1552
).
1553
 The Grand Chamber 
stated that, though MSA never set a particular duration for the video surveillance 
beforehand, it was ultimately only for 10 days, and then it ceased as soon as the 
employees were identified, so this was not excessive.
1554
 Also, only the manager, legal 
representative, and union representative viewed the recordings, so there was not a high 
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degree of seriousness of intrusion.
1555
 The consequences of the monitoring were serious 
since the employees involved were dismissed based on the recording, but the domestic 
courts noted that the recordings were not used for any other purpose except to trace the 
losses and take disciplinary measures against the employees.
1556
 Further, there were no 
other means to fulfill the legitimate aim, there was a significant possibility that the thefts 
were committed by more than one person given the losses, and providing any information 
to the employees could have defeated the purposes of the video surveillance.
1557
 
Domestic laws adequately prescribed a certain number of safeguards to prevent improper 
interference with the rights of individuals.
1558
  
The Grand Chamber also confirmed that the lack of prior information was justified; in the 
specific circumstances, given the degree of intrusion and the legitimate interests 
justifying the video surveillance, the employment courts were able to, without 
overstepping the margin of appreciation, decide that the interference with the employees’ 
privacy was proportionate.
1559
 There was reasonable suspicion of serious misconduct in 
light of the extent of the losses, and this was especially important in situations where the 
smooth functioning of the company was endangered by the suspicion of concerted action 
by several employees (14 employees were dismissed in total)
1560
 that created a general 
atmosphere of mistrust in the workplace.
1561
 The Grand Chamber stressed that the 
employees had other avenues for making complaints, such as complaining to the Data 
Protection Agency for a failure to fulfill the obligation to provide prior information, and 
MSA could have received fines.
1562
 Thus, it found (by 14 votes to three) that Spain did 
not fail to fulfill its positive obligations under Article 8 of the EU Convention
1563
and 
there was no violation.
1564
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5.6.2 Analysis of López Ribalda 
This case involved the following features of workplace privacy cases: the employees 
were not successful in their claims; the matter took place in a court;
1565
 the surveillance 
scenario dealt with proactive surveillance operations; the electronic surveillance 
technology involved both overt and covert video surveillance, namely continuous CCTV 
monitoring; and the misconduct took place while the employees were on-duty.  
This was not the same kind of situation as in Graphic Packaging, where T had done 
nothing wrong while off-duty, but was subject to aggressive covert electronic 
surveillance that led to his hasty dismissal; there was an abuse of surveillance power 
when Graphic Packaging rashly commenced the surveillance on T, interpreted the results, 
and dismissed T. This case was not quite the same as Bărbulescu either, since there was 
no suspicion beforehand that Bărbulescu had done anything wrong; E was monitoring all 
of the employees’ communications in the workplace without any specific reason or 
target. On the contrary, López Ribalda involved a situation where five employees were 
caught on hidden camera stealing thousands of euros of product from MSA over several 
months; in light of the amount of losses, MSA appeared to have genuine suspicion when 
installing the video surveillance cameras to protect its property rights. 
My goal in this section is to extract principles and values from López Ribalda.  First, I 
will note the challenges associated with balancing the competing interests and principles 
that emerge from this particular workplace privacy case. Second, I will delve into the 
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problematic issues associated with covert and continuous video surveillance. And third, I 
will argue that the concept of suspicion must be clarified and handled with caution. 
To this end, the first thing to observe about this case is the recurring theme of the 
challenges faced by decision makers who must balance the interests of the parties in 
difficult cases such as this. The disputatious nature of the case could be seen with the 
history of the case, where the employees were repetitively unsuccessful since their 
dismissals in 2009, but were for a moment successful at the Third Section in 2018, and 
then were ultimately unsuccessful at the Grand Chamber in 2019 (10 years later).
1566
 And 
it is worth noting that there were some noteworthy dissenting opinions at both the Third 
Section and the Grand Chamber.
1567
  
In my view, this case was more contentious than Bărbulescu, likely due to the fact that 
theft was involved, and there may have been a conflation of various ideas concerning 
violations involving private life and theft, which could have had the effect of intensifying 
feelings of betrayal of trust. The Grand Chamber picked up on this notion when stating 
that suspicion of concerted action by several employees created a general atmosphere of 
mistrust in the workplace.
1568
 As discussed throughout the dissertation, trust is essential 
in the employment relationship; when trust is shattered in employment, the parties 
experience feelings of violation and betrayal that lead to a complete breakdown in the 
relationship.
1569
 In fact, broken trust in the employment relationship often leads to 
dismissals being upheld.
1570
 Likewise, trust is essential and is at the core of our 
expectations of privacy as a significant factor in our decisions to share our personal 
information.
1571
 In employment, trust can be damaged when employees are of the view 
that electronic surveillance systems have been improperly implemented and this can lead 
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to employees simply refusing to comply with management or adopt a more adversarial 
“us” versus “them” mentality.
1572
  
It should come as no surprise, then, that there were conflicting views regarding whether 
there was a violation of Article 8 of the EU Convention
1573
 in this case. 
On one hand, the findings of the Third Section made sense in many ways. For instance, 
the court found that private life was interpreted broadly and extended to aspects relating 
to personal identity, including name and picture.
1574
 The Third Section also confirmed 
that covert video surveillance of an employee was viewed as a considerable intrusion into 
private life, because it involved recording and reproducing documentation about an 
employee’s conduct at work, which was a place where the employee had to be and could 
not evade.
1575
 The case dealt with using hidden cameras, about which employees were 
not aware, and this raised serious concerns about private life.
1576
 Also, the Third Section 
noted that the domestic courts already found that MSA did not properly inform the 
employees about the installation of the covert video surveillance or of their rights under 
the applicable data protection legislation.
1577
 When examining the nature of the 
surveillance, the Third Section confirmed that the surveillance was not aimed at one 
particular employee as a result of suspicion, but rather it was directed at all staff because 
of the general suspicion of employees working near the cash registers.
1578
 The Third 
Section also found that the video surveillance took place over a prolonged period of time, 
in a continuous manner, during all working hours.
1579
 It was understandable then, why the 
Third Section found that there was inadequate proportionality in this case, and MSA 
violated Article 8 of the EU Convention
1580
 when it did not comply with the requirements 
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to inform the employees of the existence of the system of video surveillance and provide 
them with the necessary information about their rights under data protection laws.
1581
  
Yet on the other hand, there were also reasons why the decision did not make sense, as 
noted by the dissenting judge at the Third Section, Judge Dedov.
1582
 For example, the 
judge opined that there were no other effective means of protecting the MSA’s property 
rights, so it was not possible to interfere with the right to private life to a lesser extent and 
capture the information that was required.
1583
 Also, Judge Dedov believed that there 
could be no violation since the misconduct (theft) was incompatible with the right to 
private life under the EU Convention
1584
 in this case.
1585
 Further, based on the amount of 
losses that were experienced by MSA (between €7,780 and €24,614 per month), it was 
reasonable to conclude that the losses might have been caused by more than one person, 
so there was a good chance that the surveillance was indeed necessary.
1586
 Judge Dedov 
did not agree with the result that the employees were allowed to profit from their own 
wrongdoing.
1587
 Judges Poláčková and Vilanova agreed with that point, and thought that 
the finding of a violation constituted just satisfaction for their non-pecuniary damage.
1588
   
Following this decision at the Third Section, I agreed with many of the privacy principles 
confirmed by the majority regarding the intrusiveness regarding covert and continuous 
surveillance during all working hours, the need to use the least intrusive methods, and the 
importance of properly informing employees about video surveillance (overt and covert). 
However, while the principles coming out of the decision appeared to make sense, there 
were some aspects of the decision that led to an absurd result. In this sense, I agreed with 
some of the points made by the dissenting judges. For instance, I believed that the 
majority decision sent an inappropriate message that it was acceptable for A, B, C, D, and 
E to complain to the court and rely on human rights and privacy principles to argue that 
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there was a privacy violation; they did so, despite the amount of losses that MSA 
suffered, and even though they had unclean hands.
1589
 This was troubling, given that it 
was essential to come to the court with clean hands for two main reasons: the first reason 
was to ensure fairness and protection of the parties (that is, to prevent claimants from 
engaging in opportunism and benefitting from their own misconduct in the action); the 
second reason was to maintain the integrity of the court (in particular, to maintain respect 
for the law, to promote confidence in the administration of justice, and to preserve the 
judicial process from contamination).
1590
 One may go so far as to assert that the 
employees in this case were acting in line with the economic theoretical approach to 
privacy, and appeared to be trying to argue for privacy rights to obtain a monetary award 
that was in addition to the value already realized from the substantial thefts.
1591
 In the 
circumstances, this use of privacy rights to gain further value was concerning. 
Upon learning of the upcoming appeal decision, I anticipated that the Grand Chamber 
would confirm the decision of the Third Section to reinforce the privacy principles on 
video surveillance, but modify the decision by not awarding monetary amounts to the 
employees in line with the dissenting opinions of the Third Section. However, the Grand 
Chamber subsequently released its decision—reversing the Third Section’s decision.  
In my view, the decision of the Grand Chamber raised a few problematic issues. First, the 
balancing appeared to be shallow, where the Grand Chamber glossed over one or two of 
the Bărbulescu Principles per paragraph.
1592
 Second, the Grand Chamber also seemed to 
minimize the fact that MSA never actually had a plan for the duration of the continuous 
covert video surveillance that was always on for all workers in the area; it just so 
happened that the employees were caught after 10 days, so the surveillance activity was 
brought to an end—there was a potential for the electronic surveillance to continue for a 
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longer period of time, without any real safeguards in place.
1593
 In my view, this meant 
that there was a risk of the abuse of electronic surveillance power, and it is unacceptable 
to downplay this fact. The Grand Chamber barely even touched on the kinds of limits that 
would need to be used; more was needed than merely stating that it did not appear to be 
excessive.
1594
 Third, I agree with the dissenting judges that it was inappropriate to find 
that the degree of intrusion was not serious since only the manager, legal representative, 
and union representative viewed the recordings.
1595
 That is, I agree with Judges De 
Gaetano, Yudkivska, and Grozev that much more attention had to be paid to the power of 
electronic surveillance technology and the dangers associated with abusing that power, 
especially when it came to covert video surveillance.
1596
 More precisely, electronic 
surveillance technologies, had the potential to be carried out and transmitted with 
technological ease, and this became crucial where an employer used covert video 
surveillance in the workplace.
1597
  
Fourth, and most strikingly, I find the decision to minimize the importance of being 
properly informed somewhat perplexing. More precisely, the Grand Chamber found that, 
even though the duty to inform had not been met as confirmed by the domestic courts, in 
this case, the employment courts were able to decide that the interference with the 
employees’ privacy was proportionate.
1598
 In my view, this could create some problems. 
The first problem is that this decision could enable employers to believe that they can 
engage in numerous instances of covert surveillance without using proper safeguards 
based on clouded understandings of suspicion. The second problem is that there could be 
a softening of the requirement to inform over time, where it is transformed into just one 
of the other factors to consider. The third problem is that allowing the introduction of 
covert surveillance cameras into the workplace, without properly informing employees or 
using any real safeguards, could wreak havoc in the workplace and intensify feelings of 
mistrust between the parties in the employment relationship.  
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The Grand Chamber noted that the legitimate interests were to discover and punish those 
responsible for the losses, with the aim of ensuring the protection of its property and the 
smooth functioning of the company.
1599
 Also, there was no other way to fulfill the 
legitimate aim, and an examination of lesser intrusive methods would have defeated the 
purposes given the extent of the losses.
1600
 Yet, in my view, MSA still could have 
provided proper notification of the covert surveillance cameras in accordance with 
domestic laws, even in a general manner, and provided A, B, C, D, and E with basic 
information on their rights as suggested by the Third Section.
1601
 In particular, I argue 
that it was not necessarily true that MSA’s approach was the only way to achieve the 
legitimate purposes. I found it surprising that the Grand Chamber spent so little time 
deliberating on the process of exploring other lesser intrusive options. I contend that, had 
A, B, C, D, and E been told of the covert operation, at least they would have better 
understood their rights in a situation that they could not evade,
1602
 and these laws are, 
after all, considered to be “a certain number of safeguards for the purpose of preventing 
any improper interference”.
1603
 The Grand Chamber made such a significant effort in 
Bărbulescu to make the material finding that there was no proper notification in that 
case;
1604
 in contrast, no similar effort was made in this case to acknowledge the import of 
the factor of proper notification.
1605
 Proper notification, after all, is a low threshold to 
meet, and is not even close to the same thing as consent, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
Theme 2; it is difficult to see how something this fundamental could be brushed aside. 
That said, perhaps the Grand Chamber is sending a message that being informed is only 
one of the Bărbulescu Principles to consider in the balancing analysis to determine 
proportionality—this could be useful in cases where obtaining consent is not possible (as 
in employment situations), or properly informing individuals is not practical (as in theft 
situations where the goal is to discover the identities of thieves and punish them). In this 
way, considering it as one piece of the proportionality puzzle seems more reasonable. 
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Regardless of whether one agrees with the Third Section or the Grand Chamber, the 
Grand Chamber confirmed that the Bărbulescu Principles were transposable to the 
circumstances of cases involving video surveillance in the workplace.
1606
 The Grand 
Chamber also clarified the meaning of positive obligations and the margin of appreciation 
for Member States so they can meet their duties to protect private life.
1607
 In my view, the 
explanations and analysis provided in this part of the decision addressed many of the 
concerns noted by the dissent of the Grand Chamber in Bărbulescu.
1608
 
Let me pause for a moment and recap. I have just discussed the challenges associated 
with balancing the competing interests and principles that emerge from this workplace 
privacy case; I also noted that the Bărbulescu Principles apply to instances of video 
surveillance. The second thing that I will do is emphasize the serious concerns that arise 
when dealing with covert and continuous video surveillance.  
Thus, it is important to highlight that the Grand Chamber never discounted the Third 
Section’s conclusion that covert, continuous video surveillance of employees was viewed 
as a considerable intrusion into private life, because it involved recording and 
reproducing documentation about an employee’s conduct at work, which was a place 
where the employee had to be and could not evade.
1609
 In fact, the Grand Chamber noted 
the significance of creating limits regarding the degree of intrusion, such as putting 
cameras in limited areas, setting reasonable durations, as well as installing cameras in 
open, visible, and public areas rather than private areas associated with very high 
expectations of privacy protection.
1610
 Yet in my view, the Grand Chamber failed to 
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appreciate the point that employees were being subject to covert continuous video 
surveillance throughout their entire working day.
1611
 
In fact, I argue that this case underscores the critical need to acknowledge, given the 
nature of electronic surveillance technologies, that there is a serious potential for the 
abuse of surveillance power when it comes to covert, continuous monitoring—I find it 
extremely concerning that MSA would consider it appropriate to aim covert cameras “at 
all the staff working on the cash registers, over weeks, without any time limit and during 
all working hours”.
1612
  
One can easily appreciate how covert video surveillance is clearly intrusive, and also 
dangerous, in light of modern technological capabilities including the recording, storage 
and dissemination of images.
1613
 Indeed, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada has pointed out the troubling aspects of covert video surveillance, and has stated 
that there should always be a strong basis for using covert video surveillance, where the 
information gathered must further that purpose.
1614
 Also, there should be proportionality: 
the loss of privacy needs to be proportional to the benefit gained.
1615
 And less privacy-
invasive measures should always be tried first.
1616
 While there is an acknowledgment that 
most covert surveillance is conducted without consent, in the employment context, 
employers should have evidence that the relationship of trust has been broken before 
conducting covert video surveillance—there must be an evidentiary justification.
1617
 The 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has recommended that organizations have 
a policy on covert video surveillance that sets out privacy-specific criteria that must be 
met before covert video surveillance is undertaken; requires that the decision be 
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documented, including rationale and purpose; requires that authorization for undertaking 
video surveillance be given at an appropriate level of the organization; considers what 
personal information is necessary to achieve the stated purpose; limits the use of the 
surveillance to its stated purpose; requires that the surveillance be stored in a secure 
manner; designates the persons in the organization authorized to view the surveillance; 
sets out procedures for dealing with third party information; sets out a retention period for 
the surveillance; and sets out procedures for the secure disposal of images.
1618
 It is also 
important to document specific instances of video surveillance, including how the 
requirements of the organization’s policy on video surveillance have been satisfied: a 
description of alternative measures undertaken and their result; a description of the kind 
of information collected through the surveillance; the duration of surveillance; names of 
individuals who viewed the surveillance; what the surveillance was used for; when and 
how images were disposed of; and a service agreement with any third party hired to 
conduct the surveillance, if applicable.
1619
  
But it is the Panopticon that provides insights regarding the reasons why continuous 
monitoring is so troublesome. The Panopticon is associated with the idea of crowded 
solitude, where there is a chilling vision of individuals packed together yet they are 
alone.
1620
 It is disturbing that the overseer’s gaze, daylight, and interiorization can create 
transparency and a formula where power is exercised continuously for a minimal cost.
1621
 
The illusion of power is so momentous that individuals become virtuous simply by being 
observed.
1622
 Also unsettling is that this use of disciplinary power creates docile bodies 
that can be subjected, used, transformed, and improved; in instances of continuous 
surveillance, visibility becomes a trap that controls individuals.
1623
 It remains an alarming 
fact that continuous monitoring is a type of intensity
1624
 that is associated with increased 
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power if applied in the subtlest possible way.
1625
 Disciplinary power is exercised through 
the watchers’ invisibility, because the watched are not able to see, yet they are subject to 
compulsory visibility.
1626
 In this case, MSA appeared to be using the disquieting strategy 
of beginning with generalized surveillance and subsequently generating suspects, rather 
than starting with a suspect to monitor due to suspicion.
1627
 
In the Panopticon, those who are watched never know whether they are being watched at 
any time, so they have to assume that they are always being watched; the idea that 
anyone could be watching at any time creates high levels of anxiety about being 
continuously watched by anonymous observers.
1628
 This may be why the Panopticon is 
characterized as both a laboratory of power and a circular cage, because of the potential 
to take advantage of individuals who are forced to be in that one particular place.
1629
 
Continuous surveillance, then, creates a large potential for manipulation and exploitation, 
to the point where the Panopticon has been characterized as an efficient instrument of 
totalitarian control, ruthless social engineering, and psychological manipulation.
1630
  
In workplaces, employers have the ability to take advantage in several ways, since the 
supervisor performs the same function as an overseer.
1631
 With electronic surveillance, 
information systems create a universal transparency with a startling degree of 
illumination.
1632
 That is, the video screen is the modern version of the central tower.
1633
 
As a result of continuous and transparent workplace monitoring, workers may feel a loss 
of autonomy or sense of self-control, feel despair at the prospect of being socially 
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integrated into the high-technology workplace, and feel loss of unique identity and 
absence of traditional employment protections.
1634
 
I argue that consequent feelings of despair and of being manipulated and controlled may 
likely be magnified in cases where the video surveillance is both continuous and covert in 
nature; in my view, the compounded effect constitutes an appalling violation. Once made 
aware, one who was watched might question: who was watching; what were they 
watching; how often were they watching; when were they watching; what was recorded; 
who accessed it; was it disseminated or posted online; where was it now; was the image 
manipulated in any way; how many people know about it now; etcetera. Indeed, this 
could lead to a situation where the watched become distressed about being continuously 
watched by anonymous observers after-the-fact. It is understandable then, that once A, B, 
C, D, and E became aware of the continuous covert video surveillance they experienced 
in the workplace, they launched a privacy complaint and continued with it for 10 years.  
This is why it is necessary to provide adequate protections to employees regarding covert 
and continuous surveillance, since employees are not able to escape the workplace and 
would not be in a position to evade such monitoring.
1635
 Given the nature of this 
technology and the potential for abuse of surveillance power, it is necessary to ensure that 
the dignity of individuals is preserved.
1636
 
I have therefore demonstrated that there are serious concerns with regards to covert and 
continuous video surveillance, especially when they are used simultaneously. The third 
thing that I will do is argue that the concept of suspicion must be clarified and handled 
with caution. 
Indeed, the Grand Chamber was unclear regarding the concept of suspicion, and this may 
present some challenges. More precisely, as noted above, no employees were individually 
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targeted in this case, yet all employees were captured by the covert cameras.
1637
 The 
Grand Chamber was not particularly instructive with its statement: 
Thus, while [the Court] cannot accept the proposition that, generally 
speaking, the slightest suspicion of misappropriation or any other 
wrongdoing on the part of employees might justify the installation of covert 
video-surveillance by the employer, the existence of reasonable suspicion 
that serious misconduct has been committed and the extent of the losses 
identified in the present case may appear to constitute weighty justification. 
This is all the more so in a situation where the smooth functioning of a 
company is endangered not merely by the suspected misbehaviour of one 
single employee, but rather by the suspicion of concerted action by several 
employees, as this creates a general atmosphere of mistrust in the 
workplace.
1638
 
Simply put, this paragraph could be construed as an invitation for employers to conduct 
continuous, covert video surveillance of employees whenever there is something more 
than the slightest suspicion; in cases where there could be more than one employee 
involved in suspected misconduct, the floodgates open even wider and appear to allow 
employers additional justification for the use of covert video surveillance. From this 
statement, it is not clear what “reasonable suspicion”, “serious misconduct”, “extent of 
the losses”, or “may appear to constitute weighty justification” mean. 
Indeed, the dissenting judges of the Grand Chamber were not convinced and stated that, 
in the absence of a requirement of clear procedural safeguards, the existence of 
reasonable suspicion of serious misconduct was insufficient in situations involving covert 
video surveillance and could be used to justify an unacceptably large number of cases.
1639
 
The dissenting judges also emphasized that the unlimited nature of the video surveillance 
was significant and should have been given additional weight when assessing 
proportionality.
1640
 They declared that the Grand Chamber was allowing the unlimited 
use of convert video surveillance in the workplace without affording sufficient legal 
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safeguards to those whose personal data would be collected and used for purposes 
unknown to them.
1641
 
It is vital to recognize that, when it comes to suspicion, the nature of the electronic 
surveillance technologies enable the watcher to collect vast amounts of personal data and 
transform dated strategies of starting with a suspect to monitor due to suspicion, to 
starting with generalized surveillance and subsequently generating suspects.
1642
 There is 
also a potential to engage in profiling and using the personal data to forecast outcomes in 
advance in attempt to exert control over the watched.
1643
 What is more, video analytics 
can be especially intrusive given that the goal is to allow computers not just to record, but 
also to understand, the objects and actions that a camera is capturing; this technology can 
be used to alert the authorities or others when something or someone who is deemed 
“suspicious” is detected.
1644
 The power of this technology is enormous given the potential 
to gather mass amounts of personal data; in fact, artificial intelligence that centers on 
deep learning has propelled the technology to unprecedented levels since computers are 
allowed to learn on their own when fed large amounts of training data.
1645
 For instance, 
video surveillance capabilities have been enhanced with respect to computer vision.
1646
 
There are several methods used to watch individuals, such as anomaly detection, which 
involves using automated surveillance systems to automatically detect and track unusual 
objects and people.
1647
 This involves using detection algorithms to look for abnormal 
things, or a deviation approach to allow smart cameras to learn what is normal.
1648
 There 
are several dangers associated with video analytics. For example, real-time monitoring 
with video analytics could lead to situations where a massive amount of data is gathered 
and analytics are used to sift through the data to find suspicious behaviour.
1649
 The 
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technology has the alarming potential to constantly monitor and judge physical actions 
and characteristics.
1650
 This can lead to considerable chilling effects with cameras that 
judge behaviour anonymously, discriminatory consequences due to biased algorithms 
inaccurately flagging people as suspicious, and an abuse of powerful surveillance 
infrastructures by their controllers.
1651
 This takes suspicion to a new level. 
For instance, these systems rely on predictions, and a danger is that the panoptic sort 
plays a role in forecasting outcomes that are likely for classes of individuals; 
predictability reduces uncertainty about individual behaviour, and the use of power can 
induce a desired and predictable reaction.
1652
 The goal then, is the pursuit of 
improvement of predictability.
1653
 However, there is a potential for the quality of 
information to be susceptible to errors of measuring, misinterpretation, and strategic 
modification such that the analysis becomes flawed and creates even further errors.
1654
 
The potential for serious exploitation arises because this situation can generate 
predictions that lead to a loss of trust due to misuse of algorithms when we attempt to 
clean the data, make it accurate, and turn the development of automated systems over to 
the machines themselves.
1655
 Consequently, this raises significant ethical and privacy 
issues for organizations in the private sector.
1656
 This is why it is necessary to have clear 
and understandable rules in place when it comes to using suspicion to justify the 
commencement of video surveillance. In order for there to be trust and a sense of safety 
in the midst of these technological possibilities, the potential for employers’ abuse of 
surveillance must be reined in, and the dignity of employees must be protected.
1657
 
In this part, I extracted principles and values from López Ribalda.  I reached this goal by 
discussing the challenges associated with balancing the competing interests and the fact 
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that the Bărbulescu Principles apply in cases of video surveillance, the problematic issues 
associated with covert and continuous video surveillance, and the need to be clear and be 
vigilant when dealing with the concept of suspicion. 
5.6.3 Implications for the New Workplace Privacy Regime  
What the analysis confirms is that, when carrying out the balancing analysis of employee 
privacy and employer legitimate business interests in situations involving video 
surveillance, the Bărbulescu Principles apply and can be used to determine whether the 
electronic surveillance was appropriate and whether there was a fair balance was struck 
between the parties. It is necessary to have provisions incorporating these principles 
when addressing issues involving the video surveillance of employees. Moreover, the 
analysis stresses the importance of acknowledging the troubling aspects of both covert 
and continuous video surveillance, and their effects on employees. Thus, I argue that 
there needs to be provisions that provide sufficient protections for employees in order to 
prevent the abuse of electronic surveillance power by employers. This can be 
accomplished by having a provision stating that it is not acceptable for employers to 
conduct continuous covert video surveillance on all employees during all working hours; 
rather, employers need to first ensure that there is reasonable suspicion (that is clearly 
defined) regarding certain employees, and use the least intrusive means of obtaining the 
information, rather than targeting all employees for long periods of time. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined a variety of workplace privacy cases and has attempted to 
extract from them some useful principles and values that will be of help in designing a 
new workplace privacy regime that can close the electronic surveillance gap in 
employment. 
I examined workplace privacy cases from Canada, the United States, and the European 
Union that contained several important features that help to provide insights into 
workplace privacy situations. As mentioned in the Introduction, these features included: 
(1) employee success in the wrongful termination/privacy claim versus failure in the 
claim; (2) court versus labour arbitrator; (3) surveillance scenario (proactive surveillance 
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operations versus discovery of employee misuse of technology); (4) electronic 
surveillance technology type; and (5) on-duty versus off-duty conduct. 
My selections, when taken together, contained a balanced mix of jurisdictions and the 
features of workplace privacy cases. There was a deliberate attempt to avoid a skewed 
analysis favouring only one jurisdictional perspective or one kind of situation; in my 
view, variety enhanced the discussion and allowed for the construction of a stronger 
workplace privacy regime. 
Since the goal of this Chapter 5 was to extract useful elements from the workplace 
privacy cases in order to create the new workplace privacy regime, I avoided providing 
descriptions of the state of the law in each jurisdiction. Instead, I chose the most pertinent 
cases from each jurisdiction for the purposes of extracting components to generate ideas 
and ultimately create proposed provisions for the new workplace privacy regime. The 
workplace privacy cases I selected included instructive analyses by decision makers so I 
could more effectively achieve this goal. In particular, while some cases were more 
recent than others and came from different locations within the jurisdictions, there were 
notably interesting aspects about each selected case that ultimately proved useful for the 
analysis and the production of essential ingredients for making the new workplace 
privacy regime. This became clear when delving deeper and contrasting the cases for the 
purposes of isolating additional relevant insights for the purpose of crafting the new 
workplace privacy regime. Further, both the employment principles and the relevant 
social theory ideas involving surveillance and privacy played a large role when 
synthesizing ideas to form the new workplace privacy regime. 
This Chapter demonstrated that principles and values could successfully be extracted 
from the examined workplace privacy cases and could be used to design a new workplace 
privacy regime to sufficiently close the electronic surveillance gap in a way that could fit 
into Canada’s legal system.   
During my case analyses, the selected workplace privacy cases played a considerable role 
in facilitating the creation of provisions for the new workplace privacy regime.  
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For instance, Steel shed light on core aspects affecting the employment relationship and 
data protection, namely trust and balance. It also helped to understand some of the 
inconsistencies associated with data protection and employment approaches, which led to 
the creation of more even provisions that focused on the concerns of both employers and 
employees. 
Maxam Bulk Services stressed the importance of having a social media policy, and 
highlighted the sorts of considerations that must be made when crafting such a policy. It 
also uncovered important employment principles, such as progressive discipline, that can 
be incorporated into the workplace to set standards and manage expectations for 
employees.  
Graphic Packaging was significant for underscoring the dangers of electronic 
surveillance, namely the abuse of surveillance power. It also emphasized the importance 
of incorporating important employment principles such as respecting procedures, 
contracts or collective agreements, and other company policies, when imposing discipline 
in response to uncovered surveillance information.  
Baker Hughes confirmed the crucial legitimate business interest of protecting employees 
from discrimination and harassment by coworkers, and allowed for an extension of this 
principle to the online environment. It also provided clarification on the necessary 
elements of important workplace documents, including policies, procedures, and 
collective agreements.  
Bărbulescu was important for appreciating the nature of electronic surveillance of 
communications. It also made a significant impact in the analysis involving the balancing 
of interests to determine whether a fair balance is struck between the parties, since it is 
now known for generating the Bărbulescu Principles. Moreover, it confirms that the 
privacy of employees cannot be reduced to zero. 
López Ribalda contributed by standing for the proposition that the Bărbulescu Principles 
are to be used when assessing proportionality in workplace video surveillance cases. 
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Also, the case was instrumental for understanding the nature and impact of continuous 
and covert video surveillance in the workplace, and also the concept of suspicion. 
I will discuss in Chapter 6 how I propose to fit these principles and values into Canada’s 
legal system. 
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Chapter 6  
6 The New Workplace Privacy Regime 
In Chapter 4, I examined privacy provisions from Canada, the United States, and the 
European Union and organized them according to three themes: (1) foundational 
principles touching on privacy and electronic surveillance; (2) consent and balancing 
rights with legitimate interests; and (3) order-making powers, penalties, and fines. These 
themes were selected because they involve several interesting issues relating to the 
electronic surveillance gap in employment. As mentioned in the Introduction, these 
provisions contained three types of features of privacy provisions: (1) constitutional and 
human rights provisions; (2) data protection provisions; and (3) employment provisions. 
These features involved different areas of law that were relevant to privacy and 
contributed to the understanding of privacy and electronic surveillance.  
In Chapter 5, I examined six workplace privacy cases from Canada, the United States, 
and the European Union that contained several features of workplace privacy cases, 
including: (1) employee success in the wrongful termination/privacy claim versus failure 
in the claim; (2) court versus labour arbitrator; (3) surveillance scenario (proactive 
surveillance operations versus discovery of employee misuse of technology); (4) 
electronic surveillance technology type; and (5) on-duty versus off-duty conduct.  
I extracted principles and values to create building blocks when designing the new 
workplace privacy regime for the purpose of closing the electronic surveillance gap in 
employment.  
It is now time to propose how I will fit my ideas from Chapters 4 and 5 and into Canada’s 
legal system. More specifically, I will discuss some challenges associated with the task of 
proposing a new workplace privacy regime for Canada; explain the plan with which I 
have chosen to proceed; review the previous guidance provided by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada; and provide some examples of legislative provisions 
that could be used in a new workplace privacy regime. 
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6.1 Challenges Encountered When Creating the 
Workplace Privacy Regime 
The first challenge that I encountered involved the fact that there are three features of 
privacy provisions examined in this dissertation, namely constitutional and human rights, 
data protection, and employment provisions. These represent different areas of law that 
are relevant to privacy, under which the proposed provisions could be placed.  
It is tempting to take each theme and workplace privacy case and propose provisions that 
fall under each of these areas of law all at once. However, this strategy of simultaneously 
converting all ideas into proposed provisions falling under all of these areas of law would 
not be realistic, since this task would be too complicated, impractical, and time-
consuming to implement. Hence, it is necessary to be selective and focus on one or two. 
To that end, I will focus on the examination of data protection and employment for the 
purposes of creating proposed provisions for the workplace privacy regime and fitting 
them into Canada’s legal system.  
The second challenge that I faced involved Canadian federalism and the consequent 
jurisdictional issues. Federalism involves the division of powers between two or more 
orders of government to provide representation for territorial, linguistic, or ethnic 
differences in the decision-making structures of a State, entrenching differences over 
time.
1658
 One main advantage of federalism is that different communities can experience 
unity without being strictly unified.
1659
 That is, this method of organizing political life 
recognizes regional and societal diversity and preserves self-government on a local 
level.
1660
 In Canada, there is a balance between the concentration of power at the national 
level, and the dispersion of power to the provinces; in other words, there is a balance 
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between a unitary system (with a high degree of centralization) and a confederal alliance 
(with a high degree of decentralization).
1661
 
A constitution acts as a blueprint for assigning governmental responsibilities and 
entitlements, and constitutionally defined jurisdiction is one of the main factors for 
determining relative weights of the resources available to each order of government with 
respect to their interactions.
1662
 A constitution allocates legislative authority so that the 
scope of such activity is limited to what a constitution permits the legislatures to do.
1663
 
In particular, legislatures cannot legislate outside their authority since that would be 
“ultra vires”, which is Latin for “beyond the powers”.
1664
 Legislative authority to make 
laws is a factor in intergovernmental relations; for example, if a government does not 
have the authority to make certain laws, it would have to work with the government that 
does have authority in a cooperative manner to try and achieve its goals.
1665
 
The Constitution Act
1666
 is the source of federalism in Canada.
1667
 One of the most 
important features is the division of power in sections 91 and 92.
1668
 These sections 
provide a list of legislative responsibilities for both the federal and provincial levels of 
government respectively.
1669
 Section 91
1670
 lists legislative responsibilities for the federal 
Parliament, some of which include the regulation of trade and commerce and national 
defence, while section 92
1671
 provides a list of responsibilities for the provinces, some of 
which include property and civil rights and municipalities. 
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Jurisdictional issues arise in Canada’s federated system regarding the regulation of labour 
and employment (provincial) and data protection (federal).
1672
 Put another way, there are 
several important jurisdictional elements to note regarding labour and employment and 
data protection in Canada’s private sector. To fully grasp the ramifications of this fact, it 
is necessary to explore the inner workings of each regime. 
Starting with labour and employment, the governance of nonunionized employment is 
federally, provincially, or territorially regulated, and each jurisdiction has its own version 
of employment standards legislation.
1673
 The content of employment standards legislation 
of each jurisdiction is similar in nature, and discusses workplace topics including: 
compensation; employment records; hours of work; overtime; holidays; vacations; leaves 
of absence; terminations; layoffs; termination pay; severance pay; as well as penalties and 
offences.
1674
  
Likewise, the governance of unionized employment is federally, provincially, or 
territorially regulated, and each jurisdiction has its own version of labour relations 
legislation.
1675
 The content of legislation of each jurisdiction is comparable and discusses 
workplace topics including: the establishment of labour relations boards, powers, and 
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remedies; the rights of employees to be members of unions and the rights of employers to 
be members of employers’ organizations; the certification process and voluntary 
recognition of unions; bargaining rights and revocation of bargaining rights; collective 
bargaining; collective agreements; mediation; strikes and lockouts; essential services; 
picketing; arbitration; prohibited practices; along with offences and penalties.
1676
 
Therefore, if my goal is to advise Parliament on how to proceed with lawmaking in 
respect of issues solely related to labour and employment, it is important to mention that 
Parliament is limited to creating laws only in the federally regulated jurisdiction, namely 
in the Canada Labour Code,
1677
 which contains rules regarding the employment 
standards in Part III, and rules concerning industrial relations in Part I. By federally 
regulated, I mean that the legislation applies to any work, undertaking or business that is 
within the legislative authority of Parliament.
1678
 In contrast, for example, the Ontario 
government would be responsible for creating legislative changes to its Employment 
Standards Act
1679
 and its Labour Relations Act
1680
 concerning employment standards and 
labour relations respectively. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, Parliament is limited in that it can only 
legislate within its jurisdictional authority and thus can only make changes to the 
federally regulated jurisdiction in labour and employment. This creates a noteworthy 
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challenge when one strives to make legislative changes involving workplace privacy to 
apply throughout Canada. Privacy is set up differently in Canada compared to 
employment, and this adds further complications. 
More precisely, in Canada’s private sector, the key piece of omnibus privacy legislation 
is PIPEDA.
1681
 It applies to every organization in respect of personal information that the 
organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities, or is about 
an employee of, or an applicant for employment with, the organization and that the 
organization collects, uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal 
work, undertaking or business.
1682
 Specifically regarding employment, it applies to a 
federal work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of 
Parliament.
1683
 Though it applies to inter-provincial operations, PIPEDA does not apply 
to organizations operating entirely within provincially regulated jurisdictions where a 
province has legislation that has been deemed substantially similar to it, and those 
particular provincial statutes apply instead; Alberta, British Columbia, and Québec all 
have private sector privacy legislation that has been deemed substantially similar to 
PIPEDA.
1684
 More explicitly, AB PIPA,
1685
 BC PIPA,
1686
 and QC Act
1687
 are considered 
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to be substantially similar to PIPEDA. Further, the two substantially similar provinces, 
Alberta and British Columbia, have privacy laws that apply to employment 
information.
1688
  
Declaring provincial legislation substantially similar allows the provinces and territories 
the flexibility to adapt and tailor their own private sector legislation to the specific needs 
and conditions of their jurisdiction while meeting the intent of PIPEDA.
1689
 Since 
PIPEDA is considered to be the threshold or floor, substantially similar legislation must 
be equal to or superior to PIPEDA in the degree and quality of privacy protection.
1690
 
Substantially similar provinces are expected to: incorporate the ten principles in Schedule 
1 of PIPEDA
1691
 (they do not have to be enumerated distinctly, but they must all be 
present); provide for independent and effective oversight and redress mechanism with 
powers to investigate; and restrict the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information to purposes that are appropriate or legitimate.
1692
  
Indeed, there are several complexities when it comes to the application of privacy 
legislation in Canada, especially in light of the interplay between PIPEDA, AB PIPA, and 
BC PIPA. Perhaps the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has most 
effectively summarized the situation regarding application: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
1687
 An Act respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1 [QC 
Act]. 
1688
 AB PIPA, supra note 1685 at s 4; BC PIPA, supra note 1686 at s 3.  
1689
 Notice (Industry Canada), (2002) C Gaz I 2388 (Process for the Determination of Substantially Similar 
Provincial Legislation by the Governor in Council) [Notice]. 
1690
 Ibid at 2387. 
1691
 PIPEDA, supra note 1681 at Schedule 1. 
1692
 Notice, supra note 1689 at 2388. See also Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Provincial 
Legislation Deemed Substantially Similar to PIPEDA” (29 May 2017), online: Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/the-personal-
information-protection-and-electronic-documents-act-pipeda/r_o_p/provincial-legislation-deemed-
substantially-similar-to-pipeda/>. 
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What are key points about PIPEDA, PIPA Alberta and PIPA BC?  
 PIPEDA applies to federal works, undertakings or businesses (FWUBs). 
 PIPEDA applies to the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information in the course of a commercial activity and across borders. 
PIPEDA also applies within provinces without substantially similar 
private sector privacy legislation. 
 PIPEDA applies to employee information only in connection with a 
FWUB. 
 The provincial PIPAs apply to provincially regulated private sector 
organizations. 
 Employee information held by provincially-regulated organizations in 
Alberta and B.C. is covered by the provincial PIPAs
1693
 
To that end, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada suggests that 
organizations ask themselves a few questions in order to determine what private sector 
privacy law applies to them.
1694
 When asking about the province in which the 
organization operates, if the organization is not a federal work, undertaking or business, 
and it operates internally in a province with private sector privacy legislation that is 
deemed to be substantially similar (British Columbia, Alberta, and Québec), then the 
organization has to comply with that province’s law.
1695
 If the province does not have 
private sector privacy legislation, PIPEDA is the only statute that would apply.
1696
 Also, 
if considering the issue of employment, PIPEDA does not apply to employee information 
in provincially regulated organizations.
1697
 If an organization operates in more than one 
province, it may have to comply with more than one statute, depending on the 
jurisdiction.
1698
 Regarding the question of interprovincial trade and commerce, such as 
sending a mailing list from one province to another, trans-border data flows in a 
commercial context are covered by PIPEDA because of the federal government’s 
                                                 
1693
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Questions and Answers Regarding the Application of 
PIPEDA, Alberta and British Columbia's Personal Information Protection Acts” (November 2004), online: 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/> [Privacy Commissioner, 
“Questions”]. 
1694
 Ibid. 
1695
 Ibid. 
1696
 Ibid. 
1697
 Ibid. 
1698
 Ibid. 
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constitutional power; the same is true for international trans-border data flows, such as 
sending customer information to a loyalty program in another country.
1699
 When asking 
about the type of organization, organizations are also recommended to look at the 
definition of “organization” in the particular statute to decide whether it applies.
1700
 
Another consideration regarding application is that section 12(1)(a) of PIPEDA
1701
 states 
that, before a complainant can make a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
the complainant must first exhaust grievance or other review procedures that are 
otherwise reasonably available; this means that employees in unionized workplaces 
wishing to make a complaint must first go through the stages of the grievance procedure 
as discussed in detail in the unionized workplace privacy cases in Chapter 5.
1702
 
Therefore, if my goal is to advise Parliament on how to proceed with lawmaking in 
respect of issues related to privacy in employment, it is important to mention that 
Parliament is limited to creating laws only in the federally regulated jurisdiction, namely 
in PIPEDA. An additional challenge is dealing with the substantially similar provinces 
that are expected to meet certain criteria in order to be deemed substantially similar;
1703
 
for Alberta and British Columbia, employee information held by provincially regulated 
organizations is covered by the provincial AB PIPA and BC PIPA respectively, which is 
outside the scope of Parliament’s legislative authority.
1704
  
                                                 
1699
 Ibid. In fact, all businesses operating in Canada and handling personal information that crosses 
provincial or national borders are subject to PIPEDA regardless of the province or territory in which they 
are based, including provinces with substantially similar legislation. See Privacy Commissioner, “Brief”, 
supra note 1672. 
1700
 Privacy Commissioner, “Questions”, supra note 1693. 
1701
 PIPEDA, supra note 1681 at s 12(1). 
1702
 Even though there may be fewer PIPEDA complaints made by unionized workers because of section 
12(1)(a), I assert that it is still necessary to examine labour arbitrations regarding unionized privacy 
disputes because these workplace privacy cases provide a rich body of case law that provides significant 
insights about how to best close the electronic surveillance gap. 
1703
 Notice, supra note 1689 at 2388. 
1704
 One way to deal with this challenge could be to ask the substantially similar provinces to incorporate 
the main ideas of the workplace privacy regime into their own legislation within a reasonable period of 
time, so they too can close the electronic surveillance gap in employment. For example, in UFCW, Local 
401 v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2013 SCC 62 at para 41, the Supreme Court of 
Canada gave the legislature 12 months to make AB PIPA compliant as a result of its decision. 
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It is helpful to consider a couple of examples when understanding the combination of 
labour and employment and data protection in Canada, and let me assume that we are 
operating entirely in one province.
1705
 If we specifically consider privacy regarding 
employment information in British Columbia, the federally regulated jurisdiction would 
be governed by PIPEDA, and the provincially regulated jurisdiction would be governed 
by BC PIPA. In contrast, if we specifically consider privacy dealing with employment 
information in Ontario, the federally regulated jurisdiction would be governed by 
PIPEDA, and the provincially regulated jurisdiction would not be governed by any 
substantially similar legislation or by PIPEDA. As a result, in provinces like Ontario 
without substantially similar legislation as in Alberta and British Columbia, there would 
not be the same kinds of legislative workplace privacy protections as provided in 
PIPEDA.  
The third challenge that I confronted went beyond the fusion of labour and employment 
and data protection areas of law—I also had to integrate two competing mindsets 
pertaining to these fields. More precisely, as I alluded to in Chapter 5, there appears to be 
a difference in approach when tackling data protection issues compared to labour and 
employment issues; this struggle is manifested in workplace privacy cases through split 
decisions and passionate dissents. That is, the data protection realm tends to focus on 
strict compliance with the rules which are mostly contained in legislation and company 
policies. Contrarily, the labour relations environment is more inclined to focus on using a 
contextual approach characterized by several employment principles such as progressive 
discipline and decision makers giving the employee the benefit of the doubt by 
conducting a thorough examination of aggravating and mitigating factors and use of 
remedial authority to award remedies such as reinstatement.  
This dissertation requires a synthesis of these opposing mindsets in order to generate 
ideas that can be used to craft provisions for the new workplace privacy regime. A useful 
                                                 
1705
 This is important to note because all businesses operating in Canada and handling personal information 
that crosses provincial or national borders are subject to PIPEDA regardless of the province or territory in 
which they are based, including provinces with substantially similar legislation. See Privacy Commissioner, 
“Brief”, supra note 1672. 
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tactic is to focus on some of the commonalities of these areas of law that are relevant to 
privacy and keep them in the back of mind when designing the new workplace privacy 
regime. These commonalities became apparent during the analyses that took place in 
Chapters 4 and 5. For example, one commonality is balance and proportionality. In 
labour and employment disciplinary decisions, a sanction must be proportionate to the 
misconduct. Likewise, in data protection, there must be a fair balancing of the interests of 
the parties, and a proportionality analysis makes sure that legitimate interests are 
necessary and ensures that the intrusiveness of measures corresponds to the degree of risk 
experienced.   
Another commonality is trust. More precisely, there is no question that a core aspect of 
the employment relationship is trust; when there is a breach of trust, there is a breakdown 
in the employment relationship. Similarly, trust is critical in a data protection regime 
because there needs to be trust that any processing will not exceed what is necessary in 
the circumstances; if it goes beyond what is necessary or is too intrusive, then individuals 
feel violated and lose trust in the privacy regime. 
6.2 The Plan for Designing a New Workplace Privacy 
Regime 
My goal in Chapters 4 and 5 was to extract principles and values from various privacy 
provisions and workplace privacy cases. The aim was to think as broadly as possible 
about privacy, consent, and electronic surveillance to take full advantage of the 
information contained in the privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases. At that 
stage, the main concern involved identifying and pulling out relevant principles and 
values. It is now time to convert those ideas into some proposed statutory provisions; this 
means that there will likely be more ideas than actual proposed provisions, since I will 
only be providing examples of specific provisions that pertain to closing the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment. 
It is important to ask, however, where to place the proposed provisions: should they be 
placed in the data protection regime? Or in the labour and employment regime? Since the 
goal is to create a regime that contains provisions that will effectively close the electronic 
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surveillance gap in employment, and given that I take myself to be advising Parliament 
on proposed provisions for a new workplace privacy regime, I can recommend amending 
either PIPEDA or the Canada Labour Code. Ultimately, after considering the options and 
their implications, I have decided to suggest that the proposed provisions be placed in 
PIPEDA. This appears to be the most efficient choice. In particular, it is my contention 
that since some provisions in PIPEDA need to be removed and modified pursuant to my 
proposals in Chapter 4, and since other provisions need to be created in a structured and 
well-organized manner, the most effective route is for Parliament to adopt all of my ideas 
that I have proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 and simply place them in PIPEDA.  
With respect to implementation, since the proposed provisions would only apply in the 
federally regulated jurisdiction, it may be beneficial to view the new workplace privacy 
regime as a model for the provinces. It may also be useful to reach out to the provinces in 
a cooperative manner, and offer to assist them in incorporating some of the ideas into 
their employment standards and labour relations legislation (or perhaps even future 
substantially similar data protection legislation, if they prefer) as they act within their 
legislative authority. Practically speaking, when a policy initiative needs to move 
forward, the two orders of government usually need to cooperate and promote positive 
intergovernmental relations.
1706
 Thus in the spirit of harmonization, it may be possible to 
follow in the footsteps of the European Union, which is known for its harmonizing 
efforts, and convince the provinces to use their legislative authority to promote this 
important workplace privacy initiative. After all, it can only be beneficial for Canada to 
present itself as a unified force having consistent privacy protections throughout the 
country in what is becoming a more GDPR-compliant privacy landscape; in order for 
Canada to continue doing business with EU, it will need to pay attention to the EU’s 
harmonizing pressures and ensure it keeps up with evolving societal values concerning 
privacy protection.
1707
 
                                                 
1706
 Brown, Bakvis & Baier, supra note 1658 at 7. 
1707
 Judgment of 16 July 2020, Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian 
Schrems (“Schrems II”), C‑311/18, EU:C:2020:559. In this case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (Grand Chamber) invalidated the US-EU Privacy Shield program, which was jointly created by the 
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Therefore, Plan A could be to make proposed provisions and hope for the best, viewing 
the new workplace privacy regime as a model that could be adopted by provinces in their 
own way and in their own time when acting within their legislative authority. Plan B 
could involve being somewhat more proactive to affect more meaningful change by 
reaching out to provinces and working with them to achieve higher levels of 
harmonization. I would like to suggest that it would be a shame to not make any efforts to 
generate at least a couple of creative ideas to support the workplace privacy regime 
initiative. Thus, a further level could be Plan C, where specific workplace privacy 
collaborative programs could be created in conjunction with the provinces (perhaps 
through a partnership between the Ministries of Labour and the Information and Privacy 
Ombudspersons and Commissioners in Canada), which are supported using the federal 
spending power as a vehicle to promote Canada’s goals.
1708
 Perhaps new workplace 
privacy programs could facilitate the creation of frameworks that resemble the new 
workplace privacy regime but that can exist in a practical format that meets the needs of 
organizations in the short-term; these programs could set the stage for future legislative 
developments in these provinces so that there can be a more gradual closing of the 
electronic surveillance gap in employment in this regard.  
In terms of how to go about creating the proposed provisions to carry out my ideas, I 
have decided to work with the provisions that already exist in PIPEDA where possible, 
removing and modifying when necessary. However, some ideas that I proposed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 do not exist anywhere in the legislation; thus, in those situations, I will 
need to add new provisions to PIPEDA.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
US Department of Commerce and the European Commission to replace the previously recognized but later 
abandoned Safe Harbour program. 
1708
 Brown, Bakvis & Baier, supra note 1658 at 59–60, 119−125. 
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6.3 Incorporating Previous Guidance by the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada 
Before proposing the new workplace privacy regime, it is important to review the 
guidance
1709
 that has been provided by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada and highlight some of its implications for the new workplace privacy regime. 
Throughout the dissertation, I referred to guidance from the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada as it became relevant to the discussion. I explained that there 
were several ideas that could be useful for the new workplace privacy regime, ideas that 
were not expressly included in PIPEDA’s provisions.  
More specifically, I referred to the 2018–2019 Annual Report
1710
 when discussing the 
need to draft rights-based data protections in Theme 1 and also the need to create order-
making powers, penalties, and fines in Theme 3. I emphasized the need to use language 
that encapsulated the dignity/human rights theoretical approach to privacy by 
incorporating it into the data protection provisions. I also noted that it was necessary to 
equip the Privacy Commissioner with tools that would allow for the effective 
enforcement of any findings made under PIPEDA. 
I mentioned, “Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent”
1711
 in Theme 2 when 
arguing that employees are not in a position to provide, withhold, or revoke consent in 
situations involving electronic surveillance, and I suggested that new provisions were 
required to tackle this issue. I underlined the importance of finding other solutions than 
                                                 
1709
 The guidance to which I refer comes from tips, guidelines, guidance documents, and  reports of the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Some have been created in conjunction with the 
Information and Privacy Commissioners of Alberta and British Columbia (such as the document discussing 
a BYOD Program as discussed below). 
1710
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “2018-2019 Annual Report to Parliament on the 
Privacy Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act”(10 December 2019), 
online (pdf): Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/5076/ar_201819_eng.pdf > [Privacy Commissioner, “2018–2019 Annual 
Report”]. 
1711
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Guidelines for Obtaining Meaningful Consent” (24 
May 2018), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-
topics/collecting-personal-information/consent/gl_omc_201805/> [Privacy Commissioner, “Meaningful 
Consent”]. 
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the consent-based model that would be more appropriate for the employment context, 
namely the assessment of proportionality.   
In addition, I discussed, “Guidance on Covert Video Surveillance in the Private 
Sector”
1712
 in Theme 1 when arguing that “collection” as it currently is described in 
PIPEDA is insufficient for addressing situations involving electronic surveillance in 
employment, in Theme 2 when pointing out some dangerous aspects of certain PIPEDA 
provisions that could be covert in nature, and also in Lopez Ribalda
1713
 when discussing 
covert video surveillance policies. That is, I noted that the way in which collection is 
described in PIPEDA is insufficient when dealing with electronic surveillance issues in 
the employment context, and something more is required. Further, I stressed that the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has provided helpful comments related to 
covert video surveillance; the ideas in this document could be incorporated into the new 
workplace privacy regime.  
I also noted, “Privacy and Social Media in the Workplace”,
1714
 in Theme 1 when arguing 
that “collection” as it currently is in PIPEDA is insufficient for addressing situations 
involving electronic surveillance; I also discussed important considerations in respect of 
social media policies in Maxam Bulk Services.
1715
 In particular, I argued that the way in 
which collection is described in PIPEDA is insufficient when dealing with electronic 
surveillance issues in the employment context, and further provisions are required to 
clearly articulate what takes place in situations involving electronic surveillance. 
                                                 
1712
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Guidance on Covert Video Surveillance in the Private 
Sector” (May 2009), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-
topics/surveillance/video-surveillance-by-businesses/gd_cvs_20090527/> [Privacy Commissioner, “Video 
Surveillance”]. 
1713
 López Ribalda and Others v Spain, Applications 1874/13 and 8567/13, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber), 17 October 2019, rev’g Applications 1874/13 and 8567/13, Judgment of the Court (Third 
Section), 9 January 2018 [López Ribalda]. 
1714
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Privacy and Social Media in the Workplace” (August 
2019), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-
topics/employers-and-employees/mobile-devices-and-online-services-at-work/02_05_d_41_sn/> [Privacy 
Commissioner, “Social Media”]. 
1715
 Maxam Bulk Services and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 115 (Lebrun) (2015), 
2015 CarswellBC 2277 (Arbitrator: McConchie) [Maxam Bulk Services]. 
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Moreover, there have been some useful protective strategies involving social media that 
can be added to the new workplace privacy regime.  
In referring to various documents concerning mobile devices and in contemplating using 
a “bring your own device” (BYOD) program
1716
 when discussing social media in Maxam 
Bulk Services, I noted that, although this instructive information was not currently 
reflected in PIPEDA, it was very important to include it in the new workplace privacy 
regime in light of the privacy and security issues that can arise.  
Lastly, I also cited the findings in the report, “A Full Year of Mandatory Data Breach 
Reporting: What We’ve Learned and What Businesses Need to Know”
1717
 in my 
discussion about legitimate business interests that need to be considered when balancing 
the interests in Steel.
1718
 This was essential information to appreciate the context in which 
the parties were operating; more precisely, it was important to understand the kinds of 
threats faced by employers (breaches due to unauthorized data accesses), and why it was 
necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of employers while simultaneously 
protecting the privacy of employees. 
What the foregoing suggests is that, while the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada has generated many interesting ideas about how PIPEDA can apply to situations 
involving electronic surveillance in the employment context, these ideas are not currently 
included in PIPEDA.  
                                                 
1716
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Is a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Program the 
Right Choice for Your Organization?” (22 July 2015), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/technology-and-privacy/mobile-devices-and-
apps/gd_byod_201508/>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “10 Workplace Tips for 
Protecting Personal Information on Mobile Devices” (January 2011), online: Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada <https://priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/employers-and-employees/mobile-devices-
and-online-services-at-work/02_05_d_46_dpd/> ; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
“Contemplating a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) program?” (August 2015), online: Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/employers-and-employees/mobile-
devices-and-online-services-at-work/tips_byod/>. 
1717
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “A Full Year of Mandatory Data Breach Reporting: 
What We’ve Learned and What Businesses Need to Know” (31 October 2019), online (blog): Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/blog/20191031/> [Privacy Commissioner, 
“Breach Reporting”]. 
1718
 Steel v Coast Capital Savings Credit Union, 2015 BCCA 127, aff’g 2013 BCSC 527 [Steel]. 
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And in December 2019, when the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
released its 2018–2019 Annual Report
1719
 and discussed important topics regarding 
suggestions for privacy law reform in Canada,
1720
 it provided a model preamble and 
purpose statement for a revamped PIPEDA that would appear at the opening of the law 
and entrench privacy in its proper human rights framework.
1721
 Using a rights-based 
approach to data protection,
1722
 the model serves to provide guidance as to the values, 
principles, and objectives that should shape the interpretation of the law.
1723
 The Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada proposed wording for PIPEDA as follows: 
 
Proposed wording for PIPEDA 
Preamble 
WHEREAS privacy is a basic human right of every individual and a 
fundamental value reflected in international human rights instruments to 
which Canada is a signatory; 
WHEREAS the right to privacy protects individual autonomy and dignity, 
and is linked to the protection of reputation and freedom of thought and 
expression; 
WHEREAS privacy is essential to relations of mutual trust and confidence 
that are fundamental to the Canadian social fabric;  
WHEREAS privacy is essential to the preservation of democracy and the 
full and meaningful enjoyment and exercise of many of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
WHEREAS the current and evolving technological context facilitates the 
collection of massive quantities of personal data as well as the use of these 
data, whether in identifiable, aggregate or anonymized forms, in ways that 
can adversely impact individuals, groups and communities; 
WHEREAS the processing of personal data should be designed to serve 
humankind;  
                                                 
1719
 Privacy Commissioner, “2018–2019 Annual Report”, supra note 1710 at 11−18. 
1720
 Ibid at 8–24. 
1721
 Ibid at 22–23. 
1722
 Ibid at 12. 
1723
 Ibid at 22. 
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WHEREAS responsible processing of personal data can serve public 
interests such as economic growth, advances in health care and the 
protection of the environment; 
WHEREAS this law protects the privacy rights of individuals while 
recognizing the legitimate interest of organizations to collect, use and 
disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances and in ways that do not 
represent surveillance; 
WHEREAS the right to privacy must be balanced with other fundamental 
rights such as the right to freedom of expression in circumstances in which 
the collection, use or disclosure of personal information serves a legitimate 
public interest; 
AND WHEREAS this statute has been recognized by the courts as being 
quasi-constitutional in nature; 
Purpose 
The purposes of this Act are: 
(a) to implement the fundamental right to privacy of all persons in the 
commercial context through robust data protection that ensures that the 
processing of data is lawful, fair, proportional, transparent and accountable, 
and respects the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals; 
(b) to balance privacy rights with the right to freedom of expression in 
circumstances in which the collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information serves a legitimate public interest; 
(c) to balance privacy rights, where appropriate, with what the public 
interest requires; 
(d) to protect the privacy rights of individuals while recognizing the 
legitimate interest of organizations to collect, use and disclose personal 
information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider 
appropriate in the circumstances and in ways that do not represent 
surveillance; 
(e) to provide individuals with quick and effective remedies when their 
privacy rights have not been respected and to ensure the ongoing 
compliance by organizations with their obligations under this Act.
1724
 
                                                 
1724
 Ibid at 22–23 [emphasis added]. 
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When observing the above proposed preamble and purpose section created by the Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, I am encouraged because my ideas for the new 
workplace privacy regime appear to be in line with this proposed preamble and purpose; I 
also note that there is a brief mention of surveillance.
1725
 In my view, the explicit 
reference to surveillance provides a useful starting point for discussions regarding 
surveillance, and I believe that my proposed provisions in the new workplace privacy 
regime dealing with electronic surveillance in employment have the potential to build on 
this proposition.  
6.4 Examples of Proposed Workplace Privacy 
Provisions  
In this part, I propose some novel provisions for a new workplace privacy regime. These 
provisions fall under three general categories and involve modifying some existing 
provisions in Part 1 of PIPEDA,
1726
 reworking an existing fundamental principle in 
Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
1727
 and creating an innovative fundamental principle in Schedule 
1 of PIPEDA.
1728
   
I will proceed as follows. Under each category, I will first indicate how, in general, I 
propose to modify or update currently existing provisions, and then I will comment on 
the nature and effect of the proposed modifications.  
6.4.1 Modifying Existing Provisions in Part 1 of PIPEDA1729 
The goal of my proposed changes to Part 1 of PIPEDA
1730
 is to add, modify, or remove 
provisions in accordance with my suggestions contained in the analyses throughout the 
dissertation. There are six main changes in this category. Firstly, I propose adding new 
definitions that add clarity for supporting new provisions regarding electronic 
surveillance. Secondly, I propose modifying the purpose provision so that there is 
                                                 
1725
 Ibid. 
1726
 PIPEDA, supra note 1681 at ss 2−30. 
1727
 Ibid at Schedule 1. 
1728
 Ibid. 
1729
 Ibid at ss 2−30. 
1730
 Ibid. 
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reference to fundamental rights and freedoms, balance, and trust. Thirdly, I propose 
adding a provision regarding an employee’s ability to provide, withhold, or revoke 
consent and suggest an alternative. Fourthly, I propose removing or modifying specific 
provisions involving the employment relationship to create a more effective balancing of 
interests. Fifthly, I propose adding provisions that provide the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada with order-making powers and the ability to impose penalties by creating 
prohibitions, offences, and considerations for imposing fines, and by discussing the effect 
of the orders. And sixthly, I propose removing the sections that discuss applications to 
and hearings by the court in order to facilitate the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s 
order-making powers. 
The cumulative effect of these changes is to create a more robust regime that is clearer, 
more focused, more reflective of the vulnerability of employees in the employment 
relationships, and better suited to empower the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to carry 
out a meaningful deterrence approach that is necessary in today’s rapidly evolving 
technological context.  
To this end, I first propose adding some definitions to section 2(1) of PIPEDA.
1731
 
Definitions 
2 (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in this Part. 
assessment of proportionality means a balancing of interests to determine 
whether the processing in question is necessary for the purposes of the 
legitimate interests of employers, except where such interests are overridden 
by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of employees that 
require data protection.  
electronic surveillance means the systematic creation and/or use of personal 
data for the investigation or monitoring of actions or communications of one 
or more persons.  
 
                                                 
1731
 Ibid at s 2(1). 
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employer means an organization that collects, uses or discloses personal 
information or conducts electronic surveillance of employees or applicants 
for employment with the organization, in connection with the operation of a 
federal work, undertaking or business in line with section 4(1)(b).  
excessive means more than necessary. 
four temporal dimensions includes 
 (a) the timeframe in which the electronic surveillance is conducted    
(ephemeral, across a single span of time, across recurrent spans such as 
within 24-hour cycles, or scattered across time following a trigger);  
 (b) the intensity with which the electronic surveillance is conducted 
(once, repeated, or continuous);  
 (c) the persistence of consequences of the electronic surveillance 
(ephemeral because it is limited to observation, short-to-medium term 
because it is recorded, or long-term or permanent because it is recorded 
and archived); and 
(d) the time period within which the electronic surveillance is applied 
(the present, real-time use, the past through retrospective use, or the 
future through prospective or predictive use). 
function creep means the repurposing of personal data for new uses without 
the knowledge of the owner of the personal data. 
overly intrusive means causing disruption or adverse effects through being 
unwelcome or uninvited. 
personal data is the same as personal information, which means 
information about an identifiable individual. 
processing means any operation or set of operations which is performed on 
personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction. 
profiling means any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to a natural person, in particular to analyze or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, 
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
movements.  
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unreasonable electronic surveillance means the use of electronic 
surveillance by an employer that is excessive and/or overly intrusive, and 
which includes profiling. 
Second, in line with my recommendation to refer specifically to fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the purpose section of the legislation, I propose replacing the current section 
3 of PIPEDA
1732
 with a new section 3. In this new provision I refer to the two main 
themes that run throughout the entire dissertation that pertain to both data protection and 
employment, namely balance and trust. Since this part deals with the removal and 
replacement of a provision, I will list the provision before and after my proposed changes 
so the differences between the two can be seen. 
Before the changes: 
Purpose 
3 The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology 
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to 
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a 
manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to 
their personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or 
disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.
1733
 
After the changes: 
Purpose 
3 The purpose of this Part is to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of individuals and in particular their right to the protection of personal data, 
where the focus is on achieving a fair balance of rights and legitimate 
interests in a manner that enhances trust among the parties involved as well 
as in the data protection regime.  
Third, I propose adding a provision in a new section, 6.1(2), dealing with employee 
consent and the employment relationship. 
 
                                                 
1732
 Ibid at s 3. 
1733
 Ibid. 
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Consent in employment 
6.1 (2) For the purposes of clauses 4.3 and 4.11 of Schedule 1, employees 
are hardly ever in a position to freely give, withhold, or revoke consent with 
respect to the collection, use or disclosure of their personal information, or 
to electronic surveillance when dealing with employers because of the 
inherent unequal bargaining power that is present in the employment 
relationship. Since employees can only give free consent in rare 
circumstances when no consequences at all are connected to acceptance or 
rejection of an offer, it is necessary to conduct an assessment of 
proportionality in most cases.  
Fourth, I propose removing section 7.3 of PIPEDA
1734
 entirely. This section allows 
employers to collect, use and disclose personal information without the consent of 
employees if it is to manage or terminate an employment relationship and as long as the 
employees are informed of the collection, use or disclosure of that information.
1735
 
Likewise, I propose removing provisions in section 7.4 of PIPEDA
1736
 that enable 
organizations to use and disclose employees’ personal information for purposes other 
than those for which the information was collected in any of the circumstances set out in 
section 7.3 of PIPEDA.
1737
 Since this part deals with removal of some or all of a 
provision, I will list the provisions before and after my proposed changes so the 
differences between the two can be seen. 
Before the changes: 
Employment relationship 
7.3 In addition to the circumstances set out in section 7, for the purpose of 
clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, 
a federal work, undertaking or business may collect, use and disclose 
personal information without the consent of the individual if 
(a) the collection, use or disclosure is necessary to establish, manage or 
terminate an employment relationship between the federal work, 
undertaking or business and the individual; and 
                                                 
1734
 Ibid at s 7.3. 
1735
 Ibid. 
1736
 Ibid at s 7.4. 
1737
 Ibid at s 7.3. 
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(b) the federal work, undertaking or business has informed the individual 
that the personal information will be or may be collected, used or 
disclosed for those purposes. 
Use without consent 
7.4 (1) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may use personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2) or section 7.3. 
Disclosure without consent 
(2) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may disclose personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2) or section 7.3.
1738
 
After the changes: 
7.3 [Repealed, 2020]  
Use without consent 
7.4 (1) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may use personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2).  
Disclosure without consent 
(2) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may disclose personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2). 
Fifth, I propose adding a new provision, section 12.3, that enables the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada to proactively inspect the premises of an employer, regardless 
of whether a complaint is made, in order to determine whether the employer is in 
compliance and to more effectively facilitate its order-making powers. Similarly, I 
propose adding provisions prohibiting acts of unreasonable electronic surveillance in new 
sections, 27.2 and 27.3; creating some corresponding fines in new sections, 28.1 and 
28.2; listing the considerations when imposing fines in a new section, 28.3; and stating 
                                                 
1738
 Ibid at ss 7.3−7.4. 
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the effect of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s orders in a new section, 28.4. This 
results in the following new sections: 
Powers of the Commissioner  
12.3 (1) Regardless of whether a complaint is made, the Commissioner may 
do one or more of the following: 
 (a) at any reasonable time, enter any premises, other than a dwelling-
house, occupied by an employer on satisfying any security requirements 
of the organization relating to the premises; 
 (b) converse in private with any person in any premises entered under 
paragraph (a) and otherwise carry out in those premises any inquiries that 
the Commissioner sees fit; and 
 (c) examine or obtain copies of or extracts from records found in any 
premises entered under paragraph (a) for the purposes of determining 
whether the employer is in compliance with this Act, including sections 
27.2−27.3. 
(2) The Commissioner may do one or more of the following:  
(a) issue warnings to the employer that certain intended electronic 
surveillance operations are likely to infringe provisions of this Act, 
including sections 27.2−27.3; 
(b) order the employer to cease committing acts of unreasonable 
electronic surveillance of employees;  
(c) order the employer to correct its electronic surveillance practices in 
order to comply with this Act, and where appropriate, in a specified 
manner and within a specified period;  
(d) impose a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on an 
employer’s electronic surveillance operations; and 
(e) impose fines as set out in section 28.1−28.2. 
Prohibition 
27.2 For the purposes of clause 4.11 of Schedule 1, no employer shall 
commit acts of unreasonable electronic surveillance of employees. 
27.3 For the purposes of clause 4.11 of Schedule 1, no employer shall 
conduct mass electronic surveillance, such as the unreasonable electronic 
surveillance of large numbers of employees in one or more work locations, 
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for the purposes of manipulating and controlling the employees or their 
personal data in ways that are detrimental to them.  
Offence and punishment 
28.1 Every employer that contravenes section 27.2 is guilty of an offence 
and is liable to a fine not exceeding $100,000, and for a subsequent offence, 
a fine not exceeding $200,000. 
28.2 Every employer that contravenes section 27.3 is guilty of an offence 
and is liable to a fine not exceeding $10 million. 
Considerations for imposing fines 
28.3 When deciding whether to impose fines and amounts of fines in each 
individual case regarding sections 28.1 and 28.2, due regard shall be given 
to the following considerations: 
(a) nature, severity, degree of data sensitivity, and duration;  
(b) the intentional or negligent character; 
(c) any action taken to mitigate the damage suffered by individuals;  
(d) the types of safeguards used; 
(e) any relevant previous violations;  
(f) the degree of cooperation with the Privacy Commissioner in the 
current matter;  
(g) compliance with previous orders of the Privacy Commissioner;  
(h) the size of the organization; 
(i) the amount of annual gross profits earned by the organization; 
(j) any other aggravating or mitigating factors such as financial benefits 
gained or losses avoided as a result of the violation. 
Effect of the Commissioner’s orders 
28.4 A decision of the Commissioner becomes executory as a judgment of 
the Court and has all the effects of such a judgment once filed with the 
Court. 
Sixth, in light of the above newly-created order-making powers and penalties of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, I propose removing provisions involving applications 
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to and hearings by the court under sections 14 through to 17.2 of PIPEDA.
1739
 Since this 
part deals with the removal of provisions, I will list the provisions before and after my 
proposed changes so the differences between the two can be seen.  
Before the changes: 
Hearing by Court 
Application 
14 (1) A complainant may, after receiving the Commissioner’s report or 
being notified under subsection 12.2(3) that the investigation of the 
complaint has been discontinued, apply to the Court for a hearing in respect 
of any matter in respect of which the complaint was made, or that is referred 
to in the Commissioner’s report, and that is referred to in clause 4.1.3, 4.2, 
4.3.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 or 4.8 of Schedule 1, in clause 4.3, 4.5 or 4.9 of that 
Schedule as modified or clarified by Division 1 or 1.1, in subsection 5(3) or 
8(6) or (7), in section 10 or in Division 1.1. 
Time for application 
(2) A complainant shall make an application within one year after the report 
or notification is sent or within any longer period that the Court may, either 
before or after the expiry of that year, allow. 
For greater certainty 
(3) For greater certainty, subsections (1) and (2) apply in the same manner 
to complaints referred to in subsection 11(2) as to complaints referred to in 
subsection 11(1). 
Commissioner may apply or appear 
15 The Commissioner may, in respect of a complaint that the Commissioner 
did not initiate, 
(a) apply to the Court, within the time limited by section 14, for a 
hearing in respect of any matter described in that section, if the 
Commissioner has the consent of the complainant; 
(b) appear before the Court on behalf of any complainant who has 
applied for a hearing under section 14; or 
                                                 
1739
 Ibid at ss 14−17.2. 
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(c) with leave of the Court, appear as a party to any hearing applied for 
under section 14. 
Remedies 
16 The Court may, in addition to any other remedies it may give, 
(a) order an organization to correct its practices in order to comply with 
Divisions 1 and 1.1; 
(b) order an organization to publish a notice of any action taken or 
proposed to be taken to correct its practices, whether or not ordered to 
correct them under paragraph (a); and 
(c) award damages to the complainant, including damages for any 
humiliation that the complainant has suffered. 
Summary hearings 
17 (1) An application made under section 14 or 15 shall be heard and 
determined without delay and in a summary way unless the Court considers 
it inappropriate to do so. 
Precautions 
(2) In any proceedings arising from an application made under section 14 or 
15, the Court shall take every reasonable precaution, including, when 
appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and conducting hearings in 
camera, to avoid the disclosure by the Court or any person of any 
information or other material that the organization would be authorized to 
refuse to disclose if it were requested under clause 4.9 of Schedule 1. 
Compliance agreement 
17.1 (1) If the Commissioner believes on reasonable grounds that an 
organization has committed, is about to commit or is likely to commit an act 
or omission that could constitute a contravention of a provision of Division 
1 or 1.1 or a failure to follow a recommendation set out in Schedule 1, the 
Commissioner may enter into a compliance agreement, aimed at ensuring 
compliance with this Part, with that organization. 
Terms 
(2) A compliance agreement may contain any terms that the Commissioner 
considers necessary to ensure compliance with this Part. 
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Effect of compliance agreement — no application 
(3) When a compliance agreement is entered into, the Commissioner, in 
respect of any matter covered under the agreement, 
(a) shall not apply to the Court for a hearing under subsection 14(1) or 
paragraph 15(a); and 
(b) shall apply to the court for the suspension of any pending 
applications that were made by the Commissioner under those 
provisions. 
For greater certainty 
(4) For greater certainty, a compliance agreement does not preclude 
 (a) an individual from applying for a hearing under section 14; or 
 (b) the prosecution of an offence under the Act. 
Agreement complied with 
17.2 (1) If the Commissioner is of the opinion that a compliance agreement 
has been complied with, the Commissioner shall provide written notice to 
that effect to the organization and withdraw any applications that were made 
under subsection 14(1) or paragraph 15(a) in respect of any matter covered 
under the agreement. 
Agreement not complied with 
(2) If the Commissioner is of the opinion that an organization is not 
complying with the terms of a compliance agreement, the Commissioner 
shall notify the organization and may apply to the Court for 
(a) an order requiring the organization to comply with the terms of the 
agreement, in addition to any other remedies it may give; or 
(b) a hearing under subsection 14(1) or paragraph 15(a) or to reinstate 
proceedings that have been suspended as a result of an application made 
under paragraph 17.1(3)(b). 
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Time for application 
(3) Despite subsection 14(2), the application shall be made within one year 
after notification is sent or within any longer period that the Court may, 
either before or after the expiry of that year, allow.
1740
 
After the changes: 
14 [Repealed, 2020] 
15 [Repealed, 2020] 
16 [Repealed, 2020] 
17 [Repealed, 2020] 
17.1 [Repealed, 2020] 
17.2 [Repealed, 2020] 
In my view, the cumulative effect of these changes is that some of the issues that I 
raised in the problem statement of the Introduction can now be addressed. For example, 
the proposed definitions provide clarity and help set the stage for the provisions in the 
next categories that aim to close the electronic surveillance gap. The proposed provision 
regarding consent, for example, points to the need to use an alternative to a consent 
model, namely an assessment of proportionality, when dealing with employment 
relationships in the regime. The changes made to the provisions involving the 
employment relationship highlight the problem that exists when dealing with power 
imbalances and goes some way to even out the unequal power distribution between the 
parties. The proposed prohibitions, offences, and fines help to strengthen the regime by 
making it more current and responsive to technology, leading to an increased level of 
trust in the regime.   
                                                 
1740
 Ibid. 
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6.4.2 Reworking Existing Fundamental Principles in Schedule 1 of 
PIPEDA1741 
Schedule 1 of PIPEDA includes Principle 3 in clause 4.3,
1742
 which deals with consent. 
Pursuant to my discussion regarding an employee’s ability to provide, withhold, or 
revoke consent, and in line with my proposed provision 6.1(2), it is my view that the 
opening of clause 4.3
1743
 requires some reworking. The effect of these changes is that it 
will be clearer from the outset that the employment relationship is unique, and the 
consent model is in most cases inappropriate in the employment context. In particular, it 
is necessary to conduct an assessment of proportionality in most cases. Since the focus of 
this dissertation is on situations involving electronic surveillance, detail regarding how to 
conduct the assessment of proportionality as it pertains to situations involving electronic 
surveillance is located in the proposed Principle 11 in clause 4.11.   
To this end, I propose modifying the provision by adding eight lines (the last eight lines 
in underlining) at the end of the opening of clause 4.3 of PIPEDA
1744
 dealing with 
consent, to include language that makes it clear that employees are not in a position to 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent, and it is necessary to conduct an assessment of 
proportionality in most cases. As mentioned in the newly created definitions above, the 
assessment of proportionality can be generally understood as a balancing of interests to 
determine whether the processing in question is necessary for the purposes of the 
legitimate interests of employers, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of employees that require data protection.   
4.3 Principle 3 – Consent 
The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, 
use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. 
Note: In certain circumstances personal information can be collected, used, 
or disclosed without the knowledge and consent of the individual. For 
                                                 
1741
 Ibid at Schedule 1. 
1742
 Ibid at Schedule 1, cl 4.3. 
1743
 Ibid. 
1744
 Ibid. 
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example, legal, medical, or security reasons may make it impossible or 
impractical to seek consent. When information is being collected for the 
detection and prevention of fraud or for law enforcement, seeking the 
consent of the individual might defeat the purpose of collecting the 
information. Seeking consent may be impossible or inappropriate when the 
individual is a minor, seriously ill, or mentally incapacitated. In addition, 
organizations that do not have a direct relationship with the individual may 
not always be able to seek consent. For example, seeking consent may be 
impractical for a charity or a direct-marketing firm that wishes to acquire a 
mailing list from another organization. In such cases, the organization 
providing the list would be expected to obtain consent before disclosing 
personal information. Furthermore, employees are hardly ever in a position 
to freely give, withhold, or revoke consent when dealing with employers 
because of the inherent unequal bargaining power that is present in the 
employment relationship. Since employees can only give free consent in 
rare circumstances when no consequences at all are connected to acceptance 
or rejection of an offer, seeking consent from employees or expecting that 
they may be able to withhold or revoke consent is often impractical. It is 
necessary to conduct an assessment of proportionality in most cases. 
6.4.3 Creating a New Fundamental Principle in Schedule 1 of 
PIPEDA1745 Entitled Electronic Surveillance: Working Within 
Reason  
Finally, I propose adding a new fundamental principle in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
1746
 
entitled Electronic Surveillance: Working Within Reason. The goal of this new 
fundamental principle is to create simple, fundamental provisions that are clear and easy 
to understand. The provisions I propose are a combination of all my suggestions 
stemming from my analyses throughout Chapters 4 and 5, which have been boiled down 
into 11 foundational points. The main points involve: (1) duties of care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality; (2) privacy by design; (3) balanced policies and procedures; (4) creating 
an ethical work culture as part of a data protection program; (5) data impact risk 
assessments when dealing with new technologies; (6) assessments of proportionality to 
determine if electronic surveillance is can be conducted/can continue to be conducted; (7) 
social media; (8) mobile digital devices; (9) electronic communications; (10) video 
surveillance; and (11) situations involving electronic surveillance outside the workplace. 
                                                 
1745
 Ibid at Schedule 1. 
1746
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The effect of these changes is to create a more meaningful set of foundational principles 
that can be used to close the electronic surveillance gap in the employment context, by 
setting out what I believe are essential considerations that should be addressed when 
dealing with situations involving electronic surveillance in employment.  
Since Principle 11 in clause 4.11 has been placed in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA
1747
 it is 
important to note the effect of the proposed provisions by looking to section 5 of 
PIPEDA:
1748
  
Compliance with obligations 
5 (1) Subject to sections 6 to 9, every organization shall comply with the 
obligations set out in Schedule 1. 
Meaning of should 
(2) The word should, when used in Schedule 1, indicates a recommendation 
and does not impose an obligation.
1749
 
To that end, for the purposes of Principle 11 in clause 4.11, it follows that employers 
would have to comply with the proposed obligations and consider the word, “should” to 
be a recommendation. The Principle includes 11 subsidiary sections, as set out below. 
4.11 Principle 11 — Electronic Surveillance: Working Within Reason 
Employees are in a vulnerable position and are at risk of being exploited by 
employers due to the inherent unequal bargaining power that is present in 
the employment relationship. Since employees are not in a position to freely 
provide, withhold, or revoke consent in most situations involving electronic 
surveillance, seeking consent from employees or expecting that they may be 
able to withhold or revoke consent is often impractical. Given the 
consequences associated with excessive and/or overly intrusive monitoring 
inside and outside the workplace, a fair balance must be achieved between 
the parties, so that the legitimate business interests of employers and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of employees are equally respected, and so 
that trust can be enhanced among the parties as well as in the data protection 
regime. 
                                                 
1747
 Ibid. 
1748
 Ibid at s 5. 
1749
 Ibid. 
323 
 
4.11.1   
Employers must, while meeting business goals, meet the following duties of 
care, loyalty, and confidentiality to employees:  
 
(a) Duty of care means refraining from engaging in function creep by 
clearly and distinctly stating existing purposes for electronic 
surveillance and any additional desired purposes, protecting the 
personal data of employees generated from acts of reasonable electronic 
surveillance by using appropriate safeguards, and being prudent when 
making decisions to conduct electronic surveillance, working with 
surveillance reports, and imposing discipline as a result of the 
information revealed in the reports;  
 
(b) Duty of loyalty means faithfully enabling employees to perform 
their work with dignity and self-respect and without being subject to 
unreasonable electronic surveillance, meeting legitimate business 
interests without using employees’ personal data to their detriment in a 
way that causes physical, psychological, financial, or reputational harm 
(while discipline does not in itself constitute harm as contemplated in 
this part, any discipline resulting from electronic surveillance must be 
imposed in good faith), and faithfully making efforts to give employees 
the benefit of the doubt and not jump to conclusions when engaging 
with electronic surveillance technologies; and 
 
(c) Duty of confidentiality means not disclosing or sharing employees’ 
personal data with anyone unless it is aligned with the employer’s 
duties of care and loyalty (keeping in mind requirements to obey the 
law, protect vital interests of employees or others, protect public 
interests, and perform legal or contractual obligations), refraining from 
engaging in profiling involving any of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination as set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 
1985, c H-6, s 3, and aspiring to ensure that employees’ sensitive 
personal data that surfaces when conducting electronic surveillance is 
handled with meticulous safekeeping and is not disclosed, sold, or 
shared.  
 
4.11.2  
 
Employers must at all times make data protection the default and consider: 
the nature and extent (including the four temporal dimensions and degree of 
intrusion), purposes, and consequences of the electronic surveillance; the 
impact on employees’ rights and freedoms; and the necessary physical, 
organizational, and technological safeguards to address the risks. By default, 
only personal data that is necessary for each specific purpose can be subject 
to electronic surveillance, and only designated individuals who need to know 
the information are to have access to it. The principles of privacy by design 
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apply to electronic surveillance in the employment context: be proactive and 
preventative; set the data protection of employees as the default at all times; 
embed privacy protection into the design of the organization’s policies and 
procedures; strive to achieve win-win outcomes for the parties; provide 
lifetime employee protection; have transparent rules; and create clear and 
understandable expectations so employees have a firm grasp of the rules.  
 
4.11.3  
 
To build and maintain trust in the employment relationship, employers must 
create balanced policies and procedures regarding electronic surveillance in 
the workplace. While the types of policies and procedures may vary 
depending on the circumstances, employers must ensure that the policies and 
procedures are attentive to the needs of both parties, transparent, and clearly 
communicated during training sessions. For example, some policies can 
address the needs of employees by clearly informing employees about details 
concerning the monitoring; data retention; attempts to minimize the intrusion; 
and the individuals who have access to the data. Correspondingly, some 
policies can protect employers’ legitimate interests such as protecting client 
or employee data and other corporate interests such as corporate information, 
reputation, and intellectual property by explaining: company rules; 
disciplinary consequences of noncompliance and breaches of trust; as well as 
expectations for employees who work in positions of authority, work 
autonomously, or work in positions requiring special trust. 
 
4.11.4  
Employers have a legitimate business interest in strengthening their data 
protection programs and must create policies and procedures to achieve this 
goal. While the policies and procedures may vary depending on the 
circumstances, employers must ensure that they are creating social norms 
that are aimed at preventing employee unethical misconduct such as 
unauthorized data accesses and disclosures. Employers should use several 
strategies to build and maintain an ethical workplace culture, such as: 
creating a code of conduct; using effective recruitment and promotion 
techniques that value managers and employees who have integrity; 
developing ethical decision-making policies and procedures; creating 
whistleblower policies and procedures; operating with zero-tolerance 
company rules; and treating all instances of noncompliance equally. 
 
4.11.5  
When using new technologies, and taking into account the considerations in 
clause 4.11.2, where a type of electronic surveillance is likely to result in a 
high risk to the rights and freedoms of employees, employers must first 
conduct an assessment of the impact of the electronic surveillance on the 
protection of personal data in order to decide if the proposed electronic 
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surveillance is reasonable. The assessment must describe and document: the 
proposed electronic surveillance operations, the purpose, and the legitimate 
interest pursued; an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the 
electronic surveillance operations in relation to the purposes; an assessment 
of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; and the physical, 
technological and organizational safeguards used to address the risks. 
Where it is concluded that the electronic surveillance would be 
unreasonable, employers must not conduct unreasonable electronic 
surveillance of employees.  
 
4.11.6  
Employees are hardly ever in a position to freely give, withhold, or revoke 
consent when dealing with employers in situations involving electronic 
surveillance because of the inherent unequal bargaining power that is 
present in the employment relationship. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct 
an assessment of proportionality in most cases. Taking into account the 
considerations in clause 4.11.2, employers must ensure that any electronic 
surveillance operations are necessary for a legitimate business purpose and 
in compliance with principles of proportionality. To conduct the assessment 
of proportionality, employers must first determine prior to the deployment 
of any monitoring tool: whether all the data is necessary; whether the 
electronic surveillance outweighs the general privacy rights of employees; 
and what measures must be taken to ensure that any privacy violations are 
limited to the minimum necessary. Employers must have policies and 
procedures to maintain proportionality at all times and perform regular 
assessments of proportionality. After each assessment, where it is concluded 
that the electronic surveillance would be unreasonable and cannot be 
modified to be reasonable, employers must not begin or stop conducting 
such unreasonable electronic surveillance. Although the default approach 
involves conducting an assessment of proportionality, there may be rare 
circumstances where the parties identify that it is appropriate for them to 
agree to the joint creation of further data protections that apply to electronic 
surveillance in their specific workplace, keeping in mind that there must be 
free consent, adequate safeguards, and recognition that it is not possible to 
restrict the privacy of employees to zero. Ultimately, when asking whether 
it is possible to conduct electronic surveillance or continue to conduct 
electronic surveillance, employers will most likely conduct an assessment of 
proportionality, with rare exceptions that include one or more of the 
following: employee consent; performing legal or contractual obligations; 
protecting vital interests of individuals; or acting in the public interest.  
4.11.7  
Employers must have social media policies and procedures that clearly state 
that they will not require or request employees or applicants to disclose 
social media usernames or passwords, access personal social media in their 
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presence, or provide any personal information from their social media 
accounts (and they will not impose any discipline when employees or 
applicants refuse to do so). Employers must not abuse electronic 
surveillance power by conducting unreasonable ubiquitous surveillance 
from outside the workplace to make disciplinary decisions inside the 
workplace. Employers must clearly articulate their expectations regarding 
social media use in the workplace: the differences between work and 
personal accounts; the kind of corporate information that must be kept 
confidential or undisclosed; the types of social media sites that are 
appropriate to use in the workplace; the language and behaviour that is 
expected of employees when they go online given the public nature of social 
media, the realities of the online environment, and how ubiquitous 
surveillance can be used to harm the reputations of clients and both parties; 
and the consequences of noncompliance. Employers must clearly stipulate 
that it is unacceptable to engage in the online harassment of coworkers 
while on-duty or off-duty, using any device. Employers must conduct an 
assessment of proportionality pursuant to clause 4.11.6 when monitoring the 
social media use of employees during work on work devices, notify them, 
and explain the details of the monitoring, taking into account clause 4.11.2.  
4.11.8  
Employers must clearly explain in Bring Your Own Devices policies and 
procedures their expectations when employees use their own digital devices 
in the workplace. Employers must notify and explain what electronic 
surveillance techniques are used that can affect the data stored on 
employees’ personal digital devices, and confirm that they will not access 
the personal containers/compartments of partitioned devices. Where Mobile 
Device Management is used to connect to the corporate network, employers 
must not engage in unreasonable remote manipulations, recording, or 
tracking of the device. Employers must conduct an assessment of 
proportionality pursuant to clause 4.11.6 when attempting to monitor online 
activity, communications, or any data stored on the personal digital devices 
of employees, taking into account clause 4.11.2. Employers should also: 
assess privacy risks and threats; provide training to employees; mitigate 
risks by partitioning the device into containers/compartments; create storage 
and retention policies; use encryption for devices and communications; 
protect against software vulnerabilities; manage apps by having a list of 
approved apps and state how apps are installed, updated, and removed; use 
effective authentication and authorization procedures for devices, users, and 
containers/compartments; protect against malware; and create an incident 
management process.  
4.11.9     
Employers must create clear policies and procedures regarding the 
electronic surveillance of electronic communications in the workplace using 
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their equipment, which can be on corporate digital devices, through the 
corporate network, and stored on corporate servers or other gear. Employers 
must conduct an assessment of proportionality pursuant to clause 4.11.6 
when attempting to monitor communications at work, taking into account 
clause 4.11.2. Before conducting the electronic surveillance, employers 
must notify employees about the monitoring and its implementation. 
Employers must explain the details of the monitoring, including the 
particular data that the employer wishes to access, such as specific content 
or metadata involving the communications.  
4.11.10  
Employers must take special care with respect to video surveillance, and be 
particularly discerning when deciding on the limited number of designated 
individuals who have access to the data, and data retention rules. Employers 
must conduct an assessment of proportionality pursuant to clause 4.11.6 
when attempting to use video surveillance at work, taking into account 
clause 4.11.2. Before conducting video surveillance, employers must notify 
employees about the monitoring and its implementation. Employers must 
explain the details of the monitoring, including the kinds of images that may 
be captured using the technology. Covert video surveillance of an employee 
is viewed as a considerable intrusion because it may involve recording and 
reproducing documentation about an employee’s conduct at work, which is 
a place where the employee has to be and cannot evade; since it is an 
extremely privacy-invasive form of technology, it must be considered only 
in the most limited cases. Employers must not conduct continuous covert 
video surveillance on all employees during all working hours—there first 
must be reasonable suspicion (that is clearly defined and supported with 
evidence that the relationship of trust has been broken), and special attention 
paid to using the least intrusive means of obtaining the information rather 
than targeting all employees for long periods of time. Employers must have 
policies stipulating: the criteria that must be met before covert video 
surveillance is undertaken; the secure storage, retention, and destruction 
requirements; and the procedures for dealing with third party information. 
Employers should document details relating to any instances of video 
surveillance and enter into a service agreement with private investigators 
hired to conduct the surveillance. Employers must not use as the sole basis 
of employment decision-making video analytics, predictive analytics, or 
automated decisions that are made by artificial intelligence. Employers must 
not use a facial recognition service on employees inside the workplace.  
4.11.11   
Employers must create policies and procedures regarding electronic 
surveillance that is conducted outside the workplace, and confirm that this 
type of electronic surveillance is only conducted on employees in the rare 
cases where it is necessary because there is reasonable suspicion of off-duty 
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misconduct (that is clearly defined and supported with evidence that the 
relationship of trust has been broken). When deciding whether to commence 
electronic surveillance outside the workplace, employers must give 
employees the benefit of the doubt and attempt to understand their version 
of the story before hastily commencing electronic surveillance. Employers 
must conduct an assessment of proportionality pursuant to clause 4.11.6 
when attempting to use electronic surveillance outside the workplace, taking 
into account clause 4.11.2. The policies and procedures must stipulate: how 
decisions are made regarding the details of the monitoring; the types of 
technologies that are used; the kinds of third parties that are engaged; and 
the goal to constantly perform checks to ensure that the monitoring remains 
necessary and proportionate. Where employers conduct the electronic 
surveillance, upon receiving the surveillance report, employers must 
carefully examine the electronic surveillance report, scrutinize the sources 
in the surveillance report (including their motives), and share the 
information with only a minimal number of designated individuals who 
need to know the information. When deciding to act on the report, 
employers must take care to observe contractual provisions and procedures 
to ensure the imposition of discipline in good faith. When covert video 
surveillance is conducted outside the workplace, employers must comply 
with relevant parts of clause 4.11.10. Employers must not use a facial 
recognition service on employees outside the workplace.  
Principle 11 in clause 4.11 touches on the following topics, and does so in order to close 
the electronic surveillance gap: (1) duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality; (2) privacy 
by design; (3) balanced policies and procedures; (4) creating an ethical work culture as 
part of a data protection program; (5) data impact risk assessments when dealing with 
new technologies; (6) assessments of proportionality to determine if electronic 
surveillance is can be conducted/can continue to be conducted; (7) social media; (8) 
mobile digital devices; (9) electronic communications; (10) video surveillance; and (11) 
situations involving electronic surveillance outside the workplace. By addressing these 
issues, Principle 11 in clause 4.11 makes it clear that there can be a legislative response to 
the main technological concerns that arise when employers and employees are confronted 
with surveillance and privacy issues in the digital era. With these proposed provisions 
under Principle 11 in clause 4.11, there will no longer be an absence of appropriate legal 
provisions to regulate employers’ electronic surveillance of employees both inside and 
outside the workplace. The direction provided allows for a better balancing of interests, 
namely the privacy rights of employees with the legitimate business interests of 
employers.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I proposed ideas for incorporating principles and values extracted 
from the privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases into the proposed workplace 
privacy regime to close the electronic surveillance gap in employment.  
In this Chapter 6, I have proposed concrete changes to PIPEDA based on the principles 
and values identified in Chapters 4 and 5. More specifically, I did four things. First, I 
discussed some of the challenges that I encountered when considering how to create a 
new workplace privacy regime. I discussed the temptation of wanting to create provisions 
that fell into each of the areas of law that are relevant to privacy simultaneously, but I 
also noted that this was impractical and that it was necessary to focus on one or two areas 
(data protection and labour and employment). I also discussed the challenges raised by 
Canadian federalism and other jurisdictional issues when dealing with the creation of the 
workplace privacy regime and noted that it was important to understand the inner 
workings of the chosen areas of law when deciding how to proceed. Lastly, I discussed 
the challenges involved with the fusion of data protection and labour and employment 
mindsets, and concluded that it was necessary to integrate the different approaches and 
observe commonalities in order to more effectively create provisions for the workplace 
privacy regime. 
Second, I discussed the transition from divergent idea generation, which took place in 
Chapters 4 and 5, to the converging of ideas in this Chapter. I also decided where to place 
the provisions, namely in the data protection regime. Lastly, I created a strategy for 
implementing the plan for the workplace privacy regime.  
Third, I reflected on previous guidance provided by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada. More specifically, I referred to several guidance documents 
that I discussed throughout the dissertation and argued that much of that valuable 
information was not currently included in PIPEDA. I stressed the importance of finding 
ways to incorporate the information into the new workplace privacy regime.  
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And fourth, I provided some examples of proposed provisions that could form part of a 
new workplace privacy regime by modifying selected existing provisions in Part 1 of 
PIPEDA,
1750
 reworking a fundamental principle in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
1751
 and 
creating new provisions in a fundamental principle entitled, Electronic Surveillance: 
Working Within Reason, in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.
1752
 It is my hope that the cumulative 
effect of my proposed changes to PIPEDA goes some way towards effectively closing the 
electronic surveillance gap in the employment context.    
 
                                                 
1750
 PIPEDA, supra note 1681 at ss 2−30. 
1751
 Ibid at Schedule 1. 
1752
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Conclusion 
This dissertation has argued that there is an electronic surveillance gap in the 
employment context, a gap that is best understood as an absence of appropriate legal 
provisions to regulate employers’ electronic surveillance of employees both inside and 
outside the workplace.  
Canada is already falling behind other progressive jurisdictions with respect to privacy 
protection. Current privacy provisions in PIPEDA are insufficient and do not match the 
level of sophistication of those in other jurisdictions, especially those of the European 
Union. Moreover, Canadian data protection provisions that apply in the employment 
context are inconsistent and confusing, and this creates an unfair patchwork of 
protections for Canadians: Canadian employees enjoy different data protections 
depending on the province in which they are located, their unionization status, and what 
sector—public or private—they are part of. This dissertation has demonstrated that there 
are significant gaps in Canada’s privacy regime when it comes to providing the necessary 
protections for employees against employers’ unreasonable electronic surveillance. There 
are currently no provisions in place in PIPEDA or elsewhere that can effectively deal 
with employment situations where it is necessary to balance the interests of employers 
who need direction on how to achieve their legitimate business goals using electronic 
surveillance, within reasonable limits, and employees who need protection so they can do 
their jobs without being monitored in excessive or overly intrusive ways. 
If PIPEDA is to be the floor of privacy protections,
1753
 then it must be updated to account 
for the technological advances that have taken place since its inception in 2000. The 
current threshold of privacy protections is too low in large part because protections 
regarding electronic surveillance are nowhere to be found in PIPEDA. While it is 
understandable that PIPEDA was not equipped with the provisions to close the electronic 
                                                 
1753
 Notice (Industry Canada), (2002) C Gaz I 2388 (Process for the Determination of Substantially Similar 
Provincial Legislation by the Governor in Council) at 2387 [Notice]. 
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surveillance gap when it was created in 2000, it is no longer acceptable to stand by and 
ignore the numerous calls for change made by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (and 
also the Information and Privacy Ombudspersons and Commissioners from across 
Canada).
1754
 Not only does the law need to catch up with social and technological 
advances, but it also needs to become more nimble and flexible if it is to be able to adapt 
to the rapid technological advances that are very likely to take place in the near future.  
The main goal of this dissertation has been to diagnose how and why the electronic 
surveillance gap has arisen, and to offer some proposals for how to close that gap in the 
Canadian employment context. This dissertation has sought to identify and determine 
how the principles and values manifested in the selected privacy provisions and 
workplace privacy cases can be used to close the electronic surveillance gap in a manner 
consistent with Canada’s legal system. 
In my view, current approaches to the electronic surveillance gap, to the extent that they 
recognize that such a gap exists, do not provide protections that are sufficient to 
meaningfully address the electronic surveillance gap in Canada in a way that is consistent 
with Canadian legal and social values. This dissertation has suggested that, through the 
synthesis of social theories involving surveillance and privacy, together with in-depth 
analyses of privacy provisions and workplace privacy cases, a new and better workplace 
privacy regime can be designed.  
To that end, I proposed various novel legislative provisions in Chapter 6, and argued that 
these provisions could better protect the dignity and self-respect of employees, while still 
                                                 
1754
 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “2018-2019 Annual Report to Parliament on the 
Privacy Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act” (10 December 2019) 
at  2, online (pdf): Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/5076/ar_201819_eng.pdf >  [Privacy Commissioner, “2018–2019 Annual 
Report”]; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Canada’s Access to Information and Privacy 
Guardians Urge Governments to Modernize Legislation to Better Protect Canadians” (6 November 2019), 
online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-
do/provincial-and-territorial-collaboration/joint-resolutions-with-provinces-and-territories/res_191001/>; 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Resolution of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial 
Information and Privacy Commissioners” (1−2 October 2019), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2019/nr-c_191106/>. 
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allowing employers to responsibly use their electronic surveillance power to achieve their 
legitimate business goals. I argued that the proposed provisions could promote enhanced 
trust in the employer-employee relationship, minimize the chilling effects that electronic 
surveillance can have on employee morale, and go some way towards ensuring that 
gainful employment can provide a sense of meaning, dignity, and self-respect to 
employees, free from concerns about inappropriate employer intrusions into their private 
lives. 
More specifically, the introductory Chapter 1 set out the problem to be addressed, namely 
the electronic surveillance gap in employment. It explained the focus and justification for 
the dissertation, as well as the dissertation’s objective. Chapter 1 also described the 
research question, hypotheses, methodology, and the theoretical framework used in this 
dissertation. 
Chapter 2 explored surveillance theories from the perspective of a capitalist surveillance 
framework. In it I argued that there is a serious potential for employers to exploit their 
panoptic electronic surveillance powers and take advantage of their vulnerable employees 
using excessive and overly intrusive electronic surveillance. I contended that employers 
had the potential to take advantage of the electronic surveillance technologies indirectly 
with ubiquitous surveillance regarding off-duty conduct, and also directly in the 
workplace with electronic surveillance of the workplace premises concerning on-duty 
conduct. It was important to study social theories of surveillance in order to understand 
the potential for the abuse of surveillance power, develop a deeper sense of the problem 
of the electronic surveillance gap in employment, and generate unique insights when 
performing the legal analyses of the privacy provisions and the workplace privacy cases. 
In my view, a careful reflection of these informative social theories of surveillance led to 
the generation of more creative ideas when crafting the proposed workplace privacy 
regime. 
Chapter 3 investigated privacy theories from a dignity/human rights perspective of 
privacy. Given that this dissertation involved socio-legal analyses regarding workplace 
privacy in light of electronic surveillance technology, it was necessary to understand both 
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surveillance and privacy from a theoretical point of view. To that end, Chapter 3 
investigated several privacy theories and defended the claim that it was necessary to 
proceed with a dignity/human rights approach when answering the question, “What is 
privacy?” I argued that the dignity/human rights approach to privacy provided the best 
understanding of privacy and allowed for a purposive interpretation of the value of 
privacy that did not leave the most vulnerable citizens behind. I argued that this flexible 
approach could enable the creation of incremental modifications to the law while 
adapting to an evolving society and achieving appropriate balances between competing 
interests. I maintained that the approach was fitting for tackling issues associated with 
rapid technological change. It was important to study social theories of privacy in order 
to better understand what was in need of protecting. In my view, looking through the lens 
of the dignity/human rights approach enabled the creation of protective provisions that 
could more effectively close the electronic surveillance gap in the employment context.  
Chapter 4 examined selected privacy provisions from Canada, the United States, and the 
European Union. There was a mix of privacy provisions of the various jurisdictions in 
each theme. I noted the provisions that fell within each of the three themes, analyzed the 
provisions of each theme, and set out my ideas for incorporating the detected principles 
and values into the proposed workplace privacy regime to close the electronic 
surveillance gap in employment. These ideas stemmed from my discussion of the 
implications for the new workplace privacy regime. What I found was a series of gaps in 
Canada’s privacy regime, and I borrowed several ideas from other jurisdictions in an 
attempt to fill those gaps.  
Chapter 5 examined six selected workplace privacy cases from Canada, the United States, 
and the European Union. I described each workplace privacy case, analyzed the case, and 
indicated how I proposed to incorporate the principles and values thereby identified into 
the proposed workplace privacy regime, all in attempt to close the electronic surveillance 
gap in employment. These analyses enabled me to isolate essential principles and values 
that could lead to novel ideas for the creation of the new workplace privacy regime. 
Again, the goal was to generate different ideas that would result in a textured foundation 
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on which to draw for the purposes of creating effective proposed provisions for the new 
workplace privacy regime.  
Chapter 6 was the most complicated Chapter in the dissertation. In it I proposed 
provisions for the new workplace privacy regime. The Chapter had four main parts. In the 
first part of the Chapter, I discussed some of the challenges that I encountered when 
creating a new workplace privacy regime. I then discussed the temptation of wanting to 
create provisions that fell into each of the areas of law that are relevant to privacy 
simultaneously, but I also noted that this was impractical and that it was therefore better 
to focus on one or two areas (data protection and labour and employment). I also 
discussed the challenges raised by Canadian federalism and other jurisdictional issues 
when dealing with the creation of the workplace privacy regime, and noted that it was 
important to understand the inner workings of the chosen areas of law when deciding 
how to proceed. Lastly, I discussed the challenges involved with the fusion of data 
protection and labour and employment mindsets, and concluded that it was necessary to 
integrate the different approaches and observe commonalities in order to more effectively 
create provisions for the workplace privacy regime.  
In the second part of Chapter 6, I discussed the transition from divergent idea generation, 
which took place in Chapters 4 and 5, to the converging of ideas, which took place in 
Chapter 6, so that the ideas could be specifically focused on selected issues. I also 
decided where to place the provisions, namely in data protection. Lastly, I created a 
strategy for implementing the plan for the workplace privacy regime.  
In the third part of Chapter 6, I reviewed the previous guidance provided by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada with an eye to incorporating the ideas into the new 
workplace privacy regime. More specifically, I highlighted the several guidance 
documents to which I referred throughout the dissertation and argued that much of that 
valuable information was not included in PIPEDA. I stressed the importance of finding 
ways to incorporate the information into the new workplace privacy regime.  
In the fourth and final part of Chapter 6, I provided some examples of proposed 
provisions that could form part of a new workplace privacy regime under three categories 
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involving modifying selected existing provisions in Part 1 of PIPEDA,
1755
 reworking an 
existing fundamental principle in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA,
1756
  and creating a new 
fundamental principle, Principle 11 in clause 4.11, entitled, Electronic Surveillance: 
Working Within Reason, in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA.
1757
 It is my belief that these are the 
kinds of provisions needed to effectively close the electronic surveillance gap in the 
employment context.    
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recently highlighted one of the main 
issues discussed in this dissertation. In its 2018–2019 Annual Report, it stated the 
following:  
Our laws have simply not kept pace with the reality in which they operate. 
Our reality is now one in which new business models that rely on personal 
information emerge daily, and the stockpiling of personal information is 
increasingly seen as a competitive advantage. It is a reality in which 
individuals, businesses and government are all seeking to harness the 
benefits of technology, often without a full understanding of the risks it 
poses. This increased reliance on technology, combined with the ease with 
which information flows across borders and changes hands makes it 
difficult for individuals to know if they are dealing with a human or a robot, 
an entity in Canada or elsewhere, or the public or private sector. In this 
complex digital environment, what is clear is that our privacy laws need to 
be reflective of the current times, and more forcefully assert protections for 
the rights of Canadians. Now is the time for action.
1758
 
Not only is it important for the law to stay current when it comes to technology, but it is 
also essential that the law be able to protect essential Canadian values, including the 
dignity and self-respect of employees in the employment context. As Dickson C.J. noted: 
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing 
the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a 
contributory role in society. A person's employment is an essential 
component of his or her sense of identity, self‑worth and emotional 
well‑being. Accordingly, the conditions in which a person works are highly 
                                                 
1755
 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 at ss 2−30 [PIPEDA]. 
1756
 Ibid at Schedule 1. 
1757
 Ibid. 
1758
 Privacy Commissioner, “2018–2019 Annual Report”, supra note 1754 at 21. 
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significant in shaping the whole compendium of psychological, emotional 
and physical elements of a person's dignity and self-respect.
1759
   
Part of the goal of this dissertation has been to reconcile recent (and future) social and 
technological advances in electronic surveillance technology with the need to protect the 
privacy interests and dignity of individuals in private workplaces. This dissertation is not 
without limitations, however. The most important limitation is the fact that it has focused 
almost exclusively on the labour and employment context. This was by design, though, 
since the workplace context is one of the most important places in which the right to 
privacy comes into conflict with other competing interests, such as the interest of 
employers in ensuring that employees are in fact doing what they were hired to do and 
are using technology in ways that do not harm their employers. However, while the 
findings and recommendations made here can serve as a useful starting point for research 
in other contexts in which privacy concerns arise, specific research tailored to the context 
in question would be needed to close the electronic surveillance gap in those other 
contexts. 
Moving forward, I anticipate that future research in this area will involve a shift away 
from the workplace, where goods and services are produced, to the consumer context, 
where goods and services are received and consumed. There are growing concerns about 
potential abuses of surveillance power by large technology companies; one example 
involves social media companies using monitoring and persuasive technology tools to 
monopolize attention and manipulate users.
1760
 Additionally, I believe that an important 
future project would be to investigate the possibility of recognizing a right to privacy and 
freedom from unreasonable electronic surveillance throughout Canada. This would have 
to be done in a way that is consistent with Canadian values and also practical given the 
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 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at para 95, 1987 
CarswellAlta 705 (SCC) [Alberta Reference]. 
1760
 City Arts & Lectures, “City Arts & Lectures presents Your Undivided Attention: Persuasive 
Technology: Tristan Harris in conversation with Jacob Ward” (30 April 2020), online (video): YouTube 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TZKOuQLMfM>. See also Tristan Harris, Tim Wu & Aza Raskin, 
“Episode 16: When Attention Went on Sale” (28 April 2020), online (podcast): Center for Humane 
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(United Kingdom, NowNext Press, 2018) at 35−59; (Roger McNamee, Zucked (New York: Penguin Press, 
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challenges I referred to in Chapter 4, Theme 1, involving Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights 
Charter).
1761
 Lastly, other topics that touch on tensions between surveillance and privacy 
might involve the need for data protection in the creation of smart cities such as the now-
defunct Google Sidewalk Labs in Toronto,
1762
 and the privacy rights that are implicated 
when crossing international borders with digital devices.
1763
    
In designing the proposed workplace privacy regime, I have drawn on the instructive 
work of Ann Cavoukian, the former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 
who is known for creating the principles of Privacy by Design.
1764
 I have tried to design a 
workplace privacy regime that is both proactive and preventative; that sets data protection 
as the default; embeds privacy protection into the design of the regime; that creates 
balance and consequent win-win outcomes for the parties; provides lifetime protection 
for employees; insists on transparency of rules and requirements; and that creates 
understandable expectations for Canadians that can be used in the employment 
context.
1765
 It is my hope that the proposed provisions for a new workplace privacy 
regime will better balance the interests of Canadians in ensuring that workplaces that are 
free from excessive and overly intrusive employer oversight with the needs of employers 
to protect client and employee information, reputation, property, corporate trade secrets, 
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 Bill S-21, An Act to Guarantee the Human Right to Privacy, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (first reading 13 
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and confidential information. If this is achieved, then I believe that we will have gone a 
long way toward effectively closing the electronic surveillance gap in the employment 
context.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Privacy Provisions Analyzed in Chapter 4, 
Theme 1  
Canada 
Section 3 of PIPEDA:
1766
 
Purpose 
3. The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology 
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to 
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a 
manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to 
their personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or 
disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.
1767
 
Principles 2 and 4 in Clauses 4.2 and 4.4 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA:
1768
 
4.2 Principle 2 — Identifying Purposes 
The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified 
by the organization at or before the time the information is collected. 
4.2.1 
The organization shall document the purposes for which personal 
information is collected in order to comply with the Openness principle 
(Clause 4.8) and the Individual Access principle (Clause 4.9). 
4.2.2 
Identifying the purposes for which personal information is collected at or 
before the time of collection allows organizations to determine the 
information they need to collect to fulfil these purposes. The Limiting 
Collection principle (Clause 4.4) requires an organization to collect only 
that information necessary for the purposes that have been identified. 
 
                                                 
1766
 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 at s 3 
 [PIPEDA]. 
1767
 Ibid. 
1768
 Ibid at Schedule 1, cl 4.2, 4.4. 
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4.2.3 
The identified purposes should be specified at or before the time of 
collection to the individual from whom the personal information is 
collected. Depending upon the way in which the information is collected, 
this can be done orally or in writing. An application form, for example, may 
give notice of the purposes. 
4.2.4 
When personal information that has been collected is to be used for a 
purpose not previously identified, the new purpose shall be identified prior 
to use. Unless the new purpose is required by law, the consent of the 
individual is required before information can be used for that purpose. For 
an elaboration on consent, please refer to the Consent principle (Clause 4.3). 
4.2.5 
Persons collecting personal information should be able to explain to 
individuals the purposes for which the information is being collected. 
4.2.6 
This principle is linked closely to the Limiting Collection principle (Clause 
4.4) and the Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention principle (Clause 4.5). 
4.4 Principle 4 — Limiting Collection 
The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is 
necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall 
be collected by fair and lawful means. 
4.4.1 
Organizations shall not collect personal information indiscriminately. Both 
the amount and the type of information collected shall be limited to that 
which is necessary to fulfil the purposes identified. Organizations shall 
specify the type of information collected as part of their information-
handling policies and practices, in accordance with the Openness principle 
(Clause 4.8). 
4.4.2 
The requirement that personal information be collected by fair and lawful 
means is intended to prevent organizations from collecting information by 
misleading or deceiving individuals about the purpose for which 
information is being collected. This requirement implies that consent with 
respect to collection must not be obtained through deception. 
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4.4.3 
This principle is linked closely to the Identifying Purposes principle (Clause 
4.2) and the Consent principle (Clause 4.3).
1769
 
Section 5 of the Québec Charter:
1770
 
Fundamental Freedoms and Rights 
5. Every person has a right to respect for his private life.
1771
 
Sections 1−5 of Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter):
1772
 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Privacy Rights Charter. 
Purpose 
2. The purpose of this Act is to give effect to the principles that 
(a) privacy is essential to an individual’s dignity, integrity, autonomy, well-
being and freedom, and to the full and meaningful exercise of human rights 
and freedoms; 
(b) there is a legal right to privacy; 
(c) an infringement of the right to privacy, to be lawful, must be justifiable. 
Right to privacy 
3. Every individual has a right to privacy, including 
(a) physical privacy; 
(b) freedom from surveillance; 
(c) freedom from monitoring or interception of their private 
communications; and 
(d) freedom from the collection, use and disclosure of their personal 
information. 
                                                 
1769
 Ibid. 
1770
 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12 at s 5 [Québec Charter]. 
1771
 Ibid. 
1772
 Bill S-21, An Act to Guarantee the Human Right to Privacy, 1st Sess, 37th Parl, 2001 (first reading 13 
March 2001, dropped from the Senate Order Paper in 2002) [Bill S-21 (Privacy Rights Charter)]. 
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Remedy 
4. (1) Every individual is entitled to claim and enforce their right to privacy 
and to refuse to unjustifiably infringe the right to privacy of another 
individual. 
No reprisal 
(2) No person shall take or threaten to take reprisal measures against an 
individual who claims or enforces their right to privacy or who refuses to 
unjustifiably infringe the right to privacy of another individual. 
Prohibition 
(3) No person shall unjustifiably infringe an individual’s right to privacy. 
Infringement 
5. (1) A limit on or interference with an individual’s privacy infringes that 
individual’s right to privacy. 
Justification 
(2) An infringement of an individual’s right to privacy is justifiable if the 
infringement is reasonable and can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Test 
(3) An infringement is justifiable if: 
(a) it is lawful; 
(b) it is necessary to achieve an objective that is compelled by the need to 
respect another individual human right or another interest in the public good 
and is sufficiently important to warrant infringing the right to privacy; 
(c) the objective cannot be achieved by another measure that infringes 
privacy less; and 
(d) the importance of the objective and the beneficial effects of the 
infringement outweigh the detrimental effects on privacy. 
Consent 
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(4) An interference with an individual’s privacy does not infringe that 
individual’s right to privacy if the interference is done with the free and 
fully informed consent of the individual.
1773
 
United States 
Section 1798.140(e) and (q) of the California Consumer Privacy Act
1774
 define collection 
and processing: 
(e) “Collects,” “collected,” or “collection” means buying, renting, gathering, 
obtaining, receiving, or accessing any personal information pertaining to a 
consumer by any means. This includes receiving information from the 
consumer, either actively or passively, or by observing the consumer’s 
behavior. 
(q) “Processing” means any operation or set of operations that are 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means.
1775
 
Section 1102 of Bill S5642 (New York Privacy Act):
1776
 
§ 1102. Data fiduciary. 1. Personal data of consumers shall not be used, 
processed or transferred to a third party, unless the consumer provides 
express and documented consent. Every legal entity, or any affiliate of such 
entity, and every controller and data broker, which collects, sells or licenses 
personal information of consumers, shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty 
and confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the 
personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk; and shall act in the best 
interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity, 
controller or data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer 
under the circumstances.  
(a) Every legal entity, or affiliate of such entity, and every controller and 
data broker to which this article applies shall:  
(i) reasonably secure personal data from unauthorized access; and  
(ii) promptly inform a consumer of any breach of the duty described in this 
paragraph with respect to personal data of such consumer.  
(b) A legal entity, an affiliate of such entity, controller or data broker may 
not use personal data, or data derived from personal data, in any way that:  
                                                 
1773
 Ibid. 
1774
 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 3 CIV 1.81.5 (2018) at § 1798.140(e), (q) [California 
Consumer Privacy Act]. 
1775
 Ibid. 
1776
 US, SB 5642, New York Privacy Act, 2019−2020, Reg Sess, NY, 2019 at § 1102 [Bill S5642 (New York 
Privacy Act)].  
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(i) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; 
and  
(ii) (A) will result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or 
financial harm to a consumer; or  
(B) would be unexpected and highly offensive to a reasonable consumer.    
(c) A legal entity, or affiliate of such entity, controller or data broker: 
(i) may not disclose or sell personal data to, or share personal data with, any 
other person except as consistent with the duties of care and loyalty under 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subdivision;  
(ii) may not disclose or sell personal data to, or share personal data with, 
any other person unless that person enters into a contract that imposes the 
same duties of care, loyalty, and confidentially toward the consumer as are 
imposed under this section; and  
(iii) shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the practices of any person to 
whom the entity, or affiliate of such entity, controller or data broker 
discloses or sells, or with whom the entity, or affiliate of such entity, 
controller or data broker shares. Personal data fulfills the duties of care, 
loyalty, and confidentiality assumed by the person under the contract 
described in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, including by auditing, on a 
regular basis, the data security and data information practices of any such 
entity, or affiliate of such entity, controller or data broker.  
2. For the purposes of this section the term "privacy risk" means potential 
adverse consequences to consumers and society arising from the processing 
of personal data, including, but not limited to: 
(a) direct or indirect financial loss or economic harm;    
(b) physical harm;     
(c) psychological harm, including anxiety, embarrassment, fear, and  other 
demonstrable mental trauma;  
(d) significant inconvenience or expenditure of time;   
(e) adverse outcomes or decisions with respect to an individual's eligibility 
for rights, benefits or privileges in employment (including, but not limited 
to, hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, compensation), credit and insurance 
(including, but not limited to, denial of an application or obtaining less 
favorable terms), housing, education, professional certification, or the 
provision of health care and related services;    
(f) stigmatization or reputational harm;     
(g) disruption and intrusion from unwanted commercial communications or 
contacts;     
(h) price discrimination;    
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(i) effects on an individual that are not reasonably foreseeable, contemplated 
by, or expected by the individual to whom the personal data relates, that are 
nevertheless reasonably foreseeable, contemplated by, or expected by the 
controller assessing privacy risk, that:  
(A) alters that individual's experiences;     
(B) limits that individual's choices;     
(C) influences that individual's responses; or     
(D) predetermines results; or     
(j) other adverse consequences that affect an individual's private life, 
including private family matters, actions and communications within an 
individual's home or similar physical, online, or digital location, where an 
individual has a reasonable expectation that personal data will not be 
collected or used.     
3. The fiduciary duty owed to a consumer under this section shall supersede 
any duty owed to owners or shareholders of a legal entity or affiliate 
thereof, controller or data broker, to whom this article apples.
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Section 1 of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition):
1778
 
NEW SECTION. Sec. 1.  The legislature finds that:  
(1) Unconstrained use of facial recognition services by state and local 
government agencies poses broad social ramifications that should be 
considered and addressed. Accordingly, legislation is required to establish 
safeguards that will allow state and local government agencies to use facial 
recognition services in a manner that benefits society while prohibiting uses 
that threaten our democratic freedoms and put our civil liberties at risk. 
(2) However, state and local government agencies may use facial 
recognition services to locate or identify missing persons, and identify 
deceased persons, including missing or murdered indigenous women, 
subjects of Amber alerts and silver alerts, and other possible crime victims, 
for the purposes of keeping the public safe.
1779
 
Section 2(2−5), (9−12) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)
1780
defines 
enroll, facial recognition service, facial template, identification, ongoing surveillance, 
persistent tracking, recognition, and verification:  
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 Ibid. The line numbers and underline formatting are not included in this passage. 
1778
 US, SB 6280, Concerning the Use of Facial Recognition Services, 2019−2020, Reg Sess, Wash, 2020 
at § 1[Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition)]. The line numbers and underline formatting are not 
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 Ibid at § 2(1)−(5), (9−12). 
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NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. The definitions in this section apply throughout 
this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.  
(2) "Enroll," "enrolled," or "enrolling" means the process by which a facial 
recognition service creates a facial template from one or more images of an 
individual and adds the facial template to a gallery used by the facial 
recognition service for recognition or persistent tracking of individuals. It 
also includes the act of adding an existing facial template directly into a 
gallery used by a facial recognition service. 
(3)(a) "Facial recognition service" means technology that analyzes facial 
features and is used by a state or local government agency for the 
identification, verification, or persistent tracking of individuals in still or 
video images. 
(b) "Facial recognition service" does not include: (i) The analysis of facial 
features to grant or deny access to an electronic device; or (ii) the use of an 
automated or semiautomated process for the purpose of redacting a 
recording for release or disclosure outside the law enforcement agency to 
protect the privacy of a subject depicted in the recording, if the process does 
not generate or result in the retention of any biometric data or surveillance 
information. 
(4) "Facial template" means the machine-interpretable pattern of facial 
features that is extracted from one or more images of an individual by a 
facial recognition service. 
(5) "Identification" means the use of a facial recognition service by a state 
or local government agency to determine whether an unknown individual 
matches any individual whose identity is known to the state or local 
government agency and who has been enrolled by reference to that identity 
in a gallery used by the facial recognition service.  
(9) "Ongoing surveillance" means using a facial recognition service to track 
the physical movements of a specified individual through one or more 
public places over time, whether in real time or through application of a 
facial recognition service to historical records. It does not include a single 
recognition or attempted recognition of an individual, if no attempt is made 
to subsequently track that individual's movement over time after they have 
been recognized. 
(10) "Persistent tracking" means the use of a facial recognition service by a 
state or local government agency to track the movements of an individual on 
a persistent basis without identification or verification of that individual. 
Such tracking becomes persistent as soon as:  
(a) The facial template that permits the tracking is maintained for more than 
forty-eight hours after first enrolling that template; or 
(b) Data created by the facial recognition service is linked to any other data 
such that the individual who has been tracked is identified or identifiable. 
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(11) "Recognition" means the use of a facial recognition service by a state 
or local government agency to determine whether an unknown individual 
matches: 
(a) Any individual who has been enrolled in a gallery used by the facial 
recognition service; or 
(b) A specific individual who has been enrolled in a gallery used by the 
facial recognition service. 
(12) "Verification" means the use of a facial recognition service by a state or 
local government agency to determine whether an individual is a specific 
individual whose identity is known to the state or local government agency 
and who has been enrolled by reference to that identity in a gallery used by 
the facial recognition service.
1781
 
Section 3 of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition):
1782
 
NEW SECTION. Sec. 3. (1) A state or local government agency using or 
intending to develop, procure, or use a facial recognition service must file 
with a legislative authority a notice of intent to develop, procure, or use a 
facial recognition service and specify a purpose for which the technology is 
to be used. A state or local government agency may commence the 
accountability report once it files the notice of intent by the legislative 
authority. 
(2) Prior to developing, procuring, or using a facial recognition service, a 
state or local government agency must produce an accountability report for 
that service. Each accountability report must include, at minimum, clear and 
understandable statements of the following: 
(a)(i) The name of the facial recognition service, vendor, and version; and 
(ii) a description of its general capabilities and limitations, including 
reasonably foreseeable capabilities outside the scope of the proposed use of 
the agency; 
(b)(i) The type or types of data inputs that the technology uses; (ii) how that 
data is generated, collected, and processed; and (iii) the type or types of data 
the system is reasonably likely to generate; 
(c)(i) A description of the purpose and proposed use of the facial 
recognition service, including what decision or decisions will be used to 
make or support it; (ii) whether it is a final or support decision system; and 
(iii) its intended benefits, including any data or research demonstrating 
those benefits; 
(d) A clear use and data management policy, including protocols for the 
following:  
                                                 
1781
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1782
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(i) How and when the facial recognition service will be deployed or used 
and by whom including, but not limited to, the factors that will be used to 
determine where, when, and how the technology is deployed, and other 
relevant information, such as whether the technology will be operated 
continuously or used only under specific circumstances. If the facial 
recognition service will be operated or used by another entity on the 
agency's behalf, the facial recognition service accountability report must 
explicitly include a description of the other entity's access and any 
applicable protocols;  
(ii) Any measures taken to minimize inadvertent collection of additional 
data beyond the amount necessary for the specific purpose or purposes for 
which the facial recognition service will be used; 
(iii) Data integrity and retention policies applicable to the data collected 
using the facial recognition service, including how the agency will maintain 
and update records used in connection with the service, how long the 
agency will keep the data, and the processes by which data will be deleted; 
(iv) Any additional rules that will govern use of the facial recognition 
service and what processes will be required prior to each use of the facial 
recognition service; 
(v) Data security measures applicable to the facial recognition service 
including how data collected using the facial recognition service will be 
securely stored and accessed, if and why an agency intends to share access 
to the facial recognition service or the data from that facial recognition 
service with any other entity, and the rules and procedures by which an 
agency sharing data with any other entity will ensure that such entities 
comply with the sharing agency's use and data management policy as part of 
the data sharing agreement; 
(vi) How the facial recognition service provider intends to fulfill security 
breach notification requirements pursuant to chapter 19.255 RCW and how 
the agency intends to fulfill security breach notification requirements 
pursuant to RCW 42.56.590; and 
(vii) The agency's training procedures, including those implemented in 
accordance with section 7 of this act, and how the agency will ensure that 
all personnel who operate the facial recognition service or access its data are 
knowledgeable about and able to ensure compliance with the use and data 
management policy prior to use of the facial recognition service; 
(e) The agency's testing procedures, including its processes for periodically 
undertaking operational tests of the facial recognition service in accordance 
with section 5 of this act; 
(f) Information on the facial recognition service's rate of false matches, 
potential impacts on protected subpopulations, and how the agency will 
address error rates, determined independently, greater than one percent; 
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(g) A description of any potential impacts of the facial recognition service 
on civil rights and liberties, including potential impacts to privacy and 
potential disparate impacts on marginalized communities, and the specific 
steps the agency will take to mitigate the potential impacts and prevent 
unauthorized use of the facial recognition service; and  
(h) The agency's procedures for receiving feedback, including the channels 
for receiving feedback from individuals affected by the use of the facial 
recognition service and from the community at large, as well as the 
procedures for responding to feedback. 
(3) Prior to finalizing the accountability report, the agency must:  
(a) Allow for a public review and comment period; 
(b) Hold at least three community consultation meetings; and 
(c) Consider the issues raised by the public through the public review and 
comment period and the community consultation meetings. 
(4) The final accountability report must be updated every two years and 
submitted to a legislative authority. 
(5) The final adopted accountability report must be clearly communicated to 
the public at least ninety days prior to the agency putting the facial 
recognition service into operational use, posted on the agency's public web 
site, and submitted to a legislative authority. The legislative authority must 
post each submitted accountability report on its public web site. 
(6) A state or local government agency seeking to procure a facial 
recognition service must require vendors to disclose any complaints or 
reports of bias regarding the service. 
(7) An agency seeking to use a facial recognition service for a purpose not 
disclosed in the agency's existing accountability report must first seek 
public comment and community consultation on the proposed new use and 
adopt an updated accountability report pursuant to the requirements 
contained in this section. 
(8) This section does not apply to a facial recognition service under contract 
as of the effective date of this section. An agency must fulfill the 
requirements of this section upon renewal or extension of the contract.
1783
 
Section 8(1) of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition):
1784
 
NEW  SECTION. Sec.  8. (1) A state or local government agency must 
disclose their use of a facial recognition service on a criminal defendant to 
that defendant in a timely manner prior to trial.
1785
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Section 11 of Bill SB 6280 (Washington Facial Recognition):
1786
 
NEW SECTION. Sec. 11. (1) A state or local government agency may not 
use a facial recognition service to engage in ongoing surveillance, conduct 
real-time or near real-time identification, or start persistent tracking unless: 
(a) A warrant is obtained authorizing the use of the service for those 
purposes; 
(b) Exigent circumstances exist; or 
(c) A court order is obtained authorizing the use of the service for the sole 
purpose of locating or identifying a missing person, or identifying a 
deceased person. A court may issue an ex parte order under this subsection 
(1)(c) if a law enforcement officer certifies and the court finds that the 
information likely to be obtained is relevant to locating or identifying a 
missing person, or identifying a deceased person. 
(2) A state or local government agency may not apply a facial recognition 
service to any individual based on their religious, political, or social views 
or activities, participation in a particular noncriminal organization or lawful 
event, or actual or perceived race, ethnicity, citizenship, place of origin, 
immigration status, age, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, or other characteristic protected by law. This subsection does 
not condone profiling including, but not limited to, predictive law 
enforcement tools. 
(3) A state or local government agency may not use a facial recognition 
service to create a record describing any individual's exercise of rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
by Article I, section 5 of the state Constitution. 
(4) A law enforcement agency that utilizes body worn camera recordings 
shall comply with the provisions of RCW 42.56.240(14). 
(5) A state or local law enforcement agency may not use the results of a 
facial recognition service as the sole basis to establish probable cause in a 
criminal investigation. The results of a facial recognition service may be 
used in conjunction with other information and evidence lawfully obtained 
by a law enforcement officer to establish probable cause in a criminal 
investigation. 
(6) A state or local law enforcement agency may not use a facial recognition 
service to identify an individual based on a sketch or other manually 
produced image. 
(7) A state or local law enforcement agency may not substantively 
manipulate an image for use in a facial recognition service in a manner not 
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consistent with the facial recognition service provider's intended use and 
training.
1787
 
Section 1 of Article 1 of the California Constitution:
1788
   
Declaration of Rights 
1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.
1789
 
European Union  
Article 1(2) of the GDPR:
1790
 
Subject-matter and objectives 
2. This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.
1791
 
Article 4(2) and (4) of the GDPR
1792
 defines processing and profiling: 
Definitions 
(2) “processing”  means any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction 
(4) “profiling” means any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, 
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
movements
1793
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Article 5 of the GDPR:
1794
 
Principles relating to processing of personal data 
1.   Personal data shall be: 
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the 
data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further 
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with 
Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes 
(‘purpose limitation’); 
(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’); 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard 
to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without 
delay (‘accuracy’); 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; 
personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data 
will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in 
accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate 
technical and organisational measures required by this Regulation in order 
to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject (‘storage 
limitation’); 
(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical 
or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 
2. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate 
compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).
1795
 
Article 9(1) of the GDPR:
1796
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Processing of special categories of personal data 
1. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and 
the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a 
natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
1797
 
Article 21(1) of the GDPR:
1798
 
Right to object 
1. The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his 
or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data 
concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), 
including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer 
process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling 
legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights 
and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims.
1799
 
 
Article 22 of the GDPR:
1800
 
Automated individual decision-making, including profiling 
1. The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision: 
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the 
data subject and a data controller; 
(b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data 
subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or 
(c) is based on the data subject’s explicit consent. 
3. In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data 
controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point 
of view and to contest the decision. 
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4. Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special 
categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point (a) or (g) 
of Article 9(2) applies and suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.
1801
 
Article 23 of the GDPR:
1802
 
Restrictions 
1. Union or Member State law to which the data controller or processor is 
subject may restrict by way of a legislative measure the scope of the 
obligations and rights provided for in Articles 12 to 22 and Article 34, as 
well as Article 5 in so far as its provisions correspond to the rights and 
obligations provided for in Articles 12 to 22, when such a restriction 
respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a 
necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard: 
(a) national security; 
(b) defence; 
(c) public security; 
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding 
against and the prevention of threats to public security; 
(e) other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a 
Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of 
the Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and 
taxation a matters, public health and social security; 
(f) the protection of judicial independence and judicial proceedings; 
(g) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of breaches of 
ethics for regulated professions; 
(h) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even 
occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the cases referred to in 
points (a) to (e) and (g); 
(i) the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others; 
(j) the enforcement of civil law claims. 
2. In particular, any legislative measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
contain specific provisions at least, where relevant, as to: 
(a) the purposes of the processing or categories of processing; 
(b) the categories of personal data; 
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(c) the scope of the restrictions introduced; 
(d) the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer; 
(e) the specification of the controller or categories of controllers; 
(f) the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into account the 
nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing; 
(g) the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; and 
(h) the right of data subjects to be informed about the restriction, unless that 
may be prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction.
1803
 
Article 25(1) and (2) of the GDPR:
1804
 
Data protection by design and by default 
1. Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and 
the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of 
varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons 
posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the 
determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing 
itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as 
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection 
principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to 
integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the 
requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. 
2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are 
necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That 
obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of 
their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In 
particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not 
made accessible without the individual’s intervention to an indefinite 
number of natural persons.
1805
 
Article 35(1) and (7) of the GDPR:
1806
 
1. Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and 
taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the 
processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an 
assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the 
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protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of similar 
processing operations that present similar high risks. 
7. The assessment shall contain at least: 
(a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the 
purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate 
interest pursued by the controller; 
(b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing 
operations in relation to the purposes; 
(c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects 
referred to in paragraph 1; and 
(d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, 
security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data 
and to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the 
rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons 
concerned.
1807
 
Article 8 of the EU Convention:
1808
 
Right to respect for private and family life 
1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise  of  
this  right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  
necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
1809
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Appendix B: Privacy Provisions Analyzed in Chapter 4, 
Theme 2  
Canada 
In Canada, section 2(1) of PIPEDA
1810
 defines personal information: 
2(1) personal information means information about an identifiable 
individual.
1811
  
Section 6.1 of PIPEDA:
1812
 
Valid consent 
6.1 For the purposes of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, the consent of an 
individual is only valid if it is reasonable to expect that an individual to 
whom the organization’s activities are directed would understand the nature, 
purpose and consequences of the collection, use or disclosure of the 
personal information to which they are consenting.
1813
 
Section 7 of PIPEDA:
1814
 
Collection without knowledge or consent 
7 (1) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that 
accompanies that clause, an organization may collect personal information 
without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if 
(a) the collection is clearly in the interests of the individual and consent 
cannot be obtained in a timely way; 
(b) it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the knowledge or 
consent of the individual would compromise the availability or the accuracy 
of the information and the collection is reasonable for purposes related to 
investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of 
Canada or a province; 
(b.1) it is contained in a witness statement and the collection is necessary to 
assess, process or settle an insurance claim; 
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(b.2) it was produced by the individual in the course of their employment, 
business or profession and the collection is consistent with the purposes for 
which the information was produced; 
(c) the collection is solely for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes; 
(d) the information is publicly available and is specified by the regulations; 
or 
(e) the collection is made for the purpose of making a disclosure 
(i) under subparagraph (3)(c.1)(i) or (d)(ii), or 
(ii) that is required by law. 
Use without knowledge or consent 
(2) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that 
accompanies that clause, an organization may, without the knowledge or 
consent of the individual, use personal information only if 
(a) in the course of its activities, the organization becomes aware of 
information that it has reasonable grounds to believe could be useful in the 
investigation of a contravention of the laws of Canada, a province or a 
foreign jurisdiction that has been, is being or is about to be committed, and 
the information is used for the purpose of investigating that contravention; 
(b) it is used for the purpose of acting in respect of an emergency that 
threatens the life, health or security of an individual; 
(b.1) the information is contained in a witness statement and the use is 
necessary to assess, process or settle an insurance claim; 
(b.2) the information was produced by the individual in the course of their 
employment, business or profession and the use is consistent with the 
purposes for which the information was produced; 
(c) it is used for statistical, or scholarly study or research, purposes that 
cannot be achieved without using the information, the information is used in 
a manner that will ensure its confidentiality, it is impracticable to obtain 
consent and the organization informs the Commissioner of the use before 
the information is used; 
(c.1) it is publicly available and is specified by the regulations; or 
(d) it was collected under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (e). 
Disclosure without knowledge or consent 
390 
 
(3) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that 
accompanies that clause, an organization may disclose personal information 
without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is 
(a) made to, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or notary or, in any 
other province, a barrister or solicitor who is representing the organization; 
(b) for the purpose of collecting a debt owed by the individual to the 
organization; 
(c) required to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued or an order made 
by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of 
information, or to comply with rules of court relating to the production of 
records; 
(c.1) made to a government institution or part of a government institution 
that has made a request for the information, identified its lawful authority to 
obtain the information and indicated that 
(i) it suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of 
Canada or the conduct of international affairs, 
(ii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of 
Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation 
relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the 
purpose of enforcing any such law, 
(iii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering any law of 
Canada or a province, or 
(iv) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of communicating with the 
next of kin or authorized representative of an injured, ill or deceased 
individual; 
(c.2) made to the government institution mentioned in section 7 of the 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act as 
required by that section; 
(d) made on the initiative of the organization to a government institution or 
a part of a government institution and the organization 
(i) has reasonable grounds to believe that the information relates to a 
contravention of the laws of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction that 
has been, is being or is about to be committed, or 
(ii) suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of 
Canada or the conduct of international affairs; 
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(d.1) made to another organization and is reasonable for the purposes of 
investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of 
Canada or a province that has been, is being or is about to be committed and 
it is reasonable to expect that disclosure with the knowledge or consent of 
the individual would compromise the investigation; 
(d.2) made to another organization and is reasonable for the purposes of 
detecting or suppressing fraud or of preventing fraud that is likely to be 
committed and it is reasonable to expect that the disclosure with the 
knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the ability to 
prevent, detect or suppress the fraud; 
(d.3) made on the initiative of the organization to a government institution, a 
part of a government institution or the individual’s next of kin or authorized 
representative and 
(i) the organization has reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has 
been, is or may be the victim of financial abuse, 
(ii) the disclosure is made solely for purposes related to preventing or 
investigating the abuse, and 
(iii) it is reasonable to expect that disclosure with the knowledge or consent 
of the individual would compromise the ability to prevent or investigate the 
abuse; 
(d.4) necessary to identify the individual who is injured, ill or deceased, 
made to a government institution, a part of a government institution or the 
individual’s next of kin or authorized representative and, if the individual is 
alive, the organization informs that individual in writing without delay of 
the disclosure; 
(e) made to a person who needs the information because of an emergency 
that threatens the life, health or security of an individual and, if the 
individual whom the information is about is alive, the organization informs 
that individual in writing without delay of the disclosure; 
(e.1) of information that is contained in a witness statement and the 
disclosure is necessary to assess, process or settle an insurance claim; 
(e.2) of information that was produced by the individual in the course of 
their employment, business or profession and the disclosure is consistent 
with the purposes for which the information was produced; 
(f) for statistical, or scholarly study or research, purposes that cannot be 
achieved without disclosing the information, it is impracticable to obtain 
consent and the organization informs the Commissioner of the disclosure 
before the information is disclosed; 
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(g) made to an institution whose functions include the conservation of 
records of historic or archival importance, and the disclosure is made for the 
purpose of such conservation; 
(h) made after the earlier of 
(i) one hundred years after the record containing the information was 
created, and 
(ii) twenty years after the death of the individual whom the information is 
about; 
(h.1) of information that is publicly available and is specified by the 
regulations; or 
(h.2) [Repealed, 2015, c. 32, s. 6] 
(i) required by law. 
Use without consent 
(4) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may use personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection (2). 
Disclosure without consent 
(5) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may disclose personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in paragraphs (3)(a) to (h.1).
1815
 
Section 7.3 of PIPEDA:
1816
  
Employment relationship 
7.3 In addition to the circumstances set out in section 7, for the purpose of 
clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, 
a federal work, undertaking or business may collect, use and disclose 
personal information without the consent of the individual if 
(a) the collection, use or disclosure is necessary to establish, manage or 
terminate an employment relationship between the federal work, 
undertaking or business and the individual; and 
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(b) the federal work, undertaking or business has informed the individual 
that the personal information will be or may be collected, used or disclosed 
for those purposes.
1817
 
Section 7.4 of PIPEDA:
1818
 
Use without consent 
7.4 (1) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may use personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2) or section 7.3. 
Disclosure without consent 
(2) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may disclose personal 
information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any 
of the circumstances set out in subsection 7.2(1) or (2) or section 7.3.
1819
 
Sections 10.1–10.3 of PIPEDA:
1820
  
Report to Commissioner 
10.1 (1) An organization shall report to the Commissioner any breach of 
security safeguards involving personal information under its control if it is 
reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk 
of significant harm to an individual. 
Report requirements 
(2) The report shall contain the prescribed information and shall be made in 
the prescribed form and manner as soon as feasible after the organization 
determines that the breach has occurred. 
Notification to individual 
(3) Unless otherwise prohibited by law, an organization shall notify an 
individual of any breach of security safeguards involving the individual’s 
personal information under the organization’s control if it is reasonable in 
the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant 
harm to the individual. 
Contents of notification 
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(4) The notification shall contain sufficient information to allow the 
individual to understand the significance to them of the breach and to take 
steps, if any are possible, to reduce the risk of harm that could result from it 
or to mitigate that harm. It shall also contain any other prescribed 
information. 
Form and manner 
(5) The notification shall be conspicuous and shall be given directly to the 
individual in the prescribed form and manner, except in prescribed 
circumstances, in which case it shall be given indirectly in the prescribed 
form and manner. 
Time to give notification 
(6) The notification shall be given as soon as feasible after the organization 
determines that the breach has occurred. 
Definition of significant harm 
(7) For the purpose of this section, significant harm includes bodily harm, 
humiliation, damage to reputation or relationships, loss of employment, 
business or professional opportunities, financial loss, identity theft, negative 
effects on the credit record and damage to or loss of property. 
Real risk of significant harm — factors 
(8) The factors that are relevant to determining whether a breach of security 
safeguards creates a real risk of significant harm to the individual include 
(a) the sensitivity of the personal information involved in the breach; 
(b) the probability that the personal information has been, is being or will be 
misused; and 
(c) any other prescribed factor.
1821
 
Section 27.1(1) of PIPEDA:
1822
 
Prohibition 
27.1 (1) No employer shall dismiss, suspend, demote, discipline, harass or 
otherwise disadvantage an employee, or deny an employee a benefit of 
employment, by reason that 
                                                 
1821
 Ibid. 
1822
 Ibid at s 27.1(1). 
395 
 
(a) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, 
has disclosed to the Commissioner that the employer or any other person 
has contravened or intends to contravene a provision of Division 1 or 1.1; 
(b) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, 
has refused or stated an intention of refusing to do anything that is a 
contravention of a provision of Division 1 or 1.1; 
(c) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, 
has done or stated an intention of doing anything that is required to be done 
in order that a provision of Division 1 or 1.1 not be contravened; or 
(d) the employer believes that the employee will do anything referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
1823
 
Section 28 of PIPEDA:
1824
 
Offence and punishment 
28 Every organization that knowingly contravenes subsection 8(8), section 
10.1 or subsection 10.3(1) or 27.1(1) or that obstructs the Commissioner or 
the Commissioner’s delegate in the investigation of a complaint or in 
conducting an audit is guilty of 
(a) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not 
exceeding $10,000; or 
(b) an indictable offence and liable to a fine not exceeding $100,000.
1825
 
Principle 3 under Clause 4.3 in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA:
1826
 
4.3 Principle 3 – Consent 
The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, 
use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate. 
Note: In certain circumstances personal information can be collected, used, 
or disclosed without the knowledge and consent of the individual. For 
example, legal, medical, or security reasons may make it impossible or 
impractical to seek consent. When information is being collected for the 
detection and prevention of fraud or for law enforcement, seeking the 
consent of the individual might defeat the purpose of collecting the 
information. Seeking consent may be impossible or inappropriate when the 
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individual is a minor, seriously ill, or mentally incapacitated. In addition, 
organizations that do not have a direct relationship with the individual may 
not always be able to seek consent. For example, seeking consent may be 
impractical for a charity or a direct-marketing firm that wishes to acquire a 
mailing list from another organization. In such cases, the organization 
providing the list would be expected to obtain consent before disclosing 
personal information. 
4.3.1 
Consent is required for the collection of personal information and the 
subsequent use or disclosure of this information. Typically, an organization 
will seek consent for the use or disclosure of the information at the time of 
collection. In certain circumstances, consent with respect to use or 
disclosure may be sought after the information has been collected but before 
use (for example, when an organization wants to use information for a 
purpose not previously identified). 
4.3.2 
The principle requires “knowledge and consent”. Organizations shall make 
a reasonable effort to ensure that the individual is advised of the purposes 
for which the information will be used. To make the consent meaningful, 
the purposes must be stated in such a manner that the individual can 
reasonably understand how the information will be used or disclosed. 
4.3.3 
An organization shall not, as a condition of the supply of a product or 
service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure 
of information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and 
legitimate purposes. 
4.3.4 
The form of the consent sought by the organization may vary, depending 
upon the circumstances and the type of information. In determining the form 
of consent to use, organizations shall take into account the sensitivity of the 
information. Although some information (for example, medical records and 
income records) is almost always considered to be sensitive, any 
information can be sensitive, depending on the context. For example, the 
names and addresses of subscribers to a newsmagazine would generally not 
be considered sensitive information. However, the names and addresses of 
subscribers to some special-interest magazines might be considered 
sensitive. 
4.3.5 
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In obtaining consent, the reasonable expectations of the individual are also 
relevant. For example, an individual buying a subscription to a magazine 
should reasonably expect that the organization, in addition to using the 
individual’s name and address for mailing and billing purposes, would also 
contact the person to solicit the renewal of the subscription. In this case, the 
organization can assume that the individual’s request constitutes consent for 
specific purposes. On the other hand, an individual would not reasonably 
expect that personal information given to a health-care professional would 
be given to a company selling health-care products, unless consent were 
obtained. Consent shall not be obtained through deception. 
4.3.6 
The way in which an organization seeks consent may vary, depending on 
the circumstances and the type of information collected. An organization 
should generally seek express consent when the information is likely to be 
considered sensitive. Implied consent would generally be appropriate when 
the information is less sensitive. Consent can also be given by an authorized 
representative (such as a legal guardian or a person having power of 
attorney). 
4.3.7 
Individuals can give consent in many ways. For example: 
(a) an application form may be used to seek consent, collect information, 
and inform the individual of the use that will be made of the information. 
By completing and signing the form, the individual is giving consent to the 
collection and the specified uses; 
(b) a checkoff box may be used to allow individuals to request that their 
names and addresses not be given to other organizations. Individuals who 
do not check the box are assumed to consent to the transfer of this 
information to third parties; 
(c) consent may be given orally when information is collected over the 
telephone; or 
(d) consent may be given at the time that individuals use a product or 
service. 
4.3.8 
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An individual may withdraw consent at any time, subject to legal or 
contractual restrictions and reasonable notice. The organization shall inform 
the individual of the implications of such withdrawal.
1827
 
Section 2−6 of the PIPEDA Breach Regulations:
1828
 
Report to Commissioner 
Report — content, form and manner 
2 (1) A report of a breach of security safeguards referred to in subsection 
10.1(2) of the Act must be in writing and must contain 
(a) a description of the circumstances of the breach and, if known, the cause; 
(b) the day on which, or the period during which, the breach occurred or, if 
neither is known, the approximate period; 
(c) a description of the personal information that is the subject of the breach 
to the extent that the information is known; 
(d) the number of individuals affected by the breach or, if unknown, the 
approximate number; 
(e) a description of the steps that the organization has taken to reduce the risk 
of harm to affected individuals that could result from the breach or to mitigate 
that harm; 
(f) a description of the steps that the organization has taken or intends to take 
to notify affected individuals of the breach in accordance with subsection 
10.1(3) of the Act; and 
(g) the name and contact information of a person who can answer, on behalf 
of the organization, the Commissioner’s questions about the breach. 
New information 
(2) An organization may submit to the Commissioner any new information 
referred to in subsection (1) that the organization becomes aware of after 
having made the report. 
Means of communication 
(3) The report may be sent to the Commissioner by any secure means of 
communication. 
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Notification to Affected Individual 
Contents of notification 
3 A notification provided by an organization, in accordance with subsection 
10.1(3) of the Act, to an affected individual with respect to a breach of 
security safeguards must contain 
(a) a description of the circumstances of the breach; 
(b) the day on which, or period during which, the breach occurred or, if 
neither is known, the approximate period; 
(c) a description of the personal information that is the subject of the breach 
to the extent that the information is known; 
(d) a description of the steps that the organization has taken to reduce the risk 
of harm that could result from the breach; 
(e) a description of the steps that affected individuals could take to reduce the 
risk of harm that could result from the breach or to mitigate that harm; and 
(f) contact information that the affected individual can use to obtain further 
information about the breach. 
Direct notification — form and manner 
4 For the purposes of subsection 10.1(5) of the Act, direct notification must 
be given to the affected individual in person, by telephone, mail, email or any 
other form of communication that a reasonable person would consider 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
Indirect notification — circumstances 
5 (1) For the purposes of subsection 10.1(5) of the Act, indirect notification 
must be given by an organization in any of the following circumstances: 
(a) direct notification would be likely to cause further harm to the affected 
individual; 
(b) direct notification would be likely to cause undue hardship for the 
organization; or 
(c) the organization does not have contact information for the affected 
individual. 
Indirect notification — form and manner 
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(2) For the purposes of subsection 10.1(5) of the Act, indirect notification 
must be given by public communication or similar measure that could 
reasonably be expected to reach the affected individuals. 
Record-keeping 
Record-keeping requirements 
6 (1) For the purposes of subsection 10.3(1) of the Act, an organization must 
maintain a record of every breach of security safeguards for 24 months after 
the day on which the organization determines that the breach has occurred. 
Compliance 
(2) The record referred to in subsection 10.3(1) of the Act must contain any 
information that enables the Commissioner to verify compliance with 
subsections 10.1(1) and (3) of the Act.
1829
 
In section 1 of the BC PIPA,
1830
 defines personal information and employee personal 
information: 
“employee personal information” means personal information about an 
individual that is collected, used or disclosed solely for the purposes 
reasonably required to establish, manage or terminate an employment 
relationship between the organization and that individual, but does not 
include personal information that is not about an individual’s employment; 
“personal information” means information about an identifiable individual 
and includes employee personal information but does not include 
(a) contact information, or 
(b) work product information.
1831
 
Section 7 of the BC PIPA
1832
 defines consent as: 
Provision of consent 
7(1) An individual has not given consent under this Act to an organization 
unless 
(a) the organization has provided the individual with the information 
required under section 10(1), and 
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(b) the individual’s consent is provided in accordance with this Act. 
(2) An organization must not, as a condition of supplying a product or 
service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use or disclosure 
of personal information beyond what is necessary to provide the product or 
service. 
(3) If an organization attempts to obtain consent for collecting, using or 
disclosing personal information by 
(a) providing false or misleading information respecting the collection, use 
or disclosure of the information, or 
(b) using deceptive or misleading practices 
any consent provided in those circumstances is not validly given.
1833
 
Section 8(3) of the BC PIPA:
1834
  
(3) An organization may collect, use or disclose personal information about 
an individual for specified purposes if 
(a) the organization provides the individual with a notice, in a form the 
individual can reasonably be considered to understand, that it intends to 
collect, use or disclose the individual's personal information for those 
purposes, 
(b) the organization gives the individual a reasonable opportunity to decline 
within a reasonable time to have his or her personal information collected, 
used or disclosed for those purposes, 
(c) the individual does not decline, within the time allowed under paragraph 
(b), the proposed collection, use or disclosure, and 
(d) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is reasonable 
having regard to the sensitivity of the personal information in the 
circumstances.
1835
 
Section 9(3) of the BC PIPA:
1836
 
(3) An organization must not prohibit an individual from withdrawing his or 
her consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information 
related to the individual.
1837
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Sections 13, 16, and 19 of the BC PIPA:
1838
 
Collection of employee personal information 
13 (1) Subject to subsection (2), an organization may collect employee 
personal information without the consent of the individual. 
(2) An organization may not collect employee personal information without 
the consent of the individual unless 
(a) section 12 allows the collection of the employee personal information 
without consent, or 
(b) the collection is reasonable for the purposes of establishing, managing or 
terminating an employment relationship between the organization and the 
individual. 
(3) An organization must notify an individual that it will be collecting 
employee personal information about the individual and the purposes for the 
collection before the organization collects the employee personal 
information without the consent of the individual. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to employee personal information if 
section 12 allows it to be collected without the consent of the individual. 
Use of employee personal information 
16   (1) Subject to subsection (2), an organization may use employee 
personal information without the consent of the individual. 
(2) An organization may not use employee personal information without the 
consent of the individual unless 
(a) section 15 allows the use of the employee personal information without 
consent, or 
(b) the use is reasonable for the purposes of establishing, managing or 
terminating an employment relationship between the organization and the 
individual. 
(3) An organization must notify an individual that it will be using employee 
personal information about the individual and the purposes for the use 
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before the organization uses the employee personal information without the 
consent of the individual. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to employee personal information if 
section 15 allows it to be used without the consent of the individual. 
Disclosure of employee personal information 
19   (1) Subject to subsection (2), an organization may disclose employee 
personal information without the consent of the individual. 
(2) An organization may not disclose employee personal information 
without the consent of the individual unless 
(a) section 18 allows the disclosure of the employee personal information 
without consent, or 
(b) the disclosure is reasonable for the purposes of establishing, managing 
or terminating an employment relationship between the organization and the 
individual. 
(3) An organization must notify an individual that it will be disclosing 
employee personal information about the individual and the purposes for the 
disclosure before the organization discloses employee personal information 
about the individual without the consent of the individual. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to employee personal information if 
section 18 allows it to be disclosed without the consent of the individual.
1839
 
Section 14 of the QC Act:
1840
 
Retention, use and non-communication of information 
14. Consent to the collection, communication or use of personal information 
must be manifest, free, and enlightened, and must be given for specific 
purposes. Such consent is valid only for the length of time needed to 
achieve the purposes for which it was requested. 
Consent given otherwise than in accordance with the first paragraph is 
without effect.
1841
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United States 
Section 980 of the California Labor Code:
1842
  
980. 
(a) As used in this chapter, “social media” means an electronic service or 
account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still 
photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, 
online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations. 
(b) An employer shall not require or request an employee or applicant for 
employment to do any of the following: 
(1) Disclose a username or password for the purpose of accessing personal 
social media. 
(2) Access personal social media in the presence of the employer. 
(3) Divulge any personal social media, except as provided in subdivision 
(c). 
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect an employer’s existing rights and 
obligations to request an employee to divulge personal social media 
reasonably believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegations of 
employee misconduct or employee violation of applicable laws and 
regulations, provided that the social media is used solely for purposes of 
that investigation or a related proceeding. 
(d) Nothing in this section precludes an employer from requiring or 
requesting an employee to disclose a username, password, or other method 
for the purpose of accessing an employer-issued electronic device. 
(e) An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten to discharge or 
discipline, or otherwise retaliate against an employee or applicant for not 
complying with a request or demand by the employer that violates this 
section. However, this section does not prohibit an employer from 
terminating or otherwise taking an adverse action against an employee or 
applicant if otherwise permitted by law.
1843
 
Section 1798.120(a) and (b)
1844
 of the California Consumer Privacy Act:  
1798.120. (a) A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a 
business that sells personal information about the consumer to third parties 
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not to sell the consumer’s personal information. This right may be referred to 
as the right to opt-out. 
(b) A business that sells consumers’ personal information to third parties shall 
provide notice to consumers, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1798.135, 
that this information may be sold and that consumers have the “right to opt-
out” of the sale of their personal information.
1845
 
Section 1798.125(a)(1) of the California Consumer Privacy Act:
1846
 
1798.125. (a) (1) A business shall not discriminate against a consumer 
because the consumer exercised any of the consumer’s rights under this 
title, including, but not limited to, by: 
(A) Denying goods or services to the consumer. 
(B) Charging different prices or rates for goods or services, including 
through the use of discounts or other benefits or imposing penalties. 
(C) Providing a different level or quality of goods or services to the 
consumer. 
(D) Suggesting that the consumer will receive a different price or rate for 
goods or services or a different level or quality of goods or services.
1847
 
Section 1798.145(a)(1) to (5) of the California Consumer Privacy Act:
1848
  
1798.145. (a) The obligations imposed on businesses by this title shall not 
restrict a business’s ability to: 
(1) Comply with federal, state, or local laws. 
(2) Comply with a civil, criminal, or regulatory inquiry, investigation, 
subpoena, or summons by federal, state, or local authorities. 
(3) Cooperate with law enforcement agencies concerning conduct or activity 
that the business, service provider, or third party reasonably and in good 
faith believes may violate federal, state, or local law. 
(4) Exercise or defend legal claims. 
(5) Collect, use, retain, sell, or disclose consumer information that is 
deidentified or in the aggregate consumer information.
1849
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Section 1798.81.5 (a) to (b) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records):
1850
  
1798.81.5. (a) (1) It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal 
information about California residents is protected. To that end, the purpose 
of this section is to encourage businesses that own, license, or maintain 
personal information about Californians to provide reasonable security for 
that information. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, the terms “own” and “license” include 
personal information that a business retains as part of the business’ internal 
customer account or for the purpose of using that information in 
transactions with the person to whom the information relates. The term 
“maintain” includes personal information that a business maintains but does 
not own or license. 
(b) A business that owns, licenses, or maintains personal information about 
a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to 
protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure.
1851
 
Section 1798.82 (a) to (g) of the California Civil Code (Customer Records):
1852
  
1798.82. (a) A person or business that conducts business in California, and 
that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, 
shall disclose a breach of the security of the system following discovery or 
notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of 
California (1) whose unencrypted personal information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person, or, 
(2) whose encrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person and the encryption key or 
security credential was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by 
an unauthorized person and the person or business that owns or licenses the 
encrypted information has a reasonable belief that the encryption key or 
security credential could render that personal information readable or 
usable. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible 
and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law 
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enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or any measures necessary to 
determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the 
data system. 
(b) A person or business that maintains computerized data that includes 
personal information that the person or business does not own shall notify 
the owner or licensee of the information of the breach of the security of the 
data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. 
(c) The notification required by this section may be delayed if a law 
enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal 
investigation. The notification required by this section shall be made 
promptly after the law enforcement agency determines that it will not 
compromise the investigation. 
(d) A person or business that is required to issue a security breach 
notification pursuant to this section shall meet all of the following 
requirements: 
(1) The security breach notification shall be written in plain language, shall 
be titled “Notice of Data Breach,” and shall present the information 
described in paragraph (2) under the following headings: “What Happened,” 
“What Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,” “What You Can 
Do,” and “For More Information.” Additional information may be provided 
as a supplement to the notice. 
(A) The format of the notice shall be designed to call attention to the nature 
and significance of the information it contains. 
(B) The title and headings in the notice shall be clearly and conspicuously 
displayed. 
(C) The text of the notice and any other notice provided pursuant to this 
section shall be no smaller than 10-point type. 
(D) For a written notice described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (j), use of 
the model security breach notification form prescribed below or use of the 
headings described in this paragraph with the information described in 
paragraph (2), written in plain language, shall be deemed to be in 
compliance with this subdivision. 
(E) For an electronic notice described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (j), 
use of the headings described in this paragraph with the information 
described in paragraph (2), written in plain language, shall be deemed to be 
in compliance with this subdivision. 
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(2) The security breach notification described in paragraph (1) shall include, 
at a minimum, the following information: 
(A) The name and contact information of the reporting person or business 
subject to this section. 
(B) A list of the types of personal information that were or are reasonably 
believed to have been the subject of a breach. 
(C) If the information is possible to determine at the time the notice is 
provided, then any of the following: (i) the date of the breach, (ii) the 
estimated date of the breach, or (iii) the date range within which the breach 
occurred. The notification shall also include the date of the notice. 
(D) Whether notification was delayed as a result of a law enforcement 
investigation, if that information is possible to determine at the time the 
notice is provided. 
(E) A general description of the breach incident, if that information is 
possible to determine at the time the notice is provided. 
(F) The toll-free telephone numbers and addresses of the major credit 
reporting agencies if the breach exposed a social security number or a 
driver’s license or California identification card number. 
(G) If the person or business providing the notification was the source of the 
breach, an offer to provide appropriate identity theft prevention and 
mitigation services, if any, shall be provided at no cost to the affected 
person for not less than 12 months along with all information necessary to 
take advantage of the offer to any person whose information was or may 
have been breached if the breach exposed or may have exposed personal 
information defined in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) of 
subdivision (h). 
(3) At the discretion of the person or business, the security breach 
notification may also include any of the following: 
(A) Information about what the person or business has done to protect 
individuals whose information has been breached. 
(B) Advice on steps that people whose information has been breached may 
take to protect themselves. 
(C) In breaches involving biometric data, instructions on how to notify other 
entities that used the same type of biometric data as an authenticator to no 
longer rely on data for authentication purposes. 
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(e) A covered entity under the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320d et seq.) will be deemed 
to have complied with the notice requirements in subdivision (d) if it has 
complied completely with Section 13402(f) of the federal Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (Public Law 
111-5). However, nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to exempt a 
covered entity from any other provision of this section. 
(f) A person or business that is required to issue a security breach 
notification pursuant to this section to more than 500 California residents as 
a result of a single breach of the security system shall electronically submit 
a single sample copy of that security breach notification, excluding any 
personally identifiable information, to the Attorney General. A single 
sample copy of a security breach notification shall not be deemed to be 
within subdivision (f) of Section 6254 of the Government Code. 
(g) For purposes of this section, “breach of the security of the system” 
means unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the 
security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by 
the person or business. Good faith acquisition of personal information by an 
employee or agent of the person or business for the purposes of the person 
or business is not a breach of the security of the system, provided that the 
personal information is not used or subject to further unauthorized 
disclosure.
1853
 
European Union  
Article 4(11) of the GDPR
1854
 defines consent: 
Definitions 
(11) “consent” of the data subject means any freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which 
he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.
1855
 
Article 6(1) of the GDPR:
1856
 
Lawfulness of processing 
1.   Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of 
the following applies: 
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(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her 
personal data for one or more specific purposes; 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data 
subject prior to entering into a contract; 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which 
the controller is subject; 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject or of another natural person; 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the 
data subject is a child. 
Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out 
by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.
1857
 
Article 7 of the GDPR:
1858
 
Conditions for consent 
1.   Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to 
demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her 
personal data. 
2.   If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written 
declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall 
be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other 
matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain 
language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement 
of this Regulation shall not be binding. 
3.   The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at 
any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of 
processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, 
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the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as 
to give consent. 
4.   When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be 
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the 
provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of 
personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.
1859
 
Articles 33 and 34 of the GDPR:
1860
  
Article 33 
Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority 
1.   In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue 
delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware 
of it, notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority competent 
in accordance with Article 55, unless the personal data breach is unlikely to 
result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Where the 
notification to the supervisory authority is not made within 72 hours, it shall 
be accompanied by reasons for the delay. 
2.   The processor shall notify the controller without undue delay after 
becoming aware of a personal data breach. 
3.   The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall at least: 
(a) describe the nature of the personal data breach including where possible, 
the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the 
categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned; 
(b) communicate the name and contact details of the data protection officer 
or other contact point where more information can be obtained; 
(c) describe the likely consequences of the personal data breach; 
(d) describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to 
address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures to 
mitigate its possible adverse effects. 
4.   Where, and in so far as, it is not possible to provide the information at 
the same time, the information may be provided in phases without undue 
further delay. 
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5.   The controller shall document any personal data breaches, comprising 
the facts relating to the personal data breach, its effects and the remedial 
action taken. That documentation shall enable the supervisory authority to 
verify compliance with this Article. 
Article 34 
Communication of a personal data breach to the data subject 
1.   When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall communicate the 
personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay. 
2.   The communication to the data subject referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall describe in clear and plain language the nature of the personal 
data breach and contain at least the information and measures referred to in 
points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 33(3). 
3.   The communication to the data subject referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
not be required if any of the following conditions are met: 
(a) the controller has implemented appropriate technical and organisational 
protection measures, and those measures were applied to the personal data 
affected by the personal data breach, in particular those that render the 
personal data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it, 
such as encryption; 
(b) the controller has taken subsequent measures which ensure that the high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1 is 
no longer likely to materialise; 
(c) it would involve disproportionate effort. In such a case, there shall 
instead be a public communication or similar measure whereby the data 
subjects are informed in an equally effective manner. 
4.   If the controller has not already communicated the personal data breach 
to the data subject, the supervisory authority, having considered the 
likelihood of the personal data breach resulting in a high risk, may require it 
to do so or may decide that any of the conditions referred to in paragraph 3 
are met.
1861
 
Article 88(1) and (2) of the GDPR:
1862
 
Processing in the context of employment 
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1.   Member States may, by law or by collective agreements, provide for 
more specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in 
respect of the processing of employees’ personal data in the employment 
context, in particular for the purposes of the recruitment, the performance of 
the contract of employment, including discharge of obligations laid down by 
law or by collective agreements, management, planning and organisation of 
work, equality and diversity in the workplace, health and safety at work, 
protection of employer’s or customer’s property and for the purposes of the 
exercise and enjoyment, on an individual or collective basis, of rights and 
benefits related to employment, and for the purpose of the termination of the 
employment relationship. 
2.   Those rules shall include suitable and specific measures to safeguard the 
data subject’s human dignity, legitimate interests and fundamental rights, 
with particular regard to the transparency of processing, the transfer of 
personal data within a group of undertakings, or a group of enterprises 
engaged in a joint economic activity and monitoring systems at the work 
place.
1863
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Appendix C: Privacy Provisions Analyzed in Chapter 4, 
Theme 3  
Canada 
Section 14 of PIPEDA:
1864
  
Hearing by Court 
Application 
14 (1) A complainant may, after receiving the Commissioner’s report or 
being notified under subsection 12.2(3) that the investigation of the 
complaint has been discontinued, apply to the Court for a hearing in respect 
of any matter in respect of which the complaint was made, or that is referred 
to in the Commissioner’s report, and that is referred to in clause 4.1.3, 4.2, 
4.3.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 or 4.8 of Schedule 1, in clause 4.3, 4.5 or 4.9 of that 
Schedule as modified or clarified by Division 1 or 1.1, in subsection 5(3) or 
8(6) or (7), in section 10 or in Division 1.1. 
Time for application 
(2) A complainant shall make an application within one year after the report 
or notification is sent or within any longer period that the Court may, either 
before or after the expiry of that year, allow. 
For greater certainty 
(3) For greater certainty, subsections (1) and (2) apply in the same manner 
to complaints referred to in subsection 11(2) as to complaints referred to in 
subsection 11(1).
1865
 
Section 15 of PIPEDA:
1866
  
Commissioner may apply or appear 
15 The Commissioner may, in respect of a complaint that the Commissioner 
did not initiate, 
(a) apply to the Court, within the time limited by section 14, for a hearing in 
respect of any matter described in that section, if the Commissioner has the 
consent of the complainant; 
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(b) appear before the Court on behalf of any complainant who has applied 
for a hearing under section 14; or 
(c) with leave of the Court, appear as a party to any hearing applied for 
under section 14.
1867
 
Section 16 of PIPEDA:
1868
  
Remedies 
16 The Court may, in addition to any other remedies it may give, 
(a) order an organization to correct its practices in order to comply with 
Divisions 1 and 1.1; 
(b) order an organization to publish a notice of any action taken or proposed 
to be taken to correct its practices, whether or not ordered to correct them 
under paragraph (a); and 
(c) award damages to the complainant, including damages for any 
humiliation that the complainant has suffered.
1869
 
Section 17 of PIPEDA:
1870
  
Summary hearings 
17 (1) An application made under section 14 or 15 shall be heard and 
determined without delay and in a summary way unless the Court considers 
it inappropriate to do so. 
Precautions 
(2) In any proceedings arising from an application made under section 14 or 
15, the Court shall take every reasonable precaution, including, when 
appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and conducting hearings in 
camera, to avoid the disclosure by the Court or any person of any 
information or other material that the organization would be authorized to 
refuse to disclose if it were requested under clause 4.9 of Schedule 1.
1871
 
Section 17.1 of PIPEDA:
1872
  
Compliance agreement 
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17.1 (1) If the Commissioner believes on reasonable grounds that an 
organization has committed, is about to commit or is likely to commit an act 
or omission that could constitute a contravention of a provision of Division 
1 or 1.1 or a failure to follow a recommendation set out in Schedule 1, the 
Commissioner may enter into a compliance agreement, aimed at ensuring 
compliance with this Part, with that organization. 
Terms 
(2) A compliance agreement may contain any terms that the Commissioner 
considers necessary to ensure compliance with this Part. 
Effect of compliance agreement — no application 
(3) When a compliance agreement is entered into, the Commissioner, in 
respect of any matter covered under the agreement, 
(a) shall not apply to the Court for a hearing under subsection 14(1) or 
paragraph 15(a); and 
(b) shall apply to the court for the suspension of any pending applications 
that were made by the Commissioner under those provisions. 
For greater certainty 
(4) For greater certainty, a compliance agreement does not preclude 
(a) an individual from applying for a hearing under section 14; or 
(b) the prosecution of an offence under the Act.
1873
 
Section 17.2(2) of PIPEDA:
1874
 
Agreement not complied with 
(2) If the Commissioner is of the opinion that an organization is not 
complying with the terms of a compliance agreement, the Commissioner 
shall notify the organization and may apply to the Court for 
(a) an order requiring the organization to comply with the terms of the 
agreement, in addition to any other remedies it may give; or 
(b) a hearing under subsection 14(1) or paragraph 15(a) or to reinstate 
proceedings that have been suspended as a result of an application made 
under paragraph 17.1(3)(b).
1875
 
                                                 
1873
 Ibid. 
1874
 Ibid at s 17.2(2)  
417 
 
Section 28 of PIPEDA:
1876
 
Offence and punishment 
28 Every organization that knowingly contravenes subsection 8(8), section 
10.1 or subsection 10.3(1) or 27.1(1) or that obstructs the Commissioner or 
the Commissioner’s delegate in the investigation of a complaint or in 
conducting an audit is guilty of 
(a) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not 
exceeding $10,000; or 
(b) an indictable offence and liable to a fine not exceeding $100,000.
1877
 
Section 52(1) to (4) of BC PIPA:
1878
 
Commissioner’s orders 
52 (1) On completing an inquiry under section 50, the commissioner must 
dispose of the issues by making an order under this section. 
(2) If the inquiry is into a decision of an organization to give or to refuse to 
give access to all or part of an individual’s personal information, the 
commissioner must, by order, do one of the following: 
(a) require the organization 
(i) to give the individual access to all or part of his or her personal 
information under the control of the organization, 
(ii) to disclose to the individual the ways in which the personal information 
has been used, 
(iii) to disclose to the individual names of the individuals and organizations 
to whom the personal information has been disclosed by the organization, or 
(iv) if the organization is a credit reporting agency, to disclose to the 
individual the names of the sources from which it received personal 
information about the individual, 
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if the commissioner determines that the organization is not authorized or 
required to refuse access by the individual to the personal information; 
(b) either confirm the decision of the organization or require the 
organization to reconsider its decision, if the commissioner determines that 
the organization is authorized to refuse the individual access to his or her 
personal information; 
(c) require the organization to refuse the individual access to all or part of 
his or her personal information, if the commissioner determines that the 
organization is required to refuse that access. 
(3) If the inquiry is into a matter not described in subsection (2), the 
commissioner may, by order, do one or more of the following: 
(a) confirm that a duty imposed under this Act has been performed or 
require that a duty imposed under this Act be performed; 
(b) confirm or reduce the extension of a time limit under section 31; 
(c) confirm, excuse or reduce a fee, or order a refund, in the appropriate 
circumstances; 
(d) confirm a decision not to correct personal information or specify how 
personal information is to be corrected; 
(e) require an organization to stop collecting, using or disclosing personal 
information in contravention of this Act, or confirm a decision of an 
organization to collect, use or disclose personal information; 
(f) require an organization to destroy personal information collected in 
contravention of this Act. 
(4) The commissioner may specify any terms or conditions in an order made 
under this section.
1879
 
Section 53 of BC PIPA:
1880
 
Duty to comply with orders 
53 (1) Not later than 30 days after being given a copy of an order of the 
commissioner, the organization concerned must comply with the order 
unless an application for judicial review of the order is brought before that 
period ends. 
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(2) If an application for judicial review is brought before the end of the 
period referred to in subsection (1), the order of the commissioner is stayed 
from the date the application is brought until a court orders otherwise.
1881
 
Section 56 of the BC PIPA:
1882
 
Offences and penalties 
56 (1) Subject to subsection (2), an organization or person commits an 
offence if the organization or person 
(a) uses deception or coercion to collect personal information in 
contravention of this Act, 
(b) disposes of personal information with an intent to evade a request for 
access to the personal information, 
(c) obstructs the commissioner or an authorized delegate of the 
commissioner in the performance of his or her duties or powers under this 
Act, 
(d) knowingly makes a false statement to the commissioner, or knowingly 
misleads or attempts to mislead the commissioner, in the course of the 
commissioner’s performance of his or her duties or powers under this Act, 
(e) contravenes section 54, or 
(f) fails to comply with an order made by the commissioner under this Act. 
(2) An organization or person that commits an offence under subsection (1) 
is liable, 
(a) if an individual, to a fine of not more than $10 000, and 
(b) if a person other than an individual, to a fine of not more than $100 000. 
(3) A person or organization is not liable to prosecution for an offence 
against this or any other Act because the person or organization complies 
with a requirement of the commissioner under this Act. 
(4) Section 5 of the Offence Act does not apply to this Act or the 
regulations.
1883
 
Section 57(1) of the BC PIPA:
1884
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Damages for breach of Act 
57 (1) If the commissioner has made an order under this Act against an 
organization and the order has become final as a result of there being no 
further right of appeal, an individual affected by the order has a cause of 
action against the organization for damages for actual harm that the 
individual has suffered as a result of the breach by the organization of 
obligations under this Act.
1885
 
Section 55 of the QC Act:
1886
 
55.  The Commission has all the powers necessary for the exercise of its 
jurisdiction; it may make any order it considers appropriate to protect the 
rights of the parties and rule on any issue of fact or law.
1887
 
The Commission may, in particular, order a person carrying on an enterprise 
to communicate or rectify personal information or refrain from doing so. 
Section 58 of the QC Act:
1888
 
58. A decision by the Commission becomes executory as a judgment of the 
Superior Court and has all the effects of such a judgment from the date of its 
homologation by the Superior Court. 
Homologation of the decision is obtained by the filing, by the Commission 
or one of the parties, of a true copy of the decision at the office of the clerk 
of the Superior Court of the district in which the domicile or the residence 
or business establishment of the person affected by the decision is 
situated.
1889
 
Sections 91 to 93 of the QC Act:
1890
  
91. Every person who collects, holds, communicates to third persons or uses 
personal information on other persons otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of Divisions II, III and IV of this Act is liable to a fine of $1,000 to 
$10,000 and, for a subsequent offence, to a fine of $10,000 to $20,000. 
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However, for a contravention of section 17, the fine is $5,000 to $50,000 and, 
for a subsequent offence, $10,000 to $100,000. 
92. Any personal information agent who contravenes any provision of section 
70, 70.1, 72, 78 or 79 of this Act is liable to a fine of $6,000 to $12,000 and, 
for a subsequent offence, to a fine of $10,000 to $20,000. 
92.1. Any person who hampers an inquiry or inspection by communicating 
false or inaccurate information or otherwise is guilty of an offence and is 
liable to a fine of $1,000 to $10,000 and, for a subsequent offence, to a fine of 
$2,000 to $20,000. 
93. Where an offence under this Act is committed by a legal person, the 
administrator, director or representative of the legal person who ordered or 
authorized the act or omission constituting the offence, or who consented 
thereto, is a party to the offence and is liable to the prescribed penalty.
1891
 
United States 
Section 1798.155 (b) of the California Consumer Privacy Act:
1892
 
1798.155. (b) A business shall be in violation of this title if it fails to cure 
any alleged violation within 30 days after being notified of alleged 
noncompliance. Any business, service provider, or other person that violates 
this title shall be subject to an injunction and liable for a civil penalty of not 
more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation or 
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) for each intentional violation, 
which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name 
of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General. The civil 
penalties provided for in this section shall be exclusively assessed and 
recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of 
California by the Attorney General.
1893
 
European Union  
Article 58 (1) and (2) of the GDPR:
1894
 
Powers 
1.   Each supervisory authority shall have all of the following investigative 
powers: 
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(a) to order the controller and the processor, and, where applicable, the 
controller's or the processor's representative to provide any information it 
requires for the performance of its tasks; 
(b) to carry out investigations in the form of data protection audits; 
(c) to carry out a review on certifications issued pursuant to Article 42(7); 
(d) to notify the controller or the processor of an alleged infringement of this 
Regulation; 
(e) to obtain, from the controller and the processor, access to all personal 
data and to all information necessary for the performance of its tasks; 
(f) to obtain access to any premises of the controller and the processor, 
including to any data processing equipment and means, in accordance with 
Union or Member State procedural law. 
2.   Each supervisory authority shall have all of the following corrective 
powers: 
(a) to issue warnings to a controller or processor that intended processing 
operations are likely to infringe provisions of this Regulation; 
(b) to issue reprimands to a controller or a processor where processing 
operations have infringed provisions of this Regulation; 
(c) to order the controller or the processor to comply with the data subject's 
requests to exercise his or her rights pursuant to this Regulation; 
(d) to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into 
compliance with the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate, in a 
specified manner and within a specified period; 
(e) to order the controller to communicate a personal data breach to the data 
subject; 
(f) to impose a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on 
processing; 
(g) to order the rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of 
processing pursuant to Articles 16, 17 and 18 and the notification of such 
actions to recipients to whom the personal data have been disclosed 
pursuant to Article 17(2) and Article 19; 
(h) to withdraw a certification or to order the certification body to withdraw 
a certification issued pursuant to Articles 42 and 43, or to order the 
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certification body not to issue certification if the requirements for the 
certification are not or are no longer met; 
(i) to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83, in addition to, or 
instead of measures referred to in this paragraph, depending on the 
circumstances of each individual case; 
(j) to order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to 
an international organisation.
1895
 
Article 83(1) to (6) of the GDPR:
1896
 
General conditions for imposing administrative fines 
1.   Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the imposition of 
administrative fines pursuant to this Article in respect of infringements of 
this Regulation referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 shall in each individual 
case be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
2.   Administrative fines shall, depending on the circumstances of each 
individual case, be imposed in addition to, or instead of, measures referred 
to in points (a) to (h) and (j) of Article 58(2). When deciding whether to 
impose an administrative fine and deciding on the amount of the 
administrative fine in each individual case due regard shall be given to the 
following: 
(a) the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking into account 
the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the 
number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them; 
(b) the intentional or negligent character of the infringement; 
(c) any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage 
suffered by data subjects; 
(d) the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor taking into 
account technical and organisational measures implemented by them 
pursuant to Articles 25 and 32; 
(e) any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor; 
(f) the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority, in order to 
remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the 
infringement; 
                                                 
1895
 Ibid. 
1896
 Ibid at art 83(1)−(6). 
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(g) the categories of personal data affected by the infringement; 
(h) the manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory 
authority, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, the controller or 
processor notified the infringement; 
(i) where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been ordered 
against the controller or processor concerned with regard to the same 
subject-matter, compliance with those measures; 
(j) adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or 
approved certification mechanisms pursuant to Article 42; and 
(k) any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the 
circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained, or losses 
avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement. 
3.   If a controller or processor intentionally or negligently, for the same or 
linked processing operations, infringes several provisions of this Regulation, 
the total amount of the administrative fine shall not exceed the amount 
specified for the gravest infringement. 
4.   Infringements of the following provisions shall, in accordance with 
paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 10 000 000 EUR, or in 
the case of an undertaking, up to 2 % of the total worldwide annual turnover 
of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: 
(a) the obligations of the controller and the processor pursuant to Articles 8, 
11, 25 to 39 and 42 and 43; 
(b) the obligations of the certification body pursuant to Articles 42 and 43; 
(c) the obligations of the monitoring body pursuant to Article 41(4). 
5.   Infringements of the following provisions shall, in accordance with 
paragraph 2, be subject to administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or in 
the case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover 
of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher: 
(a) the basic principles for processing, including conditions for consent, 
pursuant to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9; 
(b) the data subjects’ rights pursuant to Articles 12 to 22; 
(c) the transfers of personal data to a recipient in a third country or an 
international organisation pursuant to Articles 44 to 49; 
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(d) any obligations pursuant to Member State law adopted under Chapter 
IX; 
(e) non-compliance with an order or a temporary or definitive limitation on 
processing or the suspension of data flows by the supervisory authority 
pursuant to Article 58(2) or failure to provide access in violation of Article 
58(1). 
6.   Non-compliance with an order by the supervisory authority as referred 
to in Article 58(2) shall, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, be 
subject to administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or in the case of an 
undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the 
preceding financial year, whichever is higher.
1897
 
Article 84(1) of the GDPR:
1898
 
Penalties 
1.   Member States shall lay down the rules on other penalties applicable to 
infringements of this Regulation in particular for infringements which are 
not subject to administrative fines pursuant to Article 83, and shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Such penalties 
shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
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 Ibid at art 84(1). 
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